

THE
POLITICAL LIFE
OF
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
GEORGE CANNING,

FROM
HIS ACCEPTANCE OF THE SEALS OF THE FOREIGN
DEPARTMENT, IN SEPTEMBER, 1822,
TO
THE PERIOD OF HIS DEATH, IN AUGUST, 1827.

TOGETHER WITH
A SHORT REVIEW OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SUBSEQUENTLY TO THAT EVENT
BY
HIS PRIVATE SECRETARY,
AUGUSTUS GRANVILLE STAPLETON, Esq.

SECOND EDITION,
INCLUDING THE PART OMITTED IN THE FIRST.

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ERRATA IN VOL. II.

- Page** 59. line 14. for *adding*, read *including*.
75. line 16. dele *take*.
109. line 29. before *necessitated*, insert *having*.
122. line 11. for *supposed hypothesis*, read *hypothetical case above stated*.
149. line 18. for *whom*, read *who*.
173. line 5. after *cause*, read *it*.
326. lines 29. and 30. for *to have allowed*, read *to allow*.
348. line 6 for *should continue*, read *continued*.
356. line 7. for *should be*, read *to be*.
375. line 14. after *dared*, read *deny*.
377. line 17. for *up*, read *down*.
402. line 15. for *it*, read *the fact*.
484. line 6. dele *that*.
500. line 1 before *being*, insert *from*.
— line 8. for *Porte*, read *Port*.
508. line 10. for *after*, read *following*.

MR. CANNING'S

POLITICAL LIFE, FROM, &c.

CHAPTER VIII.

SPANISH AMERICA. — STATE OF THE COLONIES FROM THE BREAKING OUT OF THE INSURRECTION UP TO THE YEAR 1821:—COMMUNICATIONS WITH MR. RUSH. — CONFERENCE WITH THE PRINCE DE POLIGNAC. — SPANISH PROPOSAL FOR A CONGRESS. — DESPATCH TO SIR WILLIAM À COURT. — DEBATES IN PARLIAMENT. — RECOGNITION OF BUENOS AYRES. — RECOGNITION OF COLUMBIA AND MEXICO. — COMPLAINTS OF THE SPANISH MINISTERS, AND MR. CANNING'S ANSWER TO THEM. — DOMESTICK DIFFICULTIES. *

THE Recognition of Spanish American Independence, was, perhaps, the most important measure adopted by the British Cabinet during the time that Mr. Canning was responsible for the management of our external relations.

First, it was a measure essentially advantageous to British interests; being especially calculated to benefit our commerce. Next, it enabled this country to remain at peace, since it compensated us for the continued occupation of Spain by a French force, — a disparagement to which, otherwise, it would not have become us to submit. Lastly, it maintained the balance between conflicting principles; since it gave just so much of a triumph to popular rights and privileges, as was sufficient to soothe the irritation felt by their advocates at the victory, which absolute principles had obtained, by the overthrow of the Constitutions of Spain, Portugal, and Naples; and it dealt a death-blow to the Holy Alliance, by disabusing its members of the strange fancy, with which they were prepossessed, that “the differences between them
“and the British Ministers (where they did
“differ) were merely feints on the part of the
“latter to avoid a conflict with public opinion.”

With regard to the first: the extensive commercial transactions between Great Britain and the Spanish Colonies from 1818 to 1825, are a sufficient proof of the magnitude of the interests which were at stake. It could not, however, be expected, that a trade so considerable, with such countries, could be carried on without the merchants concerned in it meeting occasionally with some grievances of which they

had cause to complain. The authority of Spain was extinguished in almost all of the ports of the Spanish Main. If British merchants were aggrieved, there was no authority to which Great Britain could apply for redress : those possessing the legitimate power, being wholly unable to grant it, and those, possessing the *de facto* power, not being recognized as Governments, could not be called upon to remedy evils, for which, while unrecognized, they could not be held to be responsible. The recognition, therefore, of those *de facto* Governments, which had the means of protecting the trade carried on with their subjects, gave a security to that trade, which must necessarily have been highly advantageous to the individuals who were engaged in it ; since security is one of the first essentials of commerce.

With regard to the second : the occupation of Spain by France, being prolonged indefinitely, was undoubtedly a disparagement to this Country ; because it disturbed the balance of power, in a manner, which, if Spain had been the Spain of former days, would have been exactly similar to that which Great Britain had twice before exerted her whole force to prevent. If Mr. Canning, therefore, abstained from either making a "direct attack upon France," or "undertaking a war upon the soil of Spain," it was because he saw, not only that the "possession" of that Country might "be rendered harmless"

“ in rival hands — harmless as regarded us, and “ valueless to the possessors ; ” — but that compensation might be obtained by conferring a recognized political existence on the different countries of the Spanish Indies ; so that if France occupied Spain, it should not be “ Spain, “ *with* the Indies.”

With regard to the last : the demonstration of the fact, that, because the Spanish American Governments were the offspring of rebellion, and republican in their form, Great Britain would not be prevented from entering with those Governments into treaties of amity and commerce, provided that other circumstances prescribed the fitness of such a course, was an exact counterpoise to the conduct of the Holy Alliance, in refusing to continue diplomatick relations with the Constitutional Government of Spain, because that form of government was not the free gift of the Spanish Monarch.

Moreover, the Holy Alliance was virtually dissolved by the measure ; for, from that time forth, the intimate union between its members ceased to exist, and they no longer continued to act together upon the same principles. The preservation of the Quintuple Alliance, of which Great Britain was a constituent Member, was, indeed, incompatible with the maintenance of the Holy Alliance ; and the members of the latter had to choose between the dissolution of the one first mentioned,

by taking some signal means of marking their disapprobation of the conduct of England, or else of tacitly allowing the latter to sink into oblivion. For the course of keeping on perfect good terms with a Power, which openly set at defiance their principles, was wholly irreconcilable with a strict adherence to the principles which were thus defied.

The recognition, therefore, of the New States, was strictly holding the balance between conflicting principles ; and tended to calm the minds of the liberal portion of the European community, by convincing it, that if liberty had received a check in the Old World, she was more than indemnified in the New. It likewise established the fact, that the British Government was no longer in trammels ; and restored Great Britain to that independent position, by the maintenance of which She can alone exercise her just influence amongst the Nations which surround Her.

Further, the very boldness of the act taught those, whose corporate influence it destroyed, that to rouse the anger of England by any unprovoked aggression, would be an experiment too dangerous to try ; while it would be the certain loss of the benefit to be reaped from the friendship, which She still tendered to their acceptance.

It must not, however, be supposed, that these

results would have been produced, if Mr. Canning had not succeeded in making this great measure operate in the way which he intended. For (as will appear in the sequel) had it been prematurely perfected, or less discreetly managed, it might have produced effects, the very opposite of beneficial.

With these introductory remarks, we may now proceed to give a detailed account of the transactions relative to the Spanish American Colonies, from the time when Mr. Canning accepted office, to the period of the acknowledgement by this Country of their independence ; prefacing that account with a short explanation of the state in which he found affairs, connected with these Transatlantic Provinces.

When Napoleon Buonaparte, in 1808, attempted to place the Crown of Spain on the head of his brother, Joseph, there is no doubt, but that he looked to the possession of the Spanish Monarchy in all its parts, as well in America, as in Europe.

In the struggle, to which that attempt gave rise, Provincial Juntas were set up in the different provinces of Spain, each claiming the right to exercise the functions of sovereignty, and denouncing the authority of the others ; and when the accounts of the commencement of the contest, and the establishment of these Juntas,

reached the Colonies, they were accompanied with contradictory claims of Allegiance on the part of these self-constituted Governments.

The Spanish Americans, perplexed by such opposing pretensions, seemed to think that the best solution of the difficulty would be to follow the example of the Mother Country; and they accordingly established independent and separate Juntas of their own, to govern the country, so long as the authority of Ferdinand the VII. should be held in abeyance by Napoleon.

When, however, the provincial Juntas in Old Spain united themselves into one, which was denominated, "Central," the authority of this last created Junta was generally acknowledged throughout the Colonies. But the Colonists had then had a taste of the sweets of Independence; and moreover, during the few months that the Central Junta acted, as the undisputed legitimate Government of Spain, the European Spaniards were guilty of some harsh, and unwise conduct, which indisposed the minds of the indigenous American Spaniards, in a very considerable degree, to tolerate any longer the yoke of a distant Government. When, therefore, the intelligence of the overthrow of the Central Junta, and the establishment of a Regency, arrived, together with a Requisition to the Colonists to obey any, and whatever, Government might prevail in Spain, the two things united acted,

throughout the Colonies, as a signal for an explosion of feeling in the independent cause ; and insurrectionary movements everywhere took place against those of the constituted authorities, which were willing, for the sake of preserving the dominion of Spain, to acknowledge Her new form of Government.

When these proceedings, in their turn, came to the knowledge of the Regency, that Body, true to the policy, which each successive Government in Spain had invariably pursued towards these valuable dependencies, never hinted at conciliation, but breathed nothing but a vengeance, which it was impotent to execute. So likewise the Cortes, who succeeded the Regency in the Government, followed a similar course of policy, and made no efforts, by indulgences, to induce the return of the insurgents to their allegiance. The contest was consequently carried on with undiminished exertions by the Independents, and the cruelties, which were, to the disgrace of humanity, perpetrated on both sides, but of which the Royalist Commanders first set the example, exasperated to desperation the mutual animosities of the contending parties.

Nevertheless, when Ferdinand was restored to his throne, such was the feeling which still existed, of fear and respect for the Mother Country, that it was the general opinion of those most competent to form one, that, if, instead of

threatening punishments, he had promised pardon; and if, instead of determining to perpetuate grievances, he had consented to redress them; the greater part of the Colonies might still have been preserved to the Spanish Crown.

But when the permanent Government of Ferdinand, by following the example of the temporary Governments that had preceded it, extinguished the last hope of a change of system, the Colonists found that they had only to choose between certain degradation and ruin on the one hand, and the completion of their Independence on the other.

The conflict was therefore continued; and, until 1821, with various successes on both sides: in the course of that year the dominion of the Mother Country was almost wholly annihilated in Mexico, and in Colombia, the new Governments of which States formally proclaimed their Independence. In Buenos Ayres, and Chili, the power of Spain had previously been destroyed: in Peru alone a Royalist army was able to maintain a doubtful combat with the Patriot forces.

During these transactions, the mediation of Great Britain between Spain and her Colonies was frequently suggested, both by the British and Spanish Governments, as affording the best chance of bringing about an amicable arrangement.

In 1810, Spain solicited the interference of our King, singly, to effect a reconciliation: in 1812, it was offered to the Cortes by the British Government: in 1815, it was asked by Spain, and granted to Her: but on all these occasions Spain Herself contrived to defeat the objects for which the task of mediation was undertaken.

In 1818, at Aix-la-Chapelle, the interference of the Allies was solicited by Spain; but the project fell to the ground in consequence of Spain not declaring any distinct basis on which She would treat, as well as, owing to the improbability of any advantage being derived from an interference by so many different Powers, who would have found it difficult to have agreed amongst themselves, in what way that interference should be directed.

During the continuance of the War with Napoleon, it came to pass, with the connivance, and consent of Spain, that a most extensive traffick sprung up between this Country and Spanish America.

When that war was concluded, Spain, fearful lest this commerce should induce Great Britain to assist the Colonies against the Parent State, proposed to the British Government to bind itself by treaty to maintain a strict neutrality. To this proposition no objection was offered, and the treaty was signed. Moreover, in 1818, a

strong step was taken (strong, at least, in reference to our own internal legislation), in the enactment, at the suggestion of the Cabinet, by Parliament, of the Foreign Enlistment Bill for the avowed purpose of enforcing the observance of the treaty. “ But at the time this treaty was “ made, there was a distinct understanding with “ Spain, that our commercial intercourse with “ the Colonies, was not to be deemed a breach “ of its stipulations.”

Such was the position of affairs between Spain and Great Britain directly subsequent to the Congress of Vienna (in 1815); and if any reliance were to be placed on a sentiment of National gratitude, it would seem incredible, that Spain, after the obligations heaped upon her by this Country, in the war for her liberation, and independence, should not have been cautious to avoid giving just cause of offence to Great Britain, or, at least, to abstain from inflicting injury upon Her benefactress: and it might have been expected, that in any case in which such injury might have been unintentionally done to the interests of British subjects, by the Agents, whether civil or military, of the Spanish Government, the utmost promptitude would have been evinced by that Government to offer redress.

So far, however, was this from being a true picture of the conduct of the Spanish Govern-

ment, that before two years had elapsed from the restoration of Ferdinand to the throne, many instances occurred of vexation, fraud, and violence towards the persons of British subjects resident in Spain, and her Americas: and by the beginning of the year 1819 a long list of grievances of these various kinds had accumulated upon the hands of the British Ambassador at Madrid, and remained, in spite of urgent and repeated remonstrances, unredressed. And, as if these outrages were not sufficient, from 1819 to 1822, the Governments of the Spanish West Indian Islands that had not thrown off their Allegiance to Spain, appeared to vie with the Commanders of the few remaining maritime ports on the Spanish American Continent still occupied by Spanish forces, in carrying on against British Commerce a direct and undisguised hostility.

That Great Britain had fulfilled her engagements as strictly as was in her power, Spain did not, as indeed she could not, deny: but, nevertheless, British merchant vessels trading with Spanish America were captured by Spanish ships of war, carried into the ports of the Colonies still under Spanish allegiance, and there condemned as good prizes — for the crime of trading with the Insurgent Colonies.

Partly as a remedy for these grievances, an Act was passed, in 1822, giving the rights of

free States to the different divisions of Spanish America under the Navigation Act, by which we practically acknowledged the flag of those Colonies. And in July of the same year, Lord Londonderry declared to the Minister of the Spanish *Constitutional* Government in London, in commenting upon some plan of reconciliation between the Colonies and Spain which the Spanish Government proposed to try, that, “ while those measures were in progress, His Majesty would abstain, as far as possible, from any step which would prejudice His Majesty’s endeavours for the termination of His differences with the said Colonies ; but His Britannick Majesty would not act with the candour and explicit friendship which he owed to his Ally, the King of Spain, were he not, under present circumstances, to warn him of the rapid progress of events, and of the danger of delay : that His Catholick Majesty must be aware that so large a portion of the world could not, without fundamentally disturbing the intercourse of civilized society, long continue without some recognized and established relations : and that the State which, neither by its Councils, nor by its arms, could effectually assert its own rights over its dependencies, so as to force obedience, and thus make itself responsible for maintaining their relations with other Powers, must sooner or later

“ be prepared to see those relations establish themselves, from the over-ruling necessity of the case, under some other form.”

Nothing further occurred between Spain and Great Britain respecting the Colonies of the former, until Mr. Canning accepted the Seals of the Foreign Department, at which time other circumstances, of which the history has already been told, respecting the position of the European division of the Spanish Monarchy, considerably increased the complication of Spanish American affairs, and the difficulties of dealing with them in a way to effect their satisfactory solution.

It was then that Mr. Canning inclined to the opinion, since we had such specifick grounds of complaint against Spain for her violation of the tacit compact on her part, not to molest our commerce with her Americas—a compact entered into as an inducement to us to abstain from assisting them in conquering their Independence ; and urged as a reason for our forbearing to recognize it, that we ought to have taken our remedy into our own hands, and have ceased any longer to forbear. By conferring on the Colonies, so far as our recognition could do it, an Independent, instead of a Colonial character, we should have taken away all pretext for the enforcement of her absurd and absolute pretensions to interdict commercial intercourse with

those Countries, and have cut short all dispute as to Spain's Colonial jurisdiction.

Such a recognition, if it had opened new channels of trade, would have compensated the nation. (though not the individuals), for commercial grievance, with commercial benefit; and so far as the grievances arose from an unjust interruption, and penal visitation by Spain, of British intercourse with the Colonies, the redress would have been exactly fitted to the grievance. As to the Colonies, "the degree of recognition " was of course intended to have been proportioned to the degree of force and stability " which the several States might have respectively acquired, and to the absence of struggle " for ascendancy, on the part either of the " Mother Country, or of parties into which each " State might happen to be divided." The question of principle would have been decided by the recognition of any one State; and the decision of the principle would have decided the legality of the Commerce, or at least the right of Great Britain to protect it.

Connected with this question of the recognition of the Spanish Colonies, in its general character, though distinguished from it by some striking peculiarities, was that of the more recently assumed Independence of Brazil.

Our relations with that Country made the indefinite postponement of the recognition of its

Independence absolutely impossible, while certain considerations respecting the Slave Trade rendered the immediate adoption of that measure of the very last importance. "To have recognized Brazil as an Independent Government, leaving Buenos Ayres and Columbia unacknowledged, would have been, to say the least, invidious, and might have been fairly considered as unjust."

The state, therefore, of the question between Portugal and Her Colony served to strengthen Mr. Canning in his opinion as to the expediency of hastening the decision respecting the Colonies of Spain. But that immediate decision was prevented in consequence of the discussions being postponed, until the return from Verona of the Duke of Wellington, who was hostile to recognition.

Mr. Canning, therefore, turned his mind to other and more speedy means of reparation for the insults offered to our flag, and the injuries inflicted on our trade. He accordingly recommended that a local remedy should be applied to the local grievance; and that a squadron should be sent out to insist upon immediate satisfaction on the spot, and to make instant reprisals should any fresh outrages occur. This course was agreed upon; and the determination to adopt it was communicated to the Spanish Ministers, on whom it produced the best

effect, since it induced them at once to promise to render by themselves all the atonement in their power; a promise which, of course, changed the whole position of the question, and put an end, at once, to the project of recognition, as a measure of retaliation for the long continued denial of justice by Spain, both under her absolute and constitutional Governments.

But, besides this concession, which was alone sufficient, other circumstances combined to furnish additional reasons for delay: the first of which was, that "in the course of November (1822) the British Minister at Madrid had received an intimation that the Cortes meditated opening negotiations with the Colonies, on the basis of Colonial Independence (negotiations which were in fact subsequently opened and carried to a successful termination with Buenos Ayres);" and next, the result of the deliberations of the Congress at Verona made it the policy of the British Government not to increase the difficulties of Spain, but to help her (since she had entitled herself to assistance by having promised redress) out of the difficulties in which she was involved by the attack, threatened by France, on her Independence.

While the struggle which ensued, in consequence of that attack, lasted, and "while the whole force in the Country was absorbed by

“civil war (one of the parties in that war having called in a foreign army), it would have been,” as Mr. Canning afterwards said in Parliament, “most ungenerous, if Great Britain had taken advantage of such an untoward state of things, to have made an inroad into the Colonial possessions of her Ally.”

From the conclusion, therefore, of the Congress at Verona to the time when the success of the French Expedition, and the liberation of the Spanish King, were no longer doubtful, the whole question was allowed to remain at rest, with the exception of the announcement, in December 1822, to the Spanish Government, of the intention of Great Britain to send Consuls to the several provinces of Spanish America, to protect the British Trade in those Countries, and of the remarks contained in the paragraph of Mr. Canning’s despatch to Sir Charles Stuart, already quoted, of the 31st March, 1823, in which he said, that “with respect to the Spanish American Provinces which had thrown off their allegiance to the Crown of Spain, time and the course of events appeared substantially to have decided their separation from the Mother Country, although the formal recognition by His Majesty, of those Provinces, as Independent States, might be hastened or retarded by various external circumstances, as well as by the more or less satisfactory progress, in each

“ State, towards a regular and settled form of
 “ Government. Spain had been long apprized
 “ of the King’s opinions on this subject. Dis-
 “ claiming in the most solemn manner any in-
 “ tention of appropriating to himself the smallest
 “ portion of the late Spanish possessions in Ame-
 “ rica, His Majesty was satisfied that no attempt
 “ would be made by France to bring under her
 “ dominion any of those possessions, either by
 “ conquest, or cession from Spain.”

It was in this way that Mr. Canning intimated to the French Government, and to the world, that, if England abstained from opposing by hostilities the invasion of Spain by French troops, she would not allow of any foreign force being employed to re-subjugate the Spanish Colonies. To this despatch no answer was returned by the French Ministers. Their silence was received by the British Government as a tacit agreement on their part not to infringe upon the proposed conditions. But, at the same time, since they were bound neither by a written, nor verbal expression of their determination to abide by those conditions, it became the more necessary to watch with care and anxiety all their movements, and, if possible, to divine their intentions : and this especially, since M. de Villèle’s language had, in more than one instance, seemed to betray, that he cherished some lurking idea of

a direct interference in the affairs of Spanish America; and since M. de Châteaubriand had made, before the invasion took place, through M. de la Garde, a specifick offer of succour to the Spanish Government, while yet it retained its Constitutional form.

As that invasion drew near to a successful conclusion, symptoms began to appear of a design on the part of the French Government to seek indemnity for its expences by means of the Spanish American Provinces; and to paralyze the opposition of Great Britain to the execution of their designs, by the assembling of a Congress to deliberate on the affairs of those Countries. What would have been the result of such a Congress it was easy to foresee. The same principle, which, in spite of feelings of jealousy, had induced the Allies to countenance France in taking possession of Spain, would have influenced them to give their sanction to an enterprize, undertaken against insurgent Colonies; for the restoration of Ferdinand to absolute power, which was then nearly accomplished, was sure to have had the effect (as in point of fact it had) of completely altering the view which the Holy Alliance had previously taken of the contest between Spain, and her Americas.

. . It became, after that event, no longer in their eyes a question of Insurrectionary Colonists,

throwing off the yoke of an equally guilty revolutionary Government ; but of rebellious subjects, setting at defiance the authority of a legitimate, and absolute Monarch.

All the principles of legitimacy were involved in it ; and the acknowledgement of the rights of a people, not only to limit the authority, but to throw off entirely the rule of their Sovereign, was necessarily an event to be averted, if the Members of the Holy Alliance intended to adhere to the doctrines which they had hitherto professed.

But it was from the application of these very doctrines that Mr. Canning apprehended the greatest disasters ; and one of the most beneficial consequences which he anticipated would arise from the recognition of the Independence of the Colonies by Great Britain, was, the effect which it would have in convincing the professors of these doctrines that, in the then condition of the World, they were unfit to be the guide of practical policy. Moreover, this recognition was the measure to which, from the commencement, Mr. Canning had looked to serve as a counterpoise to the additional influence which France would acquire by obtaining military possession of the Spanish portion of the Peninsula ; and it therefore became the more necessary to take care that France should not be permitted to interpose in any way to prevent Great Britain

from thus obtaining eventual compensation. But the opportunity which had offered in the Autumn of 1822, for immediately securing to this Country the advantages to be derived from this measure, no longer presented itself in the Autumn of 1823, and the difficulties of taking *such a step were multiplied in a tenfold degree.* At the former period, such a measure would not, because it would have been directed against Constitutional Spain, have excited the anger of the Great Continental Powers. At the latter period, the recognition might not improbably have been followed by a declaration of War, on the part of those Powers, against Great Britain ; or, at any rate, a cessation of diplomattick intercourse between them : and this risk, while it opposed a real obstacle to the measure, made it it so much the harder for Mr. Canning to accomplish, by furnishing its influential opponents with a substantial argument against it.

Mr. Canning, however, was not to be deterred, even by serious obstacles, from pursuing the course which the best interests of his Country appeared to him to require. He felt that an open, straight forward declaration of his future intentions would be the best preparation for their fulfilment, inasmuch as the Powers who were opposed to them, would be much less likely to resent their realization, if they did not, as they probably would not, resent their announcement.

There was, however, little time to be lost in giving fair notice of our designs, since France and the Holy Alliance were on the point of being leagued against us. Mr. Canning, therefore, considered that the best chance of avoiding collision, was not to wait till that combination had been completed, but at once to speak out and prevent its formation. It was with this view, that, towards the latter end of August, 1823, Mr. Canning sounded Mr. Rush, the then Minister of the United States in this Country, as to whether, in his opinion, “the moment were not arrived, when the two Governments of Great Britain and the United States might not come to some understanding with each other, on the subject of the Spanish American Colonies; and whether, if they could arrive at such understanding, it would not be expedient for themselves, and beneficial for the world, that the principles of it should be clearly settled and plainly avowed.”

The English Government said Mr. Canning had nothing to disguise on the subject.

“1. It conceived the recovery of the Colonies by Spain to be hopeless.

“2. It conceived the question of the recognition of them to be one of time and circumstances.

“3. It was, however, by no means disposed to throw any impediment in the way of an

“ arrangement between them and the Mother
 “ Country by amicable negotiation.

“ 4. It aimed not at the possession of any
 “ portion of them for Great Britain.

“ 5. And, it could not see any part of them
 “ transferred to any other Power with indiffer-
 “ ence.

“ These were its opinions and feelings ; and if
 “ they were shared by the Government of the
 “ United States, why,” asked Mr. Canning,
 “ should they not be mutually confided to each
 “ other, and declared in the face of the world ?

“ Was Mr. Rush authorized to enter into any
 “ negotiation, and to sign any convention upon
 “ the subject ? or would he exchange Ministerial
 “ notes upon it ?

“ A proceeding of such a nature,” continued
 Mr. Canning, “ would be at once the most effec-
 “ tual and the least offensive mode of intimating
 “ the joint disapprobation of Great Britain and
 “ the United States, of any projects, which might
 “ be cherished by any European Power, of a
 “ forcible enterprize for reducing the Colonies to
 “ subjugation on the behalf, or in the name of
 “ Spain ; or the acquisition of any part of them
 “ to itself by cession or by conquest.”

This was the substance of the confidential
 communication made by Mr. Canning to Mr.
 Rush.

As that Gentleman's answer is written in the

same spirit of confidence, it will not be right (and fortunately it is not material) to state the nature of that answer, further than to say that, in every respect, it was highly creditable to its distinguished Author, who unfortunately was not furnished by his Government with instructions which would justify him in committing it, to an expression of its sentiments, which was to be formally recorded in writing.

“ Had Mr. Rush felt himself authorized to “ have entertained any formal proposition, and “ to have decided upon it without reference to “ his Government, an eminently beneficial practical result ” might have been produced by the correspondence : “ but as he had no specifick “ powers,” Mr. Canning found that “ in the delay which must intervene before he could procure them,” the progress of events might have rendered any such proceeding nugatory ; and the being engaged in a communication with the United States, in which a considerable time would have been consumed before it would have been possible to have arrived at a conclusive understanding with them, would have embarrassed any other mode of proclaiming our views, which circumstances might have rendered it expedient to adopt.

Mr. Canning, therefore, allowed the matter to drop ; but what was done in it was far from proving wholly useless, as will be seen hereafter.

This plan of publishing our sentiments having thus failed, it became advisable to have recourse to some other means of openly declaring them, for the purpose of thwarting the designs of France.

To this end, therefore, Mr. Canning thought, that, next to the acquirement of a coadjutor so powerful as the United States, the best thing would be to acquaint the French Government, by a direct communication, that it could not prosecute its designs on Spanish America, except at the expence of a war with this Country. He therefore determined to seek a conference with the French Ambassador; the substance of what passed at which was afterwards to be recorded in an official Memorandum.

Mr. Canning, therefore, informed the Prince de Polignac, that it was his wish to give a frank explanation to His Excellency of the views of the British Government respecting the question of Spanish America: and the Prince having announced in reply, that he was prepared to make a reciprocal communication on the part of the French Government, the conference was opened on the 9th of October, 1823, by Mr. Canning, who, having recapitulated, in substance, the five propositions which he stated to Mr. Rush, proceeded to say —

“ That the British Government absolutely dis-
 “ claimed any intention of forming any political

“ connexion with the Spanish Colonies, beyond
 “ that of amity, and commercial intercourse.

“ That in those respects, so far from seeking
 “ an exclusive preference for British subjects over
 “ those of Foreign States, England was prepared,
 “ and would be contented, to see the Mother
 “ Country (by virtue of an amicable arrange-
 “ ment) in possession of that preference ; and to
 “ be ranked, after Her, equally with others, on
 “ the footing of the most favoured Nation :

“ That completely convinced that the antient
 “ system of the Colonies could not be restored,
 “ the British Government could not enter into any
 “ stipulation binding Itself either to refuse, or to
 “ delay its recognition of their Independence :

“ That the British Government had no desire
 “ to precipitate that recognition, so long as there
 “ was any reasonable chance of an accommod-
 “ ation with the Mother Country, by which such
 “ a recognition might come first from Spain :

“ But that it could not wait indefinitely for
 “ that result ; that it could not consent to make
 “ its recognition of the New States *dependent*
 “ upon that of Spain ; and that it would consider
 “ any foreign interference, by force or by me-
 “ nace, in the dispute between Spain and the
 “ Colonies, as a motive for recognizing the latter
 “ without delay :

“ That the intended Mission of Consuls to the
 “ several Provinces of Spanish America, was no

“ new measure on the part of this Country; that
 “ it was one which had, on the contrary, been
 “ delayed, perhaps, too long, in consideration of
 “ the state of Spain, after having been announced
 “ to the Spanish Government in the month of
 “ December last, as settled; and even after a
 “ list had been furnished to that Government of
 “ the places, to which such appointments were
 “ intended to be made :

“ That such appointments were absolutely
 “ necessary for the protection of British Trade
 “ in those Countries :

“ That the old pretension of Spain, to inter-
 “ dict all trade with those Countries, was, in the
 “ opinion of the British Government, altogether
 “ obsolete; but that, even if attempted to be
 “ enforced against others, it was with regard to
 “ Great Britain clearly inapplicable :

“ That permission to trade with the Spanish
 “ Colonies had been conceded to Great Britain
 “ in the year 1810, when the mediation of Great
 “ Britain between Spain and her Colonies was
 “ asked by Spain, and granted by Great Britain :
 “ that this mediation, indeed, was not afterwards
 “ employed, because Spain changed her Counsel;
 “ but that it was not therefore practicable for
 “ Great Britain to withdraw Commercial Capital
 “ once embarked in Spanish America, and to
 “ desist from Commercial Intercourse once esta-
 “ blished :

“ That it had been ever since distinctly understood, that the Trade was open to British subjects, and that the American Coast Laws of Spain were, so far as regarded them at least, tacitly repealed :

“ That in virtue of this undertaking, redress had been demanded of Spain in 1822, for (among other grievances) seizures of vessels for alleged infringements of those Laws; which redress the Spanish Government bound itself by a Convention (now in course of execution) to afford :

“ That Great Britain, however, had no desire to set up any separate right to the enjoyment of this Trade; that she considered the force of circumstances, and the irreversible progress of events, to have already determined the question of the existence of that freedom for all the world; but that for herself, she claimed and would continue to use it; and should any attempt be made to dispute that claim, and to renew the obsolete interdiction, such attempt might be best cut short, by a speedy and unqualified recognition of the Independence of the Spanish American States.

“ That with these general opinions, and with these peculiar claims, England could not go into a joint deliberation upon the subject of Spanish America upon an equal footing with other powers, whose opinions were less

“ formed upon that question, and whose interests were less implicated in the decision of it :

“ That she thought it fair, therefore, to explain beforehand, to what degree her mind was made up, and her determination taken.”

The Prince de Polignac declared,

“ That his Government believed it to be utterly hopeless to reduce Spanish America to the state of its former relation to Spain ;

“ That France disclaimed, on her part, any intention or desire to avail Herself of the present state of the Colonies, or of the present situation of France towards Spain, to appropriate to Herself any part of the Spanish possessions in America, or to obtain for Herself any exclusive advantages ;

“ And, that like England, She would willingly see the Mother Country, in possession of superior Commercial advantages, by amicable arrangements ; and would be contented like Her, to rank after the Mother Country, among the most favoured Nations :

“ Lastly, that she abjured, in any case, any design of acting against the Colonies by force of Arms.”

The Prince de Polignac proceeded to say,

“ That as to what might be the best arrangement between Spain and her Colonies, the French Government could not give, nor ven-

“ ture to form, an opinion, until the King of
 “ Spain should be at liberty ;

“ That they would then be ready to enter
 “ upon it in concert with their Allies, and with
 “ Great Britain among the number.”

In observing upon what Mr. Canning had said, with respect to the peculiar situation of Great Britain, in reference to such a Conference, the Prince de Polignac declared,

“ That he saw no difficulty which should
 “ prevent England from taking part in the
 “ Conference, however she might now announce
 “ the difference, in the view which she took of
 “ the question from that taken by the Allies.

“ The refusal of England to co-operate in
 “ the work of reconciliation might afford reason
 “ to think, either that she did not really wish
 “ for that reconciliation, or that she had some
 “ ulterior object in contemplation ; two suppo-
 “ sitions equally injurious to the honour and
 “ good faith of the British Cabinet.”

The Prince de Polignac further declared, that
 “ he could not conceive what could be meant,
 “ under present circumstances, by a pure and
 “ simple acknowledgement of the Independence
 “ of the Spanish Colonies ; since those Countries
 “ being actually distracted by civil wars, there
 “ existed no Government in them which could
 “ afford any appearance of solidity ; and that
 “ the acknowledgement of American Indepen-

“ dence, so long as such a state of things continued, appeared to him to be nothing less than a real sanction of Anarchy.

The Prince de Polignac added,

“ That in the interest of humanity, and especially in that of the Spanish Colonies, it would be worthy of the European Governments to concert together the means of calming, in those distant and scarcely civilized regions, passions blinded by party spirit; and to endeavour to bring back to a principle of union in Government, whether Monarchical or Aristocratical, people among whom, absurd and dangerous theories were now keeping up agitation, and disunion.”

Mr. Canning, without entering into discussion upon these abstract principles, contented himself with saying,

“ That, however desirable the establishment of a Monarchical form of Government, in any of those Provinces, might be, on the one hand, or whatever might be the difficulties in the way of it, on the other hand, His Government could not take upon Itself to put it forward as a condition of their recognition.”

By the declarations of the Prince de Polignac in this important Conference, it is not unfair to conclude, if the projects of the French Cabinet were, as they were supposed to have been, to have indemnified France for the ex-

pences of the invasion of Spain by territorial acquisitions in Spanish America, that those projects were in a great degree laid aside, in consequence of the firm, and decided tone taken by Mr. Canning. But whether they were abandoned, or not, the conviction of the French Government, that "it was utterly hopeless to reduce Spanish America to the state of its former relations to Spain," being avowed; and "the design of acting in any case against the Colonies by force of Arms" being abjured, were of the utmost value in preparing the way for the ultimate measure of recognition, on which, in the event of their being gratified, Mr. Canning had resolved. For France by these admissions committed herself to the opinion, that, without regard to the right of the Colonies to be independent, they had acquired the power of being so,—a power which she "abjured" any design of attempting to subdue. The account of what passed at this Conference was communicated without delay to the Allied Courts, who received the communication, although evidently little pleased with the tenour of it, without any demonstrations of anger.

The greater part of the Consuls mentioned in the Conference took their departure for Spanish America, before the close of the year.

Independently of these Consuls, Commissioners both to Columbia and Mexico, were

sent out, who were specifically directed to report on the political situations of the countries to which they were despatched, in order that their Government might have certain, and accurate information of the actual condition of the newly constituted States.

It was about the time of the departure of these Consuls for America, that an official note was sent to Sir William à Court by the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Conde de Oñate, enclosing another note from that Minister to the Spanish diplomatic Agents at the Courts of Paris, St. Petersburg, and Vienna, inviting “the several
“Powers, the Allies of His Catholick Majesty, to
“establish a Conference at Paris; in order that
“their Plenipotentiaries, together with those of
“His Catholick Majesty, might aid Spain in ad-
“justing the Affairs of the Revolted Colonies.”

In this invitation Ferdinand promised “to
“consider of the alterations which events had
“produced in his American Provinces; in
“order to adopt the measures most proper for
“conciliating the rights and just interests of the
“Crown of Spain, and its Sovereignty, with
“those which circumstances might have occa-
“sioned with respect to other Nations.” But, as if for a set off to this moderate language, the Council of the Indies, nearly at the same time, published a decree, placing every thing in the Colonies upon the same footing that it was on,

previously to the Revolution in Spain in 1820; and for this inconsistency no other explanation was given, than that each Département of the Spanish Government was in the habit of acting independently for itself, and without consultation with the others !

The language respecting a Congress held by the Prince de Polignac in the Conference with Mr. Canning, and the circumstance of Paris being designated by the Spanish Minister as the place of its meeting, are sufficient indications of the influence which prevailed at Madrid, at the time that this proposition was made by the Spanish Cabinet. For although the French Ministers had but little reason to expect that England would consent to be a party to the Congress, they were yet apparently not without hopes of inducing the British Ministers in some way or other to connect themselves with it, if only by making a declaration of their own views, and intentions, without joining in any deliberations which might subsequently take place respecting either that declaration, or any similar declarations which France or the other Continental Powers might think proper to make upon the subject. By this means France might have had the authority of the Allies in support of any proceedings of her own, and the Congress would not have been so discountenanced by Great Britain, as to have rendered valueless

the assistance to be derived from such an Assembly.

To persuade Great Britain not to decline the Spanish Invitation, or to convince the other Powers of Europe that her refusal would be unjustifiable and ungenerous, a state paper, much laboured and highly finished, was composed, and circulated by M. de Châteaubriand. But this State Paper only produced from Mr. Canning a few marginal Notes ; pointing out the mistakes, and fallacies with which it abounded, and shewing that it contained nothing to lead him to alter his views upon the subject.

He, indeed, was one of those, who in 1820 had protested against the system of holding Congresses for the Government of the World. And the results of those which were subsequently held at Laybach, and Verona, were not of a description to change the opinions which he had previously formed of the nature of those Assemblages. Had he been in office three months before the meeting at Verona, no English Minister would probably have assisted at it.

“ For if,” said he, in speaking of those Congresses, “ such a war as England sustained for “ (with a slight intermission) a quarter of a “ century in behalf of all Europe, and by turns “ against all Europe in its own behalf, had not “ taught all Europe where they ought to look “ for protection against overgrown and over-

“ bearing power ; no part that she could take
 “ in a Congress upon an insurrection of Carbo-
 “ nari at Naples, or of Freemasons at Madrid,
 “ would acquire for Great Britain the confidence
 “ which such a war had failed to command.

“ If the occasion came, the world should see.
 “ But it was not by perpetually creating occa-
 “ sions ; it was not by incessant meddling with
 “ petty interests, and domestick squabbles in other
 “ Countries, that the influence of Great Britain
 “ was to be maintained. On the contrary, it
 “ was more likely to be frittered away by such
 “ restless exertion, and to be found exhausted,
 “ or disabled from acting, when real occasion
 “ should arise.

“ Besides, what was the influence which we
 “ had had in the Counsels of the Alliance ?

“ We protested at Laybach ; we remonstrated
 “ at Verona. Our protest was treated as waste
 “ paper : our remonstrances mingled with the
 “ air ;” and although our power shewed itself
 in disconcerting the plans of the Alliance at
 Verona, it was not owing to the influence of
 persuasion, but to the influence of fear.

“ Our influence,” therefore said Mr. Can-
 ning, “ if it be to be maintained abroad, must
 “ be secure in the sources of its own strength at
 “ home. The sources of that strength are in
 “ the sympathy between the people and the
 “ Government, in the union of the publick senti-

“ment with the Publick Counsels, and in the
 “reciprocal confidence and co-operation of the
 “House of Commons and the Crown.”

If Mr. Canning thus thought of the proceedings at Laybach and Verona, it was not to be expected that he would look more favourably upon a Congress proposed for the discussing of affairs, in which Great Britain had the deepest interest, and which were of little practical importance to Russia and Austria, who would without doubt have seized the opportunity to recommend their favourite theory of the indefeasableness of hereditary right; the application of which principle, in *this instance*, would have been no way detrimental to themselves.

To the determination, therefore, expressed in the Conference with the Prince de Polignac, he steadfastly adhered; and, fortunately, just at the moment when these discussions were being carried on, the message of the President of the United States to their Congress, arrived in Europe; in which document it was stated, that
 “any interference on the part of the Great
 “Powers of Europe for the purpose of oppressing
 “or controlling the destiny of the Spanish
 “American States, which had declared their
 “Independence, would be dangerous to the
 “peace and safety of the United States, and
 “would be considered as the manifestation of
 “an unfriendly disposition towards them.”

Although this language was not the consequence of any understanding with, or of any suggestion of, this Country ; it is impossible not to believe, but that the correspondence which passed between Mr. Canning and Mr. Rush, mainly encouraged, if it did not originate to the Government of the United States, the idea of taking so firm and decisive a tone. So evident, indeed, was it, that the language of this message was the consequence of that correspondence, that Sir James Mackintosh, who probably had no knowledge of any correspondence having taken place, suggested the notion in Parliament, that “ the message was influenced by our communications !” But whether it were so or not, when coupled with the refusal of Great Britain to take part in a Congress, it effectually put an end to the project of assembling one similar to those which had met at Vienna, Aix-la-Chapelle, Laybach, and Verona. Since, with the intentions of Great Britain, and the United States, thus unequivocally declared, such an Assembly would have been utterly unable to have given effect to its own resolutions, if at variance with those intentions ; and if in accordance with them, they would have only served the purpose of assisting Great Britain, — a purpose which those who promoted the plan had certainly no desire to further.

It was under these circumstances that Mr.

Canning framed his answer to the invitation, or rather to the communication of the fact that an invitation had been given to the Courts of Austria, France, and Russia, to meet in Congress on the affairs of Spanish America. In which answer, after having repelled the insinuation that the British Government had in their hearts approved the proceedings at Verona, and the invasion of Spain ; which insinuation, the Spanish Minister conveyed by intimating, that the late events in the Peninsula had “ paved the way for the “ desired co-operation ;” he proceeded to recapitulate the same sentiments which he had expressed to Prince Polignac in the Conference of the preceding October : and then went on to say, “ That as to any further step,” (beyond that of sending Consuls, which had already been adopted,) “ to be taken by His Majesty towards “ the acknowledgement of the *de facto* Govern- “ ments of America, the decision must (as has “ been already stated more than once, to Spain “ and other powers) depend upon various cir- “ cumstances, and among others, upon the “ reports which the British Government might “ receive of the actual state of affairs in the “ several Spanish American Provinces.

“ But that it appeared manifest to the British “ Government, that, if so large a portion of the “ Globe should remain much longer without any “ recognized political existence, or any definite

“ political connexion with the Established Go-
 “ vernments of Europe, the consequence of such
 “ a state of things must be, at once most em-
 “ barrassing to those Governments, and most
 “ injurious to the interests of all European
 “ Nations.

“ That for these reasons, and not from mere
 “ views of selfish policy, the British Government
 “ was decidedly of opinion, that the recognition
 “ of such of the new States as had established,
 “ *de facto*, their separate political existence, could
 “ not be much longer delayed.

“ That the British Government had no desire
 “ to anticipate Spain in the recognition. On
 “ the contrary, it was on every account their
 “ wish, that His Catholick Majesty should have
 “ the grace and the advantage of leading the
 “ way in that recognition amongst the Powers
 “ of Europe. But the Court of Madrid must be
 “ aware, that the discretion of His Majesty in
 “ this respect could not be indefinitely bound
 “ up by that of His Catholick Majesty; and
 “ that even before many months might elapse,
 “ the desire now sincerely felt by the British
 “ Government, to leave this precedence to Spain,
 “ might be overborne by considerations of a more
 “ extensive nature, — considerations regarding
 “ not only the essential interests of His Majesty’s
 “ subjects, but the relations of the Old World
 “ with the New.

“ Should Spain resolve to avail herself of the
 “ opportunity yet within her power, the British
 “ Government would, if the Court of Madrid
 “ desired it, willingly afford its countenance and
 “ aid to a negotiation commenced on that only
 “ basis which appears to them to be now practi-
 “ cable ; and would see without reluctance the
 “ conclusion, through a negotiation on that basis,
 “ of an agreement, by which the Mother Coun-
 “ try should be secured in the enjoyment of
 “ commercial advantages superior to those con-
 “ ceded to other Nations.

“ That for herself, Great Britain asked no ex-
 “ clusive privileges of trade ; no invidious pre-
 “ ference, but equal freedom of Commerce for
 “ all.

“ That if Spain should determine to persevere
 “ in other Counsels, it could not but be expected
 “ that Great Britain must take her own course
 “ upon this matter, when the time for taking it
 “ should arrive, of which Spain should have full
 “ and early intimation.

“ After thus declaring,” continued Mr. Can-
 “ ning, “ for the information of the Court of
 “ Madrid, the deliberate opinion of the British
 “ Government on the points on which Spain re-
 “ quired the advice of her Allies, it does not
 “ appear to the British Cabinet at all necessary
 “ to go into a Conference to declare that opinion
 “ anew, even if it were perfectly clear, from the

“ tenour of M. Ofalia’s instruction, that Great
 “ Britain was in fact included in the invitation
 “ to the Conference at Paris.

“ Every one of the Powers so invited has been
 “ constantly and unreservedly apprized, not only
 “ of each step which the British Government
 “ has taken, but of every opinion which it has
 “ formed on this subject :—

“ If those Powers should severally come to
 “ the same conclusion with Great Britain, the
 “ concurrent expression of their several opinions
 “ cannot have less weight in the judgement of
 “ Spain, and must naturally be more acceptable
 “ to her feelings, than if such concurrence, being
 “ the result of a Conference of five Powers,
 “ should carry the appearance of a concerted
 “ dictation.

“ If (unhappily as we think) the Allies, or
 “ any of them, should come to a *different* con-
 “ clusion, we shall at least have avoided the in-
 “ convenience of a discussion by which our opi-
 “ nion could not have been changed ; we shall
 “ have avoided a delay, which the state of the
 “ question may hardly allow.”

This despatch, which, two days after it was sent, was read, February 1, 1824, to the Foreign Ambassadors and Ministers in London, goes beyond what was stated by Mr. Canning in his conference with the French Ambassador.

In that conference the immediate recognition

of Spanish American Independence was only threatened in certain specified contingencies : in this document an opinion was expressed (without reference to those contingencies), that that recognition could not be much longer, *perhaps not many months*, delayed.

At this period the British Government had not made any public avowal of its views. Nor when Parliament met, February 3, 1824, was it thought advisable that the King's Speech should be so explicit on the subject as this despatch ; both because the giving to the world the substance of that document, would have been taking another step in advance, too soon after the one just taken in writing it, and because it contained advice to Spain, coupled with an offer of mediation between her and her Colonies, the disclosure of which would have been unseemly until the views of the Court of Madrid upon the subject had been ascertained.

Spanish America, however, was of too great importance to be passed over unnoticed ; it was, therefore, simply stated in the Speech, that
 “ With respect to the Provinces of America,
 “ which had declared their separation from Spain,
 “ His Majesty's conduct had been open and
 “ consistent, and his opinions had been at all
 “ times frankly avowed to Spain, and other
 “ Powers.

“ That Consuls had been appointed to reside at

“ the principal ports and places of those Pro-
 “ vinces ; ” and that, “ as to any further measures,
 “ His Majesty had reserved to himself an un-
 “ fettered discretion to be exercised as the cir-
 “ cumstances of those countries, and the interests
 “ of his own people might appear to His Majesty
 “ to require.”

To this part of the Speech, the chief objections which were made by the Opposition were, that it was not “ sufficiently liberal, frank, and explicit ; ” but, had the objectors known the exact position in which affairs were, at the time when this Speech was delivered, it is not to be supposed, that such an objection would have been urged. “ It would not have been just,” as Mr. Canning subsequently observed, “ that a pause should not “ have been granted to the Parent State, during “ which She might have the advantage of learn- “ ing the sentiments of the different Powers of “ Europe ; and it could not be doubted, but that “ by allowing this pause, by suffering this subject “ to be temperately discussed, by giving an op- “ portunity to Spain herself, perhaps to acknow- “ ledge the independence of those States, a “ greater boon was bestowed on the Colonies “ themselves than the immediate recognition of “ England would have bestowed.”

But the most important observations which were made on this part of the Speech fell from Mr. Brougham, — most important, at least, so far

as regards Mr. Canning ; since they now serve as a testimony (the stronger, as it can hardly be supposed that they were so intended by the individual who made them) of how great a share in the preservation of Spanish American Independence Mr. Canning had a right to claim.

“ The question with regard to South America,” said Mr. Brougham, “ was now he believed disposed of, or nearly so : for an event had recently happened, than which no event had ever dispersed greater joy, exultation, and gratitude, over all the Freemen of Europe ; that event, which was decisive on the subject, was the language held with respect to Spanish America in the Speech, or Message (of which the nature has already been described) of the President of the United States to the Congress.” But was not that language, which in Mr. Brougham’s opinion was “ decisive on the subject,” in a very great degree, if not wholly, the result of Mr. Canning’s overture to Mr. Rush ?

Mr. Brougham then proceeded to state, as an indisputable fact, that “ Ferdinand had been promised by the Emperor Alexander, that if the King of Spain would throw off the Constitutional fetters by which he was trammelled, he would assist him in recovering his Transatlantic Dominions.

“ In that case, however,” continued Mr. Brougham, “ assistance would not have been “ given openly, but in a covert, and underhand “ way to the efforts of the Spanish Government :” and having then described how this secret help would have been managed, he concluded this part of his subject, by expressing his belief, that “ If the declaration of the United States did not “ put an end to such attempts on the Indepen- “ dence of the Colonies ; if a vigorous resistance “ were not opposed to such machinations, *sooner “ or later, the liberties of those Colonies would “ fall a sacrifice to the intrigues of Spain and the “ Allied Powers.*”

It appears, therefore, up to so late a period as February 1824, in Mr. Brougham’s opinion (and nobody was more competent to form one), that the Spanish American States would “ sooner or later ” have lost their independence, if the Holy Alliance, under the name of Spain, had been allowed to exert its power against them.

But so long before as March 1823, the French Government had been distinctly given to understand by Mr. Canning “ that any attempt by “ France to bring under her dominion any part “ of the Spanish Colonies ” would call for the armed opposition of Great Britain ; and in October of the same year it was again intimated to France and the Allies “ that the junction of any “ Foreign Power with Spain, in an enterprize

“ against Her Colonies, would not be permitted
 “ by this Country.”

To this timely warning then, and determined language of Mr. Canning, coupled with the encouragement which he gave to the Government of the United States to follow his example ; it must be considered to have been owing, that no attempts were made, either by France, or the Holy Alliance, openly, or covertly, to conquer the Spanish Colonies — perhaps for Spain, but not improbably, ultimately for themselves. And, in proportion as these attempts, if made, would have been likely to have been successful, in the same proportion is Mr. Canning entitled to the merit, whatever the amount of it may be, for having been the Preserver of their new-born liberty.

Mr. Brougham must rate that merit highly, since it seems that he considered that “ sooner or later ” the success of these attempts was certain, if they were not resisted by other Powers.

Mr. Canning in replying to Mr. Brougham’s observations took occasion to state, that His Majesty “ had declined overtures for any joint “ consideration with His Allies on the affairs of “ Spanish America,” and that “ a proposition had “ been made by the Government of Spain to this “ Country, and that an answer had been re- “ turned to it. That answer,” said Mr. Canning, “ was then on the road to Madrid ; and after it

“ should be disposed of, the time would arrive
 “ when the Government would be enabled to
 “ speak with more explicitness on the subject.”

In the President's message, before mentioned, deserving of praise as it was in many respects, there was a passage, however, which by many was construed, not only as denying the right of Foreign Powers to interfere to recover the Spanish American Provinces, but likewise the right of the Mother Country to continue her exertions for their re-subjugation ; and since this document was much eulogized by Mr. Brougham, Mr. Canning thought it necessary to declare that he did not agree in the latter principle. In consequence of this observation, Mr. Hobhouse, on the following day, when the report of the Address was brought up, adverting to the state of Spain, then occupied by French troops, asked, whether the King of Spain would be allowed by this country to seek to recover His Transatlantick Colonies, whilst France held military possession of His Country ? Mr. Canning, in answer, contented himself with recapitulating his former opinions, that the Mother Country had the right to attempt to recover her Colonies, but that no Foreign Power had the right to make that attempt in her behalf ; leaving it to be determined by the special circumstances of the case, should Spain, so situated, make the effort, whether it were the *bonâ fide* effort of Spain Herself, or

whether it were in reality a French effort, and consequently the effort of a Foreign Power. On this part of the King's Speech nothing more was said in Parliament ; and, with the exception of notices of motions by Lord Lansdowne, and Sir James Mackintosh, without any time being fixed for their being brought forward, the subject of Spanish America was not stirred by the Opposition until after it was again introduced by the presentation to Parliament, of the Conference between Mr. Canning and the Prince de Polignac, and the despatch of the former, respecting the desire of the Spanish Government that a Congress should assemble to advise King Ferdinand, on the course, which it would best befit him to adopt, towards his insurgent Colonies.

Before, however, these papers were thus made publick, the British Government had taken care to ascertain, whether the Spanish Ministers were disposed either to profit by the advice contained in this despatch, or to accept the proffered mediation.

It was manifest, however, that they had no such disposition : they did not, at first, even return a written answer ; and their chief, if not their only, aim in the verbal discussion which took place, was to gain time, and to retard the decision of the British Government. To this end all their arguments were directed : and since Great Britain had declared, that Her im-

mediate recognition of the independence of the Colonies would be the consequence, either of any attempt on the part of Foreign Powers to restore them to the Mother Country, or of a renewal by Spain of the interdiction to trade with them; the Spanish Ministers did not hesitate to give a positive assurance with respect to the former, that other Powers had no intention to offer, or Spain to ask, for any armed interference: and with respect to the latter, the decree opening the commerce of Spanish America to all nations, which decree had been published by Ferdinand at the instigation of France, about a week before Mr. Canning's despatch arrived at Madrid, was cited as a proof that the Spanish Government had no thoughts of again trying to enforce the antient restrictions on the trade with the Colonies.

The Spanish Cabinet would therefore determine nothing on the Colonial Question until it had learnt what might be the receptions of this decree, both in England and the Colonies.

But although the assurances, and the decree, did away with the probability of either of the two cases occurring, which would have precipitated the recognition of the New States, that measure was one which rested for the justification of its ultimate adoption, on higher grounds than those of jealousy of neighbouring States, or of mere Commercial facility: it still

remained “ a question of time and circumstances, to be determined by the reports which should be received of the respective situations, externally, and internally, of the several Provinces of Spanish America; and by a consideration of the interests of Great Britain, viewed not only in their separate character, but in conjunction with the interests of other nations, both European and American.”

When, therefore, the account of the manner in which the communication of Mr. Canning's despatch had been received by the Spanish Ministers came to England, no delay was allowed to take place in presenting the papers already mentioned to Parliament; and Sir William à Court was directed to inform the Spanish Government, that the decree respecting the future Commerce of Spanish America was not calculated to alter the views of the British Government, since it would produce no practical change.

To this M. Ofalia had nothing to reply; and confined himself to denying the accuracy of the information possessed by the English Cabinet as to the state of the Colonies, and to declaring it to be such as would not entitle them to the boon of recognition.

As to the offer of mediation, a written answer was returned; which, however, was of so vague a description, that it was impossible to determine,

whether it was meant to be merely of an evasive description, or a positive rejection on the part of Spain of the good offices of Great Britain. The excuse for the vagueness was, that up to the very day (27th of March, 1824) on which the answer was delivered, no reply had been received from the Allied Courts to the invitation of Spain (dated 27th of December, 1823) to take part in a Congress.

In the beginning of May, the consent of the Allied Powers to the establishment of Conferences at Paris was intimated to the Spanish Ministers, and another answer to Sir William à Court was forthwith prepared by the Condé de Oflalia, the apparent object of which was to induce the British Cabinet to re-consider their determination not to take part in the Conferences; by detailing at great length the state of each separate Province in Spanish America, and representing the condition of all, and each of them, to be one of complete anarchy, and confusion.

If this description had been borne out by facts, it would indeed have been out of the question for England to have taken the step which she meditated; but it so happened that all the reports received in England of the condition of those countries, whether official or private, went to prove the erroneousness of the data from which the Spanish Government pro-

fessed to have drawn these conclusions. But the real object of Spain was to gain time, and that at foreign suggestion ; for “ whatever might be the “ shades of difference with which the question “ was viewed by the Allied Governments, they “ all combined in the strenuous wish to thwart “ the policy of Great Britain.”

But it was not, by such stratagems, that the chief director of that policy was to be thwarted in his straight forward course ; and shortly after the answer of the Condé de Oflalia arrived in England, Mr. Canning intimated to Spain, that “ His Majesty would; at his own time, take such “ steps as he might think proper in respect to “ the several States of Spanish America *without* “ *further reference to the Court of Madrid* : but “ at the same time without any feeling of alien- “ ation towards that Court, or of hostility towards “ the real interests of Spain.”

So opposite indeed from being hostile to those interests was the British Government, that when a conspiracy of foreigners to effect a change in the Government of Cuba, was discovered in England, every thing was done by Mr. Canning to defeat the designs of the conspirators, by giving timely notice of their intentions, both to the Spanish Authorities in that Island, and the Spanish Government at Madrid. Nor was it only in this instance that generosity towards Spain was shewn, and a desire to prevent the

diminution of the Spanish power, when the elements of that power were *bonâ fide* Spanish.

It will be remembered, that the mediation of Great Britain was offered to Spain provided the latter would consent to open a negotiation *on the basis of the independence of the Colonies*; not, however, that it was intended that the recognition of that independence by Spain should be absolute and uncompensated, and should precede all negotiation, but that recognition should be distinctly understood to be a point which Spain would be prepared to concede in the negotiation, provided that other terms should be agreed upon, in that negotiation which should be satisfactory to Spain. As an inducement, therefore, to the Spanish Government to consent on such terms to negotiate, as well as to secure to Spain what yet remained to Her of Her Colonial possessions, the British Government offered to enter into a formal engagement with Spain, to employ, when called upon, its Maritime Forces to defend Cuba for Spain, against any *external* aggression; with which, from different quarters, that magnificent appendage of the Spanish Monarchy was at that time threatened. True, however, to the principles of not forcibly meddling in the internal concerns of other States, it was distinctly explained, when this offer was made, that the engagement, if entered into, would not extend to interference for the suppression of internal dis-

sentions in Cuba. This offer was not accepted by Spain.

Notwithstanding that the British Government was committed, by the presentation to Parliament of the Papers which explained its past conduct, and future intentions, to pursue the course of policy therein laid down, it seemed good to the Opposition to endeavour to compel the Government forthwith to recognize the New States. For this purpose Lord Lansdowne made a motion to address the Throne. His Lordship ably treated the question in the only way in which it could have been fairly argued; by endeavouring to establish first the right to recognize, and next the expediency of immediately using it.

Lord Lansdowne's arguments, however, were not needed, to convince Mr. Canning that both right and expediency were in favour of the measure. The whole of the published arguments of the latter rested on the assumption, that the *de facto* independence of the Colonies, and the utter inability of Spain by Herself, to regain her dominion over them, gave this country the right to acknowledge that *de facto* independence; and the expressed determination very shortly to exercise the right, was in itself a proof that its exercise was considered to be expedient.

The only practical difference therefore between

Lord Lansdowne, and those Members of the Cabinet who approved of the language which Mr. Canning had held in his official communications with the French Ambassador and the Spanish Government, was, as to the time when the recognition should take place; the one thinking that it should be immediate, the other that there should yet be a short pause. The fact however was, that the Ministers having sent out agents to inquire into the real condition of the New States, thought it incumbent upon them, at least to wait for the reports of those agents; and without arguing the question whether it were wise or necessary to take that preliminary step, since Lord Lansdowne did not dispute its wisdom or necessity, it would seem that, having taken it, and having declared that the internal condition of the New States was to determine the time of their recognition, an immediate proceeding such as Lord Lansdowne recommended, would at once have stultified their own measure, and left them open to the charge of acting with haste, and inconsistency.

Lord Liverpool therefore, in reply to Lord Lansdowne, placed his opposition to the motion first on this ground; and next, that the papers on the table spoke so unequivocally the sentiments of his Majesty's Ministers, that they had entitled themselves to the confidence of Parliament, and to having the further management of

this important question left entirely to their own discretion.

The House coincided in opinion with Lord Liverpool, and an amendment, laudatory of the course pursued by the Government, was passed by a majority of nearly three to one.

In the House of Commons, ten days after this debate, *Sir James Mackintosh withdrew the notice* which he had given of a motion respecting this same subject, which was not again agitated until near the close of the Session; when Sir James took advantage of the opportunity which was afforded to him in presenting a petition of the London Merchants, to make a most elaborate, and luminous speech, embracing every topick in any way connected with the question.

The purposes of this history do not require that Sir James should be followed through all his observations, which were seldom at variance, and generally in complete unison with Mr. Canning's sentiments: but Sir James in his Speech, so handsomely bears testimony to the merits of the Documents, which had been communicated to Parliament, that that part is too valuable a tribute of praise to be passed over unnoticed.

“ I can only describe them,” said he, “ as containing a body of liberal maxims of policy, and just principles of publick law, expressed with a precision, a circumspection, and a dignity, which will always render them models

“ and masterpieces of diplomattick composition.”

“ From them *seems to me to flow every consequence respecting the future*, which I think most desirable.”

The whole, indeed, of Sir James’s argument was founded on the principles laid down in the papers; and went to urge, as Lord Lansdowne had done some three months before, the fitness of immediate recognition.

Mr. Canning made but a short reply, confining himself to pointing out the different steps which the Government had taken, and which were already before the Publick; adding the additional one, which had not before been disclosed, that the British Government “ having thought it not only politically expedient, but just and generous, to afford Spain the opportunity of taking precedence, by suspending any decision, until it should know in what way she would avail herself of that opportunity, had at last signified its intention of acting upon its own discretion, without further reference to Spain.” Mr. Canning then stated, that “ to every principle laid down in the papers he steadfastly adhered, but that he was still without official information of the actual state of the Colonies;” and the Government being without that information was sufficient explanation of the delay.

After a short debate, in which nothing of im-

portance occurred, the Petition was ordered to be printed. The subject was again slightly touched upon in both Houses by Lord Lansdowne and Sir James Mackintosh, before the prorogation of Parliament, which took place on the 25th of June. No mention was made of Spanish America in the Speech, and the Government were again freed from the embarrassment of any further discussions in Parliament.

Meanwhile, in conformity with the readiness to enter into a conference on the affairs of Spanish America, notified to the Court of Madrid, in answer to its invitation by the Continental Powers, Conferences were held at Paris, but only composed of the ordinary Representatives of those Powers resident in that capital. The object of those Conferences never clearly transpired, although the only practical result which could be traced to their deliberations was, the encouragement which they gave to Spain to turn a deaf ear, to the wise and prudent advice given to Her by the British Ministry.

The close of a Session of Parliament, by relieving the Ministers from the discharge of a laborious duty, is generally the signal for the Cabinet to take into its consideration the external condition of the Empire, which, during their necessary attendance in the two Houses, they have but little leisure to discuss. Accordingly, very shortly after Parliament was prorogued,

Mr. Canning called the attention of his Colleagues to the affairs of Spanish America.

Of the five great divisions into which that vast territory is distributed, Peru, Chili, Mexico, Columbia, and Buenos Ayres, the position, with respect to Great Britain, of the last two alone, was such, as to give rise to the question of an immediate advance towards a more direct diplomatic relation than what had before existed.

For, in Peru, a struggle still continued on behalf of the Mother Country.

Of Chili, the information in possession of the Government was very imperfect ; and of Mexico, the information as to the strength of the Government and tranquillity of the Country, as far as it went, was of an unsatisfactory nature.

Moreover, General Iturbide, the individual who had once possessed the Sovereignty of Mexico, had just quitted the shores of Europe to attempt the recovery of the Crown which he had lost.

With regard to Columbia, not a Spanish soldier had for some time existed throughout the whole Republick ; and the Government had acquired a degree of stability, which actually enabled it to send a powerful force, to assist the Peruvians against the Royal Armies.

But it was this very circumstance, which, although considered as a strong proof of strength by some, was considered by others as exposing

the newly established political Institutions of Columbia, to the hazard of ultimate destruction. Those, however, whose minds were little influenced by such apprehensions, were nevertheless contented to wait for further intelligence, especially as no such circumstance of disqualification appearing to attach to Buenos Ayres, (respecting which State the most favourable accounts had been received, as to the consolidation of its Government,) there was no pretence for delaying the immediate negotiation of a Treaty with that Republick.

It was therefore determined, on the 23d of July, 1824, by the Government to send full powers to Mr. Parish, the British Consul, to negotiate a Commercial Treaty with Buenos Ayres, which Treaty, when ratified by the King would amount to a diplomattick recognition of the State, with which it had been concluded.

Mr. Parish, however, was instructed to make use of the full powers entrusted to him, only in the contingency of the Government of Buenos Ayres, continuing, at the time of his receiving it, to afford the same reasonable prospect of being able to maintain its authority, which it presented, at the period when he sent off the despatches, on the reports contained in which, the decision of the British Government was founded.

It should be observed, that this determination to recognize without delay, the Independence of

Buenos Ayres, was taken on the ground of the Government established there, being sufficiently consolidated to afford a reasonable prospect of its being able to fulfil any engagements into which it might enter; and sufficiently firmly established to preserve its sway over the Provinces which then acknowledged its dominion.

It should also be remembered, that no steps were taken towards the other Spanish American States, because the stability of their Governments seemed more likely to be affected, either by internal, or external causes.

Mr. Canning, therefore, and those of his Colleagues who agreed with him, were at that time, (considering the then situation of affairs) content to wait for further advices from those countries. Before, however, the accounts were received, of the final success of the Columbian expedition in Peru, or of an entirely satisfactory nature from Mexico, but nevertheless, after the fate of Iturbide was decided by his execution, events nearer home occurred, which materially changed the question, as to the expediency of any further delay.

The period to which the occupation of the Peninsula, by French troops, was limited by Treaty, had expired; and that occupation was still continued, without any fresh stipulations being entered into by the two Countries, to define the time at which it was to cease.

Reports were also in circulation; that it was the intention of the French Cabinet to make an alteration in the mode of the occupation by concentrating their Army, till then spread over the whole face of the Country, and to hold possession of Cadiz, and of the Spanish Fortresses, North of the Ebro; a scheme, which if carried into execution would have so changed the character of the occupation that it would no longer have been, (as Mr. Canning had described it in Parliament) an occupation for the benefit of Spain, but would have become one for the purposes of France; while the diminution of the charge, which such an alteration would have brought about, would have taken away one main inducement to France for the withdrawal of her troops.

The British Cabinet, notwithstanding, were quite willing to admit that the gradual diminution of the French Force, would require additional security for that part of it, which was latest in the evacuation; and therefore there was no objection to the distribution of that remainder, *for a time*, in the Spanish Fortresses. But if such a state of things were to endure for more than a strictly limited time, or, if it were to be considered in any other light than as a stage, in the course and progress of evacuation, the effect of it would be to incorporate the Fortresses so retained, into the French Dominion, and as such

it could not but be viewed with great jealousy by England.

It was therefore determined * to direct Lord Granville, who was then British Ambassador at Paris, to seek without delay explanations from the French Ministers upon these points.

In answer to his enquiries, the French Ministers did not hesitate to confess that no fixed period was specified for the evacuation of Spain, and that it depended entirely upon the will and pleasure of either party; the French being bound to withdraw, whenever the King of Spain should require it; and the King of France being at liberty to recall the whole of his army, even against the wishes of the King of Spain. On the other hand, they still declared, that it was their anxious desire to bring back their army; and that they should watch with eagerness for the first moment when they could do so, consistently with a due regard to the tranquillity of France; but that that tranquillity so materially depended on the state of Spain, which was in a more distracted condition than ever, that they could not even, give an opinion as to the period, when they should be able to secure that desirable object.

In short, though many good reasons were urged, why it was essentially necessary to pro-

* December 3d, 1824.

long, at that moment, the stay of the French Troops in Spain, yet, since the French Ministers could not be induced to assign any probable, much less to pledge themselves to any definite, period for their removal, a much more permanent character was given to the occupation than it had previously assumed.

For the British Government to have accepted, as satisfactory, such an explanation, would have been inconsistent with those principles of policy, which at the beginning of the last century had engaged this Country in a war to prevent the placing of a Bourbon on the throne of Spain ; with those principally which dictated the Sécet Article of the Treaty with Spain in 1814, stipulating against the renewal of any " Engagement " between Spain and France of the nature of " the Family Compact ;" and with those which induced Great Britain at the breaking out of the war between France and Spain to qualify her declarations of neutrality with the condition that " France should not attempt any thing like " a permanent occupation of Spain."

Still, however, it could not be denied that, the distracted state of Spain did furnish an urgent reason to France, for the continuance of her Army in that Country ; and this argument joined to the assurances of the French Ministers that they would seize the very first opportunity for withdrawing their Troops could not be put wholly

out of the account, in considering what would be the best course, under such circumstances, for Great Britain to follow.

Nevertheless for Her to have acquiesced quietly, in such a state of things, seemed to be impossible: for although with the assurances in question the occupation could hardly have been treated, as permanent, yet, if it were to be commensurate with the elements of discord in the Peninsula, the then existing generation would probably have to pass away, before the Spanish Fortresses, Ports, and Arsenals would be in other than French hands. •

While they were so, they gave to France a decided increase of political consideration, and preponderancy; which advantages might indeed be incidental, and involuntary, but were still, real; and although perhaps they were not the motives of the occupation, were not the less the consequences of it.

Since France, therefore, pursued an object which she deemed to be connected with Her interests and Her safety, at the known risk of a collision with the feelings of the British Nation, it became more than ever necessary, and advisable for the British Government, to go on straight forward in the steady pursuit of British Interests without deference for the feelings of France or of any other Power.

For it needs not to be told, that all the great

Powers of Europe entertained very strong objections to Great Britain's recognizing the Independence of the Spanish Colonies. Austria, Russia, and Prussia on the ground that such a measure was at variance with the principles of Divine Right, or Legitimacy; and France for two reasons: 1st, Because She knew the measure would more than counterbalance to England, the benefit derived by Herself from the occupation of Spain; 2d, Because she could not take a similar step without offending the Holy Alliance, and without acting ungenerously towards the Country of which she professed to retain military possession for the sole purpose of befriending it.

But it was not befitting British Statesmen to postpone the promotion of British Interests out of deference to the extravagant principles, or prejudices, of Governments, which had shewn that in their own concerns in Europe they were not disposed to sacrifice a tittle of their Views, and their Policy, to the views and policy of the British Government, when a difference of opinion arose between them: especially too when the principle, on which the Holy Alliance rested their opposition was everlasting, and would have been equally valid, at the end of half a century, as it was at the moment when it was put forth.

That in every point of view the recognition

was desirable for Great Britain, it is hardly necessary to argue. The interests which she had at stake in Spanish America were immense — not only the greater part of the external Commerce of those Countries, but even the internal operations of Mining, and Agriculture were being carried on in a great degree by British Enterprize and British Capital. In the intercourse to which such extensive dealings and connexion must have given rise, it was impossible but that numerous questions must constantly have been raised, on which Great Britain would have had a right to expect redress ; but such redress could only have been obtained by acknowledging the Authority from which it was demanded.

That Authority the United States of North America had for some months acknowledged ; and the delay of the boon which the New States of America were looking to receive from Great Britain, would have incurred the hazard of their giving such a decided preference to the people of the United States, over ourselves, as would have gone far to deprive us altogether of the navigation of the seas which surround these extensive territories.

That the essential interests therefore of this country were deeply involved in the fate of Spanish America was obvious to any one who the least reflected on political affairs : the conduct of France in Spain rendered it necessary, in or-

der to counteract any mistaken impression as to the motives of the forbearance of this country, that our Government should without hesitation pursue those interests — that it might be clearly understood that, if the British Government did not forthwith take any other notice of the explanations received from the French Government, than such as might be sufficient to preserve whole, and unimpaired, the unquestionable right of protesting against the continuance of the French occupation in Spain, whenever the circumstances of the time might render such a protest advisable ; it was, because at that moment, the British Cabinet deemed, that British interests would be more substantially promoted by taking care, that, if Old Spain were essentially French in her Foreign Policy, New Spain should not be brought within the same subjection.

For these reasons, therefore, it was determined to recognize forthwith the Independence of Columbia and Mexico ; and as the condition of the Government of those States was such as to justify, if not to invite, the negotiation of a Treaty, it was resolved, that the recognition should be effected by the establishment of relations between this Country, and those States, in the same manner, and to the same extent, as in the case of Buenos Ayres.

This important decision was taken on the 14th of December, 1824 ; and the remainder of

the month was employed by Mr. Canning in preparing the means for carrying it into execution. On the first day of the following year, when the Instructions and Full Powers, had actually left the Coasts of England, he communicated to all the Ambassadors, and Ministers of the Allied Courts, that measures for recognizing the Independence of the three most powerful of the new States of Spanish America, had been taken, past recall, by the British Government.

Not more than two days elapsed after these communications were made, before the fact became known to the English Publick. So that when a month after it was announced in the Speech from the Throne, that, “ In conformity
“ with the declarations that had been repeatedly
“ made by His Majesty, His Majesty had taken
“ measures for confirming by Treaties the com-
“ mercial relations already subsisting between
“ this Kingdom and those Countries of America,
“ which appeared to have established their
“ separation from Spain ;” the announcement, although a matter of deep interest, had ceased to be a matter of novelty.

The measure was hailed with great satisfaction by the Speakers in both Houses ; but so entirely was it approved by the Opposition in the House of Commons, and so much credit did it seem to reflect upon its Authors, that Mr. Brougham

endeavoured, not indeed to detract from those merits, but to apportion some share, and that a “large” share, of the glory which belonged to it, to some of his friends by whom he was surrounded, and specifically to Sir James Mackintosh. Still, however, the time that was chosen Mr. Brougham indirectly condemned, as having been too long deferred; and it would appear, from what fell from Mr. Canning in reply, that other Members of Mr. Brougham’s Party out of doors had found fault with the *mode* of doing it.

Mr. Brougham having claimed the merit to himself of some other Measures of the Government, Mr. Canning in answering this part of the Mr. Brougham’s Speech observed, “that as the “learned Gentleman was no unfrequent Speaker, “and was not very concise in his speeches, which “touched occasionally as he proceeded on “almost every subject within the range of his “imagination, as well as making some observations on the matter in hand; it was next to “impossible to innovate without appearing to “borrow from him.”

With respect to the time being wrong, Mr. Canning said “that he differed so essentially “from that opinion, that if he piqued himself “on any thing in the affair, it was *the time*. “That at some time or other States which had “separated themselves from the Mother Coun-

“ try should be admitted to the rank of inde-
 “ pendent nations, was a proposition from which
 “ nobody could dissent. The whole question
 “ was one of time and mode ;” and, as to the
 time, he maintained, that “ at no earlier period
 “ could *the measures then in progress*, with re-
 “ spect to the three States of Buenos Ayres,
 “ Columbia, and Mexico, have been adopted.
 “ Any other period or mode,” (viz. negotiating
 Treaties) “ than the one chosen would have been
 “ liable to some objection. For with regard to
 “ Buenos Ayres, it was true, that, for many years
 “ its soil had been free ; but up to a very recent
 “ period the vast extent of Territory generally
 “ called Buenos Ayres, consisted of thirteen or
 “ fourteen States unconnected by any federal
 “ tie ; and therefore Great Britain could not
 “ have entered into a treaty with a Government
 “ which could not say what were its constituent
 “ parts. As to Columbia—She had chosen to risk
 “ her existence by sending her whole armed
 “ force, to carry on a distant war,” in which had
 she been defeated, “ the war and the Spaniards
 “ might have been brought back into the heart
 “ of the Country. So soon as it appeared that
 “ that danger was *sufficiently* removed, Columbia
 “ became ripe for recognition, and the British
 “ Government acted upon that opinion.

“ As to Mexico, it was not till the failure of
 “ Iturbide’s expedition that the State had an

“ opportunity of organizing a Government on a
 “ solid basis ; and then it was that the decision
 “ was made by this Country, of recognizing her
 “ independence.”

As to the mode, which had been represented as “ mean and paltry,” Mr. Canning justified it by the precedent, of the Court of France towards the United States: but, in truth, any other mode might have given great offence to our European Allies.

Our commercial transactions with Spanish America were such as to render it essentially necessary for our interests that they should be placed on some secure, and definite footing. A Treaty afforded the only means : and the entering into a Treaty with a State, amounts to a recognition of its Independence.

Recognition, therefore, as the consequence of protecting interests already legally existing, was a very different thing from Recognition for the purpose of creating new ones.

The end which Mr. Canning had in view was
 “ to arrive at his object not only without war,
 “ but without giving just cause of war, to any
 “ other Power. War lay here, and there — on
 “ the right and on the left of our path — we
 “ attained our object by pursuing a middle
 “ course, without stirring the dangers which
 “ encompassed it.

“ It could not be concealed that we had hurt

“ many feelings, run against many interests,
 “ shocked many prejudices, and caused many
 “ regrets; but,” said Mr. Canning, “ it is my
 “ sanguine hope that we shall remain with our
 “ point gained, and the peace of the world un-
 “ disturbed.

“ Is the result then unsatisfactory because,
 “ from beginning to end, we have taken no step
 “ that we have not previously announced to
 “ every party interested, by immediate relations,
 “ by sympathy, or by honour? There is not in
 “ the archives of my office, a document con-
 “ nected with this negotiation, which Spain has
 “ not seen, or of which the Allies have not had
 “ cognizance. Spain was told, for many years,
 “ that if She would take take the precedence
 “ We would fall behind and follow at a humble
 “ distance. We offered to give her a superiority
 “ in the Markets of her late Colonies, but, at
 “ last, because we were forced to go alone, did
 “ We avail ourselves of our priority, to secure
 “ peculiar advantages? So far from selling
 “ our recognition, we demanded only to be
 “ placed where all who chose to follow us may
 “ be placed on the same footing. The Honour-
 “ able and Learned Gentleman approves the
 “ measure, but he disapproves the mode and
 “ time. The measure, for ought I care, may be
 “ his, or his friends, or the Country’s. What
 “ I claim to myself of merit, if any merit

“there be, is precisely what he fixes upon to
“blame.”

The observations of Mr. Canning's taking credit to himself for the *time* selected for the recognition of the Independence of Spanish America, may, perhaps, at first sight, appear to be inconsistent with the fact, before stated, that about two months after his acceptance of the Foreign Office, he inclined to the opinion that that Independence should then have been acknowledged by this Country. But it must be remembered, that in saying what he said, in this debate, as to time, he was not replying to the charge, of having left Spanish America unacknowledged, *before* the French Invasion of Spain, but of having been too tardy after the success of that Invasion had been ascertained. While Spain was constitutional, the Opposition did not urge the measure: it was only when the Despotism of Ferdinand was re-established, that they pressed the Government no longer to delay. With them, as with the Holy Alliance, the change in the Government of Spain made all the difference, by completely reversing their respective opinions. But Mr. Canning held that we could only deal with Spain, as Spain, regardless whether her Government were absolute, or constitutional. — Insults and injuries offered by Spanish Authorities to British Subjects, were to be avenged whatever might be the form

of Government under which those Authorities acted.

.Had the Independence of the Spanish Colonies been recognized, when aggression upon aggression remained unredressed, the measure would have been to be vindicated by other principles, than those by which, at the time when it was accomplished, it could only be defended.

In the first case, it would have been a blow, struck in retaliation for outrages which afforded ample ground even for the extremity of War,—the conclusion of a Treaty would not have been the “mode” of doing it; and “the degree” of recognition would, as Mr. Canning then argued, have been “proportioned to the degree of force “and stability, which the several States might have “respectively acquired.” It would therefore not have been essential for these States to have possessed either entire Independence, or firmly constituted Governments: the boon would have been granted to have assisted them in acquiring the one, and establishing the other. In the second case, it was a step, to be justified to Spain by the necessity of having, as soon as possible, some acknowledged Government, which could be held accountable for any grievances to which British Subjects might be exposed in their multifarious commercial dealings with the Transatlantic Countries; and it would have been deprived of the chief, if not the only grounds on which,

consistently with its being a pacifick measure, it could be explained, had it been taken before some authorities capable of bearing responsibility had been constituted in the New States. The blame, therefore, which was imputed to Mr. Canning was the neglect of opportunities after the restoration of Ferdinand. The merit which he claimed was the having lost none after that event, and the having so prepared the way, as to be able to seize the very first which occurred.

After the Debate on the Address the question of Spanish America was not again mentioned in Parliament.

Neither, with the exception of Spain, did much more pass upon the subject between this Country and Foreign Powers, whom (strange as it may appear after all that the British Government had publicly declared) the decision took by surprise: perhaps in consequence of their supposing that had the execution of the measure been really in the contemplation of the British Cabinet, it would have been more in conformity with the ordinary practice of diplomacy, to have brought it about in some secret, indirect way, in preference to the open, and straight forward manner in which it was avowed, and perfected by Mr. Canning.

When the communication did come that the New States were called by this Country into a new state of Existence, England was too powerful both at home and abroad, the charac-

ter of her Foreign Minister was too well known, the position in which his policy had placed her was too strong and commanding, for it to be prudent for them to seek to revenge, what it was no longer in their power to prevent.

As for France, when the news was first communicated to her Ministers, they chiefly deprecated it not on Her account, but on account of the effect which it might have upon the Holy Alliance, and the measures which might be taken in consequence of it. Indeed in their hearts, they probably would have been too glad to have followed our example, if the fact of their having agents in Spanish America, and their frequent intercourse with Spanish American Agents, in Europe, may be considered as any criterion of their opinions.

The Austrian, Russian, and Prussian Courts received the communication of our Ambassadors and Minister with deep regret: "Since," they said, "it gave a final blow to the interests of Spain in the New World, and tended to encourage the revolutionary spirit which it had been found so difficult to restrain in Europe."

They moreover gave directions to their several Representatives in London to read Mr. Canning a despatch by way of lecture; but not to furnish him with a Copy of the despatch so read. Mr. Canning declined to listen to such a communication, unless he were allowed to have

a Copy of what was read to him, because, said he, it was impossible for him to charge his memory with the expressions of a long Despatch once read over to him; or to be able to judge, on one such hearing, whether it did, or did not, contain expressions which ought not to be passed over without remark: but by the process of reading he would be responsible to the King and to his Colleagues, and ultimately perhaps to Parliament, for the contents of a Paper which might be of the most important character, and of which the text might be quoted afterwards, by third Parties, as having a meaning which he did not, on the instant, attribute to it; and yet which upon bare recollection it would not be possible for him to controvert. As a way out of this difficulty; the substance of the despatches were verbally communicated; and Mr. Canning having immediately made a memorandum of what was severally said, sent it to the respective communicators to be altered, added to, or curtailed, but, verified; and having thus got into his possession certified memoranda of what passed, if any boasts were made of the strong language of reprehension which the Holy Alliance addressed to the British Minister (as had been done before), he had his revenge, not by retorting, but by merely repeating exactly what was said, and shewing, “how little need there was to mind it, and to how little it amounted.” For

not one of the three talked of *consequences* : and Russia professedly wished to hear no more of the matter.

As for Spain, the Country most interested in the subject, it was not to be expected that any delicacy of form, or gentleness of expression, could reconcile Her Ministers, with the view which they took of Her Interests, to the substance of the communication : nevertheless, care was taken to assure them that Great Britain, in the resolution, which She had taken, was not actuated, in the slightest degree, by any feelings of unfriendliness towards their Country ; and that the British Government would much rather have been the channel of reconciliatory communication, and the instrument of amicable arrangement between Spain, and Her Colonies, if the determination of Spain had not rendered unavailing all the offers of mediation made to Her ; and if “ time and the course of events ” had not effectually precluded any useful renewal of them.

M. Zea de Bermudez, the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, expressed much surprise when the intelligence was announced to him, and gave utterance to complaints, and arguments which he subsequently embodied in an official note, in which he first denied the truth of facts reported to the British Government as to the condition of the several States of Spanish Ame-

rica ; next charged Great Britain with the violation of existing treaties : thirdly, accused her of attacking the imprescriptible rights of the Throne of Spain ; fourthly, asserted that the mediation of Great Britain had never been offered on a basis which Spain could accept, viz. “ that “ of the preservation of her rights of Sovereignty “ over her rebellious Colonies ;” and, lastly, made it matter of grave charge that the British Government acted in opposition to the principles of legitimacy.

It was impossible for Mr. Canning to have left unanswered so unjust an attack upon the conduct of His Government ; and he accordingly forthwith prepared a reply which he addressed to the Spanish Minister in England.

With respect to the discrepancy in the accounts transmitted to Spain, and those which had been received in England as to the actual state of the contest in Spanish America between the Patriots and the Royalists, Mr. Canning merely alluded to, without mentioning, the splendid victory of Bolivar obtained in the plains of Ayacucho, by which it was notorious that the fate of the dominion of the Mother Country, over its former Colonies was irrecoverably decided.

With regard to the charge of violating existing Treaties, Mr. Canning demonstrated that not only no Treaty had been broken, but that in the wish scrupulously to act up to the spirit of our Treaties

with Spain, we had actually gone beyond the obligations which they imposed.

With reference to the assertion that the offers of mediation made by England "were uniformly "founded on the single basis of the admission "by Spain of the Independence of the Spanish "Provinces;" Mr. Canning shewed not only that that assertion was contrary to the facts, but that "the first suggestion of that basis came in "fact from the Government of Spain itself; and "that it was not till after that suggestion, that "Great Britain expressed the opinion which she "entertained, as to the hopelessness of negotiating upon any other basis."

But the most important part of Mr. Canning's reply is that in which he refers to the alleged breach by Great Britain of International Law in treating with the Governments of States, which, having rebelled against the Government, whose authority they formerly acknowledged, had established their *de facto* Independence.

If, indeed, Spain had been able to establish this position, she would, in good truth, have succeeded in inculcating, past redemption, the conduct of this Country; for nothing could have been more disgraceful, or more at variance with all notions of honour and justice, than a reckless pursuit of our own interests, in defiance of the acknowledged laws, which regulate the intercourse of civilized nations.

“ But,” asked Mr. Canning, “ has it ever been
 “ admitted as an axiom, or ever been observed
 “ by any Nation or Government as a practical
 “ maxim, that no circumstances and no time
 “ should entitle a *de facto* Government to recog-
 “ nition? or should entitle the Powers who may
 “ have a deep interest in defining and establish-
 “ ing their relations with a *de facto* Government
 “ to do so ?

“ Such a proceeding on the part of third
 “ Powers does not indeed decide the question of
 “ right against the Mother Country.

“ The Netherlands had thrown off the Supre-
 “ macy of Spain long before the end of the
 “ Sixteenth Century ; but that Supremacy was
 “ not formally renounced by Spain till the
 “ Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Portugal de-
 “ clared, in 1640, her independence of the Spa-
 “ nish Monarch ; but it was not till 1688 that
 “ Spain, by Treaty, acknowledged that Inde-
 “ pendence.

“ During each of these intervals, the abstract
 “ rights of Spain may be said to have remained
 “ unextinguished ; but third Powers did not, in
 “ either of these instances, wait the slow con-
 “ viction of Spain before they thought themselves
 “ warranted to establish direct relations, and
 “ even to contract intimate alliances with the
 “ Republick of the United Netherlands, as well

“ as with the new Monarchy of the House of
 “ Braganza.

“ The separation of the Spanish Colonies
 “ from Spain had been neither our work, nor
 “ our wish. Events, in which the British
 “ Government had no participation, decided
 “ that separation, — a separation which we
 “ are still of opinion, might have been averted,
 “ if our Counsels had been listened to in time.
 “ But out of that Separation, grew a state of
 “ things, to which it was the duty of the
 “ British Government (in proportion as it be-
 “ came the plain and legitimate interest of the
 “ Nation, whose welfare was committed to its
 “ charge) to conform its measures as well as its
 “ language, not hastily and precipitately, but
 “ with due deliberation and circumspection.

“ To have continued to call that a possession
 “ of Spain in which all Spanish occupation and
 “ Power had been actually extinguished and
 “ effaced could have rendered no practical
 “ service to the Mother Country ; but it would
 “ have risked the peace of the World. For all
 “ political Communities are responsible to other
 “ political Communities for their conduct — that
 “ is, they are bound to perform the ordinary
 “ international duties, and to afford redress for
 “ any violation of the rights of others by their
 “ Citizens, or Subjects.

“ Now, either the Mother Country must have

“ continued responsible for acts, over which it
 “ could no longer exercise the shadow of a
 “ controul: or the inhabitants of those Coun-
 “ tries, whose independent political existence
 “ was, in fact, established, but to whom the
 “ acknowledgement of that independence was
 “ denied, must have been placed in a situation
 “ in which they were wholly irresponsible for
 “ all their actions, or were to be visited for such
 “ of those actions as might furnish ground of
 “ complaint to other Nations, with the punish-
 “ ment due to pirates and outlaws.

“ If the former of these alternatives — the
 “ total irresponsibility of unrecognized States —
 “ be too absurd to be maintained; and if the
 “ latter, the treatment of their inhabitants as
 “ pirates and outlaws, be too monstrous to be
 “ applied, for an indefinite length of time to a
 “ large portion of the habitable globe; no other
 “ choice remained for Great Britain, or for any
 “ Country having intercourse with the Spanish
 “ American Provinces, but to recognize in due
 “ time their political existence, as States, and
 “ thus to bring them within the pale of those
 “ rights and duties, which Civilized Nations are
 “ bound mutually to respect, and are entitled
 “ reciprocally to claim from each other.”

It will be observed that in this argument Mr.
 Canning appears to have thought that the mere
 statement of the proposition that “ the holding

“ the Mother Country responsible for actions
 “ over which it could not exercise the Shadow
 “ of a Controul,” was all that was necessary,
 to prove both its absurdity, and its injustice.

But it must not be forgotten, that on the consequences to be deduced from this proposition the justice of the measure of recognition in a great degree depends. If it would not have been unjust to have demanded redress and compensation from Spain, for injuries endured by British Subjects at Mexico, and Bogota — and if Spain had been willing and able to give such redress and compensation, then She might have justly considered the act of recognition as an act of unnecessary hostility ; but if She were neither willing, nor *able* to do so, it could only be on the plea, that those who inflicted the injuries were no longer, *de facto*, her subjects.

If She allowed they were not, then Great Britain only followed her example in acknowledging their Independence ; if She did not allow it, and still did not grant redress, then Great Britain would have been justified in seeking, by hostility, that redress which was denied to remonstrance. Recognition, therefore, was a measure of mercy to Spain, and of justice to ourselves. It at once freed Spain from all responsibility for actions, for which we could not have held her accountable, without being guilty of an unjust and ungenerous exercise of

our superior strength ; while it was in no way an interference with the internal concerns of the Spanish Empire, but was purely a matter of external arrangement.

But as if all this were not sufficient to establish the abstract right of a third Power to recognize as States, Colonies, which were, *de facto*, independent, M. Zea Bermudez seemed determined to render the justification of it in this particular instance still more complete by declaring “ that the King of Spain would *never* “ recognize the new States of Spanish America, “ and would *never* cease to employ the force of “ Arms against his rebellious Subjects in that “ part of the world.

“ Now this declaration plainly shewed that “ the complaint was not merely as to the mode, “ or the time of our advances towards the New “ States ; that the dispute between us and “ Spain was not merely as to the question of “ fact, whether the internal condition of any “ of these States was such as to justify the “ entering into definite relations with them : “ and that it was not merely a reasonable “ delay for the purpose of verifying contradictory reports, and of affording opportunity “ for friendly negotiation, that was required of “ us : but that no extent of forbearance would “ have satisfied Spain, and that defer our advances towards the New States as long as we

“ might, we should still have had to have made
 “ them without the consent of Spain ; for that
 “ Spain was determined against all compromise
 “ under any circumstances and at any time,
 “ and was resolved upon interminable War
 “ with the late Colonies in Spanish America.”

So much for the right ; — and now with regard to the complaint against Great Britain for acting in opposition to the principles of legitimacy, which complaint was first made by the Holy Alliance, and was re-echoed by M. Zea in his note. But could any thing be more absurd than reproaching the British Government for acting contrary to principles which no British Government since the Revolution had ever professed ? Or could any thing be more inconsistent on their parts than arguing for the inviolability of principles, which those who argued had not hesitated, to disregard, whenever the so doing happened to chime in with their convenience ?

Unfortunately for M. Zea (to strengthen his argument upon legitimacy), he selected “ the
 “ example of the French Revolution, and of the
 “ ultimate happy restoration of Louis XVIII.,
 “ in illustration of the principle of unextinguish-
 “ able right in a legitimate Sovereign, and of
 “ the respect to which that right is entitled from
 “ all Foreign Powers.”

But this example, so far from serving his purpose, exactly told in a contrary sense : “ since

“ every Power in Europe, and specifically Spain
 “ amongst the foremost, not only acknowledged
 “ the several successive Governments *de facto*, by
 “ which the House of Bourbon was first ex-
 “ pelled from the Throne of France, and after-
 “ wards kept for near a quarter of a century out
 “ of possession of it, but contracted intimate
 “ alliances with them all; and, above all, with
 “ that strongest of *de facto* Governments, the
 “ Government of Buonaparte; against whom
 “ not any principle of respect for the rights of
 “ legitimate Monarchy, but his own unconquer-
 “ able ambition, finally brought combined Eu-
 “ rope into the field.”

Neither could Great Britain deny having
 “ treated with the Powers of the French Re-
 “ volution, although, certainly, up to 1796, she
 “ abstained from treating with Revolutionary
 “ France, long after other Powers had set her
 “ the example. But the reason alleged in Par-
 “ liament, and in State Papers, for that absti-
 “ nence, was the unsettled state of the French
 “ Government. And it cannot be denied, that
 “ both in 1796 and 1797, Great Britain opened
 “ a negotiation for peace with the Dynasty of
 “ France,—a negotiation, the favourable conclu-
 “ sion of which would have implied a recog-
 “ nition of that form of Government; that, in
 “ 1801, she made Peace with the Consulate; and
 “ that if, in 1806, she did not conclude a Treaty

“ with Buonaparte, Emperor of France, the ne-
 “ gotiation was broken off merely on a question
 “ of terms ; and that if, from 1811 to 1814, she
 “ steadily refused to listen to any overtures from
 “ France, she did so declaredly and notoriously
 “ on account of Spain alone, whom Buonaparte
 “ pertinaciously refused to admit as a party to
 “ the negotiation.

“ Nay further, it cannot be denied that even
 “ in 1814, the year in which the Bourbon
 “ Dynasty was eventually restored, Peace would
 “ have been made by Great Britain, with Bu-
 “ naparte, if he had not been unreasonable in his
 “ demands ; and Spain cannot be ignorant that
 “ even after Buonaparte was set aside, there was
 “ question among the Allies of the possible
 “ expediency of placing some other than a
 “ Bourbon upon the Throne of France.

“ The appeal therefore to the conduct of the
 “ Powers of Europe, and even to that of Great
 “ Britain Herself, with respect to the French
 “ Revolution, did but recall abundant instances
 “ of the recognition of *de facto* Governments :—
 “ by Great Britain perhaps later, and more re-
 “ luctantly than by others, but by Great Britain
 “ Herself, however reluctant, after the example
 “ set to her by other Powers of Europe, and
 “ specifically by Spain.”

The note to M. Zea was concluded with the
 expression of a hope that Spain would not con-

tinue the discussion, or renew the subject, unless to accept the offer then repeated, of the good offices of His Britannick Majesty “ for the “ bringing about of any amicable arrangement “ which might yet be practicable between Spain “ and her late Colonies.”

In compliance with this wish Spain did not attempt to revert to the subject: nor indeed was it again touched upon by any other of the Continental Powers. But not only did this unanswerable State Paper put an end to all further cavillings at the conduct of this Country in this matter; but the bringing into notice the violations of the principles of legitimacy, of which the Continental Powers had been guilty, when it suited their convenience, and above all the fact of their having hesitated about restoring the Bourbons, after the overthrow of Napoleon, effectually silenced the clamour about the doctrines of Divine Right, and gave, as it were, the *coup de grace* to an Alliance, which had been formed for the sole purpose of enforcing the practice of those doctrines.

In due time, Treaties were negotiated, and ratified, with the States of Buenos Ayres, and Columbia. With Mexico, the Treaty which was at first concluded, was sent back unratified, in consequence of an article having been admitted contrary to the standing policy of the Country: conceding to Mexico, under certain qualifica-

tions, the principle of, "Free Ships, Free Goods." But another Treaty was subsequently concluded, omitting the objectionable article.

In all these Treaties Great Britain stipulated for no exclusive commercial privileges; contenting herself with being placed on the footing of the most favoured Nation, and with giving to the New States in their commercial intercourse with this Country, the same advantages which were claimed from them in their own. Neither were the interests of religion and humanity neglected, or forgotten. The unmolested exercise by every British Subject of his religion (no mean concession in Countries, where as yet, Bigotry prevails in a very considerable degree) has been secured by those Treaties, for ever; so far as an existing generation can bind the generations which succeed it. And the newly established Governments have pledged themselves to co-operate to the utmost of their power with His Britannick Majesty in His beneficent, and holy endeavours to effect throughout the World the entire abolition of the Slave Trade. f *

In the month of November the measure was completed in all its parts by the appointment by the King of Ministers Plenipotentiary, to the Republicks of Columbia and Buenos Ayres, the Ministers of those New States presenting their credentials to the King. They were received

in the most gracious manner by His Majesty, who thus put the seal of his approbation on this most important transaction, — a transaction on which the anxious attention of the world had long been fixed. The Sovereigns dreading its completion ; their subjects looking upon it as the test, whereby they should know whether Great Britain had, or had not, emancipated herself from the trammels of the Holy Alliance.

Some time elapsed before our diplomattick relations were placed on the same footing with Mexico ; some of the Members of whose Government congratulated themselves, prematurely, on having made better terms for their Country than Columbia had been able to obtain.

And here this chapter might close, were it not that it would not be fair to Mr. Canning to leave unnoticed the domestick difficulties with which he had to contend in accomplishing his task.

Without attempting to penetrate the secrets of the Cabinet, quite sufficient matter is left on record, to prove how hardly the victory was won.

In every step which was taken, from the first to last, he had to encounter a powerful opposition : some idea of the nature of which may be formed from the fact, that the mere declaration to Spain that the British Government would proceed in their course without further reference to Madrid, “ simple as it may appear,

was the result of long discussions ; and it is well known, before the final decision to recognize the Independence of the New States was taken, that Mr. Canning was twice on the point of resigning the seals of his office.

CHAP. IX.

FINANCIAL STATEMENTS IN 1824, 1825.—DEBATES IN PARLIAMENT ON IRISH AFFAIRS, IN THE COURSE OF 1824.—DEBATES IN PARLIAMENT, IN 1825, RESPECTING THE CATHOLICK ASSOCIATION, AND THE CATHOLICK QUESTION. — STATE OF THAT QUESTION AFTER THE PROROGATION. — ALIEN BILL. — COURT OF CHANCERY.

THE History of the internal Affairs of the United Kingdom, up to the close of the Session of 1823, has formed the subject-matter of a preceding chapter. From that period, to the end of the Session of 1825, with the exception of the debates in the two Houses of Parliament, there are few events; which either call for observation, or even require to be mentioned. An account has already been given of the discussions which took place in 1824 and 1825, touching Spain and Spanish America: and all that passed on the subject of the Slave Trade and Slavery, Turkey and Greece, and Foreign Commerce, will be reserved for subsequent chapters. There remain, only the debates upon Finance, Ireland, the Catholick Question, the Alien Bill, and the Court

of Chancery. From the time when Parliament was prorogued in July, 1823, to its meeting in the following year, the distress, which had generally prevailed, had nearly, if not entirely, disappeared. The King's Speech, at the opening of Parliament, congratulated the two Houses on the State of the Agricultural, Commercial, and Manufacturing Interests: and stated, that even in Ireland, there were "many indications of amendment." In the debate, on the Address, the truth of the description given by the Government of the state of the Country, was admitted by the Opposition; and although they did not spare their condemnation of our Foreign Policy, they did not think it advisable to bring their opinions to the test of a vote, by moving an Amendment to the Address. In the course of this debate, some observations were made by Mr. Brougham and Mr. Canning, respectively, on the Catholick Question, to which reference will hereafter be made.

At an early period of the Session, Mr. Robinson made his Financial statement; and since the Revenue had increased considerably in amount, he had the agreeable task of proposing, without diminishing the Sinking Fund, to give relief "to some important branches of the National Industry," by taking off a portion of the Taxes which pressed upon them. The articles on which it was proposed to lower the duties were, Rum, (to relieve the West India interests;) Coals

brought to London by inland navigation; Foreign Wool, from 6*d.* to 1*d.* per lb.; and Raw Silk, imported from the East Indies, from 4*s.* to 3*d.*, and that imported from China and Italy, from 5*s.* 6*d.* to 3*d.* These reductions were made professedly on the ground of relaxing our Commercial Restrictions: and since Agriculture had recovered from its depression, the opponents of such relaxations were for the most part amongst the supporters of the Government, while the greater part of the Opposition had long been its advocates; the reductions in question were therefore received by the House, not only without any expressions of discontent, but even with considerable applause.

Upon the whole, the statement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer gave a favourable impression of the financial policy of the Government; and although motions were subsequently made for the repeal of other Taxes, than those which had been selected, and, specifically, one by Mr. Hobhouse for the repeal of the Window Tax, they were all rejected by considerable majorities: and the Government carried all the measures of the year respecting finance without any difficulty. The year after (1825) the produce of the Revenue far exceeded in amount what had been calculated upon by the Chancellor of the Exchequer; and he was enabled again to propose a "still further reduction in the publick

“burthens,” to the amount of upwards of a million and a half.

The debates, distinct from the Catholick Question, respecting Ireland, in the Session of 1824, may be divided into two classes: those which were originated by Members of the Government, in bringing forward measures to meliorate the condition of that country; and those which were originated by the Opposition, either with the same view, or as furnishing means of attack upon the Government.

Those of the first class were, 1st, A Bill for the Amendment of the Irish Tythe Composition Act, which had been passed in 1823; 2d, A Bill to set at rest disputes, which had arisen, and which had been carried on with considerable animosity, between the Clergy of the Irish Establishment and the Roman Catholick Priests, respecting the rights of the Members of the latter Communion to be buried with the Ceremonies of their Religion, in Protestant Church-yards; and, 3dly, A Bill to compel the residence of the Irish Protestant Clergy on their benefices; and to make the rules which regulate it, the same, as those, which obtained in England. These three Bills seemed so well calculated to do good, that the last two passed, without any resistance, and the first with next to none. No other measures were proposed by the Government this Session, with respect to Ireland, with the exception of the ap-

pointment of a Commission to inquire into the state of Education.

Of the motions brought forward by the Opposition, the first, made by Mr. Grattan, was for a return of all persons holding offices in Ireland, to which said offices, Catholics were by law eligible; distinguishing those who professed the Roman Catholic Religion, from those who professed the Protestant: the purpose being to shew, that, even to those situations to which Catholics were admissible, they were, in a great degree, practically excluded. To this motion the Government objected; and Mr. Canning opposed it as "being directly contrary to the principle
 "on which the Catholic Question had been
 "promoted, and to the usual policy of Parliament. By the law of the land certain persons,
 "not Roman Catholics, could not be employed
 "in affairs of the State. What was the remedy?
 "An annual Indemnity Bill: but the House
 "never thought of instituting an inquiry to ascertain, who were benefitted by the indemnity.
 "The true policy of Parliament was not detection, but concealment. Not to make a distinction, but, as far as possible, to confound it,
 "and to unite all under one denomination. Far,
 "indeed, were the friends of concession from
 "wishing that any man should be required to
 "declare whether he were a Roman Catholic
 "or a Protestant, but this motion was intended
 to put this very question. To such a question"

(Mr. Canning said) “ that he would under no
 “ circumstances consent ; since though innocent,
 “ in the outset, it might hereafter be applied to
 “ purposes of the very worst description. For had
 “ a similar motion been carried a few years back ;
 “ it would have had the effect of subjecting to
 “ punishment many Roman Catholicks, who were
 “ then serving in the Army, by connivance.”

Mr. Canning also objected “ to the motion on
 “ another ground, viz. that so long as this King-
 “ dom was a Monarchy, and the Executive Go-
 “ vernment had the distribution of offices under
 “ the Crown, it was not discreet in the House
 “ to inquire into the exercise of patronage, unless
 “ crime or fault were imputed ;” and he believed,
 that, in “ the Irish Government, there was a
 “ strong disposition, to admit, all who were qua-
 “ lified, to a fair share of patronage of the State.”

The motion was rejected : the truth being well
 known, that one of the first principles by which
 the distinguished Individual * at the head of the
 Irish Government was guided, was, that of dis-
 tributing his patronage as far as the law allowed
 according to merit, without regard to religious
 distinctions.

The next motion, made by Captain Maberly,
 was for an Address to the Throne, to grant an
 advance of Capital, “ not exceeding one million,
 “ by way of loan to Trade, and Agriculture ; to

Marquess Wellesley.

“ be employed in the Irish Provinces of Munster “ and Connaught.” It was brought forward with such good feeling and temper, that it could not be considered in any other light than as intended for its avowed object, the amelioration of the condition of Ireland. The Government, and Mr. Canning, however, opposed it. The reasons which he assigned for so doing, have already been quoted, in explanation of his declining to propose a similar scheme for England, at the moment of his coming into office, when the Agricultural Interests of this Country were so much depressed. Captain Maberly’s motion was negatived : the numbers being for it, 33 ; against it, 85.

On the 6th of May, Mr. Hume renewed his attack on the Irish Church Establishment, somewhat mitigated in form, but not the less, in reality, levelled at its very existence. Since, amongst the arguments which he used to obtain the inquiry which he recommended, was one setting forth the example of Scotland ; and advising, as a cure for some of the evils which afflicted Ireland, the setting up of a Catholick Establishment on the ruins of the Protestant Church. A considerable portion of Mr. Hume’s speech consisted in enforcing the necessity of Catholick Emancipation ; the remainder, in making statements respecting the conduct of the Protestant Clergy, and the largeness of their revenues : few of which statements had the merit of accuracy.

Mr. Hume, after having, in the course of his speech, declared, that “in his opinion, he should “be glad to see Great Britain placed upon the “same footing as the United States of America,” (where there is no Church Establishment,) concluded with saying, that “his object was *not* “to injure the Established Church in Ireland, or “to attack its possessions, but merely to pledge “the House to an inquiry.” He, therefore, moved, that “it was expedient to inquire, whether the Church Establishment of Ireland were “not more than commensurate to the services to “be performed, both as regarded the number of “persons employed, and the incomes they received.” Mr. Stanley opposed the motion, on the grounds of the sacredness of Church Property, as well as, because he thought, even if such an objection did not exist, that it would not be calculated to do good to Ireland.

Mr. Plunket urged arguments of the same nature; and concluded by declaring, that, in his opinion, the existence of the Protestant Establishment in Ireland was the great bond of union between the two Countries.

After Sir Francis Burdett had spoken for the motion, and Mr. Leslie Foster against it, the House divided, when so many as 79 votes were given in its favour, there being 150 against it.

Lord Althorpe’s motion for a Committee to inquire into the State of Ireland, had, among its

supporters, many of those who generally voted with the Government; the Members of the House of Commons being so strongly impressed with the wretched condition of Ireland, that they were willing to catch at any proposition, however illusory, which was introduced, in the hope, or under the pretext, of its amelioration.

The arguments for the Committee all turned upon the acknowledged existence of grievances in that Country; and, amongst others, that prime one of all, the inequality of civil rights, without the abolition of which, few seemed disposed to deny, that no real or permanent good could be effected. On the other hand, it was said that the subjects of inquiry were far too numerous for the labours of a Committee; and, above all, that it was useless to refer to such a body the consideration of the Catholick Question, when it was quite clear, that if they should be unanimous in recommending concession, it would not influence the votes of the Members.

The motion was met on the part of the Government by Mr. Goulburn moving, as an Amendment, that, instead of the words "into the state of Ireland," should be inserted "into the nature and extent of the disturbances, that have prevailed in those districts of Ireland which were subject to the Insurrection Act." Mr. Goulburn had previously given notice of his intention to move for a Committee, which should

be entrusted to enter into this limited inquiry, with a view to the renewal of that act. The amendment was carried by the small majority of 48.

In the course of the discussion some extraneous matters were introduced, to which reference will hereafter be made.

A still smaller majority, of 17, threw out the resolutions proposed by Sir John Newport, for inquiry into the First Fruit Fund of the Irish Church.

A motion similar to Lord Althorpe's was made by Lord Darnley, in the House of Lords, in the beginning of April; on which occasion a remarkable statement was elicited from Lord Liverpool, respecting the rapid augmentation of schools in Ireland since the year 1817, in which they were first established. In that year there were only 30 in being; in the course of the seven succeeding years, they had increased to 1122. On the division, there appeared for the Committee 17; against it 57.

With respect to the Catholick Question, the determination the preceding year by many of the sincere friends of Emancipation to withdraw their support from the Cause, until there should appear some better prospect of its success, deterred every one from bringing forward any direct proposition for relief; and Mr. Plunket, in presenting a petition signed by 1800 Irish Ca-

tholicks, stated, that he did not contemplate that Session any ulterior proceedings on the subject of it ; since he thought, and the oldest and best friends of the Catholicks coincided with him in thinking, that an effort, at that period, would be unavailing and hopeless. ' Almost every time, however, when the subject of Ireland was mentioned, the Catholick Question, as more deeply affecting that Country than any other, of the numerous and important questions relating to it, was brought into discussion ; and although, as connected with Ireland, it made no progress, yet the general question cannot be considered to have remained stationary. Lord Liverpool himself, introduced two Bills, to which he had previously obtained the Royal Sanction, the one, as an act of grace and clemency, restored to the descendants of four Scotch Peers (Mar, Kenmure, Strathallan, and Nairn,) the titles of which their ancestors had been deprived for having taken part in the rebellions in favour of the House of Stuart ; the other, as an act of justice, reversed the 'attainder of Lord Stafford, who in the reign of Charles II. fell a victim to the delusion of the publick mind, on the subject of the celebrated Popish plot. Both these measures, by the first of which, mercy was extended to individuals, on whose heads the sins of their progenitors had been, it must be confessed, not undeservedly visited, and by the second of which

justice was done to an ill-fated nobleman in the restoration of his posterity to honours of which neither he, nor they, ought ever to have been deprived, were important, as affording strong ground for hope that, since the time had at length arrived, when the Anti-Catholick Members of the Cabinet no longer considered that it would be either unfit, or unsafe, to repeal laws which had been enacted against individual Catholick families, the period could not be far distant, when it would be considered equally fit, and safe, to repeal those statutes, all part and parcel of the same system, and growing out of the same state of things, whereby the whole Catholick Body were disqualified, and degraded.

But these were not the only instances of concession, on the part of Lord Liverpool. He supported a Bill, brought in by Lord Lansdowne, which had it passed would have placed the English Catholicks upon the same footing, as the Irish, by giving them the elective franchise, and by dispensing with certain Oaths, which excluded them from offices in the Revenue. The Bill also contained a clause, enabling the Catholick Duke of Norfolk to perform in person the duties of his Hereditary Office of Earl Marshall of England. The countenance, however, given by the Prime Minister to the Bill was unfortunately more than counter-balanced by

the activity of the Lord Chancellor against it, who succeeded in getting it rejected although only by a small majority. But since the opponents of the Bill objected to the grant of the Elective Franchise, two separate Bills were brought in by Lord Holland, conceding the *two other boons, and these Bills were allowed to pass without opposition, although after they had passed, the Duke of Newcastle and the Earl of Abingdon entered a strong protest against the Earl Marshall's Bill.*

The removal of these few disabilities, and the restoration of the forfeited Titles, undoubtedly were steps in advance towards the final settlement of the Question. Nevertheless the violent behaviour of the Catholick Association which had been established in the preceding January, and the unconstitutional nature of its proceedings, so influenced the minds of many individual Members of the Legislature, that, as the Session drew near to its termination, the period of that desired settlement seemed at as great a distance as ever. 'The existence and conduct of that Association were first brought under the notice of Parliament by Mr. Brownlow, in presenting a petition respecting it, from some of the Inhabitants of Dublin. Mr. Brownlow, called upon the Ministry, at once, to put down the Association, if the powers which they already possessed were sufficient, if not, then he said it was

their duty to apply to Parliament to arm them with power for its suppression.

Mr. Brownlow described, at considerable length, the nature of the Association, and endeavoured to obtain from the Ministers some communication of what were their views respecting it. But Mr. Plunket, and Mr. Canning, while they fully admitted that the conduct of this self-constituted Body required to be narrowly watched, refused to give any opinion, either as to whether the existing law was considered as sufficient for suppressing it, or as to whether any new measure was intended to be proposed for that purpose.

The Petition was received, and, subsequently, on the motion of Mr. Brownlow, was referred to the Committee of inquiry then sitting on the state of the disturbed districts of Ireland. The report of that Committee induced Parliament to consent to the renewal of the Insurrection Act, but the Prorogation was allowed to take place, without any new law affecting the Catholick Association being introduced by the Government.

In the course of the following Autumn, Mr. Canning visited Ireland; and passed a few days with his friend, Lord Wellesley, at the Phoenix Park. His stay there was shortened by the death of the King of France, the arrangements consequent on which event, necessitated his immediate return to London. During his residence

in the neighbourhood of Dublin, he lived in as retired a manner as possible ; preventing various meetings being summoned to vote addresses, which different parties, and bodies in the Capital, wished to have presented to him on the occasion of his arrival. He nevertheless went to see all the publick buildings, and institutions, and wherever he appeared, he was received with strong marks of respect, and, in many cases, with very considerable applause by the crowds whom his presence attracted.

In the interval which elapsed, between the prorogation of Parliament in 1824 and its assembling in the following year, the Catholick Association became an object of far greater importance than ever. It daily augmented in numbers, and in strength, and in like proportion the language held by its Orators increased in boldness and violence ; moreover it assumed to itself attributes, and exercised functions, which went almost to annihilate those, which belonged of right to the Irish Government. It was impossible however not to believe, but that this Association grew out of the laws by which the Catholicks were disqualified ; and it was, in consequence of this belief, and partly in consequence of a hope that the Association “ might die away of itself,” that, when Mr. Brownlow urged and goaded the Government to bring forward some measure for its suppression, Mr.

Canning disregarded the call, thinking it "better to wait until the effect of patience had been fairly tried." But when it was found that the only effect which patience had, was to enable the Association to acquire strength, and to give courage to its Orators, to indulge at each successive meeting, in language more daring and seditious than they had ventured previously to utter, then, Mr. Canning thought that, at any rate, it would not be wise to oppose the trying of an opposite course, and to endeavour, if possible, to extinguish this evil, as he would any other evil of similar magnitude, even if it did owe its origin to laws, which he individually thought unjust, but which nevertheless the Parliament could not be induced to repeal. Furthermore he was convinced that putting down the Association by the strong arm of the law would facilitate the grant of Emancipation, at least in the only way in which he ever was anxious to obtain it, with the free good will of the mass of the English people. For from first to last he had always advocated the Catholick Claims: "not for the sake of the Catholicks alone, but for the sake of the State; not as a boon to a single class, but as a benefit to the universal, and comprehensive whole." But, important as he considered this settlement, he did not consider it so all-important, as that it would have been worth while to have pur-

chased it at the expence of a convulsion. Already the menacing attitude assumed by the Association had alienated from the Catholick cause many of its former supporters, and it was not to be expected that the Parliament would yield to menace, without one effort to overthrow the menacing power. To have allowed therefore the Association to have consolidated its strength, would have been to have stood quietly by, while the preparations were being made for a conflict, which had it occurred would have desolated the Country from one end of it to the other. It was necessary therefore to endeavour to avert the crisis; and although it cannot be denied that Mr. Canning had no very sanguine hopes of the possibility of framing a law, which would pass the two Houses of Parliament, and which would be, at the same time, lastingly effectual for its purpose, still as such was not the opinion of his Anti-Catholick Colleagues, and as at that moment Emancipation was clearly unattainable, he had no hesitation in consenting to try their remedy, both because he conceived that something was necessary to be done; and that it could not fail of advancing the cause of the Catholicks, as well in the Cabinet as out of it, whether the measure did, or did not, permanently secure the end for which it was intended. If it succeeded, then it would at the same time have dispelled a great

danger, and have removed the grounds on which many rested their opposition to concession. If it failed, then the people of England would be taught, that if such combinations were formidable, they were not to be put down by severity of legislation ; and the opponents of concession in the Cabinet, could be pressed by their Colleagues, its supporters, with double force by the argument, that having applied the *nostrum* of coercion to cure an acknowledged evil, in common fairness, since it had failed they ought to try the *nostrum* of Emancipation. Mr. Canning consented therefore to support a measure of suppression, but at the same time he resolved never again to apply, as a Member of the Government, to Parliament for further powers, except upon an understanding with his Colleagues, that after the further powers had been granted, they, in their turn, would consent to support some conciliatory settlement of the Catholick Question. The King's Speech therefore, while it expressed His Majesty's satisfaction that Ireland participated in the general prosperity, and that order and tranquillity were restored in most of the districts formerly disturbed, pointed out the mischievous tendency of such associations, and called upon Parliament "to consider the means of applying a remedy." In the House of Lords, this intimation of the intentions of the Government did not elicit any very strong decla-

rations of opposition ; but, in the House of Commons, after the Address had been moved and seconded by Lord F. L. Gower, and Mr. Alderman Thompson, Mr. Brougham declared it to be his fixed resolution, to oppose in every stage the passing of the projected Bill to suppress the Association. The speech of the learned Gentleman was somewhat desultory, which makes it difficult to abstract his observations ; but the whole of his arguments went to confound the Catholick Association with the Catholick Question, insisting that the cure for the one, was the grant of the other, and calling upon the Government to apply it, as if Emancipation were to have been had for asking. Mr. Canning therefore in his reply to Mr. Brougham, first endeavoured to separate the Association from the general Body of the Catholicks ; and next to show that the removal of the Catholick disabilities was not quite so easy a matter to accomplish, as Mr. Brougham would fain make it appear. For said he, “so far from
 “the Association being identified with the in-
 “terests of the Catholick population, its insti-
 “tution, and the conduct of its Members, more
 “resembled the scheme of an enemy, who had
 “devised this, as the best invention for throwing
 “back, and thwarting the further progress of
 “Emancipation, of the eventual success of which
 “measure he felt as convinced, as he did of the
 “certainty, that, if it were then brought forward

“it would be opposed by this whole Country, as
“by one man.”

Mr. Brougham did not scruple to assert, what if the Association had itself asserted, would have at once brought it within the reach of the existing laws, viz. that it “actually, and virtually represented the wishes and feelings of almost the whole of the Irish Catholick Body;” although, at the same time, he admitted, that “the whole of its proceedings were not approved of by every body, nor by himself, in particular;” but he did not hesitate to say, that, “after the most attentive observation, and vigilant inspection of all the Association had done or said, he could not discover one single word or act, which justified the charge conveyed in His Majesty’s Speech;” while he considered that “the Association, and the Association alone, had secured to Ireland the peace which she had been described as enjoying.”

Mr. Canning expressed his surprise at Mr. Brougham’s adoption of this “mode of treating the subject. To prove that the existence of the Association might be tolerated, he ought to have shown, that it was a body perfectly harmless — a meeting of a few zealous individuals, who did not in any manner profess to represent the whole people of Ireland — who had no design of assuming the Government of the Country. But the learned gentleman had

“ told the House, that the Association was the
 “ Government; that to it Ireland owed its tran-
 “ quillity, leaving out of view the great talents,
 “ and merits of Lord Wellesley, in retrieving,
 “ by the firm, and equal justice of his Govern-
 “ ment, the respect and authority due to the
 “ laws. The steps taken by that eminent man,
 “ to secure the enjoyment for Catholicks and
 “ Protestants of the sunshine of Government,
 “ and the favour of the Crown, were nothing;”
 no — her repose was “ the work of the Catho-
 “ lick Association — and by what charm had it
 “ brought about this object? Whence did it ob-
 “ tain the magical elements of concord? From
 “ the pit of Acheron! Their combination was
 “ cemented by an adjuration of horror and loath-
 “ ing. — ‘ Be peaceful, by the hatred which you
 “ bear the Orangemen’ — was the charm by
 “ which it worked — was the bond of union which
 “ its Members deliberately put down in writing,
 “ and when called upon to explain, they deli-
 “ berately affirmed the deed. So far, therefore,
 “ from doing mischief to the Catholicks, by sup-
 “ pressing the Association, it would be doing
 “ them the greatest good by relieving them of
 “ the incubus which rode them.”

The Address pledging the House to consider
 the means of remedying the evil was carried una-
 nimously. Besides the two principal subjects of
 the Association, and Spanish America, on which

last, what passed has already been noticed, the other topicks of the Speech related to the general condition of the Country. The Burmese war in India; and the increase of our military establishments, in consequence of that war, and other circumstances connected with His Majesty's foreign possessions; mention was also made of the affairs of the East of Europe, and some commercial Treaties with foreign Powers.

On the bringing up of the Report on the Address,

Mr. Hobhouse observed, upon the increase of the Army—the Association—the Burmese War—and the Affairs of Greece, to which observations the Chancellor of the Exchequer replied.

After the Chancellor of the Exchequer had concluded, the debate was continued for some time by different Members; but nothing remarkable passed, except a very warm defence of the Lord Chancellor by Mr. Peel, in answer to the sarcasms which had been directed at that Learned Lord by Mr. Brougham, in his Speech of the preceding evening. Before the Bill for suppressing the Association was introduced into the House of Commons, Lord Lansdowne moved for the production “of any despatches which
“ might have been received from the Lord Lieu-
“ tenant of Ireland, relating to political and re-
“ ligious Societies existing in that Country.”

He prefaced his motion by observing, that it was fitting, before the House proceeded to legislate in a way which would abridge the liberty of the subject, that it should ascertain by inquiry, whether such legislation were necessary. Lord Liverpool, on the other hand, maintained that the proceedings of the Association were matter of publick notoriety, and were, or might be, as well known to every Peer, as they were to the Executive Government; and that since His Majesty's Ministers intended to act on the notoriety of the case, inquiry was unnecessary. The motion was negatived by a majority of 42 to 20.

Two days after this motion, Lord Liverpool, in compliance with the recommendation in the King's Speech, that the inquiries of last Session into the state of Ireland, should be renewed, moved for the appointment of a Committee whose investigations should not be limited, as were those of the one last year, to the disturbed districts, but should be extended, to the whole of Ireland. To this Committee, however, the Catholick Question was not to be referred; but with this important exception, it was very nearly of the same description, as the one for which Lord Darnley had moved in the past year.

On the same day that this took place in the House of Lords, Mr. Goulburn moved for leave to bring in a Bill to "amend certain Acts relat-

“ing to unlawful Societies in Ireland ;” in other words, a Bill which should put an end to the Catholick Association. The debate on this motion lasted four nights. The Opposition at the end of the second night adjourning the House, against the wishes of the Government, by perseveringly renewing the motion for adjournment : a motion which although rejected one minute, can be renewed the next, and which the forms of the House allow to take precedence of every other ; thus placing the question of adjournment within the controul of a single individual.

The debate was carried on with considerable warmth on both sides.

The arguments of those who maintained the necessity of putting down the Association were confined chiefly to three points.

First, That the power of the Association was so great that it was contrary to the spirit of the Constitution to allow of the existence of a Body, so constituted, which was unrecognized by law.

Second, That the proceedings of the Association were actually mischievous, and the tendency of its language calculated to inflame the minds of the people against the laws and Government of the Country.

And, lastly, The objects which it professed to have in view, would, if effected, be injurious to the real interests of the United Kingdom.

And first, As to the power of the Association,

which was described (at the time when Mr. Goulburn introduced the Bill for its suppression) as consisting of about 3000 Members, amongst whom were men, formidable from their talents and influence, all the surviving delegates of the Association of 1793, together with the "familiar friends of the traitors of old times, the Tones, the Russells, and the Emmetts."—Besides these, whose characters could not inspire much confidence in the loyal sentiments generally entertained by the Association, there were others of a very different description. Since a great majority of the Catholick Nobility and Gentry, and many of the Catholick Clergy, were numbered in its ranks; but then these had mostly become Members in the earlier stages of its existence, before it assumed that seditious character, which it had derived from the violent language of its Orators, and before it had acquired a strength which made it impossible for any Catholick to withdraw, without bringing down on his head a storm of vengeance, which few would have dared to brave. The circumstance of the higher order of the Catholicks being thus linked to the Association, gave to its proceedings a weight which those proceedings would not otherwise have possessed; and enabled the individuals who ruled there, to rule the whole Catholick Population of Ireland; since the circumstance of the Nobility and Gentry being com-

prized in the Association, and submitting to its will, induced the Priests to obey the Association, and the Peasantry to obey the Priests. To crown the whole, a body of 30,000 men were organized, to collect money from every Catholick peasant, thus identifying all of them with the Association, and establishing a fund applicable to any purposes for which money might be requisite.

Here then was a confederacy governing six Millions of People, collecting a revenue so large that no inconsiderable portion of it could well be spared to hoard up for any future emergency ; “ self elected, self constituted, self assembled, “ self adjourned, acknowledging no superior, “ tolerating no equal ! — unaccountable even “ to those, whom it was supposed virtually to “ represent — assuming the Legislative and Executive functions of Government by raising “ Taxes ! ” — issuing proclamations, and being able (as was proved by the fact) to cause them to be read from the Altar of every Catholick Chapel in Ireland, on one and the same day. Of such a Body (without any reference to its religious character) it was maintained, that no Government, worthy the name of Government, could, or ought, to tolerate the existence. For even, granting the truth of the assertion that, to the efforts of this Body, Ireland owed the peace which then prevailed there, and assuming

for argument sake that all the Speeches of its Members had been of the most loyal, and temperate description, and that all their corporate Acts had been, not only blameless in themselves, but justifiable in their principle, still, it would have been impossible for the Government to be certain, either of the continuance of such judicious conduct on their part, or of the irresponsible directors of so powerful a political engine, never turning its force, as effectually against the State, as in the supposed hypothesis it had been employed for its support.

But, said the advocates of the motion, the Association actually uses its power for evil; for it interferes in the administration of justice. —Of this interference Mr. Goulburn cited two memorable instances, in which two innocent individuals were sent to take their trial, with the opinion of the Association previously declared against them; and how could an impartial Jury be found, to judge persons so placed upon their defence, when if it were not composed of those who were either themselves Members of the Association, or contributors to its funds, would necessarily have consisted of men, prejudiced in favour of the persons to be tried, because the Association was their Accuser? Mr. Peel with great force, in this part of the Argument shewed, how strictly, all that on former occasions had been said by the Oppo-

sition respecting the intermeddlement by the Constitutional Association, with the regular course of justice, was applicable to the proceedings of the Catholick Association, which was now upheld by the same party.

Moreover, said an Irish Member, well acquainted with the condition of his Country, the Association tyrannized over the poorer Catholics themselves, for money is not so plenty with them that they would willingly subscribe it. They would not give any, if it were not extorted from them by their Priests.

Such were the injuries, that the Association directly inflicted upon the Irish people. But the inflammatory harangues of those who belonged to it, and above all their proclamation already mentioned, in which they adjured their Countrymen "to be peaceful by the hate which they bore to Orangemen," told ill for their present disposition, and augured worse for their future intentions. For this sentence, as Mr. Canning observed, was a fair criterion, by which they might be judged; since it was "prepared with care, and considered with deliberation, and although pointed out to the framers of it, as objectionable, was nevertheless upon argument retained."

That their Speeches were in keeping with this specimen of their written compositions is not to be wondered at, for one of the peculiar evils (as

Mr. North, in his eloquent speech observed) which was inherent in the very nature of an Assembly, having a common object, was, that
 “ as no Member could obtain credit by in-
 “ genuity of reply, or liveliness of debate, each
 “ Man was obliged to establish his reputation by
 “ going beyond his Associates in vehemence of
 “ language. So that the only emulation which
 “ was excited was an emulation of violence.
 “ What therefore was violent yesterday would be
 “ considered as temperate to-day, and what was
 “ considered to-day as the extreme verge of vio-
 “ lence would be considered to-morrow too vapid
 “ for the publick taste.”

The tendency therefore of the Association was to be violent, and the tendency of violent speeches must necessarily be to inflame the minds of those to whom they are addressed.

Such was the conduct of the Association, and such were the effects produced, before it was even a year old. Would it then have been wise, prudent, or justifiable in the Government to have waited till its funds were augmented ; till it had united itself still more closely with the people ; and till it had acquired sufficient strength to carry on with success its projected operations in the Cause of Emancipation, for the redress of grievances, for the overthrow of the Irish Church, and for the dissolution of the Union ? Would it have been wise to have left the Protestants, al-

ready in a state of great excitement and alarm, “to form Counter Associations for their own protection,” or to “have left the Country a prey to all the dismay, confusion, and anarchy which would inevitably have resulted from the Protestants and Catholicks being placed in organized array against each other.”

To these arguments against the Association little was offered in the way of direct answer by the Opposition.

For while they did not deny the general accuracy of the description given of the constitution, the power, and the proceedings of the Association, their aim with the exception of Mr. Brougham, seemed to be to diminish and to palliate, rather than to defend. That learned Gentleman, indeed, avowed himself to be the defender of the Association *per se*, and “the advocate of the right of the Irish people to meet to consider, to *plan*, to petition, to remonstrate, to *demand* !” Not so Mr. Tierney, who confessed that “he could have wished that it had adopted a different course from that which it had pursued,” and who endeavoured to destroy the effect of the extraordinary, forcible speech of Mr. Plunket, by ridiculing some of the expressions which he had employed, in delineating the formidable character of the Association. As for its interference in the administration of justice, that was admitted on

all hands, but then, it was said to be in self-defence; and the cases brought forward by the Irish Secretary, as proofs of an improper meddling, were declared to be very much misrepresented. As a counterpoise, even if an accurate account had been given of them, four others were detailed by Sir Henry Parnell, in which, the proceedings of the Association were made out to have been highly conducive to the ends of justice. But, even if such were the case, the examples quoted, served but to prove the interference, which was, in itself, so exceedingly objectionable. It was likewise confessed that the minds of the People were inflamed, but then it was not in consequence of the proceedings of the Association, but in consequence of Mr. Noel and Capt. Gordon having gone about the Country, endeavouring to make Proselytes to Protestantism amongst the Catholics. It was allowed also, that the language of some members of the Association had been violent, but *that*, it was contended, made in its favour, since it was rather an advantage than otherwise to have a regular vent, for that irritation and discontent, which, if no vent existed, would burst forth suddenly in some unexpected place, and in a more dangerous manner.

Neither, it was averred, was there any reason for dreading the future projects of the Association. — “Why,” said Mr. Tierney, “was it

“ to be assumed that its intentions were evil ?
 “ What right had any one to make such an
 “ assumption ? What right to assume that in
 “ the application of the rent, evil was intended
 “ to the publick peace ? The Association under-
 “ took the Cause of Emancipation ; there was
 “ surely nothing very criminal in that ? — they
 “ undertook to inquire into the Church Esta-
 “ blishment ; there was surely nothing very ob-
 “ jectionable in that : they further endertook
 “ to investigate a *variety of circumstances*, all
 “ of which were fair matter of discussion.”

The Collection of the rent too Mr. Brougham considered ought not to be stopped, because the Methodists collected Money, and no attempt was ever made to prevent their so doing ; and Sir James Mackintosh, and Sir F. Burdett, endeavoured to explain away the expression, “ be peaceful by the hate you bear to Orangemen ;” and to prove that it was innocent, and harmless.

But Mr. Brougham ingeniously attempted to make out that the Association was a victim, and that its Members were unfairly treated, because those proceedings which were put forward as faults would have been equally condemned, had they been of a directly contrary description. — “ If,” said he, “ they act openly, they are called impudent ; if in secret, illegal : if they imitate the forms of Parliament, they are assuming ; if they introduce other forms, they are inno-

“vators : if they elect themselves, they are self
 “constituted ; if they are elected, they subject
 “themselves to the Convention Act, and are
 “prosecuted. And so with respect to their
 “Speeches. If bold, they are rebellious ; if quiet,
 “designing : if they blame, it is said they are
 “vituperative ; if they praise, they are hypo-
 “critical.”

But surely Mr. Brougham forgot when he thus reasoned, that the point of merit is generally to be found between extremes, and that the direct opposite of any particular vice, very rarely, if ever, is a virtue.

But the opponents of the Bill seemed to rely for its defeat, far less upon any direct defence of the Association, than upon indirectly throwing discredit on the measure, and by creating a Catholick feeling in favour of the Association, by confounding its Cause with that of Emancipation, and by the suggestion of conciliatory, in preference to coercive, enactments. Repeal the disqualifying laws, and the nuisance, if nuisance it be, will of itself abate : but so long as those laws exist, combinations will continue, and
 “although the Association may be put down in
 “one form, it will revive in some other form,
 “requiring new exertions on the part of the
 “Legislature to keep pace with its ingenuity.”
 Immediate concession therefore, and not any additional restrictions on the liberty of the Sub-

ject was represented as the best means of annihilating the association, and giving peace to Ireland. Now admitting, what can hardly be disputed, that emancipation would certainly have destroyed the association; yet, what if emancipation were unattainable, as was asserted by the supporters of the bill; "was the refusal to be submitted to or to be resisted?" In the answer to this question, said Mr. Plunket, was "involved the justice or the reprobation" of the measure.

But, moreover, what if the violent language of the leaders of the association were one of the main causes of emancipation being unattainable, was it not in that case the business of the true friend of the Catholick cause to separate it from that of the association? and would not the infallible consequence of their identification have been, that those feelings of disgust, and irritation, which the intemperance of the association had excited, in the minds of the people of this Country, would have been no longer confined to that assembly, but would have been directed indiscriminately against the whole body of the Catholics?

The Opposition indeed, on the other hand, would not admit that emancipation was unattainable, although Mr. Tierney was of opinion that "it could never be carried but by a Govern-

ment that was unanimous in its determination to carry it ;” but he assumed that it was in Mr. Canning’s power to cause such a Government to be formed. Mr. Tierney likewise joined the cry, which his party had raised against the Administration, because it was divided on this question. The outcry on this ground against the Administration, as well as the assumption that Mr. Canning, if he chose, could put an end to such a state of things, if intended to embarrass Mr. Canning, entirely failed in its object ; and so far from doing so, it actually afforded him an occasion for vindicating the differences, which prevailed in the Government upon this question, as well as “ a golden opportunity, which he “ could never have contrived for himself, of “ acquiring the confidence of the Protestants of “ England, which he wanted before, but “ which after that night’s debate he received “ some singular demonstrations.” Towards the end of the fourth sitting, before Mr. Brougham had spoken, immediately after Sir Francis Burdett had concluded, Mr. Canning rose.

He divided his observations into four parts : — the “ first, the unconstitutional associations in “ Ireland ; the second, the Catholick question ; “ the third and fourth, the conduct of Govern- “ ment, and his own personal conduct in relation “ to that much agitated question.”

The substance of what he said, under the first head, has already been given in stating the arguments against the Association ; some of which he abstained from pressing more closely, thinking such a course would have been ungenerous, seeing that the Catholick Association (as vouched for by Mr. Brougham) had promised unconditional submission to the Bill, so soon as it should have become the Law of the Land.

Under the second, — while He declared that, “ his own opinions, and wishes on the subject “ of the Catholick Claims remained unaltered,” he added, that he did not think it the best proof of the sincerity with which, wishes “ and “ opinions in favour of any particular cause “ were entertained, to shut one’s eyes to any “ disadvantage (temporary and transient he was “ willing to hope) under which that Cause “ might labour. He certainly thought that the “ Catholick Question laboured under such temporary disadvantage at that moment ; and “ that the Association was one of the main “ sources of that disadvantage. The Association was not, however, the only cause of “ the Publick mind of England being alienated “ from the Catholick Cause.” For the resolutions moved by Mr. Hume, “ attacking the “ Irish Protestant Church Establishment, having “ been received by the House of Commons “ with more or less favour, had revived appre-

“hensions which had been previously quieted,
 “and excited serious alarm, amongst the sin-
 “cere wellwishers of the Catholick Cause, as
 “advocated and explained by Mr. Grattan.
 “That great man always maintained, that the
 “tendency of his proposed measures was to
 “confirm and strengthen the Irish Protestant
 “Church Establishment, which by the Act of
 “Union was united with that of England, and
 “was declared to be permanent, and invi-
 “olable; and it was in reference to this es-
 “sential, and fundamental part of the Union,
 “that the preamble of the Bills introduced by
 “Mr. Grattan were always in substance as
 “follows:—‘Whereas the United Protestant
 “‘Church of England and Ireland is esta-
 “‘blished permanently and inviolably.’—
 “‘And whereas it would tend to promote the
 “‘interests of the same, and to strengthen the
 “‘free Constitution of which the said United
 “‘Church forms an essential part, to admit
 “‘the Roman Catholick Subjects of His Ma-
 “‘jesty into a full participation of civil pri-
 “‘vileges.’

“Mr. Grattan, therefore,” continued Mr.
 Canning, “considered it necessary to consult
 “the feelings of the English People in this
 “respect; and to found his measure upon a
 “careful observance of them. The resolutions
 “(Mr. Hume’s) to which I have referred, be-

“ speak a disposition to overlook the guides
 “ and to break down the principle so respected
 “ by Mr. Grattan. Who is there, then,
 “ amongst those who are favourable to the
 “ Catholick Question, and, still more, amongst
 “ those who think the carrying of it the one
 “ thing needful for the peace, and strength
 “ of the United Kingdom, but would acknow-
 “ ledge it to be an inauspicious circumstance
 “ for the success of that Question, that any
 “ doubt should go forth as to the disposition
 “ of those who bring it forward to tread in
 “ Mr. Grattan’s steps, and to proceed with all
 “ the tenderness, and consideration, towards
 “ the Protestant Church Establishment? When
 “ the Honourable Gentlemen on the other side
 “ of the House, shall bring forward any mea-
 “ sure for the relief of the Catholicks, I warn
 “ them, but I warn them in kindness, that
 “ unless that Bill shall manifest the same anx-
 “ ious regard for the inviolability, and per-
 “ manency of the Protestant Church of Eng-
 “ land and Ireland, as Mr. Grattan’s Bills, it
 “ will fail. It may be, that some of those who
 “ think the carrying of the Catholick Question
 “ the one thing needful, may also think that
 “ it would have been better, if the Legislature
 “ had never been bound by an inviolable pledge
 “ to preserve the inviolability of the Church
 “ of Ireland: that it would be better if the

“ Parliament were to revoke that pledge: but
 “ I warn the Honourable Gentlemen that they
 “ must settle that matter—not only with the
 “ Opponents of their Bill, but—with many
 “ supporters of the Catholick Question, and
 “ with the Protestant People of England; and
 “ that before another Bill for Catholick Eman-
 “ cipation can be successfully carried through
 “ this House, the Supporters of the resolution
 “ in question must make up their minds to one
 “ of two alternatives, either to renounce those
 “ resolutions, or to despair of the Catholick
 “ Question. On this statement I am ready
 “ to go to issue; and I am content to be
 “ judged by the event.

“ Let it not, therefore, be inferred that I am
 “ unfriendly to the Catholick Question. I pe-
 “ remptorily deny the inference. I am at all
 “ times ready to give it my best support, but I
 “ plead guilty to the charge of *being irrecon-*
 “ *cilably unfriendly to the spoliation of the Pro-*
 “ *testant Church of Ireland.*”—“ Until all classes
 “ of Catholics,” said Mr. Canning in conclud-
 “ ing this part of his subject, “ shall be admitted
 “ to a participation in the privileges of their
 “ Protestant fellow subjects (with some excep-
 “ tions indeed), until they shall be admitted to
 “ the full extent which Mr. Grattan proposed, I
 “ do not expect, not that much good may not
 “ be done (for past concessions have already

“ done very great good), but I do not expect
 “ that the great work will be complete. The
 “ concessions which remain to be granted, will
 “ be the crown and finish of the whole.” Mr.
 Canning then proceeded to the two last divisions
 of his subject, in which he not only replied to
 what had been advanced, in the course of these
 debates on the Association, but to all the attacks
 which had been made on him on this subject,
 during this and the preceding Session.

To begin with the complaint against the Go-
 vernment, that its Members were not all of the
 same mind respecting the Catholick Question :
 some opposing, and others supporting it. To
 which Mr. Canning said that, if it were a re-
 proach, it was one to which every Administration
 that had existed since the Union with Ireland,
 was equally exposed, for there was not a “ single
 “ month, since that event, when division of opi-
 “ nion, on that question, did not exist among the
 “ confidential Servants of the Crown. There
 “ had, indeed, been periods when this conflict
 “ of opinions had no practical operation, because
 “ it was superseded, by a general understanding
 “ that all the Members of the Cabinet, whatever
 “ might be their opinions, concurred in resisting
 “ for a time, all consideration of the Catholick
 “ Claims ; but of a Cabinet, concurring in opi-
 “ nion to grant those claims, there was no ex-
 “ ample.” In proof of this Mr. Canning entered

into an examination of the different Administrations which had been formed subsequently to Mr. Pitt's retirement in 1801; and shewed that each, and all of them, were disunited on this question, and specifically, in 1806, Mr. Fox's and Lord Grenville's Government, "which did "make the abolition of the Slave Trade, for the "first time, a Cabinet question, and therefore "had the doctrine of Cabinet questions full and "clear before their eyes. Mr. Fox, indeed, "actually went out of his way, to bring into the "Administration, the two persons in publick life, "who were most decidedly and notoriously opposed to that question;" viz. Lord Sidmouth and the Lord Chief Justice, Ellenborough. After Mr. Fox's death, Lord Grenville continued at the head of the Administration; and from the dissolution of that Administration, up to the final settlement of Lord Liverpool's Government, after the death of Mr. Perceval, the principle on which the Cabinet acted, was to "resist as one "man the *consideration* of the question;" when that settlement took place, this principle was changed, and that which was adopted instead of it, was "to treat the question as out of the ordinary course of Ministerial business; as one "to be argued upon its own merits, such as they "might appear to each individual Member 'of "the Administration." And this principle was never altered from the time, at which it was

settled, to the time at which Mr. Canning was speaking. "Why then," he asked, "when the principle of a mixed Cabinet has been acted upon for five and twenty years, in respect to the Catholick Question — why is the present Cabinet to be alone arraigned for a vice which it shares with so many of its Predecessors?"

To this question no answer was ever given: and it would seem indeed impossible to find for it any satisfactory solution. Complete, however, as is this defence of the Government, as compared with the Governments which had gone before it, it was never denied that the division of the Cabinet on so important a question was an evil. But, since it was an evil, which, in Mr. Canning's opinion, could only be remedied by incurring a greater, it was not for him, holding that opinion, to act in direct defiance of it. "He believed in the then state of publick feeling in England, the Catholick Question could not be carried as a Government question, and *that the publick men of the Country did not afford the materials for an Administration*, united upon that point, and upon other questions of paramount importance."

The existing Government, therefore, was as favourable to the Catholick claims, as all, and more favourable than many by which, since 1801, it had been preceded. If it were not unanimous respecting it, and if Mr. Canning still

continued a Member of it, it was because he thought that no Government could be formed which would be unanimous on that question, and upon every other of importance ; and, in particular, Reform, which he considered would more vitally affect the existence of the Constitution, than the settlement of the Catholick Question.

Having disposed of the Government, we must now proceed to Mr. Canning's own personal conduct. — “ And why,” as he naturally asked, “ was he to be held responsible for a system in “ which he had no more personal concern than “ any other Member of the several Cabinets since “ the Union ?”

Although it is impossible to assign any just, it is, nevertheless, not difficult to perceive the true cause of this attempt to fasten a particular responsibility on Mr. Canning. It is the business of an Opposition to turn out the Government, and their best chance of success is by discrediting the individual on whom its existence depended. But, in order to render this matter clear, it will be necessary to carry the reader back to certain episodes in former debates, the notice of which has been purposely omitted until now, that their spirit and tendency might be better understood by being viewed in connexion with each other.

It will doubtless not be forgotten that the tacticks of the Opposition, on the first Session

after Mr. Canning had accepted office, were to insinuate that he had betrayed the Catholics, in order to obtain it. This mode of warfare was continued up to the period when Mr. Brougham, no longer keeping himself within the limits of insinuation, made that direct charge, which Mr. Canning so indignantly repelled by, at once, emphatically asserting that "it was false." In the House of Commons no one subsequently to this ventured on a repetition of the accusation directly, or indirectly; but in the House of Lords, his speech at Liverpool was once more cited as a proof of his abandonment of the Catholics. Of that speech so much has been already said, that it is quite needless to say more; especially since this was the last allusion which was made to it in Parliament. Still his conduct respecting the Catholics continued to be impugned, although the charges brought against him were of a much more modified description.

Those charges were — First, that because Mr. Canning, in 1812, had refused to belong to a Government the Members of which were "determined to resist," as *a Government*, "all *consideration*" of the Catholic Question, and because he had been "willing to belong to a Government, and to become part of an Administration, which was to have been united upon that question, that therefore it was inconsistency for him to act with any Government dif-

“ferently constituted.”—Secondly, that he had the means of carrying it in his hands, and that it was his bounden duty to employ them.

With respect to the first charge, which was made by Lord Grey, and Mr. Brougham, there surely was no inconsistency in his consenting to join an Administration in 1815, which professed neutrality, as a Government, with respect to concession to the Catholics, because he had, in April 1812, refused to join one which was united as a Government, in resistance not only to concession, but even to “the *consideration*” of concession. Neither, because he once endeavoured to form a Cabinet united on that question, could he be said to have “pledged himself implicitly “never to belong to any Cabinet which was not “determined to carry it.”—So far, indeed, from having done so, the Cabinet which he so tried to form was a last resource; since the attempt was only made, after the effort to effect the formation of a mixed Cabinet had failed. For when Mr. Canning, in conjunction with Lord Wellesley, received the commission to form a Government, instead of “wishing to exclude “the Anti-Catholics, the first stipulation which “he made was, that he should be at liberty to “make proposals to Lord Liverpool,” who was notoriously of what was called the “Protestant “faction.”—“If, therefore, on the 17th of “May, 1812 (the time of the offer, and refusal

“ of the office), Mr. Canning refused to come
 “ into an Administration united against the
 “ Catholick Question; and if, by that refusal, he
 “ meant to say that he would never enter into
 “ office except with an Administration created
 “ to carry this question, — what madness was it
 “ for him, within a short fortnight afterwards —
 “ when he had the power in his own hands, to
 “ endeavour to form a mixed Administration?
 “ The accusation requires merely to be stated to
 “ refute itself.”

As to the Second Accusation, which was brought forward by several Members on the Opposition side of the House; by Lord Althorpe, with apparently no unfriendly feeling, in 1824, by Mr. Brougham on the first day of the Session in 1825, and by Mr. Smith, Mr. Denman, Mr. Williams, Mr. Tierney, Sir F. Burdett, and others in this debate on the Catholick Association; it must be observed that the charge depended for its establishment, on the truth of the assertion, that Mr. Canning possessed the means of carrying the Catholick Question. If that assertion were incorrect, the charge necessarily falls to the ground.

The arguments for the truth of the assertion were, that Mr. Canning had only to threaten his Anti-Catholick Colleagues with his resignation. And since they were too fond of their offices, to quit them, and since they could not form an

Administration without Mr. Canning, and those Ministers who agreed with him, on this question, they would at once, to prevent his resignation, in deference to his opinions, have surrendered their own : the subsequent conduct of the Anti-Catholick part of the Cabinet, it must be admitted, takes away all ground for the supposition that they would thus have yielded to *Mr. Canning's* threats; but it was said that Mr. Canning's "wisdom and "manliness" had compelled those Anti-Catholick Members, to consent to many measures, which they had once opposed, and specifically that he had carried the Independence of Spanish America because he was "backed by publick Opinion, and by those Gentlemen, who filled "the Benches on the Opposition side of the "House of Commons;" why did not he then, it was asked, exert his influence in the same way to carry the Catholick Question?

"What had a Minister to fear with the House "of Commons, the Opposition Benches, the "Country, all England at his back?" To which question Mr. Canning replied by proposing another — "What would a Minister do with "only those Benches, and no England at his "back?" And that no Minister would have the publick voice of England to support him, in carrying that Question, was an opinion which Mr. Canning conscientiously entertained, and had frequently avowed. Besides, his prevailing

on the Spanish American Question, was by no means a proof that he could have prevailed in favour of the Catholics; for on the one hand, he had the support both of Lord Liverpool and Mr. Peel; on the other, Mr. Peel would certainly have been pitted against him; while Lord Liverpool, if he had not been *against* him, would hardly have been *for* him. “The line drawn between the supposed Liberals and Il-liberals of the Cabinet Council being by no means a straight but a serpentine line, as respected some Questions, although as regarded the Catholic it was nearly straight and direct.”

To assume, therefore, as an incontrovertible position, that the Anti-Catholic Ministers would have preferred surrendering their opinions to *Mr. Canning*, to resigning their places, is assuming that which is at variance both with facts and arguments; and so, likewise, to take for granted, as a matter of course, that had Mr. Canning broken up the existing Ministry, on the ground of the Catholic Question, he could have arranged a new one for the express purpose of carrying it, — with the Duke of York, the Duke of Wellington, and Mr. Peel, and perhaps Lord Liverpool, arrayed against him, and with the very small probability, that, under such circumstances, he would have been commanded to construct one, — is utterly inconsistent with reason.

The difficulties which Mr. Canning experienced, in forming an Administration under much more favourable circumstances, prove, if proof were wanting, that under those which were less favourable, without the confidence of his Sovereign, and with the consciousness of having been guilty of unfair dealing towards his Colleagues, he never could have succeeded in his undertaking. And yet, on these two groundless assumptions depends the assertion, that he had the power to settle the Catholick Question; while, if that assertion be false, it is quite clear that the attempt to attach blame to him, for not using a power, which he did not possess, is at once futile and ridiculous.

But, lest this reasoning should not be considered as conclusive, let it be admitted that Mr. Canning had the power; that is, that had he refused to continue in the Government, unless the Catholick, were made a Cabinet, Question, the consequence would have been, either that his Anti-Catholick Colleagues would have yielded, or else, if they had resigned, that Mr. Canning could have formed an united Cabinet by a junction with the Whigs.

Does it, therefore, follow that it was his *duty* to exert this power?

A few plain reasons are more than sufficient to prove that it was not.

First, because it was his opinion that a Govern-

ment united for that purpose, would not succeed in accomplishing it, so long as the Duke of Wellington, and Mr. Peel, were willing to lead an opposition against it.

Secondly, because, as an Individual Member of the House, he would not be more unshackled, for bringing the Question unreservedly before it, than he was, as a Member of the Government.

And lastly, “because, after going on so long “with his Colleagues in the Cabinet upon the “principle of free action respecting this Question, for him to demand the formation of a “new compact, was a course which he would “disdain to take; I would,” said he, “ten “thousand times rather quit Office, than turn “round upon the Administration, of which I “am a Member, and insist upon changing the “footing upon which I entered it.”

How large indeed would have been the measure of abuse and obloquy meted out to Mr. Canning, had he taken the course which he was so loudly condemned for not taking! and how unjust was it to say that he had sacrificed the Catholic Question to a love of office!

It would be indeed difficult to single out any publick Man who had made more personal sacrifices for the promotion of that Cause, or was more entitled to gratitude for a long course of active services. In 1812, for the sake of

it, he refused Office, and that, at a time, when it was no "ordinary effort to do so."

"I had, at that moment," said Mr. Canning, "a temptation to take Office, more powerful perhaps than I have felt, at any other period of my political life. There are circumstances which excuse, in generous minds, a strong desire of power: and such precisely were the circumstances under which Office was then tendered to my acceptance. I had been Secretary of State during the first years of the War in the Peninsula. I had been in a measure the Author, and in this House the responsible defender of that animating but difficult struggle. I had, therefore, gone through all the Parliamentary contests; which the disasters and reverses that attended the Commencement of the Spanish War, called down upon the Administration; I had borne the brunt of all the attacks, and buffeted all the storms, with which the Opposition of that day had assailed us. Certainly, my opinions had never been altered, nor my hopes depressed, by the misfortunes of the early Campaigns in Spain. I had anticipated, even in the hour of the deepest gloom, a brighter and more fortunate period, when the gale of fortune would yet set in gloriously, and prosperously for the great Cause in which we were embarked.

“ In 1812 the prospect had begun to clear,
 “ victory attached itself to our standard, and
 “ the cause which I had so long advocated
 “ under less auspicious circumstances, ap-
 “ peared to promise, even to less sanguine
 “ eyes, those brilliant results which ultimately
 “ crowned it. And, I desire to ask any man
 “ who hears me, and who has within him the
 “ heart of an English Gentleman, animated by
 “ a just desire to serve his Country, whether
 “ greater temptation to take office, could
 “ possibly be held out to any one, than was,
 “ at that moment, held out to me. At the
 “ very moment when I might have come in
 “ to reap the fruits of the harvest, which I
 “ had sown under the lowering atmosphere of
 “ distrust and discouragement, and the early
 “ and ungenial growth of which, I had watched
 “ with such intense anxiety?

“ At such a moment I was called, to resume
 “ my station in the councils of my Country,
 “ but the answer of the Cabinet, being what
 “ it was, on the Catholick Question, I de-
 “ clined the call. Was this to sacrifice my
 “ conscience in the Catholick Cause for the
 “ love of Office?

But was this the only refusal of office, the
 only sacrifice which Mr. Canning made for
 the Catholics?

From the earliest dawn “ of his publick

“ life — aye — from the first Visions of his
 “ Youthful Ambition — that Ambition had
 “ been directed to one object, above all
 “ others. Before that object, all others vanished
 “ into comparative insignificance. It was de-
 “ sirable to him beyond all the blandishments
 “ of power, beyond all the rewards and favour
 “ of the Crown. That object was to repre-
 “ sent in the House of Commons the Uni-
 “ versity in which he was educated. He had
 “ a fair chance of accomplishing this object,
 “ when the Catholick Question crossed his
 “ way. He was warned, fairly and kindly
 “ warned, that the adoption of that Cause
 “ would blast his prospect: he adhered to the
 “ Catholick Cause, and forfeited all his long-
 “ cherished hopes, and expectations.”

The conclusion of Mr. Canning's Speech was composed of this defence of himself, on this Question. It had the effect of effectually putting an end to all further attempts to assail his character on this point.

Mr. Brougham replied, but his speech was not one of his happiest efforts. After an attempt of Mr. Butterworth to obtain a hearing, the house divided, for the motion 278 ; against it 123.

The second day after this division Mr. Brougham presented a Petition from certain Individuals, who were Members of the Catholick Association, praying to be heard by Counsel against

the passing of the Bill, and if necessary, that witnesses should be examined to prove the falsehood of the statements which had been made respecting their principles, and the conduct of the Body to which they belonged. The following day he moved that the prayer of the Petition should be granted, on the ground that common justice demanded that the House should hear, before it punished. To this, it was answered, that although the Bill would never have been introduced, if the idea had not been suggested to its Authors by the existence of the Association, yet that that Body had no more claim to be heard against it than any other set of associated Individuals. The proposed law did not say that certain description of Associations, composed of Catholics, should not exist, but that certain descriptions of Associations, be their constituent Members whom they might, should not be lawful. It was "a matter of moral judgment, and reasoning" whether Societies, such as were described in the Bill, ought to be tolerated by the Government. If it were decided that they ought not; then, if the Catholic Association came within the operation of the Act to suppress them, it would be put down; if not, the Bill would not affect it. The propriety of the Bill was not to be established by the tendency of this, or that particular Act, but, it was maintained, that an Association, possessing great influence over so large a portion of the

Population, levying money upon the people, interfering (whether for good, or for evil, was not the question) with the administration of justice, and issuing Proclamations to the Catholics, was a description of Association, of which the existence was dangerous to the State, especially in a Country in the turbulent and excited condition of Ireland. Granting, therefore, that every proceeding of the Association had been productive of good, it would not have done away with the necessity of passing the Bill, which was not meant as a punishment for what it had done, but as a prevention against what it might do. The motion was rejected. Majority 222. Minority 89.

On the second reading of the Bill, the stage, for which the call of the House was fixed, and that on which the greatest length of discussion usually takes place, the debate only lasted two hours and a half. On the committal of the Bill Mr. Hume moved an Amendment, which, after a short discussion, was rejected. The third reading took place only ten days after the conclusion of the debate on the first motion, and the topic that excited the greatest, almost the only, interest in the discussion was the dispute between Mr. Peel and Mr. Brougham, on the personal merits of Mr. Hamilton Rowan; a gentleman whom the Catholick Association had honoured with their peculiar approbation. The Bill then passed the House of Commons.

In these last debates there was little asperity on the part of the Opposition: a quiescence which can only be accounted for, after the fierceness of their commencement, by supposing, that they discovered that the House and the Country were with the Government; and that their own friends would not continue to attend, through a series of hopeless minorities. All the Pittites, who were in the habit of voting with Mr. Canning on the Catholick Question, voted with him to a man, for this Bill; which circumstance, together with his speech, probably helped to convince his opponents that their game had failed, and that any further violent resistance would be useless, if not impolitick. In this state of things they changed their tacticks; and Mr. O'Connell, and the delegates of the Association, who were angry at the little success of their resistance to the Bill, called upon Sir Francis Burdett to fulfil his promise of bringing forward the general Motion in favour of the Catholicks; Sir Francis accordingly gave notice of his intention, to do so, before the Bill, for the suppression of the Association, had passed through the Committee.

It was not, however, exclusively with reference to this Bill, that the Opposition altered their policy. For the occasion of this Bill was the last, on which any serious conflict took place between them and Mr. Canning. From that time forth,

the greater part of them confessed his merits, and, in many instances, lent him their assistance in carrying those measures, which he was instrumental in bringing forward. On the 28th of February, three days after the Association Bill had been sent to the Upper House, Sir Francis Burdett, in perhaps the most eloquent, certainly the most temperate, and judicious speech, which up to that time he had ever made, moved that the House should resolve itself into a Committee, to consider the state of the Laws, affecting the Roman Catholicks.

Mr. Canning, who during the preceding week had been labouring under an attack of the gout, spoke very shortly and early in the debate. He contrived, however, as Mr. Brougham expressed it, “to concentrate in a small space, more of force, “and effect, than in any speech which he (Mr. Brougham,) ever remembered to have heard.”

Mr. Canning in commencing said, that “there “were circumstances which made him think the “present an unfavourable moment for the discussion of these claims; personally he was not “sorry that they had been brought forward. “After having recently lent his aid to restrain “and suppress the irregular zeal of some of the

* It is much to be lamented that Mr. Canning never corrected this speech, and that the report of it in the Parliamentary Debates, gives but an inadequate idea of the effect which it produced.

“ Catholick Body, he was not sorry to have an
 “ opportunity of showing, that it was only to the
 “ zeal which had been superinduced, on this
 “ question, that he objected, and that his opi-
 “ nion, and feelings with regard to it were at
 “ the bottom, not only, unaltered, but unalter-
 “ able.”

Having made this declaration respecting him-
 self, he briefly, but forcibly touched upon the
 general arguments in favour of Concession. First,
 that “ he could not by any process of reasoning,
 “ understand why all the subjects of the same
 “ Kingdom, all the inhabitants of the same soil,
 “ those, who lived in the same Country, mingled
 “ in the daily offices of life, and professed a com-
 “ mon Christianity, should be excluded from the
 “ common benefits of the Constitution of their
 “ Country. He next shewed that concession
 “ would be restoring things to their ancient
 “ footing, and therefore that the real innovators
 “ were those who supported the present system,
 “ not those who wished to alter it.”

Mr. Leslie Foster, who had spoken in the debate
 before Mr. Canning, having urged as an argument
 against this motion, the circumstance that there
 never was a time when the feeling of religious
 zeal was so paramount over political ambition,
 especially amongst the Continental Governments,
 as it was at that time, Mr. Canning observed,
 that he “ believed that to be a true statement of

“ the case, but he drew from it a very different
 “ inference. Mankind were divided into two
 “ classes by two distinct lines of demarcation. —
 “ There was one line between the Protestant
 “ and Catholic Churches, and another between
 “ British and Foreign influence : he would say,
 “ therefore, efface the line of separation which
 “ divides the inhabitants of the British Islands
 “ into two classes, and strengthen the line of
 “ demarcation which separates British from Fo-
 “ reign influence. This was the principle on
 “ which he had always advocated the question.”
 As for danger to the Protestant Establishment,
 he declared that he would oppose the measure
 as strenuously as he supported it, if he thought
 that Establishment would be endangered by pass-
 ing it. But he was convinced to the contrary ;
 and it was because “ he was convinced that it
 “ would increase the strength of the Empire at
 “ home, and its respectability abroad, that he
 “ was for opening wide the vest of the Constitu-
 “ tion, and receiving into its bosom all those who
 “ lived in its allegiance, and were ready to sup-
 “ port its Government.”

So soon as Mr. Canning had concluded, he
 withdrew ; and after the Solicitor-General, Mr.
 Stuart Wortley, and Mr. Bankes, had severally
 spoken, Mr. Plunket rose, and made one of the
 most powerful speeches that was ever delivered.
 Mr. Peel answered him in an ingenious speech, in

which he placed his opposition to the motion on the grounds that the concession sought could not be safely granted, and, "if granted, would not conduce to tranquillity." "I must own," said the Right Honourable Secretary, "that if I were perfectly satisfied that concession would lead to the restoration of peace and harmony; if I thought it would put an end to animosities, the existence of which all lament, I, for one, would not oppose the measure, on a mere theory of the Constitution, when consent would secure such immense practical advantages."

Mr. Brougham answered Mr. Peel, and when the House divided, there appeared for the motion 247 — against it 234; being a majority of 13 in its favour. The House then resolved itself into a Committee, and six resolutions were agreed to, which were proposed by Sir Francis Burdett. A Bill, founded on them, was ordered to be brought in by Sir F. Burdett, Sir James Mackintosh, Lord Palmerston, Sir John Newport, Sir H. Parnell, and Messrs. Abercrombie, Wynne, Spring Rice, Plunket, Tierney, Charles Grant, and Canning.

Notwithstanding that Mr. Canning was associated with these Gentlemen, he did not take any part in their deliberations, and had nothing to do, with the construction of the Bill which they framed. It was not, however, from being

luke-warm in the cause, that he abstained from so doing ; but he felt that the best, if not the only, chance which he had of being ultimately able to promote the success of Emancipation, was to keep himself uncommitted with any party. The battle which had been fought with respect to the Association had done good. " The result " of it had been to the Government strength ; " the House of Commons credit ; and to Mr. " Canning an assured and intelligible position " upon a ground till then doubtful and slippery. " — A position, in which, when the demagogues " should have sunk and the Opposition should " have exhausted themselves, he hoped," he said, " at no distant period — but at his own time, " and in his own way, to be enabled to do some " good to Ireland, and to bring this intractable " question to a pause, if not to a final settle- " ment." It was therefore Mr. Canning's object to keep himself free to act upon his own individual judgment, but in the present case he had an insuperable objection to being present at the meetings of the framers of the Bill, since Mr. O'Connell, and other delegates of the Association were consulted ; and consultation with the Catholics themselves, upon the subject of their claims, was a mode of proceeding, which, on principle, he had invariably condemned.

On the 23d of March, the Bill was brought in, and read a first time ; and the second reading,

when the principle of the Bill was to be discussed, was fixed for the 19th of April.

The occurrences which had marked the progress of the debates on the Bill for the Suppression of the Association ; — the firm and decided tone taken by the Catholick Members of the Government, and the expressed determination of the Members of the Catholick Association to submit implicitly to the enactments of the Bill, so soon as they should become law, had considerably abated the vehemence and the hostility to the cause of Emancipation, and, in some degree, turned in its favour the tide of publick opinion, which at the beginning of the Session had flowed, almost with unexampled velocity against it. Other circumstances contributed to this change. Amongst the reasons, which the moderate opponents of Emancipation most prominently put forth, in recapitulating their objections to concession, were, the danger of admitting Catholicks to Parliament while the elective franchise in all the Irish counties was possessed by such very poor people, over whom the Priests had almost unlimited influence. Especially when the Government had no influence over the Priests, who were wholly dis-united from the State. It was therefore confidently stated that if the Legislature were to grant Emancipation, the alarm of those who had lived in hostility to that measure, would be considerably diminished, if

it were accompanied with a provision for the Catholick Clergy, and an alteration of the qualification of the elective franchise. Under the idea that such a grant to the Clergy would be beneficial to the general measure, Mr. Croker, unknown to any of the Catholick Members of the Government, in seconding Sir Francis Burdett's Motion for a Committee, gave notice, if no other individual should come forward, that he would propose some plan for that purpose. After the success of Sir Francis Burdett's motion, Lord Francis L. Gower undertook this part of the business, and Mr. Littleton, (Member for Staffordshire,) notified his intention, should the second reading of the Bill be carried, to suggest some arrangement "for the regulation of the elective franchise in Ireland, either in the shape of a separate Bill, or, of a clause in the Roman Catholick Relief Bill. But," said he, *"in neither case will I make any proposition the effect of which would be to trench on existing privileges."* These two measures being introduced, as it were, to support and carry the great one of Emancipation, in its flight through the Legislature, got the name of "Wings."

The reception, which the "Wings" met with in the House of Commons, shewed that they were well calculated to conciliate; and the commencement of the debate, on the second reading, was marked by the singularly auspicious circum-

stance of Mr. Brownlow, who had been one of the most determined and most respectable of the opponents of concession, and who was a Member of an Irish County in which the Protestants were numerous, declaring his conversion to the opinion, that since affairs could not stand still, and, to go back and re-enact the penal Code was impossible, the only alternative which remained was to go forward on the principle of concession. Mr. Brownlow was not the only Member who manfully avowed his change of sentiment in the course of the debate. Colonel Forde, another Irish County Member, Mr. Maxwell, and Colonel Pakenham, Irishmen, and Lord Valletort, declared their intention to support the Bill; the latter of whom deserves no ordinary praise for his manly declaration of the "triumph, " which his reason had enabled him to achieve, " over the strong, and early prejudices which " he had unjustly entertained." Immediately after Lord Valletort had sat down, Mr. Canning rose. His speech may be divided into four parts.

First, that respecting the ignorance which prevailed upon the subject.

Second, a comparison between the Theological Tenets of the Dissenters, and those of the Roman Catholics.

Third, the general arguments in favour of the measure.

Fourth, his own opinion respecting the
 “Wings.”

Under the first head, Mr. Canning said that great mistakes prevailed, respecting the real state of the Question, and that even in the Petitions of the Clergy he found “erroneous apprehensions as to the real state of the law.” In one of them, the prayer was “not to extend “to the Roman Catholicks those privileges, and “immunities, which were withheld from other “classes of Dissenters;” when the most that the supporters of Emancipation proposed to do, was, “to place Roman Catholic Dissenters, on “precisely the same footing as other Dissenters. “Since then the Petitioners had fallen into a “palpable mistake, their prayer being preferred “in error, ought to be met with explanation, not “with compliance; and the Petitioners ought “to be told, that the Relief Bill would not “equalize all religions in the State, but only “equalize the dissenting sects of religion.” “I am,” said Mr. Canning, “and so is this Bill “for a predominant Established Church; and I “would not even in appearance meddle with the “laws which secure that predominance to the “Church of England.” Mr. Canning, in truth, was a zealous supporter of the Established Church, and it was his confirmed, and conscientious conviction that that Church had more to fear from the hostility of Dissenters, than from that of the Roman Catholicks.

It was with this view (the debate having taken a more than usually theological turn), that he entered into an argument to show, first, that the difference between those tenets of the Roman Catholicks, for holding which they were excluded from Parliament, and those of certain Protestant Dissenters, who were admitted, was not so great as to justify so decided a distinction ; and next, that some Dissenters who sat in Parliament, differed more from the Church of England, than the Roman Catholicks.

“ Do not, however,” said Mr. Canning, “ let
 “ it be imputed to me that I mean to say there
 “ are no important distinctions between the Pro-
 “ testant, and Catholick Creeds, — differences
 “ wide enough to make me rejoice that we have
 “ separated from the Church of Rome, and have
 “ purified the doctrine, and the discipline of our
 “ Church from its glosses and corruptions. But
 “ the question we are discussing, is a practical
 “ political question. It is, whether the differ-
 “ ences of faith, such as they are, justify us in
 “ denouncing the Creed of the Roman Catho-
 “ licks, as incompatible with the discharge of
 “ their duties as good subjects, and useful Mem-
 “ bers of the State? I do not mean to draw
 “ the comparison invidiously, but, I own, that
 “ if theological tenets are to have the weight
 “ which is assigned to them, in the discussion of
 “ this question, I am surprised that some Ho-

“nourable Members, while they turn up their
 “eyes at the thoughts of admitting to the privi-
 “leges of the Constitution, those, who, like the
 “Catholicks, differ from them in such points, as
 “I have described, yet do not scruple to sit and
 “vote, as they do daily, with those who deny
 “the Divinity of our Saviour.”

Mr. Canning then proceeded to support his positions by appeal to History, which told the tale of Protestant Dissenters, having brought
 “Protestant Monarchy to the block, and stripped
 “Protestant Episcopacy of its mitre, and Peer-
 “age, — of its spiritual authority, and temporal
 “rank.”

On the other hand, the Roman Catholicks of the present day, and those who lived a century ago, denied that the spiritual allegiance which they owed to the Pope did, or could, interfere with their Allegiance to their lawful Sovereign, as was proved by the evidence of the Poet, Pope, (who was a Roman Catholick) and the testimony of Dr. Doyle, before the Committee of the House of Commons.

Mr. Canning then went on to the general Arguments in favour of the measure; arguments, all of which must be too familiar to the mind of the Reader to require here to be repeated.*

* The Speech of Mr. Canning, which contains at the greatest length all the general Arguments (i. e. those which under all circumstances were applicable) respecting this

With respect to the "Wings," Mr. Canning expressed himself with considerable doubt as to their expediency. With regard to the one which affected the Elective Franchise he said, that "He had much to learn before he could make up his mind to support it. He could not look at it abstractedly with favour," but if it would secure the passing of the Relief Bill, the temptation "might perhaps overcome his scruples, and induce him, though he feared with some what questionable morality, in order 'to do a great right,' to be ready to do 'a little wrong.'"

With respect to the provision for the Catholic Clergy, it had the authority of Mr. Pitt in its support, and therefore Mr. Canning was disposed to look on it with favour. "The objection that the Protestant part of the Community

question, is the one which he delivered on the 22d of June, 1812, when he moved his celebrated resolutions. It was on that occasion that he first avowed that his Sentiments were favourable to Emancipation; and in so doing, he naturally was induced to make known all the Elements on which his decision had been founded. Although his subsequent Speeches contain many of these Arguments amplified according as he found it necessary to meet the reasoning of the opponents of the measure, yet it will be seen by an attentive examination of them, that their foundation is laid in this first Speech, into which were comprehensively collected all the general reasons for concession.

“ would be taxed, in order to raise funds, out of
 “ which the Roman Catholick Clergy might be
 “ paid, might be met by asking, whether the
 “ Catholicks do not contribute to the Taxes out
 “ of which the *Regium Donum* to a portion of
 “ the Dissenting Protestant Church is yearly
 “ paid? not that the payment of Tithes by Ro-
 “ man Catholicks to the Protestant Established
 “ Church formed any precedent for this argu-
 “ ment. That payment was necessarily incident
 “ to the fact that the Protestant Church was the
 “ legal Establishment. And, although to every
 “ thing that could meliorate the system of col-
 “ lecting Tithes, he was willing to give the most
 “ anxious and favourable consideration, yet any
 “ measure that should go to invade the Establish-
 “ ment of the Irish Protestant Church, and to
 “ alienate the property assigned for its support,
 “ he was firmly prepared to resist.

In conclusion Mr. Canning said, “ In pro-
 “ portion as we become great and powerful, as
 “ our resources continue to outgrow the re-
 “ sources of other nations; it is in human na-
 “ ture that something of an invidious feeling
 “ towards us should grow up in the World. It
 “ is a fact which implies no sentiment of envy,
 “ no hostile spirit towards us. It is, as I have
 “ said, in the nature of men that rivalry should
 “ generate not hatred, but envy; and a desire
 “ to seek for consolation in some weaker point

“ of a too successful competition. Never was
 “ there a moment at which the continuance of
 “ peace throughout the World, was more pro-
 “ bable. But even in peace the wary Poli-
 “ tician will calculate the means, and forecast
 “ the chances of War.

“ I say, then, that whatever rival nation
 “ looked jealously into the state of England to
 “ find a compensation for all her advantages,
 “ and a symptom of weakness amidst all her
 “ power, would fix — did fix — as if by instinct,
 “ its eyes on the state in which the Catholick
 “ population of Ireland was kept. ‘ There,’
 “ they say, ‘ is the weakness, there is the vul-
 “ nerable point of England.’ How sad that
 “ they should say this with so great a sem-
 “ blance of truth !

“ Shall we then continue to cherish a wound
 “ that is seated so near the vital part of our
 “ greatness? Shall we not rather disappoint
 “ those who wish us ill (if such there be), and
 “ give comfort and confidence to those who
 “ wish us well, by closing the wound which
 “ has so long remained open and rankling, and
 “ by taking care before we are ever again called
 “ upon to display the National resources, or to
 “ vindicate the National honour, it shall be
 “ so far healed, as that not even a cicatrice
 “ should be left behind ?”

Mr. Canning was followed by Mr. Peel, whose

observations on the general question presented nothing of novelty, but were all made with temperance and ability. In the beginning he studiously asserted that on all other occasions he cordially agreed with Mr. Canning, and claimed credit for the same sincerity of conviction in maintaining, which he gave to Mr. Brownlow for abandoning, his former opinions. The debate ended with a speech of Mr. Brougham's. When the House divided, the Ayes, were 268. The Noes, 241. Majority for the Second reading, 27.

The exertions made by Mr. Canning this evening brought back the gout, and he was unable to attend the House on any of the future stages of the Bill, which was committed on the 7th of May, and passed through its last stage on the 10th, having been ordered to be read a third time on that day by a majority of 21. The Ayes being 248. The Noes 227.

The day after (April 22d) the Catholick Relief Bill had been read a Second time, Mr. Littleton obtained leave to bring in a Bill to regulate the Elective Franchise in Ireland. On the 25th it was read a Second time, with a majority of 48 in its favour. But before this took place, an event occurred which certainly had a very unfavourable effect upon the Catholick cause.

H. R. H. the Duke of York, in presenting

a Petition, from the Dean and Chapter of Windsor, against the Catholicks, took occasion to express himself in very warm terms against their Claims: H. R. H. insisted that the King could not give his Royal consent to a Bill for their relief, without violating his Coronation Oath, and ended by declaring, that as he had always opposed them, so He would continue to do so “to the latest moment of his existence, “whatever might be his situation of life. — “So help him God!”

This solemn ratification by an Oath, of the resolution of the Heir Presumptive, in case He should ever be upon the Throne, to resist concession to the Catholicks being thus publicly made, produced no inconsiderable alarm in the minds of those who considered the settlement of that question, essential to the peace of Ireland, and general well-being of the Country.

Mr. Brougham the succeeding evening, on the debate on the Elective Franchise Bill, alluded to this proceeding, in no measured terms, and although he was called to order by Mr. Plunket, no Member thought proper to say a word in defence of His Royal Highness.

Mr. Littleton's measure was opposed by Mr. Peel and Mr. Brougham, and supported by Mr. Plunket: it passed through the Committee the day after the Relief Bill, and its third reading was postponed till the fate of the last men-

tioned Bill should be decided in the House of Lords. The other "Wing" was introduced, in the form of a resolution, expressive of the willingness of the House of Commons to grant a provision for the Roman Catholick Clergy. The resolution was carried by a majority of 43. So that when the Bill was sent up to the Lords, their Lordships were aware that the House of Commons were prepared, both to raise the qualification of the Elective Franchise, and to grant a maintenance to the Catholick Priesthood. It was generally thought that this knowledge would have very considerable influence with many of the Peers; and notwithstanding the vehemence of the Duke of York, it was likewise supposed, that the examinations which had been taken before the Committee then sitting, which was empowered to enquire into the state of Ireland, and especially that portion of it which related to the forfeited Lands, together with the conciliatory language of the Delegates of the Association, their acquiescence in the "Wings," and their general disposition to smooth difficulties, had gone a great way towards softening the asperity of the opponents of Emancipation, if not to convert them into supporters. It was certainly Mr. Canning's opinion that all these circumstances had made an impression upon Lord Liverpool, and that at one time his mind wavered, on the expediency

of continuing to oppose concession ; it was therefore an “astounding disappointment” to Mr. Canning, when he heard that the tone of Lord Liverpool’s speech on the second reading of the Bill had been more violent, and decided, than he had ever before adopted.

The rejection of the Bill was only what he had expected, and was comparatively of little moment, although the majority, 48, was considerable : but the disposition manifested by the First Minister, and the Heir Presumptive, was calculated to produce consequences in Ireland the more baneful, because different circumstances which had occurred, had contributed to excite in that Country great hopes, that, if the Question did not make any actual progress, yet that there would be such conciliatory feelings displayed in its dismissal, as would afford fair ground of hope for the future.

Mr. Canning, as has been already said, was taken by surprise at the course pursued by Lord Liverpool, who asserted, however, that he had no intention of shewing any increase of hostility to the cause. The mere fact, however, of Mr. Canning being unprepared for the tone of any speech delivered by Lord Liverpool, was more than sufficient to make him feel, that abstinence from all communication between the Catholick and Anti-Catholick Members of the Cabinet on the subject of Emancipation, was an inconve-

nience, which was no longer to be endured. It is certain, that it then was Mr. Canning's wish to come to some sort of compromise with his Colleagues, which should remove all ground of complaint on the part of the Catholicks on the one hand, and do away with all reasonable ground of fear by their opponents on the other. It is equally certain, that about this time, more than one Cabinet was employed in discussions upon the Catholick Question. What was the nature of those discussions, must be left in doubt; but it is not unnatural for any one to conclude from the foregoing premises, that Mr. Canning proposed to his Colleagues some measure, to which he could not obtain their consent. But, from what he said on a debate which occurred on Mr. Spring Rice's motion for the production of some supposed correspondence, between the Home Office and Lord Wellesley, it appeared that the discussions were not wholly unproductive of advantage: for, from that time, the footing, on which the Catholick Question had been placed by the Cabinet, was altered; from that of a forbidden subject, to one which Mr. Canning "held himself as perfectly at liberty to propound for discussion in the Cabinet, as any other question of National Interest." It may, moreover, be stated as a fact (but of course he did not say so in Parliament), that he made known his determination to his Colleagues to be no

longer precluded, from communicating with His Majesty upon the subject whenever he thought fit to do so. The above mentioned debate on Mr. Spring Rice's motion, tended to tranquillize the minds of the Irish people. It turned their attention from the fate of their Bill in the House of Lords to the confident hope of ultimate success, which, notwithstanding that fate, were entertained by its supporters in the Commons. Mr. Peel was conspicuous for his moderation. Mr. Brougham severely censured the conduct of the Duke of York, the Bishop of Chester, and the Lord Chancellor, and, avoided being called to order by condemning, as libels, the speeches which the Newspapers ascribed to those noble Individuals. Towards the conclusion of his speech, Mr. Brougham asserted that "the Catholic Question was the only important question which could arrest the attention of the Government," and repeated the oft-told story, that the Catholick Members of the Cabinet "had the strength to carry the Question, if they would put that strength to a proper and determined use;" telling Mr. Canning that his Anti-Catholick Colleagues "would rather acquiesce in his opinions than suffer him to quit his place."

In answer to this direct appeal Mr. Canning said, that he could "not admit that the Roman Catholick question was every thing, that it was the only question interesting to the

“ Country, or even that it was of such a nature
 “ as to overwhelm and absorb all other ques-
 “ tions.” At the same time he said that if he
 could be persuaded, that the sacrifice of his
 office would “ ensure, or even conduce to the
 “ settlement of the question, he would not hesi-
 “ tate for a moment to make the sacrifice. His
 “ opinion, however, formed upon recent and most
 “ anxious deliberation was, that the relinquish-
 “ ment of office, at that moment, so far from
 “ conducing to the effect of the measure, would
 “ only tend to throw the prospect of success of
 “ the object which it was intended to serve to a
 “ greater distance than ever, at the same time
 “ bringing upon the Country other evils of a
 “ most tremendous character.”

Mr. Canning had recently and anxiously de-
 liberated upon the expediency of his resignation ;
 moreover, he was only prevented from tendering
 it by the entire conviction that the consequences
 of his so doing, would have been to have left the
 field open to the Ultra Party, who would have
 been able to form a Government which would
 have lasted, at any rate, sufficiently long to have
 done incalculable mischief, to retard the settle-
 ment of the question, and to have destroyed, on
 other points, especially on Foreign Policy, all
 the good, of which he had laid the founda-
 tions, and of which he was just beginning to
 witness the effects. To have quitted office then,

without a moral certainty that by that step he would have advanced the Catholick Cause would surely have been most unwise. But with the belief which he entertained, that his retirement would have injured the Cause would have been little short of madness, especially since the Catholick question "was not the *only* question of the time. There are," said he, in a private letter, "others, which, under existing circumstances, I should think it a desertion of duty to throw loose by resigning." All therefore that remained for him to do, was to endeavour to calm the irritation, which the proceedings of the Lords, seemed likely to produce in Ireland, and to put as favourable a construction, as possible, upon Lord Liverpool's speech, to do away with the impression it had made.

While, therefore, he exposed the fallacy of divided allegiance, on which Lord Liverpool had laid great stress, he defended with generous warmth the character of his friend from the aspersions cast upon it by Mr. Brougham, who insinuated that the speech of Lord Liverpool had been framed upon that of the Duke of York. "If," said Mr. Canning, "there lived a man in England who disdained to shape his opinion to the smile or frown of any human creature, that man was Lord Liverpool; whatever, therefore, he had spoken the House might be assured was his sincere opinion; an opinion, from

“ which Mr. Canning differed, but to the sincerity,
 “ and disinterestedness of which he paid the
 “ most implicit homage.” So far, indeed, was it
 from being true that Lord Liverpool so framed
 his speech, its “ whole context exhibited the most
 “ marked, and glaring discrepancy between it,
 “ and the other speech to which Mr. Brougham
 “ endeavoured to assimilate it. Not one of all
 “ the persons who had spoken on the subject had
 “ disposed so summarily, so conclusively, and so
 “ satisfactorily of the idle objection, that the
 “ Coronation Oath was an impediment to the
 “ removal of civil disabilities, as Lord Liverpool,
 “ whom Mr. Brougham represented as having
 “ framed his speech wholly in conformity to that
 “ doctrine. When, therefore,” said Mr. Canning,
 gladly seizing the opportunity to explain away
 the vehemence of Lord Liverpool’s speech, “ it
 “ was considered with how much more weight
 “ that Nobleman’s denial of this doctrine of the
 “ Coronation Oath came from him, than from
 “ any other Individual entertaining a favourable
 “ view of the Catholick Question, Mr. Brougham
 “ ought not to have condemned so unequivocally
 “ a speech, which in this respect, at least, had
 “ rendered so signal a service.”

Sir Francis Burdett addressed the House after
 Mr. Canning, and the motion having answered
 its purpose and produced a debate, Mr. Spring
 Rice consented to withdraw it.

As for the “Wings,” no steps were taken in conformity with the resolution respecting the Catholick Clergy, and Mr. Littleton declined to proceed with the elective Franchise Bill. After which the Catholick Question was allowed to sleep during the remainder of the session.

The prorogation, however, had not long taken place before it was again forced upon Mr. Canning’s thoughts. The Parliament had sat through six Sessions; the United Kingdom was in a state of unexampled prosperity—at least of that sort of prosperity which, however fallacious, was yet at the time sufficient to diffuse contentment, and good humour amongst all classes of the population; and the harvest, no unimportant feature in the aspect of political affairs, had been most abundant. With this combination of fortunate circumstances, the Government, if it had only had to consult its own convenience, and advantage, in coming to a decision respecting a dissolution, would undoubtedly have decided in the affirmative. But here again, as on almost every matter of importance connected with domestick policy, the Catholick Question interfered, and prevented its supporters in the Cabinet from consenting to a step, which in every other point of view would have been beneficial to the Government; and consequently to the Country, if (as every man who continues a Member of a Government, is bound to believe) its welfare and

popularity be an object to the Empire. It was then, because that "amidst all the calm apparently diffused over the English portion of the "United Kingdom," Mr. Canning "felt satisfied "there lay hidden, but ready to break out upon "excitement, a furious zeal against the Catholick "Question," that he would not consent to an immediate dissolution. "He had received information, which left no doubt upon his mind that "such was the fact. In the North of England "there were strong indications of it: but in "the midland counties, and in the Western "and Southern, the Anti-Catholick cry was only "kept down in some places," (as was shewn by the addresses to the Duke of York, thanking him for his conduct,) "until the Proclamation "for a new Parliament, should give the signal "for raising it. Once raised, in half a dozen "Counties, or populous Towns, and there was "no saying how widely, and how rapidly it "might have spread.

"It is but justice to those of Mr. Canning's "Colleagues, who differed from him upon this "question, but first and principally to Lord "Liverpool, to say, that they earnestly deprecated the raising of such a cry; so much so, "that it was this consideration, which mainly, "almost solely, decided the Cabinet to postpone "the dissolution till the following year.

"It is plain, however, that little would have

“ been gained by this postponement (beyond the
 “ divesting Mr. Canning and his Catholick Col-
 “ leagues of the responsibility of creating the
 “ occasion for the cry) if the interval were to
 “ be employed by the Roman Catholicks and
 “ their friends, in a manner tending to keep
 “ alive the disposition to excitement, since, in
 “ some respects, the danger would have been
 “ increased, as the dissolution then, being fore-
 “ seen and inevitable, the Anti-Catholick feel-
 “ ing would have been better prepared to burst
 “ forth in all quarters at once.

“ But, on the other hand, if that interval
 “ were an interval of tranquillity and abeyance,
 “ as to the Roman Catholick Question, there
 “ could be little doubt that the postponement
 “ of the elections, until men’s minds had had
 “ time to cool, would be highly beneficial to it.”

Mr. Canning therefore endeavoured to pre-
 vent the agitation of the Question, in the en-
 suing Session, since little, if any thing, could
 have been gained by it, while every thing might
 have been risked.

“ The sentiments of the then existing House
 “ of Commons in favour of Concession were
 “ upon record. Thrice (including the Roman
 “ Catholick Peer Bill) it had sent up to the
 “ House of Lords Bills granting Concessions
 “ more or less ample. A fourth enunciation of
 “ the same principle would not have added to

“ the authority of preceding divisions, while
 “ a failure, on a fourth trial, would have done
 “ that authority away.” And of a failure there
 was no inconsiderable danger. “ Several warm
 “ and sincere friends of the cause were deter-
 “ mined to withhold their support from a motion
 “ brought forward the following Session. And
 “ if such a motion had been brought forward
 “ vexatiously, and pertinaciously, they would
 “ have turned against it, and fearfully have
 “ reduced the slender majority by which, in
 “ the preceding session, the Relief Bill had
 “ been carried. Moreover these persons were
 “ of such weight and character, so unquestion-
 “ able as to their sincerity, and so unassailable
 “ as to their motives, that their example would
 “ have afforded cloaks, and colour, to nume-
 “ rous other desertions, originating perhaps, as
 “ much in lukewarmness, as timidity. For
 “ every man that voted for the measure was not
 “ therefore an enthusiast in the cause, and
 “ ready to suffer for it the martyrdom of loss
 “ of seat, or of an expensive contest.

“ As for the House of Lords, the case was
 “ not less clear. It was impossible to suppose
 “ that the House of Lords would have yielded
 “ to the mere repetition of a Vote, three times
 “ rejected by them, of the same House of Com-
 “ mons. To have forced them, the House of
 “ Lords, to such a fourth rejection, would have

“ been, only to widen the breach between the
 “ two Houses, and to have given to the disso-
 “ lution, when it must inevitably take place, the
 “ very appearance of an appeal to the People,
 “ which the postponement of it was intended to
 “ avoid.

“ But if, in the first Session of a new House
 “ of Commons, the Vote of the last House of
 “ Commons should have been affirmed, it was
 “ not certain that the House of Lords *would*,
 “ but they might have yielded. It would in
 “ that case have been a new Question, and such
 “ an expression of opinion by a House of Com-
 “ mons, fresh from the People, would have en-
 “ abled the House of Lords to reconsider their
 “ votes, without dishonour. To afford the
 “ chance of such an impression on the House
 “ of Lords, by affording the best chance of the
 “ Election of such a House of Commons, a quiet
 “ Session with respect to the Catholick Question
 “ was absolutely, and indispensably necessary.

“ It was much to be wished that the Catho-
 “ licks themselves might acknowledge, and act
 “ upon this necessity; but if they failed to do
 “ so, it would be, in Mr. Canning’s opinion, the
 “ duty, as much as the policy (for the sake of
 “ the Cause itself) of those who took part in its
 “ favour to resist the attempt to agitate it, and
 “ so strongly did Mr. Canning feel this persua-
 “ sion that he was determined, if, unhappily, the

“ question had been forced on, to have met it
 “ himself with the previous question.

“ He was well aware of the misconstruction
 “ to which such a proceeding would probably
 “ have exposed him. He hoped that it might
 “ be averted by the discretion of the Catholick
 “ Body. But as he could not leave such a
 “ matter to chance, but ought to be prepared
 “ for possible extremities, he formed this resolu-
 “ tion contingently, and not without the hope
 “ that he might be spared the pain of acting
 “ upon it.” Having formed it almost immedi-
 ately after the decision, not to dissolve, had
 been taken by the Cabinet, he made it known to
 his friend, Mr. Plunket. And, perhaps, to the
 fact of Mr. Canning’s intention being surmised,
 might have been owing the forbearance ma-
 nifested by the Catholicks, and their friends,
 whereby he was precluded the necessity of
 acting up to his resolution. It may perhaps
 appear unnecessary to publish these circum-
 stances to the World — but his sentiments on
 this question at this juncture, are too interesting
 and too valuable, to be omitted, in a work of
 this description.

The two remaining subjects — the Alien Bill
 and the defects of the Court of Chancery —
 which occupied the attention of Parliament dur-
 ing the Sessions of 1823 and 1824, will require
 but a very brief notice.

The Bill respecting Aliens, was similar to one which had been renewed, for limited periods, five several times since the year 1815, and the Government proposed in 1824 to continue it for two years. The most important clause in the Bill went to place, in the hands of the Government, authority, at its own good will and pleasure, to send Aliens out of the Country.

Such an authority was contended by the Opposition to be, contrary to the spirit of the Constitution ; and, in truth, it was one for which Mr. Canning had little predilection, if adopted as a permanent legislative enactment. There were, however, circumstances, at the moment, which he considered as amply justifying the temporary continuance of the Bill, and he therefore consented to support it for the limited period of two years ; on the understanding that it was then to be permitted to expire. By this course he secured two objects which he had much at heart : first, by conceding to one party the temporary renewal, he secured, that *that* renewal should be the last ; and, secondly, by the promise that it should not again be revived, he was enabled to settle another point of scarcely less importance, which, in all the discussions of the different renewals of the Act since 1815, had never before been insisted on, viz. that the Government should not again be left without some law of controul over Aliens.

Mr. Peel introduced the Bill, and it passed both Houses after much discussion. Mr. Canning's speech turned chiefly upon general principles of Foreign Policy, which it is unnecessary here to recapitulate, since in other parts of this work they have been fully detailed, and exemplified.

It may be well here to state that when the Bill expired in 1826, a new law was passed, by which all Aliens were compelled, under a certain penalty for omission, to give a true designation of their name, and intended place of abode, on entering into the Country; and were made liable to be called upon by the Secretary of State, if he thought proper, to register themselves anew, at certain intervals, while they remained in England.

With respect to the Court of Chancery, Mr. John Williams, a Chancery Lawyer, brought forward (in 1824) a motion for a Committee to enquire into the causes of the delay in that Court. The arguments by which the motion was supported were directed with some degree of asperity against the individual character of Lord Eldon. The motion was rejected; but before the close of the Session, the Government determined on the appointment, by the Crown, of a Commission of Inquiry.

In the next Session, when Mr. J. Williams renewed his motion, this intention was announced

by Mr. Peel, and the motion was in consequence withdrawn.

On both these occasions Mr. Canning spoke. His observations are chiefly remarkable — First, for the uncompromising way in which he defended, and the handsome eulogy which he pronounced upon, the personal conduct of Lord Eldon; secondly, for the fixed determination which he avowed, that the Commission should not be permitted to be delusory, but should fulfil, *bonâ fide*, the purposes for which it was appointed; and, lastly, for his decided disapprobation of the scheme, for separating the political, from the judicial, character of the Lord Chancellor.

CHAP. X.

FRENCH AFFAIRS. — DEATH OF LOUIS XVIII. — BRAZILIAN AFFAIRS. — PROCEEDINGS AT LISBON AFTER THE OVERTHROW OF THE CORTES. — LORD BERESFORD. — CONSPIRACY OF THE QUEEN AND DON MIGUEL. — DEPARTURE OF DON MIGUEL. — M. DE SUBSERRA. — APPOINTMENT OF SIR WILLIAM A COURT, AS AMBASSADOR AT LISBON. — DISMISSAL OF M. DE SUBSERRA'S ADMINISTRATION. — APPOINTMENT OF M. DE PORTO SANTO, AS MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

WHILE Mr. Canning was steadily promoting the interests of his country by the fearless adoption of whatever measures he judged would prove conducive to its welfare; and while he was gradually withdrawing Great Britain from her intimate connexion with the Holy Alliance; he was, nevertheless, most anxious that the British Government should continue on terms of the strictest friendship with each individual member of that league of Sovereigns.

With France in particular he wished to establish "a close, and separate good understanding,

“on which,” he thought, “more than on any other political combination, the permanency of peace depended.” And with respect to both Russia and Austria, he was always willing, whenever he thought it could be usefully done, to employ the influence, and good offices of England to settle any external difficulties, from which danger or inconveniences were likely to arise, either to those Powers themselves, or, through them, to the rest of Europe.

The success of the invasion of Spain had tended considerably to increase the stability of the French Bourbon throne, to which, in all probability, an opposite result would have been fatal. That expedition both proved, and confirmed the loyal disposition of the army; and in respect, therefore, to the possession of a more stable Government, the nation may be said to have been benefited: but in every other way, especially in the heavy charges on its pecuniary resources which were entailed by the original cost of the war and subsequent maintenance of the army in a foreign land, and still more in the injustice of the attack, and the violation of his promise by Louis XVIII., the French, as a nation, were losers. The Ministry, also, was not eventually without its embarrassments on the same account; for the deplorable condition to which Spain was reduced, and the admitted failure of foreign interference to maintain even

that sort of order which was preserved during the existence of the Constitutional Government, and which was destroyed by the French attack, made the continuance of the French army in Spain a point of honour and duty, at the same time that the occupation involved expenses from which little, or no profit, was, or could be, derived.

Embarrassments such as these, however, were not felt till some time after the termination of the contest; and, as a necessary consequence, the triumph of the French arms gave strength, at the time, to the Ministers under whose auspices it was obtained. M. de Villèle and his colleagues, therefore, took advantage of the favourable juncture which this success had created to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies, in order to get over the elections before any events occurred which might render more questionable the wisdom of their policy, which thus far had answered to its end. No exertions were spared to insure a return of new members well-disposed towards the Government; and the result was, that the liberal opposition, who in the former Chamber mustered a very considerable party, in the renewed Chamber did not amount to more than sixteen; while the Ultra-Royalist opposition, although far more respectable in numbers, was still small in comparison with what it had been. The loudest complaints, (not with-

out good reason,) were made of the public functionaries who had the direction of the election; but so certain did the Government feel of the strength which it possessed in the overwhelming number of its friends, that it was at little pains to deny, or to conceal the corrupt and partial conduct of its agents.

The Session opened on the 23d of March.

The topics of the Speech which were of the most importance were, first, the declared intention to propose that the Chamber of Deputies, which, unless dissolved, was renewed in portions of one-fifth every five years, should be renewed "*intégralement*" every seven years; and second, a proposal for the paying off the Five per Cents. (which were above par), or their conversion into a stock bearing a lower rate of interest. By this plan it was said that means might be obtained for "closing the last wounds of the Revolution;" in other words, giving an indemnity to the emigrants.

The announcement of the Septennial Law produced little sensation. Not so that for the reduction of the Five per Cents.; in which reduction so many persons were interested, that no sooner was the proposition known than the most violent outcry was raised against it. M. de Villèle, notwithstanding, succeeded in carrying it through the Chamber of Deputies, but it was subsequently thrown out in the House of Peers;

in some slight degree, perhaps, owing to the lukewarmness shown by M. de Chateaubriand in its support. The defeat of this project, which was known to have originated with M. de Villèle, did not cause the downfall of that Minister. The King, and his brother openly lamented the failure of the measure; and M. de Villèle himself declared, that since his conduct was approved by his Sovereign, no combination should induce him to resign. In this declaration the members of the Chamber of Deputies either saw, or fancied that they saw, a manly determination not to shrink from the difficulties of his position; and an impression so favourable to M. de Villèle was produced amongst them, that he took advantage of it to punish M. de Chateaubriand, whose abrupt dismissal from his office was notified to him, by the First Minister, in a letter somewhat as laconick as the one addressed by Lord North to Mr. Fox, when the latter was deprived by the former of his seat at the Treasury Board.

M. de Chateaubriand had for some time lost his influence in the Cabinet, and the existence of the Government seemed not likely to be seriously affected either by the withdrawal from it of his co-operation, or by his junction with the Ultra-Royalists.

The other grand measure of the Session, the Septennial Law, was allowed quietly to pass; and the estimates for the service of the year

having been got through, the Chambers were prorogued on the 4th of August ; not, however, without M. de Villèle making known his intention to be ready with a plan for the adequate indemnity of the Emigrants, at the commencement of the following Session.

On all of these proceedings of the Government in the Chambers, the state of the King's health had more or less effect. His Majesty's strength had visibly declined during the summer, and there was little probability of the prolongation of his life through the ensuing winter. In consequence of this prospect of his speedy dissolution, M. de Villèle busily employed himself in preparing for the transfer of the crown, and securing, in the case of that event, the continuance of his own power.

To conciliate the good will of the heir to the throne, several measures, supposed to be agreeable to His Royal Highness, had been hastily brought forward, or notified as intended to be brought forward, by the First Minister to the Chambers ; which measures were apparently communicated to the publick, in order to give them the appearance of being originated by Louis XVIII. that His Royal Highness might be relieved from their responsibility or odium, when he should ascend the throne. The unpopular Law of Sacrilege, rejected only on account of some of its details, — the Septennial

Law, which passed, — and the promise of an Indemnity to the Emigrants, were all calculated to please the future Sovereign.

After the prorogation of the Chambers the same course of policy was pursued. Attempts were made to silence the opposition newspapers by prosecutions; but the tribunals being too independent to be influenced by the Ministry, the Crown failed in obtaining a verdict.

To counteract the effect of these defeats, the Government imposed the Censorship upon the Journals; a stroke of policy which, in spite of its tremendous unpopularity, was nevertheless well fitted to give, for a time, great additional strength to the Ministry.

The Council of State was likewise remodelled, and many of the dignitaries of the Church were introduced into that body.

By these means M. de Villèle so completely succeeded in ingratiating himself with Monsieur, that when that Prince, upon the death of his brother, on the 16th of September, became Charles X., his determination was at once avowed to make no change in the Administration.

The behaviour of Louis on his death-bed was singularly courageous: and the language of Charles on his accession was eminently patriotic. These two circumstances produced a feeling of popularity towards the house of Bour-

bon, which the first acts of the new King after his succession, tended not a little to increase.

The Duc d'Angoulême, notoriously the favourer of moderate opinions, was admitted into the Cabinet Council.

The Duc d'Orléans, of whom the late King had entertained an unreasonable jealousy, was raised from the rank of *Serene* to that of *Royal Highness*: and the abolition of the Censorship was decreed, which seemed almost as if it had been established for the express purpose of securing to Charles X. the certain means of acquiring applause by its removal. M. de Villèle, of course, reaped his share of the general good will which was thus created, and was consequently more firmly established than ever in the high situation which he occupied.

To be upon the best terms with the French Government, was, as has been before said, a part of Mr. Canning's policy. Having been unable to prevent the invasion of Spain, and having determined that the wisest course would be not to resent it by hostility, he was willing to put the most favourable construction on all that was said or done by that Government respecting it. And, above all things, he was desirous to avoid using any menacing language, which might have the effect of making it a point of honour with the French Ministers to oppose the wishes of the British Cabinet. It was with

the view of maintaining a real friendship between the two countries, that he, as it seems, went out of his way to bestow the tribute of his praise on the Duc d'Angoulême, for the wisdom and prudence which His Royal Highness had displayed while he commanded the French Army in the Peninsula. And, for the same end, Lord Granville was, on the occasion of a new reign, removed from the Hague to Paris, to replace Sir Charles Stuart as British Ambassador in the French Capital; that, as Mr. Canning's intimate personal friend, and as known to be possessed of his entire confidence, he might be instrumental in cementing a perfectly good understanding between the British Foreign Secretary and the French Premier; the latter of whom had naturally full as much concern with the Foreign Policy as the Baron de Damas, who had been appointed, before the death of Louis XVIII., to succeed the Viscomte de Chateaubriand.

The same principles which dictated this conduct towards France, induced the manifestation by Mr. Canning of similar friendly feelings towards both Russia and Austria. For at the very time when his policy was most sensibly diverging from that of the Holy Alliance, the British Ambassador at Constantinople, instructed by Mr. Canning, was actually carrying on negotiations with the Divan, to further the wishes and interests of the Russian Emperor. In the

success of these negotiations (an account of which is reserved for a subsequent chapter), the Court of Vienna was hardly less interested, than was that of St. Petersburg, and thus it was, that the two chief members of the Holy Alliance, whilst watching with unfeigned anxiety, the efforts of Great Britain in behalf of the one, and witnessing their success, were taught that Her assistance was too valuable to be thrown away, Her vengeance too formidable to be tempted.

In these transactions, Austria, although deeply, was still, only indirectly, concerned.

To convince, therefore, her Ministers that this Country *knew how to value* Her co-operation, Mr. Canning encouraged the association of the Imperial Government in the negotiations, which were carried on under British auspices, between Portugal and Brazil: the plea for which association being, the matrimonial connection between the Austrian and Brazilian Emperors.

To the affairs of Portugal and Brazil, the remainder of this chapter will be dedicated.

Those of the former Country, must be resumed from the time when the Constitutional Government was overthrown, the particulars of which event have already been detailed.

Those of the latter (of which little has been hitherto said) must be taken up from a much earlier period.

“Up to the time of the emigration of the

“ Royal Family of Portugal to Brazil, to escape
 “ falling into the hands of Napoleon, Brazil was
 “ as strictly a Colony, as Mexico, Columbia, or
 “ Peru.

“ From that time began a series of relaxations
 “ first, and of concessions afterwards, which
 “ gradually exalted the condition of Brazil, and
 “ almost inverted its relations with Portugal, so
 “ as to make, during the residence of the King
 “ in Brazil, the Mother Country, in fact, the
 “ Dependency.”

“ On the 28th of June, 1808, a *Carta Regia*,
 “ or Royal Edict, threw open all the Ports of
 “ Brazil, to Foreign Commerce. In the same
 “ year, decrees were issued, establishing through-
 “ out Brazil, Supreme Tribunals of Justice.

“ In December, 1815, a Royal Edict was
 “ published at Rio de Janeiro, declaring Brazil
 “ to be a Kingdom. By a decree of the 18th of
 “ February, 1821, His Most Faithful Majesty
 “ convoked at Rio de Janeiro, a National Re-
 “ presentation, for the avowed purpose of laying
 “ the first foundations of a political system, to
 “ be grounded, exclusively on the separate in-
 “ terests of Brazil.

“ A *Carta Regia*, in April, 1821, published
 “ by His Most Faithful Majesty, on his departure
 “ for Lisbon, created the Prince Royal, Regent
 “ of Brazil, conveyed to His Royal Highness,
 “ with the title of Lieutenant to the King, the

“ full plenitude of the Royal Authority : this
 “ *Carta Regia* was accompanied by instructions,
 “ specifying the powers which the Prince Re-
 “ gent was authorized to exercise, including all
 “ the branches of the internal Government, ju-
 “ dicial, financial, and political; the appoint-
 “ ment to all offices, civil, military, and eccle-
 “ siastical; the grant of all honours; and lastly,
 “ the right of making War, and Peace. Other
 “ private instructions were likewise, at the same
 “ time, given by the King his Father, to the
 “ Prince Regent, enjoining him above all things,
 “ to preserve Brazil to the House of Braganza;
 “ and in case of any unforeseen circumstances,
 “ which should make the continuance of the
 “ union between Portugal and Brazil impracti-
 “ cable, or should put the existence of Monarchy
 “ in Brazil to imminent hazard, to place the
 “ crown upon his own head, and to take especial
 “ care, that it was not left to fall upon the head
 “ of an adventurer.

“ By these successive acts, His Most Faithful
 “ Majesty, First, did away the Colonial charac-
 “ ter of Brazil : — Secondly, gave to it an inde-
 “ pendent judicature : — Thirdly, raised Brazil
 “ to the character of a separate Kingdom : —
 “ Fourthly, established in it a national Repre-
 “ sentation : — Fifthly, suggested and provided
 “ for the case in which it might be necessary,

“for the safety of that separate Kingdom, to
“pronounce its Independence of Portugal.”

The establishment of a National Representation, granted as it was by the King to the demands of the People, because it was hazardous to refuse them, was any thing but agreeable to His Most Faithful Majesty, who quitted Brazil for Portugal, three short months after this concession had been made by him. On his arrival at Lisbon, he found existing there a state of affairs, nearly similar to that which he had left behind him at Rio, with this difference, that the Portuguese Cortes had usurped more of the Royal Authority, than the Legislative Assemblies of Brazil. Shortly after the King's return to Lisbon, the democratical faction, which ruled in the Cortes, sent out orders to Rio de Janeiro, in the name of His Most Faithful Majesty, for the dissolution of the Brazilian Regency, and the suppression of the Supreme Tribunals, together with directions to the Prince Regent, to return to Europe forthwith, in case of disobedience on pain of being pronounced a Traitor, and excluded from the succession to the Crown of Portugal.

While the Cortes were thus employed at Lisbon, the Brazilians were growing clamorous for throwing off all the subjection of the Mother Country; and on the 21st of October, 1821, about six months after the departure of the King,

“ the tender of the Crown of Brazil was made,
 “ by acclamation of the people, to Don Pedro;”
 but “ the circumstances of the time not appear-
 “ ing to him absolutely to require so decisive a
 “ measure, he refused ” to accept the offer which
 was made to him. It was not till the decree of
 the Cortes reached Rio de Janeiro, and “ until
 “ after receiving representations from the differ-
 “ ent Provinces of Brazil, declaring that the
 “ return of the Prince to Europe, would at once,
 “ erect Brazil into an Independent Republick,
 “ that the Prince Regent consented to accept
 “ the title of Perpetual Defender of Brazil.”
 The only other step which His Royal Highness
 took, at the time when he assumed this title, was,
 that of calling together the National Represent-
 ation, already “ created by his Father;” a measure
 “ suggested to His Royal Highness, by the Pro-
 “ cureurs General of Provinces, and by the
 “ unanimous wish of all classes of the commu-
 “ nity, as absolutely necessary, for tranquillizing
 “ the publick mind in Brazil.

“ This Convocation greatly strengthened the
 “ union between the different Provinces of
 “ that Country; and while it prevented tumult,
 “ and perhaps civil war, it pledged the Brazilians
 “ irrevocably to each other, in resistance to the
 “ aggressions of the Portuguese Cortes, who had
 “ had the absurdity to menace Brazil with an
 “ attack.

“ On the 1st of August, 1822, His Royal
 “ Highness published a Proclamation, regulating
 “ the preparations of defence against these
 “ threatened hostilities ; and, on the 6th of the
 “ same month, he addressed to the Sovereigns
 “ of Europe, a Manifesto, explaining the motives
 “ which had dictated these preparations.

“ Thus far the Prince Regent had done no-
 “ thing, and permitted nothing to be done, that
 “ was not in strict execution of the trust confided
 “ to him by his Royal Father.

“ But, the Cortes of Lisbon continuing their
 “ menaces, both against Brazil, and against the
 “ Prince Regent, threatening the Cortes with
 “ subjugation, and the Prince Regent, with the
 “ forfeiture of his succession to the Crown of
 “ Portugal ; His Royal Highness was compelled
 “ to chuse between obedience on the one hand,
 “ to mandates issued in the name of his Royal
 “ Father, (although, as was well known, against
 “ His Most Faithful Majesty’s real feelings,) an
 “ obedience, which would have placed his per-
 “ son in the power of his enemies, and would
 “ have consigned Brazil, to all the miseries of a
 “ democrattick Revolution ; — and the making,
 “ on the other hand, of common cause with a
 “ people, who had signified in a manner not to
 “ be mistaken, that their continued submission
 “ to a monarchical form of Government, in the
 “ House of Braganza, was conditional upon his

“ Royal Highness’s remaining amongst them.
 “ In this dilemma, the Prince Regent consented
 “ to adopt the unanimous proposition of the
 “ Procureurs of Provinces, addressed to the
 “ Council of State, and to proclaim, in this last
 “ extremity, the political Independence of Brazil.

“ At the same time, he issued a Carta Legis,
 “ substituting the denomination of Empire, for
 “ that of Kingdom of Brazil ; ” and as a necessary
 “ consequence of this substitution, “ admitted,
 “ rather than assumed, the title of Emperor in
 “ his own person. Both these titles were devised,
 “ for the express purpose of satisfying the
 “ democratical party in Brazil — a party strong
 “ enough at that moment, to have overthrown
 “ Monarchy altogether, if they had been set at
 “ defiance.”

These events did not open the eyes of the Portuguese Cortes, whose treatment of Brazil was unaltered, to the very moment, when their existence was put an end to by Don Miguel, and the Army.

That event, of which the particulars have been already given, there was like reason to lament, for the Constitutional Government, neither gave satisfaction at home, nor inspired confidence abroad. It violated without scruple its engagements with Great Britain, by imposing upon British Woollens, double the stipulated amount of duty, and by absolutely prohibiting the im-

portation of British Corn : moreover, such signal instances of bad faith occurred in its diplomacy, that Mr. Canning, who certainly entertained any thing but an antipathy to Constitutional Governments, could not regret the revolution which transferred the power of the state into the hands of the King : since the change afforded a better chance, that British Counsels tendered with a sincere desire to promote the welfare of Portugal, might again be listened to by her Statesmen.

It has always been maintained, that it is for the interest both of Great Britain and Portugal*,

* Lord Palmerston, in his speech in the House of Commons, on the 1st of June, 1829, very ably illustrates this position: He says, " It has been the opinion of the ablest English statesmen, that it is important to the security of England, that the Tagus should be in the hands of a friendly power. It has been thought by the most competent judges, that with Gibraltar our own, and with an ally at Lisbon, we might face the combined hostility of France and Spain, should we ever be exposed to meet it, if not without effort, at least without alarm. This opinion, too, has not been confined to our ablest statesmen, it was shared by our ablest enemy—I mean Napoleon Bonaparte. It has also been the opinion of the wisest statesmen of Portugal, that the best security for Portuguese independence was to be found in the selfish interests of England; and that, as it was worth while for England, for her own sake, to make great efforts to prevent Portugal from being annexed to Spain, England therefore was sure to be the most sincere and trusty ally, to whom, in the hour of need, Portugal could turn for assistance. These reciprocal interests engendered connexion and alliance; mutual use-

but especially of the latter, that a close connection should subsist between them. In all times it has been the wise policy of British Statesmen to cement this connection. The designation of the King of Portugal as His Britannick Majesty's oldest and most faithful Ally, and the defensive Treaty which exists between them, attest at once the duration of the Alliance, and the great value which has been mutually attached to it. No one was more sensible of its importance than Mr. Canning; and he accordingly lost no time in endeavouring to secure the predominance of British influence at the Court of Lisbon. His Most Faithful Majesty, having expressed his wish that the British Chargé d'Affaires should be replaced by a British Minister, and that Sir Edward Thornton should be the individual invested with that character, the desire was promptly acceded to by His Majesty; and moreover, still more clearly to mark the interest which the Court of London took in the affairs of

“fulness led to good offices on one side, and to confidence on
 “the other; treaties imposed obligations, and conferred cor-
 “responding rights; and hence it is that Portugal has always
 “solicited and received the advice of England, as that of a
 “friend whose interests were identified with her own; and
 “hence it is, also, that England has been permitted to exer-
 “cise an interference, and possess an influence, in the coun-
 “cils of Portugal, which did not naturally belong to her, as
 “regarding an independent State.”

the King of Portugal, the arrival at Lisbon of Sir Edward Thornton, was the moment selected for the investiture of His Most Faithful Majesty with the Order of the Garter.

* When Sir Edward landed at Lisbon, he found already there, the French Ambassador, M. Hyde de Neuville, and the Diplomattick Agents of the other Continental Powers. At that time, the success of the French, in their attack on Spain, was yet undecided.

The French Ambassador (whose Government had sent the Order of St. Esprit to His Most Faithful Majesty), and the other Foreign Diplomats, were then exhausting every persuasive art to urge the Portuguese Government (since the Cortes of Lisbon were put down) to join the French, both by sea and land, in their assaults on Cadiz, in which town, Ferdinand and the Spanish Cortes were besieged. On the other hand, Sir Edward Thornton was instructed as earnestly to recommend to the Portuguese Cabinet not to aid the French in their war against the Constitutional Government of Spain, as his predecessor had been instructed to advise the Ministers of the Portuguese Cortes not to join the Spanish Constitutionals against the French.

In either case, the attack on the part of Portugal would have been unprovoked; so that had the party attacked been victorious, and in their

turn become the assailants, Portugal would have had no right to that assistance, which, had she not been the aggressor, she would have been entitled by Treaty to receive from England. The counsels of Great Britain prevailed ; and if there was a slight infringement of strict neutrality by Portugal in favour of the French, it was disavowed, and not repeated.

The fall of Cadiz put an end to any further struggles on this point, which, however, was only one of the many upon which the British Minister differed in opinion with his Diplomatick Colleagues.

It will doubtless be remembered, that before the King left Lisbon to join the party who were opposed to the Cortes, he promised by proclamation to give a Constitution to his people ; and that when he returned to his Capital, after the complete restoration of his absolute authority, he still seemed so determined to adhere to his promise, that in spite of the opposition of the Queen, and of Don Miguel, he appointed a Commission, of which M. de Palmella was the head, to draw up a plan of a Constitutional form of Government. M. de Palmella being, at the same time, appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, and M. de Pamplona (Conde de Subserra) being placed at the head of the Government. Of these two Ministers, the first named held liberal opinions, was favourable to a Constitu-

tional Government, and was strongly inclined to the opinion, that the interests of Portugal were best consulted by the cultivation of the friendship of England. The other, M. de Pamplona, disagreed, *in toto*, in this last point from his Colleague, preferring then the alliance and countenance of France, to those of Great Britain, as in former times he had preferred the army of Masséna, to the army of Wellington.

Both these Ministers were supported by the personal favour of the King. M. de Subserra more so than M. de Palmella.

Against the King's fulfilment of his promise to grant a Constitution, the Representatives of Russia, Austria, and Prussia, were instructed to use their utmost efforts. Upon such a matter, the British Government disclaimed both the right, and the wish, authoritatively, to interfere with the decision of His Most Faithful Majesty. But Mr. Canning did not, when asked, disguise his opinion, that “ since the misfortunes, with
 “ which Spain was at that moment afflicted,
 “ were in no inconsiderable degree to be traced
 “ to the violation of a like voluntary engagement
 “ on the part of Her Sovereign, and since the
 “ pledged word of His Majesty, and the declared
 “ sentiments of M. de Palmella, must have excited
 “ expectations in the people of Portugal, the fate
 “ of Spain ought to be considered as a warning,
 “ that those expectations could not be disap-

“ pointed without incurring the danger of similar
“ calamities.

On the part of M. de Palmella, there was every disposition both to adhere to his own declarations, and to secure the performance of his Sovereign's engagements; and for this purpose one of the first acts of his administration was to address a letter to Mr. Canning to solicit from the British Government, in consideration of the unsettled state of Portugal, the aid of a body of troops to give strength and stability to the Government of His Most Faithful Majesty.

This request for military succour was refused; for the British Government was most unwilling to have even the appearance, if it were possible to avoid it, of any forcible interference with the internal affairs of another State. But Portugal was too old, and too valued a connection to be lightly abandoned; and, since the presence of a British Naval force was sure to “ confirm in the
“ eyes of the Portuguese Nation, the strict inti-
“ macy and good will subsisting between the
“ two Crowns; and, by inference, the dis-
“ position of the King of England to lend every
“ practical support to His Most Faithful Ma-
“ jesty;” it was determined by the British Cabinet to send, without loss of time, a squadron to the Lisbon station.

By this plan, a certain asylum was secured to His Most Faithful Majesty in the event of his

personal safety being endangered, while the species of force was such as was not capable of being employed as an instrument of domestick Police, or as an agent in civil dissensions ; and, at the same time, a visible proof was given of the interest felt by Great Britain in the welfare of her Ally, by the exertion of that legitimate influence which any State has a right to exercise over the affairs of others, by affording them the moral support of its countenance, and friendship.

Although this measure, produced many of the good effects which were intended from it, it did not enable those Members of the Portuguese Government who were favourable to the grant of a Constitution, to insist on that grant being made.

Would England, it was asked, if a Constitution were given, guarantee its preservation against internal commotions ?

But the same reasoning which was decisive against the compliance with a similar demand on the part of the Spanish Cortes, was in this case applicable, if not in its full extent, at any rate sufficiently so, to dictate the necessity of a negative answer.

“ The best guarantee, for the internal safety “ of Portugal,” said Mr. Canning, in declaring its impossibility, “ is to be found in that sense “ of security in the Government, which will grow

“ up from the gradual restoration of its intimate
 “ connection with England ; a connection which
 “ has in itself a force more operative than any
 “ written stipulations.”

Unfortunately, however, for Portugal, the two parties in the Cabinet were so nearly balanced as to prevent the cultivation of this connection.

After the Revolution of the preceding year, the wishes of the Queen and Don Miguel, by whom that Revolution had been effected, were not allowed, in consequence of the King's dislike to his Consort, to have, in the selection of his Ministers, that influence which the chief actors in so important a political transaction had not unnaturally expected to exercise.

The Nation, like most of the other Countries of Europe, was divided into three great parties : the Constitutionalists, and the Absolutists, whose principles were in extremes ; and the moderate party, whose principles went between the other two. Of these, the first two were by far the most numerous, since together they comprehended all of the *very* lowest, and worst description of the people. They were nearly equally divided. The one was headed by all those who figured before the publick during the existence of the Cortes ; the other, by the Queen, Don Miguel, and the Priests.

The leader of the third, or moderate party,

was the King, supported by the most respectable persons in the Country. Out of this party the Cabinet was formed; but from being of the three, by far the weakest, the Members of it who belonged to the Government, were led to look rather for external, than internal support. In this originated a schism, which paralyzed all real exertions for the publick good. M. de Palmella no doubt wished to adhere to English connections. But M. de Subserra having managed to acquire great hold over the mind of the King, and being vehemently supported by the French Ambassador, continued successfully to thwart M. de Palmella's efforts, the King vacillating between the two.

The advice which was tendered to the Portuguese Cabinet by Mr. Canning, related chiefly to its relations with Brazil.

In respect to the internal affairs of Portugal, his opinions were openly given, but their adoption was not urged as was that of those which had reference to Brazil. Respecting that subject, M. de Palmella's views were unluckily at variance with Mr. Canning's, although on this point, as well as on every other, Mr. Canning's advice was dictated by an anxious wish to promote the tranquillity and happiness of Portugal, Portugal, indeed, in a distracted condition, could only be burthensome to Great Britain as an ally.

On the other hand, the French Ambassador opposed indiscriminately whatever measures were recommended by the British Minister. In his opposition to Sir Edward Thornton, M. Hyde de Neuville was joined by the Representatives of the other great Powers of Europe, so that when Great Britain approved of the gift of a Constitution, the others all united in condemning such a measure, while some of them actually went the length of threatening the employment of force to prevent the Portuguese Government from fulfilling the voluntary pledge of His Most Faithful Majesty. The British Minister, however, had no difficulty in assuring M. de Palmella, that in such a case, England would not be backward in rendering prompt and effectual aid against any external aggression. And, moreover, the Continental Powers, and Spain in particular, were distinctly warned that such was the fixed determination of the British Government.

Sir Edward Thornton was not the only Englishman who at this time bore a conspicuous part in political affairs at Lisbon.

Lord Beresford, a Field Marshal in the Portuguese service, in whom His Most Faithful Majesty had long reposed great confidence, had gone to Lisbon on private affairs. His Lordship's high rank in the Portuguese Army, and his distinguished services in the Peninsular War, pointed him out as a person peculiarly fitted to

introduce discipline into the Portuguese army, which, from having been the instrument of bringing about two successive changes in the Government, had acquired a knowledge of its power; a power, which it is dangerous to any State for the military in its employ to possess, but which is much more so, after a successful experiment has revealed to them the knowledge that they have it. The King, and some of his Ministers, were not blind to the advantages which the Country might derive from Lord Beresford's military talents; and accordingly it was made known to that nobleman, that his acceptance of the office of Minister at War, with a seat in the Cabinet, would be highly agreeable to His Most Faithful Majesty. But Lord Beresford, remembering the former behaviour of M. de Subserra, who was known still to be the adherent of the French Ambassador, refused to belong to a Cabinet of which that individual was to form a part.

The consequence of this determination, was the commencement, both in that Council, and out of it, of a series of struggles, which at first seemed as if they would have terminated in favour of Lord Beresford, but which, from M. de Subserra having the ear of the King, and being clamorously supported by M. Hyde de Neuville, seemed afterwards to promise a different result. The British Minister, in obedience

to his instructions, carefully abstained from mingling in these struggles; for although Mr. Canning was anxious, that since Lord Beresford had gone to Lisbon, his Lordship should be placed at the head of the Army, yet he did not chuse to commit his Government by directing Sir Edward Thornton to use his official influence, in order to obtain even that post for Lord Beresford, still less to force him into the Cabinet, which Mr. Canning considered, as far as England was concerned, any thing but desirable. M. de Palmella was indifferent, if not averse, to Lord Beresford's junction with the Administration, from having no great confidence in his Lordship's political bias, while M. de Subserra was violently opposed to it, because he was unavoidably identified with England. Affairs went on in an uncertain way, without any decisive occurrence, from September 1823, to April 1824, during which time the Government did not manage to conciliate either of the two extreme parties; and the Infant, Don Miguel, was still allowed to remain Commander-in-chief.

But His Royal Highness was exasperated against M. de Subserra for having contrived to absorb to himself the entire management, and all the patronage of the Army, of which the Prince was only Generalissimo in name. His Royal Highness's anger was nourished by his Mother, the Queen, by whom he was urged to take

advantage of the weakness and unpopularity of the Government, to conspire both against it, and against his Father. The Queen was Sister of Ferdinand the Seventh; and an idea of her character may be best conveyed, by saying that she possessed, in an exaggerated degree, all the qualities which have rendered that Monarch's name so famous, or infamous, amongst the Sovereigns of Europe.

Don Miguel inherited the passions, and had imbibed the feelings, of his Mother. Amongst M. de Subserra's friends, who held official situations, the one with whom he was most intimate was the Master of the Horse, the Marquis de Loulé. This unfortunate individual was found, on the morning of the 4th of March, assassinated in one of the Courts of the Palace at Salvaterra. Publick fame has long pointed at the Infant Don Miguel, as the abettor, and the Marquis of Abrantes, as the perpetrator of this crime. Whether they were so, or not, it is impossible positively either to deny, or to affirm, since the real criminals, whoever they might be, were never brought to justice. But two reasons are assigned for the hatred of the Infant to the Marquis. First, that the murdered nobleman was the dear friend of the hated Subserra, with whom he shared the favour of the King. Next, that he had been endeavouring to intrigue with one of the Infantas, to the preservation of whose

honour (to his credit be it spoken) the Prince was singularly sensitive.

The affair is still so involved in mystery, that the most that can be done in historically recording it (since it is too important to pass over unnoticed), is to state the reports which were prevalent at the time of its occurrence. M. de Subsérre was active in endeavouring to discover the assassins of his friend; and having obtained, as was imagined, satisfactory proofs that the Marquis of Abrantes, the inseparable companion of the Infant, had had a share in the murder, these proofs were to have been submitted to the Council on the 30th of April. To prevent this proceeding, the Marquis, it is supposed, urged Don Miguel to accelerate the explosion of the before-mentioned plot, which His Royal Highness and his Mother were at that time busily engaged in contriving, in accordance with the opinions of Her Majesty, which, in the preceding year she had expressed to her brother and the Duc d'Angoulême, that her Husband was unfit to reign, and that a Regency ought to be appointed to administer the Government in his name.

Early in the morning of the 30th of April the inhabitants of Lisbon were alarmed by the news that the greater part of the troops forming the Garrison of Lisbon were drawn up in the great Square of the Rocio; that several individuals

had been arrested, amongst whom was the Marquis of Palmella, and certain Officers belonging to the King's Household; and that the Palace of Bemposta, in which His Majesty was residing, was surrounded by guards, who had received orders not to allow any one to pass without an order from the Commander-in-chief, Don Miguel. It was by the orders of the Prince that the troops were thus collected, under the pretence that he had discovered a conspiracy of Free Masons against the lives of the King, the Royal Family, and Himself; but in reality with a view to intimidate His Majesty into an abdication of his authority.

The Army had not been long assembled before the Infant made his appearance, and distributed a Proclamation among the soldiers, threatening the Free Masons with extermination, and charging that sect with having intended to annihilate the House of Braganza, and to subvert the Catholick Religion.

The account of these proceedings soon reached the ears of the Foreign Ministers, who agreed to meet in the house of the Papal Nuntio, to deliberate on the course which it would be expedient for them to pursue. They determined to seek, without delay, the presence of the King; and having passed through the Square of the Rocio, in sight of Don Miguel and his officers, they shortly arrived at the Palace of Bemposta,

where they were at first refused permission to enter; but, insisting on their right to be admitted to the King, the Officers charged with the prevention of the ingress of any individuals to the Palace, did not dare to resist, with actual violence, persons, invested with the sacred character of Representatives of the Monarchs of Europe, in their efforts to obtain access to the Sovereign to whom they were accredited. On reaching the Royal Presence, where they found Lord Beresford, who had experienced similar difficulties in getting into the Palace, they conjured the King to acquaint them with the cause and motives of these extraordinary proceedings; and they assured him of the interest which they took in his personal welfare, and in the security of his Government.

They then mentioned the arrests which had been made, particularly that of the Marquis de Palmella; and asked if they had been made with His Majesty's knowledge.

The King replied, that the arrests and all the other proceedings had been carried on without his knowledge; that two of his own Chamberlains had been seized and taken from the Palace, and that all he knew of the cause was contained in two papers, one the Proclamation (already mentioned) which Don Miguel had addressed to the Army, the other a letter from the

Prince, addressed to His Majesty, justifying his conduct on the ground of the existence of a plot, and soliciting the King's sanction and authority to the measures which he was taking. After these papers had been read by the Foreign Ministers, Sir Edward Thornton asked His Majesty, "If he were free? assuring him if he "were not so, that Great Britain and every "Nation in Europe which stood represented "there, would leave nothing untried to restore "his personal liberty." The King replied, that "He hardly knew how he stood, his Palace "being filled with Troops, and his servants "arrested without his orders."

While these things were passing in the Palace, messages had been sent from thence to the Infant at the Rocio, requiring, or "requesting," his presence. At length His Royal Highness came, and had an audience with his Father in private. His Majesty then returned to the Foreign Ministers with the Prince, who, after a few words had been addressed to him by M. de Neuville, declared that he possessed proofs of the existence of a plot to assassinate the King, the Queen, and Himself. "He avowed himself "the dutiful subject of His Majesty, and de- "clared that he would execute his will in all "things;" upon which he kneeled and kissed the King's hand, and begged pardon of the Foreign Ministers for the hindrance which they

had experienced in reaching the presence of His Majesty from the soldiers stationed in the Palace. The King and the Foreign Ministers having demanded of him to withdraw the Troops, he left the Palace, promising immediately to do so. The guilty manner of the Prince in this interview was remarked by all who were present.

It was some time after the Prince's departure for the Rocio, before he returned to dismiss the Troops in the Palace-Yard. In the interim the King showed himself to the soldiers at the window, and was received by them with considerable enthusiasm.

The Foreign Ministers remained at the Palace until the several Regiments had retreated. The Queen, also, made her retreat that same evening to the Palace of Queluz, from which place she had come in the morning to Bemposta, intending to be present at the triumph of her iniquitous schemes, which were, however, fortunately discomfited by the rallying of the Diplomatick Body round the person of the King, whose actions, and will, could not be represented as different from the reality, with so many witnesses around him to testify to the truth.

Before the Foreign Ministers left the Palace, they solicited the King to order the liberation of M. de Palmella. M. de Subserra having secreted himself, had had the good fortune to

escape the pursuit of the persons sent to arrest him.

The next day, notwithstanding the failure of the Conspirators on the one which preceded it, all was alarm and uncertainty in Lisbon.

The Marquis of Palmella was released ; but the other persons who had been arrested were retained in custody : and what increased the confusion was, that the persons seized were so indiscriminately selected, that it was impossible to conjecture on what principle the choice was made. Amongst them were many persons, who, in the preceding year, had accompanied the Prince to Villa Franca on the occasion of his defection from the Cortes ; several of his own Aids-de-camp, besides officers belonging to different Regiments, which were thought to be most attached to his person.

The King himself continued by no means free from apprehension. He removed from the Palace of Bemposta, which was situated in the midst of the town, to that of Ajuda ; and when the British Minister repaired thither to ascertain the position in which His Majesty was placed, he learnt from the individuals by whom he was surrounded, that they had entertained great fears of mischief to his Royal person throughout the whole of the preceding night. The expediency of the King's going on board the British Line of Battle Ship in the Tagus,

was then discussed ; but the project “ was abandoned, for fear that, the British Ship “ being regarded as England, His Majesty “ might be pronounced out of the Kingdom, “ and the Queen might declare herself Regent.” It was, therefore, determined to see whether it would be possible to work upon Don Miguel (who was to dine with the King) so as to bring him to a better sense of his duty.

Conferences were accordingly held with the Prince, who insisted upon the reality of the conspiracy (although his proofs of it were utterly inconclusive), expressed the most perfect submission to his Father, and deprecated in the strongest terms any wish to impose restraint upon him.

These conferences continued throughout the following day, and the result of them was the issue of a decree by the King, on the 4th of May, in which His Majesty adopted the notion of a conspiracy, established commissions for the trial of those arrested, and pardoned the excesses of jurisdiction committed by the Infant.

Something like tranquillity was, for the moment, restored by this decree. But still the Ministers did not resume their functions ; and the Count de Subserra, the First Minister, did not venture to come out from his hiding-place.

The 5th of May was allowed to pass without any fresh acts of outrage ; but on the 6th more

arrests were made, and towards noon a number of fresh prisoners were sent from the Tower of Belem to the Fortress of Peniche, whither the other prisoners had been previously conveyed. When Sir Edward Thornton heard of what was going on, he repaired directly to the King, whose dread and indecision rendered him unable to summon up sufficient courage to take any decided step for putting an end to the authority of his Son. Sir Edward, finding that His Majesty was in this state of mind, advised him at once to go on board the Windsor Castle, from whence he might safely issue such orders as would put to the test the obedience of the Infant. But Lord Beresford and M. de Palmella both feared that the execution of such a project might be fatal to the King's Authority, and might be construed into a proof of his abdication of the Crown by the Queen, and the Prince; and they, therefore, were desirous of trying whether the Prince would obey his Father's orders without having recourse to this hazardous experiment: for although His Royal Highness had certainly violated his promises to the King, first, that no further arrests should be made; and second, that no orders should be issued without the King's sanction; yet he had not actually disobeyed his Father's orders, since none had been ever given him.

It was therefore suggested, as a touchstone

of the Prince's submission, that he should be desired to give directions for the return of the prisoners sent in the morning to the Fortress of Peniche: but it was stated by Lord Beresford that he believed orders to that effect had already been dispatched.

In the course of the Evening, Lord Beresford had an audience of the Infant, in which he enforced upon His Royal Highness the necessity of his submission, and of his resignation of the command of the Army; and the Prince undertook to declare his submission to the King, that evening, in the presence of the Ministers: but, notwithstanding these professions, the conduct of the Infant still kept up the alarm.

On the morning of the 7th, the Marquis of Palmella, having received secret intelligence that he was to be again arrested, took refuge in the house of the British Ambassador; and in the evening, thinking that even that asylum would not be inviolable, he embarked on board the Windsor Castle.

The attempt, indeed, made by Dòn Miguel in person, forcibly to stop the sailing of the British Packet-boat "Slamner," because M. de Subserra was supposed to be there concealed, fully justified M. de Palmella's fears.

The result of Lord Beresford's interview with the Infant was not of a decided character; and on the evening of the 6th the King made up his

mind to secure his personal safety, by going on board one of the British Ships in the River. This determination his Majesty communicated to no one but the British Minister, who accordingly made the necessary preparations for the embarkation.

The enterprize was to have been carried into execution on the 7th; the King going after dinner in his Carriage to the Palace, situated a little above the Tower of Belem, from whence His Majesty was to have gone to the rope walk, where one of his own barges was to have been ready to receive him. This plan, however, was disconcerted by the Queen, who came and spent the day at this Palace (which belonged to her), and remained there all the evening, while His Majesty was in the upper part of the grounds. The attempt was to have been renewed the next day: but, on reflection, the King thought it best to defer it till the day after, Sunday; on which day, from being more accustomed to go out, his movements would be less likely to excite suspicion. Accordingly, the King ordered his dinner at Cochois, a small house at the mouth of the River; and on his return from thence, when he came to the water-side, he left his carriage and went on board his Barge. As soon as the Captain of the Windsor Castle perceived a movement about the Royal Barge, he ordered his boats, which were in readiness, to start forward

to meet it ; they shortly surrounded it on every side, and, forming an escort to His Majesty, and the Princesses, who were with him, they reached the Ship without any interruption.

At this critical moment the Infant himself was on the river, and saw what was passing. At first he rowed towards the King's Barge ; but finding that the other boats had the start of him, he did not venture to approach. The very moment that the King set his foot upon the deck, he sent an order to the Infant to appear before him.

The Prince was still on the water, when he received his Father's summons ; and, " stricken " with a sudden fatuity," obeyed it.

On coming into the King's presence, he fell on his knees and solicited forgiveness ; which was not denied him by his indulgent Parent. Nevertheless it was felt on all sides that His Royal Highness could not remain in the Country after what had happened, and being advised to retire to another Cabin, he thence wrote a letter to the King, soliciting permission to travel. The request was at once granted ; and he went on board a Portuguese Frigate, which sailed two days afterwards for Brest, accompanied by an English, and a French Frigate.

The submission of the Infant, and the separation of His Royal Highness from his Counsellors, put an end entirely to any further attempts

against the King, and His Government. The policy, therefore, of His Majesty's Embarkation was justified by its success; but had Don Miguel, instead of "precipitating himself into his Father's power, flown to Queluz, declared the King "a prisoner, in the hands of Foreigners, and "brought back his Mother as Regent," the King's Authority, if it had ever been restored, would not have been so without a Civil War.

The Queen herself declared, that had the Infant sought Her Counsel, instead of complying with the King's mandates, "the streets of Lisbon "would have run with blood."

The Prince himself was fully sensible of the error which he had committed, in the conduct of his plot, and endeavoured to repair it by a fruitless attempt to escape on shore, in the interval which elapsed between his going on board the Windsor Castle, and his departure in the Portuguese Frigate.

The Royal Standard of Portugal was hoisted on the main-mast, at the moment that His Most Faithful Majesty entered the Ship. M. de Palmella was there to receive the King, and all the Foreign Ministers, and different Members of the Government, were invited to join His Majesty.

Sir Edward Thornton, learning from Captain Dashwood that the King was on board, followed with such alacrity, that he was with the King before the arrival of the Infant. The same

evening a Proclamation was issued by the King, condemning, but pardoning, the outrages committed by his Son; lamenting that he had been led aside from his duty by perfidious advisers, and dismissing him from the command of the Army. A Royal order was likewise given for the immediate liberation of all those who had been arrested since the 30th of April. The King remained on board till the 14th, when he returned to the Palace of Bemposta, amidst the acclamations of the people, who were loud in their praises of the English Nation, and of Sir Edward Thornton, as the Representative of His Britannick Majesty.

While His Most Faithful Majesty continued in the Windsor Castle, there were several Councils of Ministers held. The Count de Subserra, who had escaped from those who had been sent to arrest him, and who was an object of peculiar hatred to the Infant, was indebted for his safety to the generosity of Sir Edward Thornton, who had procured for him an asylum on board the Lively Frigate, where the Count remained till after the capitulation of the Infant. Before the King returned on shore, M. de Subserra had declared it to be his conviction (in which M. de Palmella coincided) that he was so unpopular with all parties, that it would not be for the interest of the King his Master, that he should remain any longer in the Ministry.

With this view, M. de Subserra himself directed the Portuguese Chargé d'Affaires in London to ascertain whether he should be received favourably by the British Government as the Representative of his Sovereign ; and also put the same question to Sir Edward Thornton.

There can be no doubt but that it was very important to British interests, that this Gentleman should not have been allowed to continue in the Government of Portugal. “ Both within that “ Country, and without it, the name of *Pamplona* “ was inseparably associated with *France* ; and “ his rise or fall was looked to as the indication “ of the ascendancy of British or French Influence at Lisbon.”

The undeniable facts that M. de Subserra owed his life to British protection, and that His Most Faithful Majesty, by the step of seeking refuge in a British Line of Battle Ship, had recovered that authority which had been, during some days, virtually extinguished, were of so remarkable a character, that it would seem that, at any rate for the time, they ought to have given to British Counsels a weight, which the King of Portugal and His Ministers could not have disregarded. The one thing needful for the internal tranquillity of Portugal was the reformation of the Army. Lord Beresford was the individual by whom that reformation could have been effected.

The Count de Subserra was the obstacle to Lord Beresford's acceptance of that post, in which alone he could render this important service to His Most Faithful Majesty. The credit of England, and the welfare of Portugal, alike, demanded the retirement of the Count de Subserra. And so sensible was the King of its necessity, that an arrangement for re-modelling the Administration, by which M. de Subserra was excluded, was actually decided upon by His Majesty. It happened, however, unfortunately, that some of the individuals, destined under these plans to fill Cabinet-Offices, were absent on Foreign Service; and it therefore became necessary, that Ministers should be found to hold their places, *ad interim*. The Marquis de Palmella was continued Minister of Foreign Affairs, *ad interim*, and also occupied the post of Minister of War, which M. de Subserra had held, for M. de Villa Real, who was then absent, discharging the duties of the Portuguese Mission in London.

The names of the proposed New Ministry never transpired to the Publick; and a few days after the King's return on shore, M. de Subserra evidently began to conceive hopes, partly his own, and partly fostered by the French Ambassador, that he still might preserve a place in the Administration. In a little while, M. de Palmella ceased to be the Minister of War, *ad interim*, and again, after a little while, M. de

Subsérra appeared openly transacting the business of that Department. On the other hand, there were no signs of Lord Beresford's being admitted into the Government, and it was known that His Lordship refused an offer of some kind which was made to him by the King, on the second day of His Most Faithful Majesty's residence on board the Windsor Castle.

It was certainly an impediment to the promotion of Lord Beresford to the Command of the Portuguese Army, that he went to Lisbon uninvited, at the time when he did. "Had he remained in England, instead of presenting himself in that Capital, and by his presence there becoming unavoidably involved in personal bickerings, and made the subject of party intrigues," the events of the 30th of April, and subsequent days, would, in all probability, have caused him to be summoned to the King of Portugal's side with the consent and approbation of all parties. As it was, by his being in Lisbon while these events occurred, and by taking an active and distinguished part in their progress, the advantage of employing him became a very questionable matter with some, while others considered that it would be positively detrimental. He was thought by many to have looked with too lenient an eye on the outrages of the Queen, and the Infant.

On the policy of the embarkation of the King,

Lord Beresford differed with the British Minister. His Most Faithful Majesty, having determined to adopt it, and knowing Lord Beresford was decidedly opposed to it, confided his resolution exclusively to Sir Edward Thornton. Sir Edward most properly preserved inviolate the King's secret, and at this Lord Beresford is supposed to have taken offence. But be that as it may, one thing is certain ; that Lord Beresford, by his treatment of Sir Edward, while the King was yet afloat, published to the Court, that a schism had occurred between the King of England's Representative, and himself.

Whether the opinion of Lord Beresford or Sir Edward Thornton were the wiser, may be matter of doubt. The latter, however, " had the "*immediate* result in his favour, which, in " doubtful and critical emergencies, is a great " matter. But if the immediate result of the " measure were propitious, the *remote* consequences were far otherwise.

" The restoration of the Count de Subserra " to his former station, and to a more overwhelming influence, was but an awkward consequence of so much English exertion. And " to the world, who saw this termination of the " transactions on board the Windsor Castle, it " appeared that the English Minister had borne " the brunt of the day, but the French Ambassador had reaped the fruit of the victory."

The proofs, indeed, of the influence of M. de Subserra, and through him of the French Ambassador, were not long wanting. The British Government had pledged itself in the face of the world, when the French invaded Spain, against the occupation of Portugal by France. To have patiently submitted to that occupation, would have been humiliating to the honour of Great Britain. To bring French Troops into Portugal, was therefore the fondest object of M. de Neuville's heart; and to affect it, he had actually, during the recent commotions in Lisbon, although unauthorized by his Government, gone the length of "summoning" (*mandant*) to that City the French Garrison at Badajoz. Fortunately for the peace of Europe, the French Commander disregarded the summons; but a French Army in Lisbon, and a British Fleet in the Tagus, could not have contemporaneously held those positions, without the risk of rekindling a general war. Notwithstanding the failure of this attempt, it does not appear that M. de Neuville abandoned his project.

England, it was argued, has already refused an application for Troops from the Portuguese Government. If, therefore, the demand were repeated, it would doubtless be again refused. And if Great Britain were Herself either unable, or unwilling to afford Military assistance to her Ally, on what principles of natural Right,

or publick Law, could she refuse to acquiesce in the entry of other troops, called at the express requisition of the Sovereign of Portugal and his Government ?

Let therefore the request be made and refused, and behold a French Army established at Lisbon without England having any just cause of complaint against France ! It was therefore resolved by the Portuguese Ministry, at the instigation of M. Hyde de Neuville, through M. de Subserra, to solicit from 4000 to 6000 British or Hanoverian troops. The request was accordingly made in an official Note by the Portuguese Minister in London ; the reason assigned for making it being the desire of the King of Portugal to have at hand a friendly foreign Force to enable him to set about the reform of his own Army.

A demand more perplexing to the British Government can hardly be imagined, whether it were granted, or refused.

On the one hand, if it were refused, it would either appear that the British Government consigned an old and faithful Ally to ruin, or else that it consented to the introduction of a French Army into Portugal ; which introduction, if not contrary to the express letter of Treaties, would yet have been entirely at variance with the whole tenour of those relations which had subsisted for near a century and half, between

Portugal and Great Britain, and would have been in defiance of those publick declarations, made in the name of the King, at the period of the French invasion of Spain, and afterwards repeatedly recalled to the recollection of the French Government.

On the other hand, if it were granted, the troops must have been sent “either in concurrence with France, and the other Powers of the Continent — whereby Great Britain would have associated herself with the schemes, and appeared, as a convert, to the principles of the Holy Alliance — or else they must have been sent (as if at all they would have been sent) without their leave; and who then could say to what that first step might lead?” Again: this military aid could not have been furnished by Great Britain, without an apparent deviation from the principle of abstinence from armed interference in the internal affairs of other States, which her Government had laid down as the guide of its conduct. And although the compliance with the request of a Government for assistance, is essentially different from a forcible interference to subvert one, — the former being a question of expediency, the latter of right, — yet the appearance of any armed intermeddling with the domestick concerns of another Country was considered so great an evil by the British

Government that it could only be endured for the sake of avoiding a greater.

Decide, therefore, as it might, the decision of the British Cabinet could not be satisfactory. As far indeed as Portugal was concerned, there would have been no real unkindness in a refusal; since the Portuguese army, in reality, was not in a state to require the presence of Foreign Troops to enable the King to reform it. The events of the 30th of April had highly tried its fidelity: but in all that it had done, it had only obeyed the orders of the Commander, appointed by His Most Faithful Majesty.

But with respect to Great Britain and the world the effects of a refusal would have been most disastrous, if the consequences were to have been, as was directly intimated by the Portuguese Government, that France would have added the military possession of Portugal, to that of Spain. True, indeed, the advance of French troops into the former Country, at the request of His Most Faithful Majesty, would not have given Great Britain a right to go to war with France. But the occupation of Spain had already given that right, and the occupation of Portugal would have produced precisely that state of things, which would have compelled Great Britain, for the protection of her vital interests, to have exer-

cised the right, which she possessed, of insisting on the immediate evacuation of Spain, by the French Army.

The preservation of the peace of the world then was an object of sufficient importance to warrant some deviation from general rules, and the Government determined that the wishes of Portugal ought not to be wholly disregarded. But, since a detachment of British troops could not be sent to Lisbon, without calling Parliament together, to sanction the measure, and since the publicity which discussions in Parliament would have occasioned were deprecated by the Portuguese Ministry, and would have defeated its utility, the King authorized Mr. Canning to signify to M. de Villa Real, His Majesty's gracious intention to direct His Hanoverian servants, to consider favourably the request of the Portuguese Government.

Fortunately, however, for the British Government, it was extricated from its difficulties in consequence of the fact of the application for troops being divulged at Lisbon. To prevent the entrance into Portugal of French troops was, as has been seen, the one grand reason with the British Cabinet for listening to the solicitations of M. de Villa Real. But for Mr. Canning to have commenced questioning the French Ambassador, as to what would be the answer of his Government, if it were asked to send troops, would have been

somewhat awkward, at the very moment, when he had it in contemplation to adopt a somewhat similar measure. But, on the rumour of an intention on the part of the King's Government to send troops to Portugal, which rumour had got abroad in consequence of the application being known at Lisbon, the French Ambassador, anxious to prevent their going, sought an opportunity of representing the inconveniences of such a step, and of renewing to Mr. Canning the verbal assurances, which he had previously given, and which had been repeated by the Government at Paris to Sir Charles Stuart, that French troops should not *under any circumstances* enter Portugal. On these assurances being repeated in writing, in the most unequivocal language; and on M. Hyde de Neuville's conduct, in offering a French force to His Most Faithful Majesty, and summoning the Garrison of Badajoz, being officially disavowed; and on positive instructions being sent to that Ambassador not to listen to any overtures for military aid from the Portuguese Government, and carefully to abstain from a repetition of his former proceedings; the project of sending either British, or of advising the sending of Hanoverian troops, was abandoned by the British Government. Shortly after, those, who at Lisbon had been instrumental in causing the demand to be made, finding that it had not

accomplished its purpose, consented to its withdrawal.

While these negotiations were being carried on, M. de Palmella and his Colleagues were not inactive in endeavouring to provide for the future peace of their Country.

For this purpose, one of the first subjects which they took into their consideration, was the best means of inducing the Queen to reside in any Country of Europe, with the exception of Portugal.

Her Majesty was so deeply implicated in the designs of her Son, that She was sure to be a rallying point for the disaffected ; moreover, her political opinions and character, made it certain that she would seize every occasion for conspiring against her Husband. Orders and entreaties, however, were tried in vain ; She left them wholly unnoticed, and declared that nothing but force should remove her from Queluz. At Queluz, therefore, she remained ; the King wanting the resolution to command the forcible expulsion of his Consort from his dominions.

The decrees which were published on the 5th of June, counterbalanced, in some degree, the disadvantages of Her Majesty's protracted residence in Portugal.

The first decreed the assembling of the antient Cortes. The second dissolved the Junta, established for considering the future Administration

of the Kingdom. The third created a new Commission for making the arrangements preliminary to the meeting of the Cortes; and the fourth annulled, with certain exceptions, the acts and laws of the Constitutional Cortes. Of the other decrees, the most important were, one granting an Amnesty, the other regulating Secret Societies. All these decrees being conceived in a spirit of moderation, contributed to tranquillize the minds of the people, and gave general satisfaction.

Not long after they were issued, His Most Faithful Majesty having expressed his wish, that the Representative of His Majesty should have the rank of an Ambassador, Sir Edward Thornton was recalled, and Sir William à Court was appointed to succeed him.

Sir Edward, on retiring, was allowed, as a testimony of his Sovereign's approbation of the part which he took in the proceedings of the Foreign Ministers, on the 30th of April, to accept the title of Count, and a grant of land; which benefits His Most Faithful Majesty, on his return from the Windsor Castle, had conferred upon the British Minister.

Sir William à Court reached Lisbon at the end of September. When he arrived he found British influence at a very low ebb.

The overbearing conduct of M. Hyde de Neuville, of whom His Most Faithful Majesty was personally afraid, and the influence which

M. de Subserra by his intrigues had contrived to acquire over the mind of the King, had obtained for them an uncontrouled ascendancy in the Councils of Portugal. It was for the purpose of destroying their preponderance, and of vindicating to the Representative of this Country at Lisbon, that station, which, unluckily, M. Hyde de Neuville had found the means of assuming to himself, that Sir William à Court was selected by Mr. Canning to fill the post of Ambassador.

To effect the dismissal of M. de Subserra, Sir William was authorized, openly to employ all fair, and honourable means. For if all the British and Portuguese Statesmen, who, for so long, had held, that a close connection between their respective Countries was beneficial to both, had judged wisely, then the interests of both required that “ the destinies of the latter should not be
 “ placed in the hands of a man who had still the
 “ rank of General in the French Army ; who had
 “ been replaced at the Head of the Government
 “ by the aid of a French Ambassador ; who, in
 “ his heart, was entirely French ; and who, in
 “ the event of a war occurring, in which Eng-
 “ land would be bound by her Treaties to engage
 “ on the side of Portugal, might side, as he had
 “ done before, against the one and the other,
 “ with the Country of his predilection.” So long as things remained in that state, there could

be no cordial union between the British and Portuguese Governments.

A more delicate and difficult task could hardly have been confided to any man.

Without being able to have recourse to either menace or intimidation, he had to overthrow a Minister supported by his own Sovereign, and by the Representatives of all the Continental Powers. For, although Mr. Canning neither wished, nor pretended, to dictate to Portugal the form of Her Government, or the choice of Her Allies, yet, since in the case of her being attacked by a Foreign Power, Great Britain was bound to come forward in her support, the right of tendering advice to an Ally in whose fate British interests were so deeply involved, was one which could not reasonably be disputed. On the will of the King, the result of Sir William's exertions almost entirely depended, and, accordingly, before his arrival, M. de Subserra's partisans had done their utmost to poison the mind of His Most Faithful Majesty against the new Ambassador. He was represented as haughty and overbearing in his manners, as the enemy of M. de Subserra, and consequently the advocate of the Queen.

Sir Edward Thornton's recall was ascribed to the fact of that Minister having been the personal friend of the King, and Sir William was said to have been sent to browbeat, and to com-

mand, rather than to advise, and to persuade. The first difficulty, therefore, that Sir William had to get over, was the preconceived antipathy of the King; but since that antipathy rested on the representations of others, and was not the consequence of His Majesty's own experience, it was conquered, almost in the very first interview. In that interview the Ambassador frankly told the King, as before it, he had told M. de Palmella, that the removal of M. de Subserra from the Administration was the work which he was most desirous to accomplish.

For, independently of the advantage to Portugal of British connection, the common hatred felt towards M. de Subserra by the two great parties, into which the Country was divided, made it impossible for a Minister whose power depended on the personal favour of the King, and the support of the French Ambassador, either usefully, or safely to administer the Government.

Such were the arguments which the British Ambassador addressed to the King of Portugal, and to M. de Palmella. Neither did Sir William disguise his sentiments from M. de Subserra, who had himself opened the subject of his retirement with the British Government, by enquiring of Mr. Canning, if he should be well received, in case of his being named, as the Ambassador in England of His Most Faithful

Majesty. The Count, as he had done before, acknowledged the justice of what was said to him, but clung to the place which he occupied. On M. de Palmella, it is difficult to say what was the effect produced by Sir William's arguments : but with the King, after a few interviews, it became evident, that the firm and respectful way in which they had been urged, had made His Majesty desirous of shaking off M. de Subserra, and of drawing as close as possible the ties which connected Portugal with England.

It was not long before these secret inclinations of His Majesty were suspected ; and every artifice was accordingly set at work to prevent as much as possible any intercourse between the King, and the British Ambassador. His Majesty was incessantly told that M. de Subserra was the only individual who could afford him effectual protection against the Queen, and the Infant. M. Hyde de Neuville declared in the very Palace, that he would recognize no Minister, whom His Most Faithful Majesty should name in the place of M. de Subserra, nor would deal with any Government at Lisbon, of which M. de Subserra did not form a part ; and a sham plot was actually got up by way of practising upon the King's timidity.

The French Ambassador did not exert himself singly to uphold M. de Subserra in the Ministry. The diplomattick Agents of the Continental Powers possessing higher rank than

those who were employed in Portugal, had sat in conclave at Paris, when the decree for assembling the ancient Cortes reached that Capital. They drew up Protocols of their Conferences, strongly remonstrating, and threatening almost force to prevent its execution; and since M. de Subserra was content to abandon the plan, he became at once entitled to the support of the Alliance. The battle, therefore, which England had to fight at Lisbon, was not with France alone, but with France, backed by Spain, and the Holy Alliance.

Success or failure, therefore, became of infinite moment to the credit and the influence of England; not, however, that a triumph would have been one half as glorious, as a defeat would have been disastrous, for England had a right, as it were, to the prize for which She fought, and She possessed the vantage ground in the strong natural tendency, which Her influence has to predominate in Portugal. The Continental Powers were well aware of the value which the victory would be to them. England would have been humbled; Brazil would have been left unrecognized; and all trace of Constitutional freedom would have been extinguished in the self-same Country, where that spark of resistance to Napoleon had been fostered, which, fanned by Great Britain, had burst into the blaze which destroyed him.

To the remonstrances of the Allies, when set forth by the King, Sir William answered that their interference in such a case would be unwarrantable; and that the employment of force on the part of any Foreign Power, to prevent the free exercise of the Royal Authority, would clearly entitle the King of Portugal to claim military assistance, which the King of Great Britain would not be backward to grant.

The renewal of this assurance tended much to tranquillize the alarms of His Most Faithful Majesty; and at the end of little more than two months he had so far made up his mind to change His Government, that he disclosed his intention to some of the Foreign Ministers.

This disclosure served but to increase the activity of the opposite party, and strong symptoms were manifested of the irresolution which agitated the Royal Breast. At this doubtful moment, some proceedings (which will be detailed hereafter *) of M. de Subserra's, in the negotiations with Brazil, came to Mr. Canning's knowledge, and enabled him to instruct Sir William à Court to speak in a more authoritative tone.

His Most Faithful Majesty was then informed that the time for his decision could no longer be delayed — that he must make his election between French, or British Connection; but that it would be extraordinary if His Majesty should

* Vide page 314.

allow the interests of a man who, a few years before, had been in arms to dethrone him, to weigh against the friendship of the Country by which his Throne had been upheld. The consequence of his so doing, would be, that the British Squadron would no longer be permitted to remain in the Tagus to give the moral support of its presence to the Government of M. de Subserra, and, in all probability, the negotiations with Brazil would fail, for England would no longer continue to act the part of Mediator.

To these representations the King had no substantial objection to oppose, except his personal fear.

Would the British Government engage to defend him against his Wife and Son? Would they protect his life against their conspiracies? were questions that he put with eagerness to Sir William à Court. That Ambassador had no difficulty in replying, that, with the exception of taking any part, which might imply an opposition to Constitutional principles, the British Force in the Tagus should be at His Majesty's orders, for His Personal Protection against any who might venture to assail him. On this assurance being confirmed in writing, His Majesty gave his Royal word, through Sir William à Court, to the British Government, that before a month had elapsed the Count de Subserra should be dismissed from his Councils.

Before the time came for the fulfilment of this promise, the French Ambassador quitted Lisbon. At the time when the French Government acknowledged that M. Hyde de Neuville had summoned the Garrison of Badajoz, Mr. Canning took the opportunity of pointing out to M. de Villèle, that so long as the residence of M. de Neuville was prolonged at Lisbon, in the character of the Representative of France, the peace of the world might be endangered by some new, and unauthorized proceeding on the part of that Ambassador.

The truth of this remark was not denied by M. de Villèle, who was evidently persuaded that the prosperity of France depended on the preservation of peace ; and who felt that a British Force in Portugal, contemporaneously with a French Army in Spain, might eventually lead to a rupture : — a risk which it was not worth while to hazard, for the doubtful chance of establishing French, to the exclusion of British, influence in Portugal. He decided, therefore, to recall M. de Neuville.

When this determination was taken, it was made known to Mr. Canning. But still, on one pretence or another, M. de Neuville lingered at his post, and, as it were, for the purpose of giving something of an *éclat* to his departure, and that, at parting, he might give a blow to England, he was permitted to urge the making Lisbon a free

Port to all the world — all the Ports of Portugal being by treaty free Ports to England. It happened, however, that, so far from such a measure being hostile to British Interests, it was really indifferent to the British Government whether it were adopted or not ; since, in point of fact, the Commercial Treaties between Great Britain and Portugal were intended to be revised, and in their then existing state, “ were clogs upon “ the new course of extended and liberal “ commercial principles into which the British “ Cabinet had entered.” This state of things was not discovered either by M. de Neuville at Lisbon, or his Government at home, and accordingly he was not to quit his post until, “ in spite “ of the supposed resistance of the British Am- “ bassador, he had seen the favourite scheme “ definitively settled.” When, therefore, Sir William à Court, instead of resisting, professed the most perfect indifference upon the subject, the effect was, “ to relax the general ardour in “ its favour, and to set its partizans a squabbling “ with each other.” The pretext for M. Hyde de Neuville’s stay was thus done away, and since he did not discover in what direction any other *blow could be struck*, he embarked on the 5th of January, just two days too soon to receive the orders of his Court, to remain where he then was. His departure was a great advantage to Sir William à Court.

Relieved from his presence, His Most Faithful Majesty set about, in good earnest, the redemption of his promises; and, within a fortnight after he had sailed, the Count de Subserra and all the Members of his Government were dismissed, he himself being named Ambassador to London, and M. de Palmella to Paris. The individuals appointed to compose the New Ministry, were M. Silvester Pinheiro, Minister of Foreign Affairs; M. Lacerda (a Lawyer), Minister of the Interior; M. Barradas, Minister of Justice; Admiral Torres, Minister of the Marine; and Don Miguel de Melho, Minister of Finance.

The principles which predominated in this Cabinet were decidedly liberal, and although "the Members of it were not Gallican, they "were not sufficiently marked in colour to be "English." Some of these appointments were, however, only *ad interim*, and M. Silvester Pinheiro refused to accept the office which was offered to him.

It was at first confidently asserted that the new Cabinet had been selected by the advice, and with the connivance, of M. de Subserra; but subsequent events satisfactorily shewed that, if his general opinions formed the basis upon which His Most Faithful Majesty worked, the precise arrangements were kept secret from him. That the dismissal of all was his work, there can

be little doubt, when, finding it impossible to keep his own place, he determined to involve all his Colleagues in his ruin. For some weeks the fallen Minister remained about the Palace, trying, as was supposed, to reinstate himself; but each day his influence diminished, and having tried various schemes for remaining at Lisbon, he was at last obliged to set off for Madrid, to which Court, at his own solicitation, he was appointed, in preference to that of London, for which he was originally selected.

That Embassy was filled up by M. de Palmella, who having, unfortunately, been placed in a false position with M. de Subserra as a Colleague, shared the fate of the other Members of the Administration. His situation, indeed, was one of extreme difficulty, as must always be that of the Minister of an absolute Sovereign, on whose royal fiat, and favour, every decision of the Government must ultimately depend.

After some negotiation the Count de Porto Santo succeeded M. de Palmella in the Foreign Office. The Count was Ambassador at Madrid, at the time when he accepted the offer, and it was by means of the vacancy which was the consequence of this acceptance, that M. de Subserra was nominated Ambassador at Madrid.

The internal history of Portugal being now carried up to the period of the appointment of the Minister, under whom the Treaty was concluded

with Brazil, by which the Independence of that Colony was acknowledged by the Mother Country, the next chapter will give an account of the negotiations which preceded that important event.

CHAP. XI.

DECLARATION OF BRAZILIAN INDEPENDENCE. — LORD AMHERST'S VISIT TO RIO DE JANEIRO. — CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT IN PORTUGAL. — PORTUGUESE MISSION TO BRAZIL. — STATE OF AFFAIRS IN THAT COUNTRY. — BRITISH MEDIATION BETWEEN PORTUGAL AND BRAZIL. — CONFERENCES IN LONDON ON BRAZILIAN AFFAIRS. — MR. CANNING'S PROJET OF RECONCILIATION. — PORTUGUESE CONTRE PROJET. — M. DE LEAL'S MISSION TO RIO. — SIR CHARLES STUART'S MISSION. — SIR CHARLES GOES TO BRAZIL AS PORTUGUESE PLENIPOTENTIARY. — SIGNATURE OF TREATY OF INDEPENDENCE BETWEEN PORTUGAL AND BRAZIL.

THE news of the Prince Royal of Portugal having consented to proclaim the political Independence of Brazil, reached London, when the Great Powers of Europe were assembled* at Verona, at the very moment when Mr. Canning was contemplating the immediate recognition of some of the New States of Spanish America. It has been already stated that the declaration of Independence by Brazil, strengthened Mr. Canning in his opinion respecting those States: since, "to have recognized Brazil

* November, 1822.

“ as an Independent Government, leaving Buenos
 “ Ayres, Columbia, &c. unacknowledged, would
 “ have been, to say the least, invidious, and
 “ might have been fairly considered as unjust.”
 To have indefinitely postponed the recognition
 of the Independence of Brazil, was, owing to our
 position towards that Country, absolutely impos-
 sible ; for Great Britain had with it already
 “ established relations, commercial intercourse
 “ regulated by a Treaty, and agencies, if not
 “ actually political, affording channels of poli-
 “ tical correspondence.”

The provisions of the Treaty either party, at
 the end of two years, had the privilege of annul-
 ling, and consequently their maintenance or ab-
 rogation being, within a certain period, at the
 option of Brazil, that period was one at which it
 would be in the power of Her Government to
 force Great Britain to admit the fact of her In-
 dependence. Moreover, Brazil then possessed
 those qualifications, the possession of which, by
 the Spanish American States, Mr. Canning
 maintained, afforded of itself sufficient justifica-
 tion for entering into definite relations with them.
 For Brazil, having been raised to the rank of a
 Kingdom by His Most Faithful Majesty, pos-
 sessed a Government, capable of preserving the
 engagements into which it might enter, while
 Portugal had no real authority, in any of the
 Brazilian Provinces. Brazil therefore was ripe

for recognition, and the time was settled, beyond which it could not be delayed. The measure therefore being both justifiable, and inevitable, Mr. Canning was of opinion that it ought to have been immediate.

The calls of humanity, and the interests of Great Britain with regard to the Slave Trade, alike required that it should not be deferred; and delay, out of generosity towards Portugal, would have been, not only uncalled for, but useless. Uncalled for,—both because we were not bound, either by the letter, or the spirit of our Treaties to interfere, “for the purpose of preventing or of avenging the defection of Brazil from Portugal,” and because the Government of the latter did not scruple to set at nought the stipulations of Treaties which the Brazilian Government scrupulously observed. Useless,—because the headstrong and impolitick course pursued towards Brazil by the Cortes at Lisbon, which had provoked the separation, so far from serving as a warning to that Body, to change their course, only had the effect of determining the Members more obstinately to adhere to it, and more violently to pursue it. To have neglected, out of delicacy to Portugal, to effect the destruction of the Slave Trade, which the circumstances of the moment appeared to place within reach, Mr. Canning thought would be wholly inexcusable. The Slave Trade was the

one great question to which this Country was committed. “ The one great mart of *legal* Slave Trade was Brazil. The continuance of that legal Slave Trade was the cover and pretext for all the Slave Trading, which was carried on illegally, and in violation of Treaty as well as of Law.

“ The voluntary relinquishment of the Slave Trade by Brazil, was the single chance for its final, and total Abolition. That chance was then offered by a combination of events, the like of which might never recur.

“ What that chance might be worth, it was impossible confidently to pronounce ; but an overture made to the British Government, by an Agent of the Prince Royal of Brazil, then in London, afforded, at least, encouragement to try it. If good for any thing, the chance was good then : at the first moment of anxiety in Brazil, when the decision of Great Britain was considered vital to their cause : but if we waited, till the Emperor of Austria should have returned a favourable answer to his Daughter’s letters, and till France should have offered support, and countenance, with the continuance of the Slave Trade, we might come too late with our offer, *contingent upon its discontinuance* ; and we should have missed, and missed irrecoverably, an opportunity of effecting the greatest moral good of which human

“ society was then susceptible ; and of getting
 “ rid of the most perplexing discussion, with
 “ which the Councils of this Country were em-
 “ barrased.”

Mr. Canning therefore proposed to seize the opportunity afforded by the overture “ from the Government of the Prince Royal of Brazil, to negotiate a Treaty, on the basis of an acknowledgement on our part, (properly qualified with respect to the rights of the King of Portugal,) of Her separate and independent Government, and an engagement on the part of the Prince Royal of Brazil, to abolish absolutely, and totally, (at a time to be specified,) the Brazilian Slave Trade.”

It appears that before this proposition was agreed to by the Government, but previously to any thing being done to carry it into effect, the British Chargé d’Affaires at Lisbon, was desired to declare to the Government at Lisbon, “ that an equal and impartial interest was felt by the British Government in the prosperity of the two Kingdoms of Portugal and Brazil ; an interest, common to both during their union, and divided, but not impaired, by their separation.”

“ That the British Government disclaimed all

“ notion of any forcible interference in their
 “ internal concerns ; and that in the unfortunate
 “ event of a war between them,—an event which
 “ His Majesty most earnestly deprecated, and
 “ from which he foresaw no consequences, but
 “ mutual injury, and an exhaustion of the re-
 “ sources of both Kingdoms, — His Majesty
 “ would observe the most exact neutrality;
 “ but, whether in war or peace, it would be
 “ his anxious desire and determination to main-
 “ tain his existing relations of amity, alike with
 “ Portugal and Brazil.

“ That if, in pursuance of this determination,
 “ the King should think it expedient to acknow-
 “ ledge more or less formally, the *de facto* es-
 “ tablishment of the new Brazilian Government,
 “ His Majesty, in consenting to that acknow-
 “ ledgement, must be understood as in no degree
 “ prejudicing, much less intending to preclude
 “ (what, on the contrary, it would be His Ma-
 “ jesty’s wish by all means in his power to
 “ promote), an amicable adjustment, by which
 “ the rights and interests of both Nations might
 “ be reconciled, and which might preserve the
 “ Crowns of both Kingdoms to the illustrious
 “ Family of Braganza.”

At the same time that this communication
 was made to Portugal, it was intimated to the
 Authorities at Rio that “ His Britannick Ma-
 “ jesty had contemplated the proceedings of the

“ Prince Regent with the deepest interest ; that
 “ it was earnestly hoped they would not lead to
 “ a protracted war, between the two branches of
 “ the Portuguese Monarchy ; and that in any
 “ case the Prince Regent need not apprehend
 “ any hostile act, or unfriendly feeling on the
 “ part of the British Government.” Notwith-
 standing this advice, war was declared on both
 sides. The Brazilian Government confiscated
 all the Portuguese property on which it could
 lay its hands, and the Cortes at Lisbon busily
 employed themselves in preparing, against Brazil,
 an expedition, which, owing to the state of the
 Country, and the exhaustion of the Treasury, was
 never sufficiently equipped to sail for its desti-
 nation.

Shortly after these communications, a Brazilian Gentleman, resident in London, was furnished by Don Pedro with credentials as Minister, to be presented, if they would be received, but, if not, to be kept back, the Gentleman in question (General Brant) continuing to fulfil the duties of Agent. To this individual Mr. Canning did not hesitate to express a readiness, on the part of His Government, to listen to proposals for a recognition, more or less formal, of the Prince Regent's separate authority.

But the account of the nomination of the Prince, as Emperor of Brazil, induced Mr. Canning to pause, until the real intention, and meaning

of the change of title was ascertained ; but when the acquiescence of the Brazilian People in that order of things removed the apprehension of internal commotion, and civil war, he again began to consider the question of recognition, as connected with the complete, and final Abolition of the Slave Trade.

Lord Amherst being at this time (February 1823) about to set sail to assume the Government of India, and having in the usual course of the voyage to touch at Rio de Janeiro in his way to Bengal, Mr. Canning thought that the advantages of employing so able and distinguished an individual to communicate with Don Pedro, and his Ministers, ought not to be thrown away.

Lord Amherst therefore was instructed to seek an interview with the most influential persons of the new Imperial Government, and to represent to them “ that the whole difference as “ to the manner in which a close connection “ with that Government would be viewed in this “ Country, depended upon the single consideration, whether that Government should, or “ should not, have proclaimed the Abolition of “ the Slave Trade.

“ For that between a colonial and independent “ policy an obvious difference existed : the purpose of a Colony was cultivation, and commerce ; and while its defence, military and

“ maritime, was entirely provided for, by the
 “ Mother Country, the inconvenience and dan-
 “ ger of imported labourers would be less felt,
 “ than in a State depending wholly on its own
 “ internal resources. A State, as such, could
 “ not, either with safety, or with dignity, rely
 “ upon an artificial, instead of a native popu-
 “ lation.

“ That for Brazil to stand single among so
 “ many States throughout the whole Continent
 “ of America, in the continuance of a traffick
 “ solemnly condemned by the united voice of
 “ America and Europe, must affect the interests,
 “ as much as it would taint the reputation, of an
 “ Empire newly vindicating its own liberty, and
 “ independence. As a Colony, Brazil had no
 “ separate responsibility; but the civilized States
 “ of the World, of whatever political Constitu-
 “ tion, might well hesitate to admit into their
 “ community a Nation, for the first time asserting
 “ Itself to be such, but retaining that blot of the
 “ colonial character, from which every inde-
 “ pendent Nation of the civilized World, Portu-
 “ gal alone excepted, was free.

“ That therefore with respect to this Country,
 “ although Brazil might in any case reckon upon
 “ its impartial justice, its friendship was only to
 “ be acquired by the sacrifice of that abominable
 “ Trade.”

Furnished with these Instructions, Lord Am-

herst, on his arrival at Rio de Janeiro, had an interview with M. Andrade, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

That Minister, so soon as he discovered that the Abolition of the Slave Trade was that for which Lord Amherst was desirous of obtaining the promise of the Brazilian Government, spontaneously reprobated that Traffick "as injurious to the Interests, and disgraceful to the Character of any Nation engaged in it." But while he admitted to the fullest extent the truth of the general arguments used by Lord Amherst against this disgusting Commerce, he objected to its "immediate renunciation, on account of the danger, which would threaten the very existence of the New Government from its precipitate abolition: since the minds of the Inhabitants of Brazil were not sufficiently prepared for it. At the same time he expressed his confident opinion that the measure might be executed within the short period of two or three years, and meanwhile he proposed that a diminution of the number of Slaves annually imported should take place forthwith; such diminution to be annually increased until the final extinction of the Trade."

This answer to Lord Amherst's representations, although affording good grounds for hope, was by no means so entire a compliance with the wishes of the British Government as to entitle

that of Rio de Janeiro to the immediate acknowledgement of its Independence.

Before this answer was received by Mr. Canning, the Revolution in Portugal had taken place, by which His Most Faithful Majesty was restored to the exercise of absolute Authority, and M. de Palmella was made a Member of the Administration. From the talents and good sense of that Gentleman, Mr. Canning looked for the happiest results, and he accordingly abstained from continuing the discussions respecting Recognition with Brazil, “ expressly for the purpose “ of allowing the intelligence of the Revolution “ at Lisbon to produce its full effect, whatever “ that might be, at Rio de Janeiro.” At the same time he informed M. de Palmella that he would defer any final communication to the Brazilian Government, until he learnt what were the views of the new Ministry at Lisbon, with respect to an arrangement with Brazil. Of the utter inability of Portugal to reconquer her ancient Colony, no one acquainted with the respective conditions of the two Countries could entertain a doubt. That the Government at Rio de Janeiro would voluntarily consent to replace Brazil under the dominion of Portugal, was even still more improbable. It was clear, therefore, that by an arrangement between them, without the intervention of hostilities, which would inevitably exasperate animosities, and pre-

vent, perhaps for ever, any cordial reconciliation, their mutual interests would be best consulted.

M. de Palmella indeed was well aware that an amicable accommodation was highly desirable; and one of the earliest acts of the Administration of which he was a Member, was to send out Commissioners to Rio to negotiate a settlement. Unfortunately, however, the plan of settlement which the Portuguese Commissioners were instructed to propose, was one to which it could hardly have been reasonably expected that the Brazilian Government would agree. Since "the recognition afresh of the King of Portugal as "Sovereign of Brazil," was demanded as a preliminary to negotiation: a preliminary which was no less than requiring of the Brazilians to "consent to destroy all that had been established; "to strip their Prince of His assumed Title; to "abjure for their Country its proclaimed Independence; and to re-enter again into that "subordinate relation which it had so long and "so loudly disclaimed; and to which the protracted residence of His Most Faithful Majesty in Brazil was calculated to excite an "unconquerable repugnance."

As for the remaining propositions with which the Commissioners were charged, they might, had the one great point of Independence been yielded, have been willingly accepted by the Brazilian Government.

On the arrival, September 20th, 1823, of the Commissioners at Rio, the first enquiry made by the Emperor was, whether they were furnished with full Powers to acknowledge the Independence of Brazil; and on a negative answer being returned, the ship in which they came was ordered to be seized, and the Commissioners themselves were not allowed to land, or even to hold any communication with the shore. The indisposition of the Brazilians to listen to any thing short of an acknowledgement by Portugal of the Independence of their Country, must have been of a very decided character for the Emperor to have been induced to treat the Representatives of His Royal Father with such studied indignity: but, in truth, although so uncourteous a reception of the Mission of any Foreign Sovereign, more especially one from a King, who was the Head of the Emperor's own Family, could not be justified, yet great allowances must be made for the difficulties of his Imperial Majesty's situation, and the novelty of the state of things with which he had to deal.

For about ten months after* His assumption of the Imperial dignity, Don Pedro was generally popular: during that time two brothers, M. Andrade e Silva, and M. Martin Francisco

* He was proclaimed Emperor in August 1822.

de Andrade, men of Royalist principles, moderate in their views, and endowed with considerable talent, had the ascendancy in the Brazilian Cabinet. But in the beginning of May 1823, the Legislative Assembly met, in which the Republican party was the strongest ; the consequence of which was, that, in the early part of July, 1823, the MM. Andrades found themselves under the necessity of resigning their situations.

The Emperor then determined to select his Ministers from the Independent Party, — a Party less Royalist than the Andrades, but notwithstanding more moderate than the Republicans, whose confidence in their strength was unfortunately increased, by the overthrow of the Andrades: an event which was considered as a triumph. After the resignation of those Ministers, the praises of the British Constitution, which while they were in office had been held up to the approbation of the publick, were no longer heard, and instead of them were substituted panegyricks on the more democrattick Constitutions which had had a temporary existence in Europe.

In the Legislative Assembly, the Republicans proved their influence by contriving to carry decrees trenching on the Rights of the Crown in many essential particulars: — but one resolution, which passed by a majority of four,

declaring the Imperial Assent unnecessary to give validity to the Acts of the Assembly, seemed but a prelude to the total destruction of the sovereign power. Against this decree, however, the Emperor determined to make a stand; and the inhabitants of the Capital, as well as the Army, being with him, they gave such evident indications that, if necessary, they would support him in any act of rigour, that the Assembly allowed the matter to drop, by deciding, in a secret Session, that the resolution respecting the Imperial Assent should not at that time be communicated to the Emperor. Still, however, the Republican and Independent parties, when united, preponderated, and notwithstanding the part which His Imperial Majesty had taken ever since the Revolution, there lurked in the minds of many of the more violent partizans of Independence, and separation from Portugal, a suspicion that some secret understanding continued to exist between His Most Faithful Majesty and His Son, and even that the latter was not disinclined (possibly engaged) to replace the two Countries upon their former relative footing, whenever a favourable opportunity should present itself for making the attempt.

Such being the posture of affairs at Rio de Janeiro, it became of the utmost moment to prevent the possibility of any misconstruction being put upon any act of the Emperor, or the

occurrence of any circumstance which might be turned to his disadvantage, whenever the Portuguese Commissioners, who were known to be on their passage, should arrive.

With this view it was determined, that, if they came with full powers to acknowledge the Independence of Brazil, every mark of respect and attention should be shown to them : but that if they were not furnished with those powers, then it was resolved, as the only sure means of preventing suspicions of the Emperor's sincerity, that they should be treated in the manner which has already been described.

For these reasons the Emperor can hardly be blamed for his determination to refuse the Commissioners all communication with the shore ; but the sequestration of the ship in which they came, was a measure which no circumstances, however critical, could have justified. But if the conduct of the Emperor, in this particular, was censurable, the imprudence of the Portuguese Government was hardly less so, in charging the First Commissioner, the Count de Rio Major, with the delivery of a letter from His Most Faithful Majesty to his Son, with orders to place it in the Prince's own hands. Had Don Pedro consented to receive it, his so doing might, in the then temper of men's minds, have proved fatal to his authority ; as it was, the letter was instantly returned unopened, and the Count de Rio Major,

finding that his continued presence at Rio de Janeiro was useless, returned to Lisbon in a packet boat, — the ship in which he had sailed from thence “remaining under adjudication.” It was shortly after this Commission had left Portugal, and before Mr. Canning was apprized either of the nature of the propositions of which it was the bearer, or of their reception in Brazil, that he directed Sir Edward Thornton to state to the Portuguese Ministry the conviction of the British Government that neither the subjugation, nor voluntary submission, of Brazil could then be reasonably expected; and that “the only point “which appeared to be practically open for discussion was the degree and mode of connection “which might be kept up between the European “and American parts of the Portuguese Monarchy, consistent at once with the Political “Independence of Brazil, and with the union of “both under the dominion of the House of “Braganza.”

From the way in which this opinion was received by the Portuguese Government, it was evident, that although it disavowed all intention of endeavouring to bring back Brazil to a state of colonial dependence, of abridging that freedom of commerce which she thus possessed, or of exercising any legislative authority in relation to her internal Government; yet that it still clung to the idea, both of re-uniting the two

Crowns upon the Head of the King of Portugal, and of having some things in common, in questions of mutual aid and support; and further was not prepared to grant unqualified Independence, which was the one thing essential to the accommodation which they professed to desire. M. de Palmella, however, hinted that the good offices of Great Britain might be advantageously employed with the Prince Royal and Brazilian People, in bringing about some arrangement between the two Countries.

When this idea of interposing the good offices of Great Britain in this dispute was suggested by M. de Palmella, Mr. Canning was far from being unwilling that England should undertake the business of a Mediator, although he was well aware that it would be a most troublesome, and difficult, as well as in all probability a thankless, office. But the interests at stake were of too alarming a magnitude for him to shrink from the responsibility of the task: for not only were Portugal and Brazil, and England in particular, deeply concerned in the adjustment of this question, but Mr. Canning clearly saw that the old Governments in Europe would necessarily be materially affected by its decision.

That it would be highly beneficial to Portugal, and Brazil, mutually to contribute to each other's welfare by friendly commercial intercourse, instead of seeking to compass each

other's ruin by waging an unnatural warfare, is a proposition that cannot be disputed. That Great Britain would participate in their prosperity, both commercially, by having rich instead of poor merchants to deal with ; as well as politically, by having a powerful instead of a burdensome Ally, is equally undeniable ; and that " the conservation of Monarchy in one part at least of the great Continent of America, was an object of vital importance to the Old World," is what must readily be admitted by all, whose principles, (like Mr. Canning's,) are decided in favour of a Monarchical form of Government.

" The preservation, therefore, of Monarchy in Brazil, and of the Crown of Brazil to the Royal House of Braganza," Mr. Canning considered " as objects within reach, as well as objects most desirable and important : " but he was intimately persuaded, that after the events which had taken place in that Country, its Government would never consent voluntarily to renounce an Independence which it enjoyed, *de facto*, and which Portugal had not the power to destroy ; while any attempt to " re-absorb the Brazilian Monarchy into that of Portugal, would be to incur the risk of precipitating its destruction."

To persuade the Portuguese Government to acknowledge the Independence of Brazil was, therefore, an end well worthy of Mr. Canning's

exertions ; and he would have thought it cheaply purchased at the expense of undergoing those heavy labours which the task of mediation was certain to entail : but, in addition to these considerations, there were others which increased his desire to bring about this result. The recognition by Portugal of the Independence of her American dominions would have afforded to Spain an example which Spain might, perhaps, have followed : but, on the other hand, if she abstained from doing so, the condition of Portugal, in consequence of the advantages which she would be sure to derive, from a reconciliation with her former Colony, would present a striking contrast to the state to which Spain was reduced by the obstinate rejection of all terms of settlement with her Colonies, and the consequent interruption of intercourse between them. Governments would then be taught that it was for their interest to listen to the Counsels of England, which were directed to promote their real and substantial interests, rather than to the Counsels of the Holy Alliance, which aimed at the maintenance of abstract principles of action, unsuited to the temper of the times, and withering to the energies of the people whose Governments were ruled by them. For the attainment of these ends, Mr. Canning was willing that Great Britain should give her assistance to effect a reconciliation ; but since he had not disguised from the

Portuguese Ministers his sentiments, that Independence was the only basis on which it could be attempted, they preferred delaying to make the formal request until they had ascertained, first, the result of the Mission of the Comte de Rio Major to Brazil; and secondly, how far Mr. Canning was prepared to go in furtherance of their views.

The Count de Villa Réal, who had been appointed Minister at the Court of London at the same time when Sir Edward Thornton went to Lisbon, was accordingly empowered to ascertain Mr. Canning's opinions upon the questions at issue between Portugal and Brazil. For this purpose a conference took place*, at which Mr. Canning expressed the readiness of his Government to undertake the Mediation; but he thought it but fair to declare in the outset, that England could "not enter into any engagement to suspend her Recognition of the Independence of Brazil till that mediation should be brought to a conclusion: for it was obvious that by so doing, she would put herself entirely in the hands of a third Power, by whom negotiations might be prolonged far beyond any hope of a favourable result, for the very purpose of averting her Recognition," towards which some progress had been, not unnaturally, made at the

* September 23d, 1823.

time when the Constitutional Government of Portugal was daily violating, and the Independent Government of Brazil was scrupulously observing, the Treaty with Great Britain; to the provisions of which both Countries were equally bound to adhere. The British Government, therefore, would not bind itself to be guided in its conduct towards Brazil by different principles from those by which it had regulated its proceedings towards the former Colonies of Spain. On M. de Villa Réal representing his fears, that unless the authority of the King of Portugal were re-established in Brazil, the Brazilian Provinces would form themselves into separate and independent Republics, Mr. Canning gave it as his opinion, that “ from what had passed it was “ sufficiently clear that the assumption of the “ Imperial Title by Don Pedro was regarded by “ the contending parties in Brazil as a sort of “ middle term between the conservation of the “ antient Monarchy, and the Institution of a Democratical form of Government; as a mode at “ once of asserting the Independence of Brazil, “ and maintaining the Throne of Braganza: “ that, therefore, any attempt to resort to one “ of the extremes, by restoring the ascendancy “ of Portugal to what it was before the Revolution, would drive to the opposite extreme the “ party aiming not only at Independence but “ separation; and that in the discussion of this

“alternative, the middle term would be lost past
“recovery.”

M. de Villa Réal, in answer, observed, that the declaration of our intention not to suspend our Recognition till the Negotiations should be ended, would nullify all the good effects to be hoped for from our Mediation ; and it would be, therefore, better for Portugal “to employ the
“credit of the great Continental Powers, who
“were coalesced for the sake of opposing revo-
“lutionary principles, and to strengthen the
“rights of legitimate Sovereigns.” To this Mr. Canning answered, “that it would be sufficient
“to make known that intention to Portugal alone ;
“but that Great Britain would never admit the
“right of the Allied Powers to meddle with the
“affairs of the Colonies ; that the British Go-
“vernment had, some months ago, declared to
“the Cabinet of Madrid, that if France or the
“Allies interfered with the Spanish Colonies,
“Great Britain would immediately take those
“measures which she thought most conducive
“to her own interest ; and that if the interfer-
“ence of the Allied Powers was asked between
“Portugal and Brazil, Great Britain would act
“in the same way : for if the British Govern-
“ment acted differently, it might be said that it
“recognized the authority of the Tribunal which
“the Allies wished to erect to regulate the affairs
“of Europe. Great Britain could not, therefore,

“ allow that they should exercise their influence
 “ in the New World, after having constantly
 “ condemned a similar supremacy in the Old.”

M. de Villa Réal, in reply, suggested that if Russia separately were joined to Austria, this objection would be done away : but Mr. Canning would not admit either the utility or necessity of the mediation of Russia, who had no concerns whatever with Brazil, while the Emperor of Austria was in a very different situation; adding that if the latter were entrusted with the mediation, the British Government would be inclined, although it would not bind itself, to defer taking any fresh step towards the Recognition of Brazil while there should exist a reasonable prospect of an early and favourable termination of that negotiation. Mr. Canning added, that in all the communications which he had had with the Brazilian Government, he had never allowed it to suppose that it would be possible for Great Britain to recognize its Independence, except it were under the authority of the Dynasty of the Royal Family of Braganza.

The substance of this conversation was embodied in a memorandum which was communicated to the Portuguese Government, which, however, persisted in considering the question as one, not so much of Independence, as of predominance, whether the seat of the Monarchy should be in the Brazils, or in Portugal. This

point, it was well aware, in a few years would be decided in favour of the former, when by the natural course of events the Heir of the Monarchy succeeded to the Throne of the United Kingdom : for there was no intention of recalling Don Pedro from Brazil ; all that was desired was that he should abandon his Titles, and act thenceforward in the name, and under the authority, of his Father. This language was accompanied with an intimation that, since the advice of the Continental Allies was of a more agreeable description than that of the British Cabinet, Mr. Canning must not be surprised, if the effect of this difference were to dispose Portugal to look rather to Continental than British connection.

This intimation was given by the Portuguese Ministers while yet they were ignorant of the fate attendant upon the Mission of the Count de Rio Major to Don Pedro. Until the result of that Mission became known, nothing further passed on the subject of Brazil between the Cabinets of Lisbon and London.

Then *, somewhat late for its purpose, the heads of the instructions to Count Rio Major were, for the first time, confidentially communicated to Mr. Canning ; still, however, without asking the mediation, but in the hope of “ inducing the British Government to employ its

* December 4th, 1823.

“ active intervention between the Governments
 “ of Portugal and Brazil, to prevail upon the
 “ latter to adopt either the whole, or as many as
 “ could be made acceptable to it, of the bases
 “ of accommodation laid down in the Instruc-
 “ tions of the Commissioners.”

The first proposition, as will be remembered, contained in those Instructions, was that Brazil should resign its Independence, “ but the British
 “ Government had certainly gone too far to
 “ insist (even if it could have persuaded itself
 “ that it ever had any the smallest right to
 “ insist) with Brazil upon the abandonment of
 “ that pretension.”

Nevertheless Mr. Canning was not unwilling to consider “ how far his Government could go,
 “ and with what means and probabilities of suc-
 “ cess, to bring about an arrangement between
 “ the Mother Country and her late Colony,
 “ short of menacing the latter either with the
 “ loss of our friendship, or with the perpetual
 “ refusal of our Recognition.

“ The British Government, indeed, would
 “ have seen with the greatest pleasure, if prac-
 “ ticable, the Crowns of Portugal and Brazil re-
 “ united on the head of the existing Sovereign
 “ of Portugal, to be transmitted together in
 “ undivided succession, by His Most Faithful
 “ Majesty, to His descendants. But in such
 “ times, and with the example of both parts of

“ the Continent of America, it seemed material,
 “ in such a discussion as that between Portugal
 “ and Brazil, not to risk every thing on one
 “ point, without being well assured, either that
 “ that point was likely to be carried, or that the
 “ trial and failure of it would not use up the
 “ chance of some other desirable, though not
 “ equally satisfactory, arrangement.”

Now this was the danger to be apprehended from insisting upon the first proposition of the Portuguese Commissioners, which, if pressed, was sure to be fatal to any arrangement, and specifically to a plan of compromise, which, in the preceding August, had been suggested by Mr. Canning, and by him to the Government of Brazil. By the plan in question, the two Crowns of Portugal and Brazil were to have been reunited in the person of Don Pedro, after the demise of his Father; and the Governments of the two Kingdoms were to have been settled, for the time to come, on the chief of the House of Braganza, in regular succession, with alternate residence of the Sovereign at Lisbon, and Rio de Janeiro.

The Portuguese Ministers were not, however, afraid of incurring this danger, “ and it was
 “ probably, in the hope of carrying this point,
 “ contained in the first article, and from the
 “ knowledge that the British Government thought
 “ less sanguinely of the chance of carrying it,

“ than they did, that they passed it by, in their
 “ first communication with Brazil, rather than
 “ apply for an assistance which would not be
 “ available to them, for the attainment of their
 “ utmost object.”

Since, therefore, Mr. Canning could not advise Brazil to accept the propositions of the Portuguese Commissioners, he determined not even to express an opinion to the Government at Rio de Janeiro respecting them. But he nevertheless directed Mr. Chamberlain, to represent, in the name of his Government, to the Brazilian Minister, in the possible case of the Comte de Rio Major not having left Rio de Janeiro, “ the strong opinion and friendly wish
 “ of the British Government, that the Emperor
 “ and his Ministers should retract their violent
 “ measures; that even if they were determined
 “ not to entertain any propositions, containing a
 “ demand of absolute submission, and a refusal
 “ to acknowledge the Independence of Brazil,
 “ that they should set themselves right in the
 “ face of the world, by giving a fair hearing to
 “ the Portuguese Commissioners; or, if the
 “ state of political parties in Brazil made that
 “ more than they could venture to do, should at
 “ least dismiss those Gentlemen with all the
 “ honours due to a Mission from a Foreign Sovereign, and should name Commissioners of

“ their own to treat with those of the King of
 “ Portugal elsewhere.”

Mr. Chamberlain was also directed to represent that “ whatever might be the probability of
 “ a favourable issue to the negotiation, the re-
 “ fusal by Brazil to suspend hostilities, and to
 “ stop the ravages of a civil war, could not but
 “ prejudice, in the eyes of all impartial persons,
 “ the cause of the refusing party. The reco-
 “ very by Portugal of the dominion of Brazil by
 “ force of arms, was a notion altogether gone
 “ by. The enterprize was allowed to be im-
 “ practicable; the attempt was altogether aban-
 “ doned.

“ The questions, therefore, whether Portugal
 “ and Brazil were to be re-united or separated
 “ for ever, or whether some new relation of
 “ federative connection were to be established
 “ between them, being then, confessedly, matter
 “ of negotiation only, how,” asked Mr. Can-
 ning, “ was the continued effusion of blood,
 “ with all the endless vexation of private families
 “ and destruction of private property, to be
 “ justified? War,” said he, “ ceases to be just,
 “ when it ceases altogether to be necessary.”

These instructions had hardly been sent off to Mr. Chamberlain, before despatches arrived from him, communicating the explanations of the Brazilian Ministers for their unceremonious dismissal of the Portuguese Commissioners. The

substance has already been given of these excuses, which were "so far satisfactory, as showing the consciousness on the part of the Emperor and his Ministers, of having acted in a manner which required to be justified, and the desire to stand well in the opinion of the British Government."

Mr. Chamberlain's despatches likewise indicated a better disposition towards Portugal, on the part of Brazil, than might have been expected from the treatment of the Commissioners.

Don Pedro and his Government expressed their wish to avail themselves of any opening for reconciliation with the Mother Country, on terms compatible with the honour and welfare of both parts of the Monarchy. They likewise announced their intention to send an Agent to London, furnished with full powers to negotiate an arrangement with Portugal, although the specifick concession, which Mr. Canning had recommended, was declared to be inadmissible.

The temper of Brazil towards the Mother Country being thus evidently improved, it became important to prevent any new Mission, with instructions similar to those confided to the Comte de Rio Major, being sent to Brazil. Of such a step, however, there was no little hazard. The Portuguese Ministers undoubtedly cherished a secret hope that Don Pedro might be enabled, by his own individual power or ascendancy, to

bring about, even against the opinion of the Brazilian Legislature and People, that entire reunion with Portugal which they took for granted his filial piety desired. But whether or not they correctly estimated His Royal Highness's sentiments, it was but too clear that if they relied upon them exclusively, they would tax Don Pedro beyond his ability.

The position of the Prince with regard to that party who were prepared not only for separation from Portugal but for the throwing off of the Monarchy, was very critical; and any manifestation, on the part of the Government of His Most Faithful Majesty, that the Prince was individually desirous of consenting to the restoration of that subordination of Brazil to Portugal, against which the Title of Emperor was considered as a guarantee, would be certain to increase the difficulties of his situation, and might not improbably end in the subversion of his Throne. A Mission, therefore, at all similar to that of the Comte de Rio Major, would be sure to prejudice other chances of settlement; but "it would be wise," said Mr. Canning, "for the Portuguese Cabinet "to consider well whether it would not avail "itself of the opportunity which would be presented by the arrival of the Brazilian Agent "in London, to employ the intervention of the "British Government to obtain such terms of "accommodation as might be most advantage-

“ous and satisfactory, short of that which had already been tried, and failed, and which, if tried again, would not only fail again, but would involve greater evils than its failure.”

These arguments, together with the reception of the Count de Rio Major by Don Pedro, produced their effect upon the minds of the Portuguese Ministers, who then said, that they did not feel so much difficulty in insisting upon the continuance of the Sovereignty of His Most Faithful Majesty over the Brazils, as in the arrangement of a system, which would ensure the union of the two branches of the Monarchy for the future, under one head, in the House of Braganza ; or which, in effect, would not be followed by the loss of Portugal to the Prince Royal, and his Successors established in the Brazils: that the acknowledgement of the Supremacy of the King of Portugal would put an end to this difficulty at once ; but that perhaps it might be better to pass over in silence the question of Independence and of the Supremacy of the King, and to re-establish all the relations of commercial and national Intercourse as they had existed before, or as they might be arranged by an amicable agreement, without any reference whatever to the “intractable political question.” It was further observed, that Portugal did not make an immediate official demand for British Mediation ; because, having applied to the Emperor of Aus-

tria to undertake that business, they waited for the answer of his Imperial Majesty, that they might know whether to ask of England a joint, or separate interference.

These sentiments, which were much more conciliatory and reasonable than any which had been before expressed by the Portuguese Government towards Brazil, Mr. Canning immediately made known* to the Government at Rio de Janeiro, in order to encourage and to confirm those kindly feelings which the Emperor and his Ministers seemed disposed to entertain towards Portugal when they talked of sending a Brazilian Agent to negotiate an agreement. At the same time he again urged upon Don Pedro the necessity of desisting from those acts of outrage and confiscation which had been committed upon Portuguese property and shipping. "It was highly important," he observed, "to the Brazilian Government, that the public opinion of Europe should not be revolted by its proceedings against the Parent State. It was not necessary to the achievement or maintenance of an Independent national existence, that the old relations of Metropolis and Colony should be converted into deadly antipathy. Nothing, on the contrary, would so much contribute to make it easy for Portugal to waive her objec-

* Jan. 8th, 1824.

“ tions to that Independence, and to reconcile
 “ other Powers to the recognition of it, as a
 “ prospect of an amicable intercourse surviving
 “ the obligations of dependency.”

“ It was idle to say, as the Brazilian Foreign
 “ Secretary appeared to have said, that Brazil
 “ was all-sufficient to Herself, and needed not
 “ the favourable opinion of Europe. No State
 “ is altogether morally independent of the good
 “ will of its neighbours ; and though the dis-
 “ tance of Brazil from Europe might place her
 “ out of the vortex of Foreign Politicks, yet, con-
 “ nected as all the States of the World, both Old
 “ and New, were daily becoming with each other,
 “ it could not be matter of indifference to any one
 “ of them, to have the sympathies of others on
 “ their side, rather than arrayed against them.
 “ Whatever M. de Campon might think, it would
 “ be of infinite advantage to Brazil, that Her
 “ new rank among nations should be not merely
 “ arrogated by Herself, but confirmed to Her by
 “ the consent of Portugal, with the sanction of
 “ other Powers.”

Since, then, the Court of Lisbon began to
 manifest a more favourable spirit towards the
 claims of Brazil ; for the Brazilian Government
 “ to refuse due acknowledgement of that new
 “ spirit, and a reciprocal approximation towards
 “ a good understanding, would betray on its
 “ part an irrational bitterness of temper, no way

“ necessary, or even congenial to a manly firmness of purpose.”

Such was the advice of the British Government to Brazil; and to convince the Portuguese Ministers that Mr. Canning was really anxious to assist them, whenever they had reason on their side, or there was any prospect of doing so with real advantage, these representations to Don Pedro were communicated to the Cabinet of Lisbon.

But the influence of the French Ambassador, whose language was singularly at variance with that of the French Consul, at Rio de Janeiro, and the representations of the Continental Powers, had again changed the views of the Portuguese Ministry before these communications were made to them.

They had again begun to hanker after the nominal Sovereignty of Brazil, a point which Brazil was determined not to grant, and Portugal had no means of enforcing. Instead, therefore, of at once seeking the assistance of the British Government, which was most desirous to obtain all that was reasonable for Portugal, the Portuguese Government allowed matters to stand still, under the plea, that they were afraid to ask British Mediation, because they thought that the Independence of Brazil would be too easily conceded.

This disposition to procrastinate, was unfortunately increased by the events at Rio.

When * the Emperor found that the Legislative Assembly was encroaching on his prerogatives, to an extent, which would be incompatible with the preservation of any of them, he boldly took the resolution to dissolve it ; and to enforce the execution of his decree, he surrounded the House of Assembly with a body of troops. Several of the Members were arrested, amongst whom were the Andrades ; who, after their fall, had been violent in their opposition to the Administration.

It was at first feared, even by the Government itself, that this stroke of policy would have produced an attempt in the Northern and Southern Provinces of the Empire, to throw off their allegiance to the Imperial Government ; but the Emperor published a manifesto, promising a new, and even more liberal, Constitution, than the one which he had put down, and the inhabitants both of the Capital and the Provinces, content with his assurance, continued firm in their fidelity to his Throne.

In Portugal these proceedings were taken as a proof of the ascendancy of the Portuguese party in Brazil, and the hope was consequently re-excited that the Emperor would consent to acknowledge the supremacy of his Father. The Cabinet of Lisbon were, however, completely

Nov. 12th, 1823.

mistaken, and it would seem that it was not long before they discovered their error; since they again began to look for assistance from Great Britain, and applied specifically, in a Note Verbale *, presented by M. de Villa Réal, for the intervention of His Britannick Majesty ; to procure, 1st, A cessation of hostilities on the part of Brazil against Portuguese ships and subjects ; 2dly, A restitution of the Portuguese property, which had been wrongfully confiscated. 3dly, An abstinence from any attack upon the Colonies remaining faithful to Portugal ; 4thly, A dismissal by the Brazilian Government from its service of British subjects. The application was made by the Portuguese Minister in London, and was described as being founded on the faith of the antient Treaties, subsisting between his Country and Great Britain. On the receipt of this requisition, Mr. Canning, “ without entering into any scrupulous examination of the “ sense and wording of these Treaties, or of “ their application to the new and unforeseen “ state of things which then existed, or to a war “ which was of a civil, and not of a foreign “ character, was still disposed to advise his “ Sovereign to hold out a helping hand to His “ Antient Ally ; and not to measure too nicely “ the positive extent of the engagements, in “ virtue of which the assistance was claimed.”

March 4th, 1824.

Mr. Canning, therefore, instructed Mr. Chamberlain to bring all the topicks of the note successively under the notice of the Brazilian Minister, enforcing the first and second, which he had already been directed to submit, and adding, by way of a caution, as to the third, respecting the enterprizes supposed to be meditated by Brazil, against the other Colonies of Portugal, “that distant expeditions of offensive warfare, “would totally change the civil character of “the War between Portugal and Brazil, into “one scarcely distinguishable from a direct “foreign attack, against the dominions of His “Most Faithful Majesty.”

As to the fourth ; the demand had been already made by the British Government, on its own account.

And, lastly, Mr. Chamberlain was to call the particular attention of the Brazilian Foreign Secretary, to the concluding paragraph of M. de Villa Réal’s Note Verbale “as affording un- “equivocal encouragement to the opening of a “direct negotiation with Portugal ;, since the “pretension to an unconditional submission by “Brazil, as a preliminary to all negotiation, was “withdrawn, and nothing was asked of Brazil, “inconsistent with the reservation of the ques- “tions of Sovereignty on the one hand, or In- “dependence on the other, until after hostilities

“ should have ceased, and the relations of Peace
“ and Commerce been restored.”

It was the decided opinion of the British Government, — an opinion which Mr. Canning directed Mr. Chamberlain to state in the most unqualified manner, — that “ this overture from
“ the Mother Country could not be justly or
“ prudently declined.”

These instructions, strong as they were, were not satisfactory to the Portuguese Ministers. They professed to be angry with Mr. Canning for declining to admit the application of antient Treaties to the circumstances of the times ; and contended that Mr. Chamberlain was only desired to do that which any of the European Sovereigns would, if requested, desire their Agents to do, without the obligation of a Treaty, — certainly, with no good effect, because no other Power possessed any thing like the same influence which was possessed by Great Britain with Brazil, who, from the very circumstance of her having influence, ought, they argued, to have gone further, and “ endeavoured, even
“ against her own conviction, to bring back
“ Brazil to a nominal union with the Parent
“ State, though with an effective Independ-
“ ence.”

The truth was, M. de Suberra was too French to admit, and M. de Palmella too patriotick, to reconcile his mind to the belief, that the divari-

cation of the Kingdom was inevitable ; and that the only question that remained for solution was, how to diminish, as much as possible, the evils which Portugal would have to endure from that unavoidable separation of the dominions of her Sovereign.

Instigated, therefore, by the advice of M. Hyde de Neuville, and the urgent representations of Russia, the Portuguese Ministers once more began to turn their minds to the chimerical project of reducing Brazil to obedience, by an expedition fitted out in the Tagus.

While they still * continued in this disposition, Marshal (formerly Général) Brant returned from Brazil to England, charged with a commission, wherein M. Gameiro (who had been acting as Brazilian Agent during the absence of the Marshal) was associated with him, to open a negotiation with the Portuguese Government for the arrangement of the differences subsisting between Portugal and Brazil. These Gentlemen were not ordered to solicit the mediation of the British Government, but they were authorized to communicate to it their proceedings, and to ask and listen to its advice.

In all that related to the affairs of Brazil, Mr. Canning was always anxious to connect the Court of Vienna with that of Great Britain.

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The wife of Don Pedro, being the daughter of the Emperor of Austria, was a good and legitimate reason why His Imperial Majesty should take an interest in the affairs of that Country; and since Mr. Canning had succeeded in convincing Prince Metternich that the Monarchical principle would be more injured by the subversion of Monarchy in Brazil, than by the acknowledgement of the Independence of that Country by the Parent State, there was but little, if any, divergence between the views of the Austrian and British Cabinets with respect to the expediency of an accommodation. The Austrian Government had been, in the latter end of the preceding year (1823), applied to by the Government of His Most Faithful Majesty to undertake the task of mediation. The answer to the application was delayed for some months; and when, at last, it came, the opinion was manfully avowed, that the chance of restoring in Brazil the authority of His Most Faithful Majesty, such as it had existed before the Revolution, was gone by: that the next best arrangement would be, that the Sovereignty should be secured to the King, by one of his Royal Family constantly residing at Rio — Brazil being governed by her own Institutions; and that if, as was most probable, the temper of the Brazilian People rendered such an arrangement impracticable, the Portuguese Government ought

to secure the Crown to the House of Braganza, even by the concession of Independence ; and that if this last proposition met the approbation of His Most Faithful Majesty, the Austrian Government would undertake to propose it. Then (as was to be expected), by way of pouring a balm upon the wound thus given to the doctrines of Legitimacy, His Imperial Majesty declared that, for himself, he would never recognize the Independence of Brazil, until His Most Faithful Majesty had set him the example.

M. de Neumann, the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires in London, was accordingly invited to be present at the consultation with the Brazilian Plenipotentiaries on the nature of the overture to be made by them to the Portuguese Government. At first they proposed to state by letter that they were authorized to come to such a settlement as should be compatible with the Independence of Brazil ; but Mr. Canning succeeded in convincing them that, " in thus " assuming, at the outset, the point which was " to be the object of the negotiation, they " risked a positive refusal on the part of Portugal, to enter into any discussion whatever." This part of the announcement was, therefore, omitted. But Mr. Canning was not equally successful in inducing them to abstain from the use of the Imperial Title, since they conceived that form to be prescribed to them, by the very

instrument from which they derived their authority. The retention of this title was the more to be deprecated, because, by the last accounts, the Portuguese Government did not seem to entertain any conciliatory dispositions : and, since Mr. Canning intended that the Brazilian overture should operate to restore that desire to conciliate ; whatever was likely to diminish the value of the overture ought, if possible, to have been avoided.

So soon, therefore, as he found that the instructions of the Plenipotentiaries would not allow them to yield, he addressed himself to M. de Palmella, pointing out to that Minister that if his Government were really “ disposed to receive and answer overtures from Brazil, with a view to an amicable adjustment, it must not suffer itself to be startled at the outset by any difficulties of mere form ; for it would, indeed, have been a grievous thing that interests so important as those which were involved in the success of the overtures then made, should be subjected to all the hazard to which a continuance of such an uncertain state of things must have exposed them, on account of questions of mere form, if in substance there were any prospect of a favourable adjustment.”

Notwithstanding Brazil did not hesitate to make this advance towards Portugal, the Government of Don Pedro would not consent to

the suspension of hostilities ; not, however, from any ill will to Portugal, but because, in the temper in which men's minds were, such suspension would, at the least, have exposed the Emperor to the imputation of treachery, and Brazil to the horror of insurrection.

Had the Emperor meant ill to his native Country, nothing would have been easier for him than to have proceeded to the condemnation of the sequestered vessels and property, and satisfied the clamours of Lord Cochrane and his unpaid sailors : but he resisted those clamours for the express purpose (though he did not dare to avow it) of retaining the Portuguese property in deposit, to be restored to its owners on the conclusion of an amicable arrangement with the Mother Country.

The circumstances of the Mission of the Brazilian Plenipotentiaries to England became known at Lisbon before the overture above mentioned reached that Capital. Without waiting for its arrival, the Count de Villa Réal was authorized to give positive assurances that no expedition should sail from Portugal against Brazil while the negotiations were pending ; and these assurances, when in their turn they were made known at Rio de Janeiro, produced a determination on the part of the Brazilian Ministers to do all in their power to prevent any further hostilities, although their cessation could not be publicly

declared. On this point, indeed, they had previously shown a great desire to yield.

It was not till after the events of the 30th of April at Lisbon, that the overture of the Brazilian Plenipotentiaries was received by the Portuguese Government.

The Ministers were for some time too much occupied to attend to any thing but their own more immediate affairs, and the preservation of their lives ; and when the tumults which that crisis had occasioned had a little subsided, the application to England for troops, which followed, engrossed all the time which Mr. Canning was able to devote to Portuguese affairs.

It was not, therefore, until the concerns of European Portugal were settled, that those of Brazil took their place ; so that it was the 12th of July, before the first discussions occurred, under the auspices of M. de Neumann and Mr. Canning, between the Portuguese Minister on the one hand, and the Brazilian Plenipotentiaries on the other. M. de Subserra had been then restored to the plenitude of his former power, and M. de Palmella was displeased at the refusal by the British Government of the request for troops : the instructions, therefore, to the Count de Villa Réal were not of the most friendly description.

The first Conference, which took place on the 12th of July, was opened by the exhibition on

both sides of the full powers with which each party was provided : this being done, the Portuguese Plenipotentiary observed, that, since it was not necessary to exchange them, he should content himself with protesting against the Titles assumed by Don Pedro. He then asked what the Brazilian Plenipotentiaries had to propose ? to which they answered, " Independence." M. de Villa Réal then observed, that before he would enter into any other discussion, he required the concession of three preliminaries : — First, that the Brazilian Government should consent to an immediate armistice; second, to the establishment of commercial relations between the two Countries without delay : third, the restitution of all Portuguese property that had been sequestered or forfeited. The Brazilian Plenipotentiaries replied, that an armistice was in reality already established, but that with regard to the two last points, they must write to their Court for instructions ; but that they, in their turn, must ask the meaning of the Portuguese expedition fitting out in the Tagus. M. de Villa Réal replied, that that expedition would not sail, except in the cases of the renewal of hostilities by Brazil, or of the negotiation then carrying on being broken off. With this the first Conference ended.

At the second, which was held on the 19th of the same month, the Brazilian Plenipotentiaries

began by saying, that they had written to their Court upon the other preliminary points brought forward by M. de Villa Réal, and that they had no doubt their Imperial Master would agree to every thing, if his Royal Father would yield Independence.

This observation gave rise to a discussion, in which nearly the whole remainder of the Conference was consumed.

The Brazilians demanded Independence — the Portuguese Plenipotentiaries claimed Sovereignty; and these two words, reciprocally interchanged, constituted the substance of what passed, and prevented any progress being made towards a settlement. At last Mr. Canning, finding that neither party would propose terms of accommodation, undertook to prepare a project of a Treaty of reconciliation which might, at any rate, “furnish the basis of a somewhat more progressive discussion.”

The third Conference was chiefly consumed in discussions respecting the three preliminaries brought forward by the Portuguese Plenipotentiary. Towards its close, Mr. Canning, who had been present at each of the Conferences, delivered his *projét*, which he described as susceptible of improvement, for which purpose he invited both parties to make any suggestions which might occur to them. The principal Articles of this project were: First, That the two parts, American

and European, of the Dominions of the House of Braganza, should be thenceforth altogether distinct, and independent of each other: Brazil being governed by its own Institutions. Second, That arrangements should be made for settling the succession to the Crowns of Portugal and Brazil, in the manner most conformable to the fundamental principles of the Monarchy. For this end the King of Portugal was voluntarily to make over to his Son all his rights in Brazil, and Don Pedro was to declare his willingness to renounce his personal right of succession to the Throne of Portugal; and upon the acceptance of this renunciation of Don Pedro to the Throne of Portugal, the Portuguese Cortes were to fix upon one of the children of the Emperor, who should be called to the succession of that Crown at the demise of His Most Faithful Majesty,—it being understood that the Cortes might call to that succession the eldest Son of the Emperor of Brazil, or the eldest Daughter in failure of Male issue. Third, That there should be strict peace and amity between the two Nations. Fourth, That hostilities should cease; sequestered property be either restored, or the parties to whom it belonged indemnified. Fifth, That all Portuguese subjects in Brazil should be at liberty, either to return to Portugal with all their Property, or to reside in Brazil at their own option, and *vice versâ*. Sixth, That Brazil should not at-

tempt to get possession, either by force or any other means, of any Portuguese Colony, and that Portugal should evacuate any port or place in Brazil, which she still occupied. Seventh, That Commissioners should be appointed to execute the third and fourth Conditions: and, lastly, that a Treaty of Commerce should be negotiated on the footing of the most favoured Nation.

The fourth and fifth Conferences were again nearly consumed in debating questions connected with M. de Villa Réal's three preliminaries. But before they broke up, the Brazilian Plenipotentiaries declared that they adopted *in toto* Mr. Canning's project, proposed it as their proposition, and were ready to sign it: the Austrians approved, but they would not recommend it; and M. de Villa Réal, pleading want of Instructions, declined even to transmit it to his Court, because it attacked the rights of Sovereignty over Brazil possessed by His Most Faithful Majesty. The Austrian Plenipotentiaries likewise would not join in its transmission to Lisbon; and it was, therefore, determined that it should be sent direct by Mr. Canning to M. de Palmella. It was accordingly sent in a note, accompanied with assurances, that "the Project would never have been submitted, through British Intervention, to the consideration of the Portuguese Government, were it not sincerely believed,

“ that the interests and honour of His Most
 “ Faithful Majesty were consulted, in the man-
 “ ner most conformable to circumstances which
 “ it was then impossible to controul.”

“ To entertain,” said Mr. Canning in endeavouring to persuade the Portuguese Government to adopt this project, “ to entertain any notion
 “ of reconquering Brazil by force, would imply
 “ a total misconception of the situation both of
 “ Portugal and Brazil ; and to persevere in the
 “ attempt without a rational prospect of suc-
 “ ceeding in it, would be to oppose the in-
 “ flexibility of an angry and resentful spirit, to
 “ results, which time had put beyond the reach
 “ of effectual resistance. In this position, to
 “ what end would Portugal prolong hostilities
 “ which it depended upon her to terminate, and
 “ nourish hatreds which it was in her power to
 “ extinguish ? Undoubtedly, if revenge were
 “ the only object of the Mother Country, it was
 “ possible that by continuing to refuse her sanc-
 “ tion to the Independent Government of Brazil,
 “ and by fomenting factions in the various Pro-
 “ vinces of that extensive Country, she *might*,
 “ if all other European Powers would connive
 “ at her policy, succeed in producing anarchy
 “ in Brazil, and in converting its Monarchical
 “ Form of Government, into a multitude of
 “ separate Republicks. But would such a success
 “ be beneficial to Portugal ? would it be worthy

“ of the Monarch who wore her Crown? or
 “ would it be advisable to throw away for ever,
 “ one half of the inheritance of the House of
 “ Braganza, because the enjoyment of the whole
 “ was by the force of events for one generation
 “ divided?

“ By the project submitted for consideration,
 “ His Most Faithful Majesty was placed in a
 “ position to grant, as of his own grace and
 “ free will, that which in effect he had no
 “ power of withholding; his Son was ready
 “ to renounce or to retain his claim to the
 “ Succession to the Crown of Portugal, as his
 “ Royal Father and the Cortes of the King-
 “ dom should decide; it was in truth referred
 “ to the King of Portugal to determine
 “ whether he would lay the foundations of
 “ two co-ordinate dynasties in the family of
 “ Braganza, or of a re-union by which after
 “ a temporary, and (in the age of a nation) a
 “ short separation, the two branches should
 “ again merge into one, and the Crowns of Por-
 “ tugal and Brazil again be settled on the same
 “ head.

“ All this was left to the determination of
 “ His Most Faithful Majesty; and the single
 “ sacrifice by which the power of thus deter-
 “ mining was to be purchased, was the devo-
 “ lution upon the Emperor of Brazil, of rights
 “ which could not be wrested from him, with-

“ out being at the same time lost not only to
 “ his Father, but to his Family.

“ With respect to the other obvious benefits
 “ of renewed amity and intercourse, of the
 “ reconcilment of kindred, of the revival and
 “ extension of commerce ; on all these points
 “ the voice of nature and of good sense could
 “ not be mistaken ; and for all these the pro-
 “ jected Treaty carefully provided.”

This then was the good which the accept-
 ance of the Treaty presented — the evil of its
 rejection has already been described.

“ But this Good and Evil was not the con-
 “ cern of Portugal alone. Other Powers were
 “ affected, who would, if Portugal much longer
 “ delayed, feel themselves at liberty — some
 “ perhaps under obligation — to act in the
 “ matter for themselves.

“ Great Britain, as has been before men-
 “ tioned, had a Treaty concluded with the Por-
 “ tuguese Government at Rio de Janeiro, which
 “ defined Her commercial relations with both
 “ Countries, but more especially with Brazil.”

The Treaty gave this Country very great
 benefits. The offer to renew it for a definite
 period had been made by the Imperial Govern-
 ment of Brazil. England had not availed her-
 self of it, nor would she, until she should know
 the answer of Portugal to the proposition which
 was then made. But if Portugal should refuse

to come to an arrangement, then it would be neither reasonable to expect, nor just to exact, from the British Government a refusal of the offered benefit.

As for Russia and France, the Powers which were the most adverse to a reconciliation, there was no reason why Portugal, sanctioned and encouraged by England, should fear the disapprobation of the one, or still less the lasting opposition of the other.

“The countenance of Austria was given to the advice of England. There was therefore nothing to fear, still less any thing to hope, from following the Russian counsels, as separate from the Alliance, and from England.

“Look at Spain,” continued Mr. Canning. “She had pursued the course recommended by Russia, and was she the nearer to the recovery of her trans-atlantick dominions? — and had she lost nothing by all intercourse being interrupted between them?”

“As for France, was the language of M. de Gestas at Rio the same as that of M. de Neuville at Lisbon? If not, whether was an obstinate refusal by the Portuguese Government to recognize the Independence of Brazil, more likely to meet with the cordial support of the French Government, or to enable it to require and obtain a higher price for its separate recognition?”

The influence of M. de Subserra prevailed over the soundness of these arguments, and Mr. Canning's *projet* was rejected as inadmissible by the Portuguese Cabinet. This determination was taken before Sir William à Court's arrival at Lisbon, Sept. 22. 1824, who at this stage of these discussions succeeded Sir Edward Thornton, as the Representative of His Britannick Majesty.

The avowed reasons of the Portuguese Ministers for thus rejecting this *projet* were, that it sacrificed every thing on the part of Portugal, without securing any thing in return, but the hope of a future Treaty of Commerce; that the nominal Sovereignty of the King of Portugal would be reconcileable with the views and interests of all parties; and (in the language of the Alliance) that "the abandonment of such an empire without a struggle would be a dishonour to the Nation." At the same time the idea that Great Britain, if She would really try, could not obtain for His Most Faithful Majesty a nominal Sovereignty, was ridiculed as absurd; and a general distrust was manifested of the intentions of England, because of that political egotism which Mr. Canning professed when he declared that the "grand object of his policy was the interest of England." That the interest of a nation ought to be the rule of its Government, and that no Government

does its duty which does not govern in the sense of that interest, is incontestibly true; but the purpose of Mr. Canning, in loudly declaring this principle, was "to disclaim those grounds "of interference with other Countries, which "had been put forward by other Powers as the "principle of their conduct in that respect. "They put forward a claim to interfere in the "general principle of setting things to rights, "whenever they thought them wrong. England renounced any such pretensions, and considered it as essential to a legitimate interference in the internal affairs of other Countries, that their interests should be in some way or other affected by their condition, or their proceedings."

It was just after the rejection of Mr. Canning's *projét* had been decided upon, that the Protocols* of the Conferences already mentioned, held at Paris on Portuguese affairs, reached Lisbon. M. de Palmella was highly indignant at this new species of usurpation. For these Protocols not only strongly remonstrated against the convocation of the ancient Cortes; but further, "the representatives of Powers" (Austria, Russia, and Prussia), "who had not a transmarine Colony belonging to them, nor a single sail on the Ocean which washed the shores of South

* See page 242.

“ America, nor a bale of goods in the ports
 “ either of Portugal or Brazil, calmly discussed
 “ the relations of a Mother Country to its
 “ Colonies, and recommended perpetual war
 “ between them, by which both might be
 “ destroyed, rather than that any inference
 “ dangerous to legitimacy should be drawn
 “ from a compromise by which both might be
 “ saved.”

M. de Palmella noticed these documents in a spirited memorandum, addressed to the Agents at Lisbon of those Courts, whose Representatives at Paris had taken part in these conferences. Nevertheless, with respect to Brazil, the Portuguese Ministers would not follow the counsels of England, although with the rejection of Mr. Canning's *projét* they did not determine to break off the Negotiations.

A *Contre Projét* was drawn up; but in such a way as to meet every one of the suggestions of the Holy Alliance. Of this *Contre Projét*, the first four Articles were to be *sine quâ non* conditions: the last fifteen were to be open to discussion. But the first of these four was quite sufficient to ensure the failure of the whole. By it the King of Portugal was to become *Senior Emperor* of Brazil. Now this title was conferred
 “ on Don Pedro by acclamation, as it was on
 “ Buonaparte by Vote, — and as it was always,
 “ in form, on the Emperor of Germany by

“ election. It was the very essence of that title,
 “ at least in the first instance to be so conferred,
 “ and was no doubt chosen for this reason by
 “ the republican party in Brazil instead of that
 “ of King.

“ What therefore, was asked, was in its very
 “ nature out of the power, not only of the
 “ Agents of the Emperor of Brazil, but of the
 “ Emperor himself, to grant. His Imperial Ma-
 “ jesty might have stipulated to call again the
 “ primary Assemblies by whom the Title was
 “ conferred upon him, and to propose to them
 “ the conferring it alike on his Father; and he
 “ might have done this without absurdity. But to
 “ associate his Father, or any one else, in a Title
 “ which he held from others, would be to do
 “ that which he had no power to do. But by
 “ the *Contre Projet* it was proposed that the
 “ Father should associate the Son in a Title
 “ which the Father did not hold at all,—an
 “ attempt which would probably bring the Son
 “ into immediate, and angry conflict with those
 “ to whom he was indebted for his authority:”
 but which, coupled with the second demand
 that the “ Sovereign,” (that is the King of Por-
 tugal), should make Commercial Treaties for
 Brazil, was sure to be fatal to the whole arrange-
 ment. There has seldom occurred an instance
 in which a Mother Country adjusting the Com-
 merce of her Colonies, has not adjusted it for

her own advantage ; and it may safely be affirmed that “ there is not one instance in which she has “ not been suspected of doing so.” Was it then likely, that “ Brazil would think its commercial “ interests safe in the hands of Portugal ?” and although the *Contre Projét* proposed that it should only be for *this first turn*, and that during the next reign, the prerogative of making Treaties for Portugal, should belong to the Brazilian Government, yet “ the *first turn* was every “ thing, because it was with the existing gene- “ ration that the compromise was to be made, “ and whenever the Brazilian turn came, it “ would be found that Portugal would be as “ little satisfied with such an arrangement as “ Brazil.”

Since the association of His Most Faithful Majesty by his Son in the title of Emperor of Brazil was a proposal which it must have been impossible for the Brazilian Government to have anticipated ; so it was impossible that its Plenipotentiaries could have received any instructions respecting it.

But it did not follow, because they were unable to accept the *Contre Projét*, that they were therefore at once to refuse it : and Mr. Canning succeeded in persuading them to promise, when the time came for them to give their answer, that they would express their willingness to take it, *ad referendum*, and to transmit it to their Govern-

ment. By this course M. de Villa Réal would be prevented from declaring the rupture of the negotiations, if such were his instructions, and time would be afforded to Mr. Canning to consider of the best means of exerting, both with Portugal and Brazil, his continued efforts of remonstrance and persuasion.

In this state of things the Conference was again called together. At its first meeting the *Contre Projét* was merely communicated to the Brazilian Plenipotentiaries; it being understood, that another was to be held, at which they would announce their intentions respecting that document. But before even this first Conference took place, Mr. Canning endeavoured to prepare the Brazilian Ministers for the reception of the *Contre Projét*, and in so doing he urged them, through Mr. Chamberlain, to deliberate calmly upon the proposals, before a final judgment was formed, or a decision taken respecting them; since he thought it but fair to the Portuguese Government, to point out to Brazil, that there were no inconsiderable advantages to be derived from their adoption.

“ If,” said he, “ the proposed assumption of
 “ the Title of Emperor of Brazil by the King of
 “ Portugal was an unexpected, and perhaps un-
 “ reasonable, demand, it must be observed on the
 “ other hand, that this demand implied a tacit
 “ renunciation of the Title of King of Brazil,

“ of which His Most Faithful Majesty was in
 “ full possession, and of which nothing but his
 “ own voluntary suggestion could ever have
 “ effectually divested him. So obvious, indeed,
 “ was this, that had the proposition, that the
 “ King of Portugal should divest himself of the
 “ Title of King of Brazil, and in lieu thereof
 “ be associated in the Title of Emperor with his
 “ Son, originated with Brazil, it would have
 “ been rejected by Portugal as absolutely pre-
 “ posterous: nor ought it to escape the observ-
 “ ation of the Brazilian Government, that if the
 “ proposition were accepted, it would give to
 “ the King of Portugal what was merely a
 “ feather, but would substantially confirm the
 “ Title to his Son. Again, if it had been pro-
 “ posed by the Brazilian Plenipotentiaries, as
 “ was proposed by the *Contre Projét*, that Don
 “ Pedro as Emperor of Brazil should, after all
 “ that had passed, succeed upon the death of
 “ his Father to the Crown of Portugal, and
 “ should continue for his life to govern that
 “ country, as a dependency from Rio de
 “ Janeiro, it cannot be doubted that this would
 “ have been equally, and at once, rejected at
 “ Lisbon.”

So strongly, indeed, did Mr. Canning feel that
 such a stipulation would be unreasonable, that
 in the *Projét* which he drew up for the consider-
 ation of the Conference, and for the transmission

to Lisbon, Don Pedro was made with the full consent of the Brazilian Plenipotentiaries to place his rights of succession to the Crown of Portugal, entirely at the disposal of the King his Father. Yet this arrangement, which would have been so "unreasonable if it had been proposed by Brazil, was voluntarily tendered by Portugal: and were the *Contre Projét* to be accepted by Brazil, and were the precarious life of His Most Faithful Majesty to terminate the next day, Don Pedro would be not only Emperor of Brazil, and confirmed in that Title by the sanction of His Father, but he would be undisputed King of Portugal, by Treaty, as well as by Succession."

Mr. Canning thus, as was the duty of a Mediator, endeavoured to allay the indignation, which he much feared that the *Contre Projét* might have the effect of exciting in Brazil.

In the interval between the Conference at which the Brazilian Plenipotentiaries received officially a copy of the *Contre Projét*, and the day fixed for the next meeting, two incidents came to the knowledge of Mr. Canning, * which put an end for ever to the re-assembling of the different parties of whom the Conference was composed.

To Mr. Canning's amazement, he received

* November 1824.

a document which had been issued by the Portuguese Government at Lisbon, addressed to the French and Spanish Ambassadors, the Russian and Prussian Chargé d’Affaires in that Capital, in which document the *Contre Projét* was enclosed, and a sort of appeal was made to Europe on the subject of Brazil: and moreover it contained a more precise exposition of the views of the Portuguese Cabinet, than any that M. de Villa Réal had as yet been authorized to communicate. On the receipt of this document Mr. Canning immediately postponed the Conferences; the transaction appeared to be of such “a character, that the attempt to analyze or “explain it, seemed wholly useless.”

“For Portugal,” Mr. Canning argued, “could “have no motive for offending England; yet “what more offensive than to call in France “and Spain to revise the course of a negotiation “which England had, for two years, been “carrying on for the sake of Portugal? Even, “if reliance upon the inveterate friendship and “experience of the endurance of England, “encouraged Portugal to coquet at her expense “with the Powers of the Continent, what possible inducement could there be to disgust “Austria, by calling in Russia and Prussia to “sit in judgment upon Her share of the negotiation; in which the Emperor had engaged “solely on account of His Family Connection

“ with the House of Braganza, and had persevered in it, not without hazard of offence to His Imperial Majesty’s Continental Allies, and not without intimations of surprise, at least, if not of displeasure, from them?” In spite, however, of this treatment, Mr. Canning would not have been prevented from urging, with all the influence of his Government, the reconciliation between Portugal and Brazil, nor would he have relaxed his efforts to overcome the difficulties, which the prejudices and passions of both Parties opposed to the accomplishment of a settlement.

“ But while the Mediation was yet labouring under the shock which it had received from this circular, came a second blow from another quarter, though dealt by the same hand, from which it was impossible to recover.”

The great difficulty which Mr. Canning had experienced at the outset of the Conferences, was (as will be recollected) to persuade either of the two parties to propose Terms of accommodation. The Portuguese Plenipotentiary was restrained by precise instructions from uttering more than the single word “Sovereignty,” to which the Brazilians uniformly opposed a no less decisive assertion of “Independence.” At that very moment, “without the knowledge of Great Britain, on whom the burden of the Mediation fell — and whose Consul General,

“ at Rio de Janeiro, had been so long the Chan-
 “ nel of our persuasions, and exhortations, to
 “ the Brazilian Government—without the know-
 “ ledge of the Austrian Plenipotentiaries, who
 “ had also a Colleague at Rio de Janeiro, high,
 “ and deservedly so, in the confidence of both
 “ the Emperor His Master, and the Emperor of
 “ Brazil — and finally, without the knowledge of
 “ the Portuguese Plenipotentiary in London —
 “ an obscure Emissary, of the name of de Léal,
 “ was sent by M. de Subserra to Rio de Janeiro,
 “ commissioned to propose the very arrange-
 “ ment which was then, at the eleventh hour,
 “ produced to the mediating Powers, as the
 “ *Contre Projét* of the Court of Lisbon !”

And here again, as in the case of the Circular,
 it may be asked for what purpose was this done ?
 “ Why was the Court of Lisbon desirous of
 “ deceiving its Plenipotentiary in London ?
 “ Why was it bent upon giving proof at Rio de
 “ Janeiro of the little reliance which it placed
 “ upon the friendship of England, and upon the
 “ connection and special good offices of Austria ?
 “ Why did it aim at disparaging the influence of
 “ the first of these Powers, and the authority of
 “ the last, at a Court where no other Powers
 “ but these enjoyed either influence, or authority ?
 “ and where the whole of what they enjoyed
 “ was sedulously exerted to save the Brazilian
 “ Crown to the House of Braganza ?”

The answer to these questions is not to be found, "if the real interest of Portugal were to be assumed as the motive of action. But if the Councils of Portugal, were under an influence which postponed the consideration of what might be good for Portugal, to that of what might break 'off the connection between Portugal and England," then the circular above mentioned, and the Mission of the Count de Subserra's emissary, at once became perfectly intelligible.

It was not till the return of M. de Léal from Rio, where he was imprisoned, and then, having had his proposals rejected, was dismissed, with orders to quit Brazil without delay, that Mr. Canning gained a knowledge of the transaction. It was on the discovery of this proceeding, which has been before alluded to, that he considered himself justified in telling the Portuguese Government, that while M. de Subserra remained in office there could "be no *good* understanding, no faith, no trust, no intelligence of any kind, between England and Portugal."

These signs of anger on the part of the British Government, changed the mind of the Court of Lisbon; which again became as anxious to continue the negotiations, as it had been, but a short time before, desirous to end them. But Mr. Canning saw that the Conferences in London could not be revived to any good purpose. If

the Members were again to be called together, the Austrian Government, who were before anxious to get out of them, would probably have ordered their Plenipotentiaries to withdraw.

The Brazilians, whom Mr. Canning had had great difficulty to persuadé to take the *Contre Projét, ad referendum*, while it was yet new to them, and while they could have no instructions upon it, would then probably have been instructed to reject it with disdain. "If therefore the Conference had been called together, the Members either wou'd not have come; or would have met only to have separated with an explosion."

The best thing therefore for Portugal was to prevent a dissolution of the Conference by suspending its meetings, until some other mode of negotiation could be devised.

It was when affairs were in this position between Portugal and Brazil, that the determination to acknowledge the Independence of some of the New States of America was taken by the British Government.

It was impossible not to see that this measure was calculated to have no inconsiderable effect upon the political position of Brazil; but it was not Mr. Canning's fault that the Portuguese Government had thought proper to delay coming to an arrangement with that Country, until the

force of events prevented any further postponement of the Recognition of Spanish America by Great Britain. Mr. Canning, indeed, had always, in anticipation of this event, urged the Portuguese Government, to hasten their proceedings, and to "*concede in time.*" Not that he feared that Portugal would ultimately, and permanently, reject all terms of accommodation with Brazil, but that She would withhold her consent to such terms until circumstances extorted it from Her; and that She would always be a few weeks, or a few months, *too late* in yielding; and by consequence would too often yield in vain.

But notwithstanding all that had passed, Mr. Canning still felt an earnest desire that England should do all in her power to help Portugal out of the difficulty with Brazil; and "he would "rather," he said, "make one effort more, and "fail in it, than not have tried any opening "which he might afterwards be reproached, or "reproach himself, for having neglected."

He felt, however, that if the mediation were to be resumed, it could only be resumed "by "Great Britain exclusively;" and with other Plenipotentiaries on the part of Portugal and Brazil, than those who had been placed in a situation so awkward towards each other.

Nevertheless, he by no means despised the assistance of Austria. On the contrary, he represented to Her Ministers, that he thought if

their Imperial Master refused counsels of moderation to his Son-in-law and the Brazilian Ministers, the chance of a compromise at all favourable to Portugal would be destroyed. And further, the admission “ of Brazilian Independence, which it would be, perhaps, in any case impossible much longer to delay, would be pressed upon the British Government, if left unsupported, in a manner which would render hopeless the preservation of the Interests of the Mother Country, and of the House of Braganza, which during the whole course of the Negotiation Great Britain had been as anxious as Austria to maintain.”

To have sought for new Plenipotentiaries from Brazil, would have been to have wasted half the year in the proposal, with the probability, after all, of being refused. The time, moreover, did not allow of such an experiment. The Portuguese Government had received repeated warnings, that the whole course of the negotiations was necessarily bounded by the expiration of six months from the 10th of February, 1825, after which date the stipulations of the Commercial Treaty of 1810 became subject to revision at the pleasure of the Brazilian Government, which might permit the stipulations to remain unquestioned. But Portugal had set the example of questioning them, having actually given formal notice of Her intention to suspend

certain Articles of that Treaty. The time therefore was limited, within which the negotiation, if renewed, must be brought to a conclusion; for there was no reason to suppose, that Brazil would be more forbearing than the Mother Country.

In meditating, therefore, on the next means of solving the difficulties in which affairs were placed, it occurred to Mr. Canning, that the best thing that could be done, would be to transfer the negotiation to Brazil, and to select some British Diplomatist of high rank, who should go first to Lisbon, and concert some middle course, between Mr. Canning's *Projét* and the *Contre Projét*, and thence proceed to Rio de Janeiro, to advise, and enforce with the mild authority of persuasion, the acceptance there of the Treaty.

By such a visible interposition, Great Britain "would do much to reconcile Brazil to something short of her unqualified demands, and Portugal to something short of her unyielding pretensions." While the long and intimate connections between the British and Portuguese Crowns, almost imposed the task upon the former, as a moral duty, if not as a positive obligation.

This plan was consequently decided upon; and the first announcement * which Sir William

* January 1825.

à Court was enabled to make to His Most Faithful Majesty, after the dismissal of M. de Suberra, was that Sir Charles Stuart, late British Ambassador at Paris, had been selected by His Government for this important Mission, as a proof of the deep interest taken by the King of England, in the concerns and prosperity of His oldest, and most faithful Ally.

In removing the seat of the Brazilian negotiations from London to Rio de Janeiro, it was essential that the negotiator should take Lisbon in his way. Mr. Canning, however, took especial care that the appearance of a second British Diplomatist on the scene of action, should neither embarrass Sir William à Court, nor disparage his credit.

Between the announcement to His Most Faithful Majesty of Sir Charles Stuart's appointment, and his departure for Lisbon, only one event occurred connected with the negotiations. That event was an official note from the Brazilian Plenipotentiaries, in which they recorded their rejection of the *Contre Projét*, and their inability to continue the discussions, the necessity of which was, however, superseded by Sir Charles Stuart's appointment.

The arrangement which Mr. Canning instructed Sir Charles Stuart to endeavour to bring about, was founded on the propositions made to Brazil, through M. de Léal, which were substan-

tially the same, as those contained in the *Contre Projét*, transmitted to the Count de Villa Réal in the preceding November, and the propositions of the *Projét* drawn up by Mr. Canning, and adopted by the Brazilian Plenipotentiaries at the Conference in London in the preceding July.

In these two instruments there were three several points of agreement.

First — The confirmation to Don Pedro by his Father of the Title of Emperor.

Second — The acknowledgement and sanction by the King of Portugal, of all that had been done in Brazil since His Most Faithful Majesty's return to Europe.

Third — The transference to Don Pedro by the King of Portugal of the substantial and independent administration of the trans-atlantick possessions of the dominions of the House of Braganza.

“ But, in the *Contre Projét*, His Most Faithful Majesty qualified these concessions in the following manner. He required — 1st. That he should share the title of Emperor with his Son: the Son to exercise the Sovereign Power in Brazil, with the additional title of Regent.

“ 2d. That the future acts of the Brazilian Government should be subject to His Most Faithful Majesty's sanction.

“ 3d. That the Army and Diplomacy of the two Countries should be common to both —

“ Portuguese and Brazilians being indifferently
 “ appointed to Commands in the former, and to
 “ Commissions in the latter — (whether these
 “ appointments were to be made wholly by the
 “ King of Portugal, or, in so far as Brazil was
 “ concerned, by the Emperor, subject to His
 “ Most Faithful Majesty’s confirmation, and in
 “ that case what proportion of such appoint-
 “ ments were to be allotted to Brazil, was not
 “ explained).”

Lastly — With respect to the question of suc-
 cession to the Crowns of Portugal and Brazil,
 there was so little material difference that the
Projet and *Contre Projet* may almost be said to
 have agreed. “ According to the first, Don
 “ Pedro was to leave his right of inheritance
 “ in his Father’s hands,” if it were so de-
 sired.

According to the second, “ the integrity of
 “ that right of inheritance was left untouched,”
 for the preservation of which no specifick stipu-
 lation was necessary; “ since the course of nature,
 “ and the fundamental principles of Portuguese
 “ law, prescribed the succession of Don Pedro,
 “ on his Father’s death, to the Crown of Por-
 “ tugal.”

The concessions of the King of Portugal, it
 must be admitted, were all that the Brazilian
 Government had a right to demand. But the
 qualifications with which they were accompanied,

were neither such as were wise for His Most Faithful Majesty to make, nor such as Brazil could be expected to admit.

“ In the first place, as to the assumption of
 “ the title of Emperor; was the making that a
 “ condition in return for His Most Faithful
 “ Majesty’s acknowledgment and sanction of
 “ that title in his Son well advised for his own
 “ dignity? The title was entirely *new*. It was
 “ not *that* by which His Most Faithful Majesty
 “ had been hitherto described, nor that by which
 “ his Allies and Europe had known him. His
 “ Most Faithful Majesty would, by this demand,
 “ therefore,” (supposing it conceded in Brazil,)
 “ submit himself to the pleasure of other Powers
 “ of the world, who might, or might not, think
 “ proper to acknowledge a new title; and some
 “ of whom, it was highly probable, might be
 “ more offended by the change, as change, than
 “ reconciled by any peculiar modifications of
 “ it.”

But if the assumption of the title of Emperor of Brazil by His Most Faithful Majesty, were an ill advised measure so far as regarded His own dignity, it was expressly calculated, as has already been shown, to stand in the way of an arrangement, between Portugal and Brazil. Mr. Canning therefore anxiously wished to persuade the King of Portugal to abandon a pretension, which would have been but of little

importance*, if it had not diminished the chances of a reconciliation.

In the second place, as to the condition on which His Most Faithful Majesty was prepared to sanction all that had been done in Brazil; viz. that every thing to be done there for the future, all acts of grace, and all titles and appointments, should be submitted for his sanction before they were to be considered as valid.

“Surely,” said Mr. Canning, “this is a condition, which it was unreasonable to demand, and which would be found to be impracticable in execution. It would be in effect to take back piecemeal the concession made in gross, by the grant of a substantive, and independent administration. The difference between the relation of Portugal to Brazil was in nothing more marked than this: that all that the Spanish Colonies had gained, had been gained in despite of the Mother Country; but that Brazil had been raised to the state of a Sister Kingdom, instead of a Colonial Dependency, by the repeated, and advised acts of policy of the Common Sovereign of Portugal and Brazil,” and therefore had a stronger claim to indulgence.

* It was decided at the Congress at Vienna, in 1815, that the title of Emperor was not to be considered as superior, in any way, to that of King.

These acts, which have been already described, it was folly for Portugal to dream of revoking; and yet the desire to revoke or modify the one, opening all the Ports of Brazil to Foreign Commerce, “would be ascribed in “Brazil as the motive of any attempt by the “Portuguese Government to keep the commercial legislation of Brazil within its corrective “supervision.”

Was it to be expected, that after the King of Portugal had established, throughout Brazil, Supreme Tribunals “of Justice, the Brazilians “would tolerate the decisions of these tribunals “being made again, as formerly, reversible “at Lisbon? and yet the only other alternative “was, that legal process must continue to be “executed in the name of the local supreme “authority.”

Besides — “Under what circumstances did. “Don Pedro make use of the discretionary “power placed by positive Instruction, and the “force of circumstances, in his hands?

“From any vindictive or angry feeling towards the King His Father? or from any “allurements of personal ambition? Not at “all. — But when the King’s authority in Portugal was overborne by a faction — when “orders were sent out by that faction, to Rio “de Janeiro in the King’s name, which, if “carried into effect, would have led to a

“ revolution in Brazil, Don Pedro had the
 “ courage and address to save the Monarchy
 “ in Brazil : an object which he effected, with-
 “ out drawing a sword, at the moment when
 “ Monarchy in Portugal was reduced to nothing
 “ but a name.

“ When His Royal Highness took the reso-
 “ lution to make the declaration of Indepen-
 “ dence, it should be observed that the title
 “ of Perpetual Defender of Brazil, which he
 “ first assumed, was not of a new or demo-
 “ cratick origin. It was known to Portugal
 “ from having been borne by John I. the
 “ Founder of the Dynasty of Braganza, and
 “ it was familiar to Brazil from its having been
 “ also borne there, by the Portuguese Govern-
 “ nor, Vieira, who wrested Brazil from its former
 “ conquerors, the Dutch. These particulars
 “ were not unimportant, as marking the absence,
 “ on the part of Don Pedro, of any revolu-
 “ tionary tendency, and a desire on his part to
 “ conform, as far as possible, to national feel-
 “ ings and national traditions, common to every
 “ branch of the dominions of the House of
 “ Braganza.”

Even in consenting to adopt the title of Em-
 peror, Don Pedro manifested great delicacy
 towards His Father ; since he was only reconciled
 to the measure “ by the consideration that it was
 “ not so direct an usurpation upon the rights of

“ His Most Faithful Majesty, as would have
 “ been the use of the King of Portugal’s un-
 “ doubted title, of King of Brazil.

“ It was surely therefore unjust to say that
 “ Don Pedro ought to have holden out against
 “ all compromise, ought to have submitted to
 “ the worst of possible consequences of popular
 “ discontent and insurrection, rather than appear
 “ to invade His Father’s rights, or to throw off
 “ allegiance to the Mother Country; when, had
 “ he obeyed Her commands, and embarked at
 “ once for Portugal, there to have shared the
 “ captivity of the King, and left Brazil a prey to
 “ contending factions, that Country, whichever
 “ faction might have prevailed, would have been
 “ irretrievably lost to the House of Braganza.

“ In all discussions, therefore, with Don Pe-
 “ dro, it became the Portuguese Ministers to
 “ recollect that it was owing to the spirit and
 “ prudence of that Prince that they had Brazil
 “ to treat of at all. Had He but obeyed the
 “ commands issued to Him in the name of the
 “ King, Brazil would have been long before, as
 “ much out of the scope of the authority of the
 “ House of Braganza, as Mexico, Columbia, and
 “ Buenos Ayres, were beyond that of the
 “ Spanish House of Bourbon.

“ Had Don Pedro refused to take the Govern-
 “ ment of Brazil into his hands, and to allow,
 “ in the last extremity, the Imperial Crown to

“ be placed upon his head, he might have fallen
 “ a worthy and glorious sacrifice to a sense of
 “ honour, and of duty, but he would not have
 “ fulfilled the real intentions of his Father and
 “ Sovereign ; while he would have lost for his
 “ Father, as effectually as for Himself, and his
 “ Descendants for ever, a possession which he
 “ was appointed to govern, and which he was
 “ instructed, in all events, and at all hazards, to
 “ preserve.

“ Further, he would have sown the seeds of
 “ an irreconcilable, and hereditary animosity
 “ between the Portuguese and Brazilian Nations,
 “ which no time, and no concurrence of circum-
 “ stances, could have effectually eradicated.

“ Nor was it only against the Cortes of Lisbon
 “ that Don Pedro had maintained the authority
 “ committed to him by his Father, in moments
 “ of most critical emergency, and against dan-
 “ gers which might have overcome a less deter-
 “ mined courage.”

When Faction and Intrigue prevailed in the
 Legislative Assembly of Brazil, the Emperor
 did not hesitate to dissolve it ; and he “ subse-
 “ quently framed a new plan of Constitution,
 “ which had been adopted by the whole people
 “ of Brazil ; and which was less unfavourable,
 “ than the one which existed before, to a good
 “ understanding with Portugal, and to a possible
 “ re-union of the two Courts ; since the prohibi-

“ tion to unite them, which formed an express
 “ article of the former Constitution, was silently
 “ repealed.

“ Lastly, the appointment of Plenipotentiaries
 “ to treat for a reconciliation with Portugal, was
 “ not to be overlooked as a proof of the *animus*
 “ which actuated Don Pedro. It would have
 “ cost him less trouble, and he would have in-
 “ curred less risk of suspicion, and of unpopu-
 “ larity, had he refused, at once, all treaty, short
 “ of a direct unqualified recognition of the
 “ Independence of Brazil: and although the
 “ British Government might take some merit to
 “ itself, for having successfully urged the expe-
 “ diency of amicable negotiation, it would not
 “ be fair to deny to Don Pedro the due praise of
 “ having acceded to reasoning, and persuasion,
 “ in spite of the strong bias to the contrary
 “ which prevailed in his Councils, as well as
 “ among his people.

“ It was perhaps an ill return, it was certainly
 “ a most unadvised one, on the part of Portugal,
 “ to perplex Don Pedro with secret Missions
 “ which he could not receive without hazarding
 “ his Sovereign Authority, nor reject without
 “ appearing to act disrespectfully to his Royal
 “ Father.

“ From this impartial retrospect, therefore, it
 “ appears that Don Pedro had in fact, for a series
 “ of years, and under a succession of most diffi-

“cult and trying circumstances, only followed
 “out to their natural consequences, the prin-
 “ciples already laid down in Brazil, when the
 “Government was confided to his hands: yield-
 “ing only to the force of events when those
 “consequences had gone beyond the line of his
 “prescribed duty; but providing in all instances
 “in the most favourable manner, that the exi-
 “gencies of his position, and the welfare of his
 “people would allow, for the great interests of
 “Hereditary Monarchy, and of the Royal
 “House of Braganza.”

Such was the real state of things in Brazil; and, if any Minister should give his advice to the King of Portugal, upon a general idea of a dispute between a Mother Country and a Colony; and should expect to reduce the latter to obedience, and to make a crime of its separation; he would deceive his Sovereign, and irreparably injure his interests.

“The question, therefore, to be solved, was
 “not whether Brazil should, or should not, re-
 “turn to its former subordination to Portugal;
 “but how the Monarchy should be saved in
 “America, and how the best chance might be
 “preserved of a re-union of the two Crowns of
 “Portugal and Brazil, on the head of the
 “Dynasty of Braganza.

“The notes of the Portuguese Government
 “had been chiefly founded on the alleged im-

“ possibility of the King’s yielding up his
 “ natural rights, consistently with His Royal
 “ Dignity. But it was not true dignity to insist
 “ upon pretensions, which there were not the
 “ means of maintaining. Brazil was beyond the
 “ reach of the power of Portugal, and a Brazilian
 “ Fleet off the mouth of the Tagus, was a much
 “ more probable result of a renewal of hostilities,
 “ than the landing of a Portuguese Army at Rio
 “ de Janeiro. If Portugal was in old times able
 “ to detach herself from Spain, and to resist the
 “ whole force of the Castilian Monarchy ; was it
 “ probable that Brazil, separated not by a shallow
 “ river, or an imaginary line, but by the immensity
 “ of an ocean, from Portugal, would be unable to
 “ maintain her Independence against any force
 “ which Portugal could detach against her ?

“ The determination, then, to withhold the re-
 “ cognition of Independence from Brazil, would
 “ not alter the fact of that Independence ; the
 “ most that it could do, would be to place the
 “ Prince in the dilemma of having either to resist
 “ his Father in arms, or to abdicate his station
 “ in Brazil.” Could it, then, be beneficial to
 Portugal to bring about either of these results ?
 Could it be for the advantage of the House of
 Braganza to run the hazard of losing Brazil, by
 obstinately refusing to acknowledge the fact of
 the Independence, which it was no longer pos-
 sible to prevent or to disguise ?

“ All, then, that remained to be considered
 “ was the best course by which the King of Por-
 “ tugal might meet this inevitable necessity, and
 “ derive from it the most satisfactory compen-
 “ sation. Thus far the attempts at an arrange-
 “ ment had been in the form of a negotiation
 “ between two Independent Powers. No other
 “ form could have been adopted, when once a
 “ war had begun to be carried on between them.
 “ The admission of this form for the purpose of
 “ negotiation, did not prejudge the question of
 “ Independence. Even Insurgents, when treated
 “ with, by the Power which claims a right to
 “ their Allegiance, are, *for the purpose* of the
 “ Treaty, and while it is in negotiation, regarded
 “ as Independent. But it has been sufficiently
 “ shown how little the character of Insurgents
 “ applied to the Brazilians, how little of what
 “ they claimed had been assumed by themselves ;
 “ and how much had been granted to them by
 “ the Authority of the King. The dispute was
 “ not general and fundamental, it was merely
 “ about the difference between what had been
 “ so granted, and what had been so assumed.

“ The negotiations in London were termi-
 “ nated, and it was in one respect fortunate for
 “ the King of Portugal that they were so, for it
 “ afforded him an opportunity of reviewing his
 “ past concessions, and of considering how small
 “ an additional exercise of the same generosity,

“ and benevolence, as well as of sound policy,
 “ which dictated these concessions, would com-
 “ plete the measure of them ; and of effecting, by
 “ His Most Faithful Majesty’s own Royal Grace
 “ and Authority, all that negotiation could de-
 “ mand, and more than Treaty could stipulate.
 “ If it were clear, then, that the Independence
 “ of Brazil was inevitable, it was surely for the
 “ true dignity of the King of Portugal, who had
 “ himself, in fact, laid the foundation of that In-
 “ dependence by acts of spontaneous bounty, to
 “ put the finishing hand to his own work, and
 “ entitle himself to the gratitude of his Son and
 “ of his subjects in Brazil, by consigning them
 “ voluntarily to each other. If Don Pédro had
 “ voluntarily thrown off his Allegiance to his
 “ Father, and Sovereign, there might have been
 “ some ground in justice, though little, even then,
 “ in prudence, for insisting upon a retraction of
 “ that voluntary offence. But, if all that had been
 “ done by the Prince, beyond what his Father
 “ chalked out for him, had been involuntary, and
 “ forced upon him by circumstances, originating
 “ for the most part not in Brazil, but in Portugal,
 “ it would be hard to require of the Prince, a
 “ rigid account of the measures for which he
 “ could be so little responsible. To require a
 “ reversal of them was vain.”

For these reasons, Sir Charles Stuart was di-
 rected, since it was fitting that the King of

Portugal should "speak the language of command rather than that of compromise or bargain," to endeavour to induce His Most Faithful Majesty in the undiminished plenitude of his rights, as King of the United Kingdom of Portugal and Brazil, to sign a *Carta Regia*, granting to Brazil all that remained to be granted, to establish an entire legislative independence, confirming to Don Pedro the unlimited exercise of the Royal Authority during the life of his Father, under such titles as the Representative Assemblies of Brazil might have conferred upon him, permitting Don Pedro to use, in addition to those titles, that of Heir Apparent of Portugal, to shew the continued connection between the two Crowns. In such an instrument His Most Faithful Majesty might reserve to himself all his own titles and dignities, and all his private property in Brazil.

The establishment of a Commission for adjusting any questions of property in dispute, was a point already agreed to by the Government of Rio de Janeiro: the one for the appointment of Commissions by Portugal and Brazil respectively, for settling the commercial intercourse between the two Countries reciprocally, "on the footing of the most favoured Nation," was one which might be arranged when the *Carta Regia* should be issued, or, if the King of Portugal desired it, before its publication at Rio de Janeiro.

“ This mode of proceeding, if adopted by his
 “ Most Faithful Majesty, would get rid of infi-
 “ nite difficulties ; at the same time, that what
 “ would be effected by it would be the result of
 “ an act of Kingly power, not the fruit of a
 “ tedious and humiliating negotiation. His Most
 “ Faithful Majesty would thus create, instead of
 “ acquiescing in the station assumed by his Son,
 “ and the title of Emperor” (of which it was
 hopeless to attempt to divest the Prince) “ would
 “ become by this process, in a *great measure*, the
 “ gift of the King.

“ Comparing this simple and direct proceed-
 “ ing with the complicated arrangements of the
 “ Contre Projêt, what embarrassments and in-
 “ congruities did it not avoid ? ”

By the Contre Projêt His Most Faithful Ma-
 jesty reserved — First, a species of sovereignty
 over independent Brazil ; and next, the right of
 negotiating the commercial Treaties. It pro-
 posed a joint Diplomacy and a common Army ;
 “ qualifications which were all vicious in prin-
 “ ciple, and impracticable in execution — tend-
 “ ing to destroy the simplicity of a transaction,
 “ which, if it were the fruit of inevitable neces-
 “ sity, must be submitted to, if not, might be al-
 “ together rejected. But, if submitted to, it ought
 “ to be with a good grace, and Portugal should
 “ not seek for the mere purpose of temporary
 “ self-delusion, with the certainty of future dis-

“ appointment, to depreciate the favour which
 “ she bestowed, and to make independence de-
 “ pendent. Portugal, therefore, for her own
 “ sake, ought (to make the future re-union of the
 “ two Crowns the more valuable) to have given
 “ to Brazil a free scope for activity and expan-
 “ sion in the new sphere into which the Revolū-
 “ tions of the world had launched her. Portu-
 “ gal ought to allow that great Country to start
 “ at equal advantage with its neighbours, in that
 “ new system of independent States by which it
 “ was surrounded. Portugal ought to remain
 “ satisfied, that of all those New States, Brazil
 “ alone would retain any connection with its
 “ European Parent; a connection, however,
 “ which, if drawn too tight, would only have the
 “ effect of imparting a more vehement impulse
 “ to the energies it was attempted to cramp, and
 “ to destroy all remnant of kind feeling for the
 “ authority by which the new destinies of Brazil
 “ should be sought to be controuled.”

“ Such was the advice tendered by the King
 “ of Great Britain to His most valued Ally, —
 “ advice which, if followed, presented two ad-
 “ vantages of a practical nature, too important
 “ to be overlooked.

“ *First*, the succession of Don Pedro to the
 “ Crown of Portugal, being left on the same
 “ grounds on which it then rested, His Most
 “ Faithful Majesty would always hold in his own

“ hands the power of modifying that right : and
 “ the King and Cortes (or whatever else might
 “ be the legitimate authority for this purpose in
 “ Portugal) would always have both the right
 “ and the power to make regulations touching
 “ the succession of the Crown.

“ On the other hand, if His Most Faithful
 “ Majesty should be extremely desirous of
 “ settling that point, at once, and irrevocably,
 “ it might be settled by the sole authority of
 “ His Most Faithful Majesty, in the proposed
 “ Carta Regia, with a better grace, than if a
 “ thing so sacred as legitimate hereditary suc-
 “ cession, were to be made the subject of a
 “ private compact. On this point, however,
 “ it was for His Most Faithful Majesty to make
 “ his option ; the British Government would be
 “ ready to second his views, in the manner
 “ which he might think most advisable.”

Second. The Treaties between “ Great Britain
 “ and Portugal against the attacks of all Foreign
 “ enemies. If Brazil were once acknowledged
 “ by Portugal as an independent State, any
 “ aggression afterwards from Brazil upon any
 “ possession of Portugal, would become that of
 “ a Foreign enemy : the obligations of Treaty
 “ would apply to that case, and England would
 “ be as much bound to defend Portugal against
 “ an aggression, from independent Brazil, as
 “ against that of any Foreign Power.

“ A Brazilian Fleet off the Mouth of the
 “ Tagus would then become a visionary
 “ danger.

“ But, if Portugal, for the sake of a mere
 “ nominal Sovereignty of which she could
 “ neither exercise the rights, nor procure the
 “ acknowledgment, should think proper to
 “ give the character of a Civil war, to the war
 “ which would infallibly break out, so soon as
 “ the refusal to recognize the Independence
 “ of Brazil should be declared, in a civil war
 “ between two branches of the same Monarchy,
 “ no Treaties bound Great Britain to interfere,
 “ and Her principles so often of late years pro-
 “ claimed to the world forbid such an inter-
 “ ference.”

Sir Charles Stuart was therefore to signify to the Government of His Most Faithful Majesty,

First, that it was His Britannick Majesty's opinion that whatever the King of Portugal was willing to yield to Brazil, should be yielded by a Royal Edict, rather than through negotiation. Second, that any concessions short of real and entire independence would be useless.

Sir Charles was authorized to express his willingness to be the bearer to Brazil of any Royal Edict framed on these principles there to be published, either directly, or, so soon as he should have ascertained the readiness of the Brazilian Government, to agree to the

several arrangements considered as requisite conditions of its publication.

Sir Charles was to do his utmost to secure the opening of a commercial intercourse between Portugal and Brazil, "on the footing of the most favoured Nation," immediately on his arrival at Rio de Janeiro with the Royal Edict: and he was authorized to "waive any right which Great Britain might possess under the Treaty of 1810 to object to the admission of Portugal to that most favoured footing."

Nevertheless, if the King of Portugal should prefer a negotiation, and Treaty with Brazil, Sir Charles was permitted to become His Most Faithful Majesty's Plenipotentiary, provided the concessions came within the scope of those which the proposed *Carta Regia* was to grant. Otherwise Sir Charles was not to undertake that office — although he was to declare his willingness to give any Portuguese Plenipotentiary all the aid and countenance in his power. But at all events, he was not to consent to be joined with a Portuguese Plenipotentiary, or even to convey one to Brazil.

In the case of the negotiation, if intrusted to a Portuguese, having an unsatisfactory issue, or being prolonged beyond the period when circumstances might force Great Britain to commence a revision of the Treaty of 1810,

Sir Charles was (as Portugal had already been told) to treat with Brazil on the subject of that revision.

With these instructions Sir Charles Stuart proceeded on his mission, and Mr. Canning left nothing undone to facilitate and ensure its success. By dint of the mere force of argument, he convinced the Austrian Government that it was for its interest to promote the settlement which he recommended; and by a frank disclosure to the Austrian Minister of the instructions with which Sir Charles was furnished, he completely disarmed the feelings of jealousy, which the circumstance of the British Government acting alone in the business was calculated to excite. At Lisbon, therefore, as well as at Rio de Janeiro, Sir Charles Stuart was ensured the aid of the Austrian Representatives, — a point of very great importance: since at Lisbon it broke the weight of the influence which the Counsels of the Alliance might, if united, have had upon the Portuguese Ministers; and, at Rio de Janeiro, it gave to Sir Charles Stuart a most able coadjutor, whose counsels had always had considerable effect on the mind of Don Pedro.

As for Russia, Mr. Canning conceived that no efforts would be effectual to conciliate that Power. The question, however, was one, in which She had naturally little interest; and since Her co-operation was not to be expected,

all that could be done was to neutralize Her opposition.

The views of Prussia upon a point so remote from Prussian interests were not material.

It was, however, far otherwise with respect to France, to whom the substance of what the British Government desired, was communicated ; and since the French Ministers could bring no arguments against it, and indeed were disposed to be well with England, except when they imagined any advantage could be gained to French Interests, by an opposite course, they promised to direct their Agents in Portugal, and Brazil, to give their support to the British Ambassador.

At Lisbon, they faithfully fulfilled their promise, but at Rio de Janeiro an attempt was made to anticipate Sir Charles, by an offer to recognize the independence of Brazil on condition of being allowed to participate in the commercial advantages enjoyed by Great Britain.

The good faith of Don Pedro, induced him at once to put an end to this effort.

When Mr. Canning first determined to send a special Mission to Brazil, the determination was communicated to Don Pedro through Mr. Chamberlain. The Prince then pledged himself to the British Government, through his Agent in London, to wait in patience, till he should learn what proposals the British negotiator should be empowered to make ; he therefore declared that

he did not consider himself at liberty to listen to propositions from any other quarter, until he knew the nature of the project of which Sir Charles Stuart would be the bearer.

Sir Charles arrived at Lisbon in the middle of March, 1824. Count Porto Santo, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, was the individual selected by His Most Faithful Majesty to conduct on His part the conferences with the British Plenipotentiary. The Count was evidently sincerely disposed to bring the negotiation to a satisfactory termination ; and to this end he had no hesitation in at once avowing the readiness of the Portuguese Government to grant without reservation, real and substantial Independence to Brazil, on the Emperor and his Ministers agreeing to certain specified conditions. M. de Porto Santo also expressed the entire approbation, by His Government, of the suggestion that a *Carta Regia*, or Letters Patent, (which amounted to the same thing) should be the mode in which it would be best befitting the dignity of the King of Portugal to make the concession. But unfortunately, from certain notions, as to the preservation of the honour of His Most Faithful Majesty, it was resolved, when the construction of the Letters Patent came to be decided, that He should first assume the title of Emperor of Brazil, and should, in that character, as well as in that of King of Portugal

and the Algarves, make Don Pedro his associate in the Imperial Title, and then cede to him the right of Sovereignty over Brazil.

Sir Charles Stuart did not obtain from the Portuguese Government the abandonment of this Imperial pretension,—a pretension which His Excellency seemed to consider as justified by a due respect to the principles of ultra-Monarchy. He however procured another version of the Letters Patent, applying the Imperial Title to the three Kingdoms of Portugal, Brazil, and the Algarves, collectively, instead of to Brazil alone : it being left to his discretion when he arrived at Rio de Janeiro, to produce whichever of the two versions he should find to be most acceptable, although, neither of the two were to be delivered, until the Brazilian Government should consent to certain, not unreasonable, preliminaries.

When Mr. Canning learnt that Sir Charles had thus departed from his instructions, in consequence of being unable to overcome the pertinacious adherence of the Portuguese Government to the point of the Title, (which was really unimportant to either party except as endangering the success of the intervention, if the temper of the Brazilian people should render it impossible for the Emperor to concede it,) Mr. Canning forthwith instructed that Ambassador, not to undertake to bring the proposition forward, except with the understanding, either that it was

not to be pressed to the rupture of the negotiation, or that Don Pedro was to be allowed to refer it to the Constitutional Authorities of Brazil, and to abide by the result of the reference. But all that the diplomattick skill of Sir Charles Stuart, in consequence of these fresh instructions, enabled him to extort from the Portuguese Ministers, who probably perceived his bias for the doctrines of legitimacy, (to which, however, erroneously, they fancied the assumption of the Imperial Title by their Royal Master was favourable,) was, another version of the Letters Patent, without any change of style in the Court of Lisbon, acknowledging Don Pedro as King of Brazil ; in which document, however, to render it more palatable to the Court of Rio, the separation of the two Countries was more distinctly pronounced than in the other versions. From the King of Portugal himself, however, Sir Charles extracted a verbal permission to do whatever might be essential for effecting a settlement.

With these three instruments Sir Charles Stuart left Lisbon on the 24th of May, being likewise invested with full Powers to conclude a Treaty in the name of Portugal with Brazil, on the several points, the acceding to which were made the conditions, on which the Letters Patent were to be surrendered to the Brazilian Government. These points were: First, The

cessation of Hostilities. Second, The restitution of captures. Third, The removal of all sequestrations. Fourth, The adoption by Brazil of the common debt. Fifth, The payment of the sums due by the publick treasure to the original donations of Brazil. Sixth, The establishment of the principles which were to form the Basis of the Treaty of Commerce.

With respect to the Succession to the Crown, that question, in compliance with the anxious wish of His Most Faithful Majesty, and his Government, was decided in favour of Don Pedro, to whom the Letters Patent declared the succession to the two Crowns belonged, giving him at the same time permission to use, the Title of Prince Royal of Portugal.

When Mr. Canning learnt that not one of the versions of the Letters Patent with which Sir Charles was furnished "included that arrangement which in his opinion would have ensured "a speedy, as well as fortunate, end to the "negotiation, although they included every "other imaginable variety," he nevertheless deemed it for the interests of all parties to promote the acceptance by Brazil of one or other of these three versions. For this purpose he first directed his efforts to persuade the Brazilian Agents in England, and especially Marshal Brant (whose good sense and talent had been conspicuous throughout all the proceedings), to

use his utmost influence with his Court to receive the second version of the Letters Patent. But neither General Brant, nor his Colleague, M. Gameiro, would consent to recommend its acceptance; feeling, that, by the assumption of the Imperial Title by His Most Faithful Majesty with respect to Portugal, and the Algarves, as well as with respect to Brazil, and the retainment of it after their separation, His Most Faithful Majesty would expose himself to the necessity of soliciting a recognition of his New Style from the Powers of Europe; — a recognition which those Powers might either give, or refuse, and in the giving of which they would have a pretext for meddling in the whole discussion between Portugal and Brazil. Of the first and second versions, therefore, the Brazilian Agents preferred the first. They even thought, if the King of Portugal “ could be persuaded so far to invert the order of the propositions contained in the Letters Patent, as to acknowledge the separate Government of Brazil in his Son, as he already proposed to acknowledge the elevation of Brazil from a Kingdom to an Empire, in His Most Faithful Majesty’s own simple, established, and unquestionable character of King of the United Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil, and the Algarves, and would then reserve to himself for life, the Style of Titular Emperor of Brazil, that such an arrangement

“ would not be unacceptable at Rio de Janeiro.”

Sir Charles Stuart was therefore once more instructed to endeavour to effect this alteration ; and in the event of his having sailed, Sir William à Court was to try to induce His Most Faithful Majesty to issue, yet another Copy of the Letters Patent, after the form above pointed out.

Sir Charles had sailed before these despatches arrived at Lisbon ; and therefore the execution of the orders contained in them devolved upon Sir William à Court.

But it was hardly to be expected that the Portuguese Ministers would yield that, to the representations of Sir William, which Sir Charles Stuart had not been able to induce them to yield while yet they were uncertain whether a refusal on their part would not prevent Sir Charles from taking charge of the negotiations. This effort to procure such a change in the wording of the Letters Patent, as would have placed the success of the mediation beyond a doubt, having failed, Mr. Canning then applied himself to promote the favourable reception at Rio de Janeiro of the terms, such as they were, which Sir Charles Stuart was empowered to offer : and since all the three Copies of the Letters Patent concurred in giving substantially the acknowledgement of the Independence of Brazil, which after all was the main practical

object in dispute, Sir Charles was directed to declare to the Brazilian Government, that if it should reject all the three, "the opinion of the British Government, and of the whole world, would be pronounced against the unreasonableness of that rejection."

The long and laborious exertions which the British Cabinet had made to bring the intricate discussions between Portugal and Brazil to a satisfactory close, "entitled the King of England to expect that His sentiments would not be altogether indifferent to Don Pedro: and, having tendered, without reserve, to His Most Faithful Majesty, His Majesty's earnest advice to yield to the circumstances of his situation, and to open his arms to a reconciliation with His Son, His Majesty could not then forbear to tender to Don Pedro, advice equally earnest, to meet the concessions and advances of His Royal Father with a spirit of corresponding kindness and moderation." Mr. Canning, indeed, whatever might be the apprehensions of the Portuguese Government, was especially anxious to prevent the Brazilian Government from supposing, that the failure in bringing about an agreement between Portugal and Brazil, would be followed immediately by a separate agreement between Brazil, and Great Britain.

With M. Gameiro Mr. Canning refused to

enter hypothetically into a consideration of what would follow, if Sir Charles Stuart should unhappily be unsuccessful : for although it was true that England would ultimately have to come to a separate arrangement with Brazil, if one, or both parties, continued obstinately immoveable ; yet, for the sake of both, the British Government would defer that arrangement, until all hope of reconciliation should be ascertained to be at an end.

In order that before such hope was abandoned, every method should have been tried, Sir Charles Stuart was instructed, if he found the Brazilian Government inflexibly resolved to reject every one of the three versions of the Letters Patent, but should agree generally to the other terms proposed, to make another appeal to the King of Portugal, to try whether he would not consent to such further variation in these documents, as might reconcile conflicting opinions.

Sir Charles arrived at Rio de Janeiro, on the 18th of July. The details of his negotiation with the Portuguese Government had already transpired there, and had produced a favourable impression. The Emperor himself was warm in His expressions of satisfaction, at Sir Charles's arrival, and seemed well disposed to listen favourably to his propositions. In the very outset, however, he remarked that he doubted much the

possibility of admitting any one of the three versions of the *Carta Patente*, since, having been chosen Emperor by acclamation, the same public opinion which would compel him to retain that title, would not allow him to grant it to His Father.

He suggested, however, as an arrangement which might be satisfactory, that His Most Faithful Majesty should abdicate the Sovereignty of Brazil, and should then recognize his Son, as Emperor, retaining the Imperial Title for his own life; Don Pedro, to conciliate public opinion in Brazil, renouncing his right to the Crown of Portugal.

After some further preliminary discussions with Don Pedro himself, in which Sir Charles in vain endeavoured to procure an immediate armistice between the two Countries, and in which His Royal Highness shewed a disposition to play off France (in consequence of the proposal which she had made) against England, M. de Carvalho de Mello, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and two other individuals, M. Santo Amaro, and M. Francisco Villela, were appointed Plenipotentiaries, charged with the management of the negotiations. The sentiments of these gentlemen were less moderate, or conciliatory, than those of their Imperial Master, as was shewn in the very first conference which took place.

It was begun with an explanation by Sir

Charles of the form in which the negotiations were to be concluded : viz. that the several arrangements which were to result from the separation of the two Countries, were to be contained in a Treaty which was to be signed at the same moment when the *Carta Patente* proclaiming the dismemberment should be delivered into the hands of the Brazilian Ministers : upon which the Plenipotentiaries declared the *Carta Patente* to be wholly inadmissible, because the Recognition by Brazil of any right on the part of the King of Portugal, to associate Don Pedro in the Title of Emperor, or even to cede the right of *Sovereignty*, would be to attack the principle of all those proceedings by which the Imperial Government had been established. On these points they seemed inexorable ; and on their beginning to use somewhat vehement language, Sir Charles begged them to reflect on the subject at leisure, and meanwhile proposed to pass on to the other subjects of discussion, which he went over successively with little difference of opinion. This being done the conference ended, it appearing, that on the practical questions in dispute between the two Countries there would be little opposition ; but that there still remained two grand difficulties : the first of which, respecting the acknowledgement by Brazil of the *right of Cession of the Sovereignty* by the King of Portugal, had been made by Mr. Canning the

foundation of the arrangement; the second, the right of His Most Faithful Majesty to associate his Son in the Imperial Dignity, was a proposition, which Mr. Canning had always foretold would present the greatest obstacle to success. In the Second Conference, Sir Charles applied himself to conquer these difficulties; but first, and principally, he insisted on the acknowledgment by Brazil of the right of His Most Faithful Majesty to *cede the Sovereignty*, charging the Brazilian Government, in no equivocal terms, with want of faith in now, for the first time, bringing forward an objection at which its Agents in England had never so much as hinted. The Plenipotentiaries seemed to feel the full force of this reproach; and on being pressed to make known the extent of their pretensions, they produced three Articles respecting the separation of the two Countries, which they allowed Sir Charles to alter, until they admitted this right of Cession; but, although they were told that these Articles could not be allowed to pass unless they contained a distinct reference to the *Carta Patente*, they stedfastly refused to admit such reference to any one of the three versions of these documents. Finding them, therefore, determined to reject this proposition, Sir Charles offered to admit the three Articles as he had altered them, provided that they should contain a paragraph declaratory of the Cession of the

Sovereignty, as being the result of some Act, signed by His Most Faithful Majesty. To this proposal an answer was promised at the next meeting; and with this promise the second conference closed

At this critical moment, the point concerning the right of Cession of the Sovereignty being gained, Sir Charles sent off his despatches by Major Gurwood, breaking off his narrative just at the time when it was, to all appearance, probable that when the Plenipotentiaries next met, they would have brought the principal point in contest to a satisfactory issue. Renewed discussion, however, about an Armistice consumed that third Conference; and it was not till the middle of the fourth, that it was finally agreed that the Cession should be conveyed in the form of an Act, done by His Most Faithful Majesty. This point being thus yielded, Sir Charles once more endeavoured to persuade the Plenipotentiaries to accept the *Carta Patente*; but they continued peremptorily to object to the form of all the three versions with which Sir Charles was supplied. The last they held to be inadmissible, because all mention of the Imperial Title was omitted, and the first two, because in them His Most Faithful Majesty first assumed, and then associated Don Pedro in the Imperial Title; whereas, had Don Pedro acknowledged himself indebted for that title to any other authority than

the popular acclamation, from which he had consented to receive it, he would have endangered the very existence of his Throne.

The acceptance, therefore, and publication of any one of the *Carta Patente* they said would have such very bad effect on the publick opinion of Brazil, that they would not consent to their reception.

Sir Charles in vain pointed out that there was no necessity for such a publication, — at the same time observing that he was confined by his Instructions to the three Versions, and that the most that he could do, with a view to some conciliatory adjustment would be, to alter their arrangement, strictly adhering to their contents.

During this discussion no opposition was made to the King of Portugal's eventually retaining the Title of Emperor.

The fifth Conference was consumed in debating how much of the *Carta Patente* would be accepted by Brazil; and at the Sixth, the Brazilian Plenipotentiaries, having produced a project of a Treaty which Sir Charles could not accept, he at last (feeling that it would not be an unsafe course so to deviate from his Portuguese Instructions) consented to lay aside the *Carta Patente*, and drew up, instead of the proposed Treaty, a project of a Preamble, which after a long discussion in a more temperate tone than that previously assumed by them, they accepted;

subject to a few trifling amendments by which it was reduced, with Sir Charles's approbation, to the following shape : —

“ His Most Faithful Majesty having constantly
 “ in his Royal mind the most lively desire to
 “ re-establish peace, friendship, and good har-
 “ mony between Sister Nations, whom the most
 “ sacred ties ought to conciliate and unite in
 “ perpetual alliance, in order to accomplish
 “ these important ends, to conduce to general
 “ prosperity, and to secure the political existence
 “ and future destinies of Portugal, as well as
 “ those of Brazil, and desiring at once to re-
 “ nounce every obstacle that might impede the
 “ said alliance, concord, and happiness of both
 “ States, by His Diploma of the 13th of May of
 “ the current year, recognized Brazil to hold the
 “ name of an independent Empire and separate
 “ from the Kingdom of Portugal, and the
 “ Algarves, and his best beloved and esteemed
 “ Son, Don Pedro, as Emperor, yielding and
 “ transferring of his own free will, the Sovereignty
 “ of the aforesaid Empire to his aforesaid Son,
 “ and his legitimate successors, only taking and
 “ reserving for his own person the same title.
 “ And these August Lords, accepting the medi-
 “ ation of His Britannick Majesty to adjust all
 “ preliminary questions regarding the separation
 “ of the two States, have named as Plenipoten-
 “ tiaries,” &c. &c.

It will be observed that in this Preamble the acknowledgement of the independence of Brazil, as well as of Don Pedro as Emperor, *precedes* the announcement of the determination of His Most Faithful Majesty to assume in his own person the Imperial Title; which order of construction was the same which Mr. Canning recommended to the Portuguese Government, in the despatches which were addressed to Sir Charles Stuart at Lisbon, but which did not arrive there till after his departure.

The Court of Lisbon refused to adopt the recommendation, and the intelligence of this refusal reached Sir Charles, at Madeira. But notwithstanding this circumstance he consented to sign this modified arrangement *sub spe rati*, rather than risk the failure, or retard the success, of his Mission.

In this Preamble, all mention of the Succession in Portugal, was avoided. Had it been mentioned, at all, by the Brazilian Government, it would only have been for the purpose of giving the Emperor an opportunity to renounce his claim altogether. The Act by which His Most Faithful Majesty recognized the Independence of Brazil, was described as a *Diploma Regio*, instead of a *Carta Patente*; it being agreed that His Most Faithful Majesty should be left at liberty to issue, and antedate a *Diploma Regio*, couched in the precise words of the preamble,

or else that the first version of the *Carta Patente* should be accepted, on condition that it was not published.

The Preamble of the Treaty once decided, the articles were matters much more easy of adjustment. The first and second, it was settled, should be a mere recapitulation, in the form of an agreement, of the facts recited in the Preamble. The third was to contain a promise on the part of "His Imperial Majesty not to accept the proposals of any Portuguese Colonies to unite themselves with Brazil:" a promise of no small importance to Great Britain, inasmuch as the Brazilian Slave Market was supplied from Portuguese Colonies, and thus the means of preventing the continuance of that odious Traffick were placed in the hands of Portugal, whose Government, from no longer being able to plead, as formerly, the impossibility of abolishing the Trade, on account of Brazil, would, by consenting to its abolition, thereby necessitate its extinction by the Brazilian Government. The fourth Article was one of peace and alliance between Portugal and Brazil. The fifth was to secure the subjects of both nations being placed on the footing of the most favoured Nation: and to allow the owners of real estates in either Country to remain in peaceable possession. The sixth, and seventh, were for the mutual restoration of confiscated, and sequestered property, and ships, and cargoes. The eighth was to establish a

Commission of Brazilians and Portuguese, to examine the matters treated of in the sixth and seventh Articles. The ninth was to settle that all publick claims should be reciprocally received and decided, either by the restitution of the articles claimed, or by an indemnification for their full value. For adjusting these claims a direct and especial convention was to be made. The tenth re-established a duty of 15 per cent. reciprocally, to be paid on all Merchandize imported, or exported, to or from the two Countries. And the eleventh settled the time of the Ratification.

In arranging these Articles two Conferences were consumed: at the end of which Sir Charles again sent off his despatches, giving an account of the progress which he had made. In two more conferences, the convention relating to pecuniary affairs mentioned in the ninth Article was concluded; and, at the last, which took place on the 29th of August, 1825, the Treaty and Convention were severally signed by the Brazilian Plenipotentiaries on the one side, and by Sir Charles Stuart, for His Most Faithful Majesty, on the other. In consequence of the Emperor's anxiety to receive His Most Faithful Majesty's Ratifications without delay, Sir Charles consented to send the Treaty to England, in the British ship, "the Spartiate," with the Ratifications of the Emperor.

When, however, those Ratifications were sent to Sir Charles, accompanied with a note requesting that Sir William à Court "might undertake "the exchange," Sir Charles thought that the style which the Emperor had assumed, viz. "by the Grace of God, and the unanimous "acclamation of the people," was highly objectionable: upon which he refused to send the ratifications by the Spartiate, unless the style was altered. The Brazilian Government at first declined to make any change, and it was not till the Spartiate had actually sailed, without the ratifications, that it consented to substitute for the sentence "unanimous acclamation of "the People," the words "according to the "constitution of the State."

This done, the Spartiate, which had been called back, departed with the ratifications; and the Brazilian Government, to calm the minds of the people, which were in a state of feverish expectation and excitement, without Sir Charles Stuart's consent, published the Treaty. By means of this irregular proceeding it so happened, that, although Sir Charles Stuart's despatches had prepared the way for the intelligence, a Merchant Vessel first brought to the knowledge of the British Ministry (who after Major Gurwood's arrival until the receipt of the aforesaid despatches had heard nothing from Sir Charles for five weeks) the fact that

the Treaty had been signed, by bringing over a Copy of it.

Mr. Canning immediately wrote to Sir William à Court, to urge the Court of Lisbon to ratify it without delay, and to congratulate His Most Faithful Majesty, and his Government, in the name of the King of Great Britain, upon the auspicious conclusion of a Treaty, which reconciled so many conflicting interests, abated so many passions and enmities, and placed towards each other in relations of peace, and mutual good will, the subjects of two Sovereigns of the same illustrious House.

Within four and twenty hours, the despatches from Sir Charles Stuart arrived, detailing the progress of the negotiation: and after having perused and fully considered their voluminous contents, Mr. Canning determined to make one effort more to induce His Most Faithful Majesty to abandon the Imperial Title; although, not, as before, on the ground of apprehensions respecting the failure of the negotiation, in which had originated the chief difficulties occasioned by its assumption. The Brazilian Government having “agreed to the
“stipulation, the point of honour was gained.
“But if *as* a point of honour, it had been im-
“portant to His Most Faithful Majesty to
“acquire the right of assuming the Title, was
“it worth while for him to retain it at the

" expence of considerable practical inconvenience? It could not be effectually retained,
 " without the tacit consent, at least, of all the
 " Powers of Europe. And was it not probable that the Emperor of Russia, who was
 " known to have disapproved the whole course
 " of these transactions with Brazil, would be
 " glad to avail himself of the opportunity
 " which this assumption of that Title would
 " afford the Autocrat of marking his disapprobation?

" But whatever might be the course that
 " Russia might take, it could not be doubted
 " that Spain would rejoice in an opportunity of
 " doing what might be disagreeable to His
 " Most Faithful Majesty, in respect to a transaction which would necessarily be hateful to
 " the Most Catholick King, on account, both
 " of the contrast which it exhibited to the
 " Counsels of the Court of Madrid, and of the
 " examples which it held out to the Countries
 " of Spanish America.

" In submitting these considerations to the
 " Portuguese Ministers, the British Government
 " had no other motive, but an anxious solicitude
 " for the happiness, tranquillity, and honour
 " (well understood), of His Most Faithful Majesty. It was a matter, in which England
 " had no interest, and with respect to which
 " no part of the anticipated evils or incon-

“ veniencies would arise from any act of Hers.
 “ England was ready to acknowledge the Im-
 “ perial Title in His Most Faithful Majesty,
 “ and to encourage others to do so by precept,
 “ as well as by example. But its value was
 “ exhausted in the very act by which it was ac-
 “ quired, and the advantage of continuing to use
 “ it was altogether disproportionate to the risk.

“ In case however of the Portuguese Govern-
 “ ment being unwilling to adopt this suggestion,
 “ Sir William à Court was instructed to entreat
 “ His Most Faithful Majesty to avoid a publick
 “ and ostentatious assumption of the Imperial
 “ Dignity. Relegated among the minor Titles
 “ of the Crown of Portugal, such as those of
 “ King of Algarves, Outremer, and Lord of the
 “ Coast of Guinea, and of the Navigation
 “ and Commerce of Ethiopia, Arabia, Persia,
 “ and India, it might perhaps escape observ-
 “ ation. But if it were put forward to challenge
 “ recognition and invite compliment, if it were
 “ taken as a change of style in his publick acts
 “ and in his intercourse with the Nations of
 “ Europe, His Most Faithful Majesty would
 “ expose himself to incidents and remarks
 “ little compatible with the real dignity of his
 “ Crown.”

* His late Majesty George the Third was advised, at the
 time of the Union with Ireland, in compensation for His
 Majesty's abandonment, then voluntarily made, of the Title

Unluckily this wise counsel came too late. The Treaty reached Lisbon on the 9th of November; which was but a few days after it arrived in England. It had been preceded, as in London, by accounts from Sir Charles Stuart which left little or no room for conjecture, as to the nature of its stipulations.

The impression which these accounts made upon the Portuguese Government, seemed to be that Sir Charles had effected as much as could be expected of him in the difficult situation in which he had been placed by the conduct of the French Government. Still, however, there were several points, with which the Portuguese Government felt dissatisfied.

The Preamble was approved of; but objections were made to the Article by which Don Pedro *acceded* to the assumption of the Imperial Title by His Father, as being superfluous, if not contradictory to the Preamble. Next, the question of the Succession being left in an unsettled state was deplored as unfortunate. And, lastly, the Commercial Arrangement was condemned, because no particular advantages were given to Portugal.

of King of France, which had been so long annexed to the Crown of England, to assume the Title of Emperor of the British and Hanoverian Dominions; but His late Majesty felt that His true dignity consisted in His being known to Europe and the World, by the appropriated and undisputed style belonging to the British Crown.

These objections, however, did not seem, to be considered of a sufficiently serious character to be likely to induce the rejection of the Treaty. That document, together with the Convention, in a few days after came to the hands of the Portuguese Ministry, who had nothing additional to complain of, except its publication, before it had been ratified by His Most Faithful Majesty.

Fortunately, however, the King “was pleased
“to speak of the whole arrangement in a manner
“which did honour to him as a Sovereign and a
“Father, and he abounded in professions of gra-
“titude to the King of Great Britain.”

At a Council at which His Most Faithful Majesty was present, it was resolved to accept, and ratify, both the Treaty, and the Convention, and to announce the fact to the Publick with rejoicings on the Empress’s name-day, which would occur in the following week.

Doubts were entertained by the Ministers, whether the Imperial Title ought to have the precedence of the Regal. Sir William à Court was consulted. He gave his opinion decidedly in favour of priority being assigned to the title of King of Portugal; but after having asked the opinion of Sir William, the Council determined to adhere to its own; as appeared by the Count de Porto Santo announcing to the Diplomatick Body, the conclusion of the Brazilian Treaty, in a circular letter, in which the Title

of Emperor was made to precede that of King. This ill-advised step was taken before Mr. Canning's warning against it was received, and unfortunately it did not stand alone. The Minister of the Interior published in a document denominated a *Carta de Lei*, the whole of the *Carta Patente* which the Brazilian Government were said to have accepted. This last proceeding was even more ill judged than the former, inasmuch as it was calculated to force forward at Rio, a premature discussion on the question of the Succession, at a time when, if the Emperor were compelled immediately to decide, he would be quite certain to determine to renounce it: moreover, the description in the *Carta de Lei* of the Act of the King, as a *Carta Patente*, when it was agreed by the Treaty to be called a *Diploma Regio*, and the publication of the contents of the Act, when it was stipulated that they were to be kept secret, amounted to a positive breach of faith.

By the Lisbon publick the Treaty was at first very ill received, and the cry was very general against it. The Commercial arrangement was that with which most fault was found, as not affording a sufficient advantage to the wines of Portugal to enable them to compete with those of France.

This discontent gave life and energy to the enemies of England; and a strong Party en-

deavoured to persuade the King, in spite of all the measures, above enumerated, which he had taken, since the arrival of the Treaty, to sacrifice his Ministers, and to withhold his ratifications. So formidable was this party that Sir William à Court did not venture to execute Mr. Canning's Instructions, advising the abandonment of the Title of Emperor, until the Treaty was actually ratified, although he had them before that event. These angry feelings towards England for her share in the Brazilian Treaty arose from the most contradictory motives. The Party which still wished to maintain a connection with the Brazils, which Party included the Government, were dissatisfied because Don Pedro's right to the succession was not specifically defined.

On the other hand, the Ultras would have had Don Pedro's right formally annulled ; while the Merchants and Wine Growers were angry with the Commercial stipulations, and the Court exclaimed against the second Article, as derogatory to the King's honour, and a violation of the principle which was to have formed the basis of Sir Charles Stuart's negotiation. All these causes of discontent had, however, no solid foundation.

As for the Succession, it must be admitted, that, at first sight, the omission of any provision respecting it, might appear liable to some inconvenience ; accordingly it will be recollected that

in Mr. Canning's *contre projet*, anxious provision was made for regulating it.

In the interval, however, which had elapsed, since that *projet* was committed to the Portuguese Government and rejected by it without exception or qualification, until the signature of the Treaty, circumstances had considerably changed. Don Pedro had in that time declared his determination to renounce all claim to the inheritance of the Portuguese Crown; and this Act, which it was in his single power to accomplish, once done, could not have been recalled. To have pressed upon him in the face of such a declaration, a detailed discussion of the conditions and arrangements, with which his future residence in Brazil must necessarily have been accompanied, would have been to have incurred a risk of the most perilous kind.

He would probably have cut short at once all such discussions.

“ A single word implying his resolution to
 “ *reign* only in Brazil, would have thrown the
 “ question of succession into difficulties, infinitely greater than any to which it could be
 “ exposed by the Silence of the Treaty regarding it.”

And so far from the Portuguese Government having reason to complain, that Sir Charles Stuart had not been enabled to obtain the concurrence of the Emperor of Brazil in any ar-

rangement of the Portuguese Succession, praise was due to that negotiator, for having diverted the Emperor from his desire, to renounce that succession altogether.

The practical result of the omission was simply that Don Pedro remained undoubted Heir to the Crown of Portugal, according to the fundamental Laws of that Kingdom.

As for the Commercial stipulations between Portugal and Brazil, they were avowedly temporary, and were therefore subject to revision and improvement. In agreeing to them, Sir Charles had to decide between the taking that which he could most readily obtain, and opening thereby at once the intercourse between the two Countries, or aiming at a more beneficial settlement, through a tedious and complicated negotiation. Under these circumstances Sir Charles Stuart surely decided wisely for Portuguese interests. “ More was likely to be “ granted willingly by Brazil to Portugal, when “ all jealousy and estrangement should have “ been done away, and when the affections of “ the two Nations should have begun to flow “ again in their accustomed channels, than “ could have been extorted by any Diplomatick “ skill or perseverance, while suspicion was yet “ alive in Brazil, and the irritation of a long “ hostility yet unsubdued.”

As for the complaint, that Don Pedro had

been allowed to signify his consent to the retainment of the Imperial Title by his Father, it appeared, that it was done in terms deliberately chosen, with the view of implying as little as possible, either the disposition, or the power to withhold it.

To quarrel with such an expression of concurrence, following as it did, not preceding, the Act which it approved, was surely unreasonable. "With much better reason would the absence of such recorded approbation in the Treaty have been felt to be unsatisfactory.

"Had the assumption of the Imperial Title taken place, through the publication of the *Carta Regia*, there would of course have been no room for the expression of such concurrence. But it was incident to the nature of a Treaty, that whatever is stipulated therein, is confirmed by the agreement of both Parties."

The objection, therefore, was to the form of the Act itself, to the doing by Treaty what was intended to be done by Proclamation; for which change, however, the most satisfactory reason was assigned; viz. that by it alone was prevented the failure of the negotiation.

It would seem, therefore, that Portugal had, in reality, very good reason to be satisfied with the exertions of her Ally. And, in truth, the discontent was almost exclusively confined to Lisbon.

In the North of Portugal the Treaty was welcomed with universal rejoicings; and it had not been ratified more than a fortnight, before "the activity manifested in fitting out the Merchant Ships" both in the North and South, contributed to restore good humour to the Capital, and to produce sounder views respecting the true value of the arrangement.

As soon as the ratifications were exchanged, Sir William applied himself to Count Porto Santo, (although the mischief for the most part was done past recall,) to advise His Most Faithful Majesty, now that the point of honour had been gained, to lay down the title of Emperor. Sir William found the Count extremely reasonable upon the subject." He only regretted that Mr. Canning had not broached the idea sooner; but it was then too late, as any change would be evidently the result of Foreign Interference: for the future, however, the Title should be kept as much in the back ground as possible.

This answer, however, somewhat surprized Mr. Canning. Having originally instructed Sir Charles Stuart to dissuade the Portuguese Government from insisting on this barren point of honour, "when he learned, nevertheless, that it had been insisted upon, and had been conceded by Sir Charles, Mr. Canning took it for granted, that the prejudice of the Portuguese Government had been found insuperable.

“ Nothing then remained to be done, but to
 “ make the best of the concessions obtained
 “ from Portugal, though encumbered with this
 “ unlucky drawback. For it was incident to
 “ the character of a Mediator to hold somewhat
 “ different language to the two different Parties,
 “ between whom the Mediation is established : so
 “ far, at least, as to endeavour to enhance in the
 “ eyes of one of them, the value of concessions
 “ which he has inculcated with the other the
 “ necessity, or expediency of granting. Mr.
 “ Canning therefore wrote to Brazil, as strongly
 “ to recommend the admission of the Title of
 “ Emperor in His Most Faithful Majesty, as he
 “ had before to Portugal, to prevent, if possi-
 “ ble, the assumption of it. But his opinion, as
 “ to the ‘inexpediency of that assumption, had
 “ never varied ; since he always had considered
 “ it as the sole point by which the negotiation
 “ at Rio de Janeiro might be exposed to hazard.
 “ The result proved the justice of his apprehen-
 “ sions. It was upon that point, and that point
 “ alone, that the negotiation hung doubtful for
 “ some time ; and Sir Charles Stuart, after all his
 “ efforts to carry it, in the way which his Por-
 “ tuguese Instructions prescribed, found it ne-
 “ cessary to compromise the matter. Had Mr.
 “ Canning known or suspected at the time when
 “ Sir Charles Stuart’s first reports from Lisbon
 “ were received, with how little tenacity M. de

“ Porto Santo (as had since appeared) was disposed to cling to the Imperial Title, he would (instead of falling in with the *Carta Regio*, as the utmost that could have been obtained,) have directed Sir Charles anew to adhere to his original Instructions. But that was too great a risk, at a time when there was every reason to suppose, that the departure from these Instructions was a sacrifice indispensable to the success of the negotiation.”

As to Mr. Canning's advice not being given in time, it was tendered as soon as he knew the result of Sir Charles Stuart's proceedings.

Fortunately, however, for Portugal, it so turned out that no practical evils did result from the adoption of this new Style by His Most Faithful Majesty. Whatever may have been the feelings of the Russian Cabinet, any demonstration of them was precluded by the death of the Emperor Alexander, which took place at the close of the year. It was not for a younger Son ascending the Throne of his Fathers, during the lifetime of his elder brother, to criticize too nicely the titles, or the pretensions of his Brother Potentates.

Early in the month of January 1826, the Ratifications of His Most Faithful Majesty were brought to Brazil. The *Carta de Lei* accompanied them.

This document excited the indignation of the Emperor and his Ministers, who at first threat-

ened to publish some other Act, which should have the effect of annulling the Treaty which had been completed. This Instrument, however, not producing the bad effects upon the publick which were at first anticipated, the necessity of taking any step respecting it ceased, and the irritation of the Brazilian Government gradually subsided.

Thus was this great work finally accomplished. When Parliament met in February 1826, the Lords Commissioners appointed to open the Session, informed the two Houses, that “His Majesty’s mediation had been successfully employed in the conclusion of a Treaty between the Crowns of Portugal and Brazil, by which the relations of friendly intercourse, long interrupted between two kindred Nations, had been restored, and the Independence of the Brazilian Empire had been formally acknowledged.”

Little was said in either House in the course of the Debate, which followed upon this part of the Speech. Important domestick events, always more interesting than those of Foreign States, engaged, to the exclusion of other considerations, the attention both of the Lords and Common

CHAP. XII.

POLICY OF GREAT BRITAIN RESPECTING EASTERN AFFAIRS.—LORD STRANGFORD'S NEGOTIATIONS AT CONSTANTINOPLE ON BEHALF OF RUSSIA. — SKETCH OF THE WAR IN GREECE. — BELLIGERENT CHARACTER ALLOWED BY GREAT BRITAIN TO THE GREEKS. — RUSSIAN PROPOSAL FOR A CONFERENCE ON GREEK AFFAIRS. — MR. STRATFORD CANNING'S MISSION TO ST. PETERSBURGH. — CONFERENCES OF THE ALLIES ON GREEK AFFAIRS IN THAT CAPITAL. — GREEK CONTEST. — GREEK OFFER OF PROTECTORATE TO ENGLAND. — LORD STRANGFORD'S EMBASSY TO ST. PETERSBURGH. — MR. STRATFORD CANNING'S EMBASSY TO CONSTANTINOPLE. — THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON'S MISSION TO RUSSIA. — SIGNATURE OF PROTOCOL. — RUSSIAN ULTIMATUM. — NEGOTIATIONS AT ACKERMANN.

At the time when the differences between Portugal and Brazil were brought, through the active intervention of Great Britain, to an amicable settlement, the only pressing question of importance in Foreign Policy remaining for adjustment was that, arising out of the conflict, which as yet, desolated the East of Europe.

Of that conflict, Mr. Canning, although he had been so deeply engaged in settling the concerns

of the New World, had not been unmindful ; for before the Treaty of reconciliation was signed between the two branches of the House of Braganza, and even before relations had been definitively established between Great Britain, and the New States of Spanish America, much had been done, by the interference of the British Government, towards simplifying the complication, in which matters were involved in the East, by the existence of differences between Russia and the Porte, contemporaneously with the disputes between the Porte and its Christian subjects. There was, however, reason still to fear that the struggle between the Rayahs and their Moslem Masters, if permitted to continue, would sow the seeds of future, and not very distant, discord amongst the Powers of Europe.

The Colonial Questions of America, however important to the Maritime States of the world, were comparatively of little interest to the great military Monarchies of Europe ; while the affairs of Greece and Turkey, from the position of the Ottoman Territories, were of the very last consequence to the Austrian, and Russian Empires.

The Commerce of the most fertile provinces of Russia is dependent upon the navigation of the Black Sea, and consequently upon the caprice of the possessors of the Bosphorus. Its possessors, however, were no longer the same fierce Bar-

barians, whose further encroachments Christian Europe combined was hardly equal to repel; for, so far from being able to add to their possessions, those which they yet retained were held on the precarious tenure of the forbearance of the Northern Autocrat, and the obstacles which the jealousy of Austria, France, and Great Britain, might be induced to oppose whenever his ambition, or the interests and clamour of his people, might get the better of his forbearance. The consequence of this state of affairs was, that the Turks, looking upon the Russians as their natural enemies, denied all the privileges which they dared deny, to Russian Navigation.

This circumstance naturally created a large party in Russia, (in whose ranks were enlisted some of the members of the Government,) who were anxious that the Porte should give a just cause of war, in order that an opportunity might be afforded to their Country, to make the Bosphorus its own. But to Austria, who had, as well as Turkey, much to dread from the ambition of Russia, it was of the deepest import to have an efficient Ally at Constantinople, instead of having the strength of the Turkish Empire paralysed, or its resources forced into array against her.

So also to France, and England, the aggrandizement of Russia, by any considerable accession of Territory, but above all by her establishment

as a Naval Power in the Mediterranean, was far from being a matter of indifference; and although many able Statesmen hold the reasonable opinion, that in all probability the Russian Empire so extended, would not long hold together, that Constantinople could not be governed at St. Petersburg, or St. Petersburg at Constantinople; yet how soon that divarication might take place, it was as impossible to predict, as it was to define the limits of the conquests which might be effected, by the enterprizes of an ambitious Monarch possessing such vast resources.

“ To preserve the peace of the world was the leading policy of England. For this purpose, it was necessary, in the first place, to prevent to the utmost of Her power the breaking out of new quarrels: in the second place, to compose, when it could be done, by friendly mediation, existing differences; and, thirdly, when that was hopeless, to narrow as much as possible their limits; fourthly, to maintain for herself an undeviating neutrality in all cases, where nothing should occur to affect injuriously Her interests or Her honour.” It was accordingly, in conformity with this fundamental principle of his policy, the preservation of peace, that Mr. Canning allowed and instructed the British Ambassador at the Porte to use every exertion to persuade the Divan to yield to the just demands of Russia; and to settle the affairs

of Greece, that the Russian Emperor might have no pretence for enforcing his demands by hostilities, of which “no human prudence could prescribe the range, or foresee the consequences.”

But, independently of this general principle of action, it must be admitted, that, in this particular case, Mr. Canning was desirous to avert both to this Country and to Europe the danger which he dreaded from “Russia swallowing up Greece at one mouthful, and Turkey at another.” In considering, therefore, the measures which Mr. Canning took on the subject of Eastern affairs, it ought always to be remembered, that this was the particular end which he had in view.

The history of Lord Strangford’s proceedings with the Porte has been already carried down to the conclusion of the Congress at Verona; his Lordship was left, on his return to Constantinople, where he was about to resume the task of advocating the cause of Russia with the Divan.

During Lord Strangford’s absence, the Sultan had made in his Ministry a change which was propitious to His Excellency’s exertions.

Those exertions were to be directed (according to the instructions which the Duke of Wellington was authorized to give him), first, to induce the Porte “to take some step in advance towards Russia;” by volunteering the com-

*annunciation of the fact, that the Principalities were evacuated:—*and, secondly, to obtain the adoption of such regulations for the navigation of the Black Sea, as would^d relieve the Russian Commerce from the impediments, amounting almost to annihilation, with which it had been embarrassed, in consequence of the orders which had been issued by the Divan.

With regard to Greece, all that the British Ambassador was instructed by the Duke to press upon the Sultan and his Ministers, was the “observance of moderation, and strict justice towards the insurgents;” but he was shortly after directed by Mr. Canning, “to inculcate upon the Ottoman Government the urgent necessity of no longer delaying to put an end to the unhappy state of affairs, which existed in that Country.”

His Excellency arrived at Constantinople from Verona on the 16th of January (1823), and on the 30th had his first conference with the Turkish Ministers, in which he represented to them, in strong language, the necessity of their announcing, directly to Russia, the Evacuation of the Principalities, and the nomination of the Hospodars.

He then passed on to the Commercial questions, which he introduced, as purely British questions, cautiously avoiding to connect them with the name of Russia, lest the Porte should,

as usual, retaliate, by demanding from ~~that~~ Power, the execution of the stipulations of the Treaty of Bucharest. Upon this topick, he complained of the obstacles which were imposed on the trade of the Black Sea, and recommended the conclusion of the Treaty with Sardinia, which, previously to his departure from Constantinople to Verona, he had been engaged in negotiating. Before he made any of these observations, he stipulated with the Turkish Ministers, that no reply should be made to them until they should have been submitted to the Sultan and Council. No answer was accordingly given, although it seemed evident, from the manner of the individuals to whom they were addressed, that the Ambassador's discourse had produced a strong impression, both as to the policy of yielding, and as to the moderation evinced by the Emperor, in his demands.

The Report of this Conference was laid before the Sultan by his Ministers; and, at their next meeting, it was unanimously agreed to accede to Lord Strangford's first proposal, to address a letter to the Russian Court. With regard to the commercial part of the question, Lord Strangford was requested to put his demands in writing; the doing of which, however, he purposely deferred, until the promised letter should be actually sent, past recall, on its road to St. Petersburg.

The point of sending the letter being thus conceded, the next thing to be secured was, that it should contain no offensive topick, which should have the effect of neutralizing the good likely to be derived from writing it. At first the Council were very refractory; and it was not till after much trouble, that the Reis Effendi would consent to shape the letter in the mitigated form in which it was finally transmitted to Count Nesselrode. As it was, although the annunciation of the state of the Principalities, and the invitation to renew diplomattick intercourse, were expressed in terms, not merely polite, but cordial, yet they were accompanied with a recurrence to the unsatisfied claims of the Porte upon Russia, and, with a demand for the fulfilment of the unexecuted Articles of the Treaty of Bucharest. Lord Strangford in vain endeavoured to persuade the Divan to leave out this part of the letter. “ Besides the invincibility
“ of Turkish pride, it was impossible to eradicate from the minds of its Members the idea,
“ that silence with regard to a claim, is a virtual
“ abandonment of it.”

The omission of the most offensive matter in the note, which was first proposed to be addressed to Count Nesselrode, was only obtained upon an agreement, that the complaints of the Porte against Russia should be recorded in a

separate note to the Internuntio and Lord Strangford.

Those Complaints were two-fold : first, the neglect by Russia of the Turkish demand for the surrender of the Insurgent Chiefs. Second, the non-fulfilment of the Article of the Treaty of Bucharest stipulating for the cession to the Porte of the fortresses on the Asiatick frontier.

The first of these demands was merely a point of honour with the Ottoman Government ; and a compliance with it was no longer expected. But the second was one, which no Turkish Government was ever likely to abandon ; it being a part of their religion, and a precept of their Koran, that no alienation of the Sacred Territory should ever be allowed to take place, without an effort, at least, to preserve it by the Sword.

This note was couched in language singularly offensive ; so much so, that Lord Strangford did not hesitate to inform the Turkish Ministers, that he should consider it as “ *non avenue*,” and should not transmit it at all to St. Petersburg, or even officially to his own Court.

Notwithstanding, however, this determination, when the Internuntio communicated his Copy of the Note to Prince Metternich, His Highness sent it direct to St. Petersburg ; a proceeding well calculated to throw an obstacle in the way

of the return of the Russian Mission to the Porte, and thereby to delay the discussions on Greek affairs, which discussions the establishment of a Russian Mission at Constantinople was to be the signal for opening.

The offensive nature of this document, coupled with the demands, respecting the Treaty of Bucharest, contained in the Turkish letter, indisposed the Russian Government to the return of a prompt answer to that letter; and in the period which was allowed to elapse before it was noticed, the arrest of a Wallachian Boyard, of the name of Villaru, by the Porte, gave fresh umbrage to the Emperor, whose grand grievance still remained unredressed, — Lord Strangford not having then made any progress with the Porte on the commercial questions. When, therefore, after a delay of upwards of four months, the Russian note at length arrived *, it was far from reciprocating the cordial expressions contained in the letter, to which it was an answer, and was accompanied with renewed complaints, and demands of further concessions.

Some of these demands, and complaints, were founded on erroneous notions, as to the intentions of the Porte, and therefore need not be detailed; but since others were of a more substantial description, the nature of them must be set forth : —

* Towards the end of July, 1823.

And, First, with respect to the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, from which Provinces, although the Porte had withdrawn the greater portion of the Troops, which it had sent there, at the first breaking out of the Insurrection in 1821, and therefore considered that it had actually complied with the demands of Russia for their evacuation, yet a very small number of Turkish soldiers were still quartered there under the plea of preserving order. The detection of a conspiracy, entered into by some Greek refugees, against the Moldavian Government, went far to justify the Porte in this measure; but the Russian Government having a right to demand their removal, it did not hesitate to take advantage of the right, and to insist upon the restoration, in the Principalities, of the *status quo*, before the Insurrection.

The next subject brought forward, was that relating to the Boyard Villaru, whose liberty, although he had been arrested on the grounds of malversation of the Public Money, and not for a political offence, the Russian Ministers thought proper to require.

Advertence was next made to the pacification of Greece, as a business to which the Porte ought seriously to devote its attention; and, lastly, with reference to the Commercial points — besides the grievance already described respecting the navigation of the Black Sea — a

fresh complaint was made on account of the prohibition to transship, in the Port of Constantinople, cargoes from one Frank vessel to another; the privilege of transshipment being limited to such Frank vessels as should receive their cargoes from Turkish vessels.

Lord Strangford, as being charged with the care of Russian Interests at the Porte, was requested to use his influence with the Turkish Ministers, to concede these points to Russia; and, shortly after these communications reached him, he received despatches from Mr. Canning, directing him to press upon the Porte the absolute necessity, if it wished to preserve peace with Russia, of no longer delaying a compliance at any rate with Her commercial requisitions.

At the Congress at Verona the personal feelings of the Emperor Alexander were decidedly adverse to a war with Turkey.

At that time he considered it more than probable that he should have occasion to employ his Army in the West of Europe.

The fidelity of the French Troops was untried, and the amount of Spanish resistance uncertain. The collection of an Army on the frontiers of Poland, ready to march, whenever he should think fit, afforded him for a time some occupation. But in proportion as the probability increased of a quick and successful termination of the French invasion, in like proportion the chances

of employment for his Army diminished, and left him nothing but his disputes with Turkey to occupy his attention, or his arms. Under these circumstances, pressed by the wishes, and the interests of his people, by the advice of many of his Ministers, and by the inclination of his Army, it was impossible for any one to predict, if the Porte continued obstinately bent on refusing the proffered terms of accommodation, how soon the pacifick disposition of the Emperor might be exhausted, or rendered unavailing, by the feelings of his subjects being raised against it.

Lord Strangford was therefore directed by Mr. Canning*, “again and again, to press upon “the leading Members of the Ottoman Council, “the dangers which they would incur by a “much longer delay.” For it was idle for the Ottoman Ministers to argue, with respect to that point of the dispute, the navigation of the Black Sea, by which the interests of Russia were not deeply affected, that they had the abstract right on their side. “It might be so,” said Mr. Canning; “and if the question were then a “new one, and the Licence necessary for giving “facilities to the Russian Trade solicited for the “first time, it would certainly have been competent for the Porte, either to refuse it altogether, or to clog the concession of it with

July, 1823.

“ a stipulation for equivalent advantages. But
 “ it was impossible not to see of how much
 “ more importance facts were in this case, than
 “ any reasoning founded upon the abstract Right
 “ of the Porte to give a preference to Her own
 “ navigation.

“ The practical effect of the enforcement of
 “ the right, which, however legitimate, was ad-
 “ mitted to have been disused, was to throw
 “ impediments in the way of Russian com-
 “ merce, precisely in that part of the Russian
 “ Empire where the stagnation of Commerce
 “ was most severely felt. The consequence of
 “ that stagnation was great discontent amongst
 “ the Commercial and Agricultural classes of
 “ His Imperial Majesty’s subjects—a discontent
 “ which naturally vented itself in murmurs
 “ against a system, by which the obvious interests
 “ of those classes were sacrificed.

“ The pacifick policy of the Emperor of Rus-
 “ sia had been before these new regulations, suf-
 “ ficiently unpopular with the Statesmen, and
 “ Soldiers of the Empire.

“ But the Traders and Cultivators throughout
 “ that Empire were by the act of the Turkish
 “ Government enlisted in the ranks of those who
 “ were before inclined to War; and the powerful
 “ incitements of ambition, of military glory, and
 “ of that natural proneness to quarrel which
 “ arises out of more than a century of national

“ rivalry and conflict, were left to operate upon
 “ the feelings of the Russian people, and through
 “ them upon the Councils of the Government,
 “ unchecked by any countervailing influence
 “ from that part of the population which might
 “ naturally look for prosperity in peace.”

The alteration, therefore, of the rules whereby the navigation of the Black Sea was regulated, at the very moment when the demands contained in the Russian Ultimatum, which was delivered in after Baron Strogonoff's departure, were on the point of adjustment, was in the highest degree unseasonable ; and seemed as if the Divan had studiously sought to interpose a new obstacle to the consummation of that adjustment at the very moment of its probable accomplishment.

“ The only excuse,” said Mr. Canning, in suggesting to Lord Strangford the arguments which he was to employ with the Divan, “ or at least the most rational excuse that can be imagined for so unfelicitous a selection of opportunity, consistently with a sincere desire for Peace on the part of the Turks, would be the persuasion that the Emperor of Russia was ready to purchase the preservation of peace at every cost and hazard.

“ But if,” said Mr. Canning, “ the Turkish Ministers had fallen into such an error, no time ought to be lost in opening their eyes to their mistake.”

On receiving these directions, Lord Strangford proceeded forthwith to their execution.

He presented* a note to the Porte, urging, in stronger terms than he had ever done before, “the indispensable necessity of coming to an “immediate and satisfactory arrangement with “Russia,” and demanded at the same time a conference with the Turkish Ministers to prevent a “written” answer being returned to his note, which answer His Excellency thought might, in the then temper of the Sultan and his Ministers, have only served to make matters worse. Unfortunately, just about the time when this note was presented, the Porte shewed a disposition to take umbrage with the British Government on account of different proceedings, which were considered as favouring the cause of the Greeks to the prejudice of the Porte. The recognition by the Commanders of the British Squadron in the Mediterranean, of the *bonâ fide* blockades, established by the Greeks of Turkish Harbours, the appearance of British subjects in the hostile ranks of the insurgents, the subscriptions raised for their assistance by individuals in London, and, above all,* the sum of £1000 given by the City of London in aid of that subscription, were all considered by the Divan as so many violations of neutrality, and as proofs

* On the morning of the 11th of August.

of the abandonment by England of her friendship for Turkey.

With respect to the recognition of the blockades, and the enlistment of British subjects in the Greek Army, there was not much difficulty in making the Turks comprehend that the one was only a measure of strict impartiality; since their blockades, if they established any, would be equally respected; and the other was not in the power of the British Government to prevent, since it could not hinder its subjects from going to Greece, still less, when there, could it exercise any controul over their actions.

The case of British Officers was, however, different; and when, on a subsequent occasion, the Porte complained that individuals, holding rank in the British Army, were serving with the Greeks, it was intimated to those Officers, that if they did not at once retire, their names would be struck off the List of the Army.

As to the City of London subscription, it is perhaps no wonder that the Ministers of a despotick Government, like that of the Sultan, should be with great difficulty made to understand, how it was that the municipal authorities of the chief city of the Empire could not be prevented from thus acting in contravention of the Government.

It is a maxim of the Law of Nations, that the policy of a Government towards Foreign States

binds its subjects ; and it is a proposition equally undeniable, that to afford aid, pecuniary or otherwise, to one of two Belligerents is inconsistent with strict neutrality between them. But the Law of England does not afford any mode of enforcing in these particulars, the principles of the Law of Nations. “ In all times the publick “ sense of this country has found vent in “ expressions of the same nature, when the “ policy of the Government had been to take “ no part in the struggles of Continental “ Europe.” The Turks indeed were not the only nation which at this time had to endure the like ebullitions of publick feeling in this Country ; since assistance was afforded by British Subjects to the Spanish Constitutionalists against France, similar to that which was furnished to the Greeks ; “ so that these causes of “ complaint were not peculiar to the Porte “ alone, but affected in an equal degree the “ most powerful Christian Nations.”

Besides these causes of complaint, there was yet an additional one, for which, if the grounds on which it was founded were correct, the British Government were certainly responsible.

The Naval Forces of His Majesty in the Levant were represented as having been guilty of breaches of neutrality. But the instructions, under which the Commanders of the King’s Ships in the Mediterranean acted, were framed

on a principle of strict impartiality, and prescribed a rigid attention to the rights of both Belligerents: "But," said Mr. Canning, in commenting on the complaints of the Porte on this head, "a maritime War carried on by "so many small Communities, scattered through "innumerable Ports, and Islands, might naturally be expected to degenerate in some "instances into acts of lawless violence and "plunder: while in a conflict waged with so "much fury, and pushed alternately on each "side to such excesses of vengeance and cruelty, "it would hardly have become the British Character, that there should not have been occasional instances of protective interference by "our Navy, which might appear in each case to "the conquering side to be carried beyond the "limits of neutrality.

"In truth, from the extraordinary character "of the wars which were then prevailing in different quarters of the world,—that between "Spain and her Colonies—that between Portugal and Brazil—and that between the Porte and "its Greek subjects, — cases continually arose "to which the technical principles of neutrality "were scarcely applicable, without some modification from circumstances new, and unforeseen.

"The naval forces of Great Britain were dispersed over these different scenes of contest,

“ and intermingled day by day, with those of
 “ the conflicting parties.

“ To protect British Commerce from insult
 “ or vexation on all sides, was of course the first
 “ duty of the British Commanders.

“ The duty which was ~~next~~ inculcated on
 “ them was to abstain from interference in aid
 “ of warlike operations on any side—but it was
 “ not forbidden to them to obey the impulses of
 “ humanity, in cases where those impulses might
 “ be obeyed, without influencing the operations
 “ of War.”

These arguments and explanations were upon the whole favourably received by the Turkish Ministers, who were thus better disposed to consider with dispassionate attention, the note, containing the demands of Russia, which Lord Strangford had addressed to the Reis Effendi. They were well aware that the question which they had to decide affected the existence of the Empire, and that they had to choose whether they should unite all the Mussulman People in one great effort of resistance, or submit to the force of circumstances.

Lord Strangford's note was made the subject-matter of discussion at a Council of Ministers held on the 10th of August. The result of its deliberations was transmitted to the Sultan, and, shortly after, the 26th of August was fixed for the Conference which Lord Strangford had proposed.

The Conference, however, was not held on that day, but was postponed in consequence of the dismissal of Yanib Effendi, who was chief of the party opposed to the adoption of conciliatory measures in Foreign policy. The effect of this change ~~was~~ very visible at the conference which took place on the 30th of August, which ended in a promise to concede the commercial points in dispute with Russia. For this end, the Turks consented to the appointment on the part of the Sultan, of Commissioners, to whom Lord Strangford, on the part of the Emperor of Russia, was joined, for the purpose of examining, and redressing the grievances to which Russian Trade in the Black Sea was exposed; the principles on which the negotiations were to proceed, being, the abolition by the Porte of all unnecessary impediments in the way of European Navigation — and the recognition by Lord Strangford of those temporary measures of local police, which the safety of the Capital demanded.

The treaty with Sardinia, granting to the ships of that Power the privilege of passing through the Bosphorus under the protection of her own Flag, in discussing the provisions of which Treaty Lord Strangford had been engaged, more or less actively, since his return to Constantinople, the Turkish Ministers likewise promised should be signed in a few days. And the right of Russia

was admitted to demand, either to be permitted to lend, as formerly, her Flag to Nations not enjoying the right of navigating in the Black Sea by Treaty; or else, if that practice were to be suppressed, that Sea should be thrown open to all Powers, who were willing to pay for it an equivalent. Furthermore, after a struggle, with respect to the privilege claimed by Russia, in virtue of antient usage, to have Cargoes of Russian Produce freely transhipped from one Frank Vessel to another, in the Port of Constantinople, the Ottoman Ministers consented to look for precedents, with the understanding, that; if they could be found, no further resistance should be made.

These points, which were the most material, being thus conceded, Lord Strangford then touched upon the other demands of Russia: first, respecting the pacification of Greece; second, the liberation of the Boyard Villaru; and, lastly, the restoration of the *status quo* of the Principalities.

On these subjects, however, he found the Turkish Ministers inflexible; and indeed, as they were not in the list of those, which he had been instructed by his Government to press, he did not strenuously urge them.

In conformity with the agreement, the Commission was forthwith appointed, and before the 22d of September finished its labours. An

official notification was likewise sent by the Reis Effendi, announcing the accession of the Porte to the several demands connected with the commercial interests of Russia; and specifically, that one, with respect to transshipment, for which an abundance of precedents had been discovered.

Lord Strangford forthwith communicated to Count Nesselrode, the account of his complete success, and at the same time urged the immediate re-establishment of diplomattick relations. Count Nesselrode received this communication at Czernowitz, to which place he had accompanied his Imperial Master, who had repaired thither for the purpose of meeting the Emperor of Austria, and Prince Metternich, that they might personally discuss together, the affairs of the East.

In what had passed at Constantinople, the Internuntio had latterly seconded Lord Strangford's efforts—Prince Metternich being sincerely anxious that success should attend them: for His Highness, finding that Alexander would not delay the discussions on Greek Affairs until the return of the Russian Mission to the Porte, had, by this time, become as desirous, as he had before been lukewarm, to secure that return, and to separate the other questions in dispute from those connected with Greek Affairs,

Notwithstanding however Prince Metternich's

wishes, and the accomplishment by Lord Strangford of the task which he had been set on his leaving Verona by the Russian Emperor; His Imperial Majesty, and His Ministers, still refused to send a Mission to the Porte until the Boyard Villaru was liberated, and the few remaining Turkish troops were withdrawn from the Principalities, although they consented to send a Chargé d'Affaires to Constantinople.

When the Russian Ministers put forward these additional pretensions, Prince Metternich, at once, consented to adopt them, and forthwith directed the Internuntio to support them. Lord Strangford was of course left for a time without instructions. He therefore resolved, when he learnt the intentions of Russia, to content himself with playing a secondary part, but not to remain altogether inactive.

These additional requisitions on the part of Russia had not been many days known at Constantinople, when a letter, which Count Nesselrode had written to Lord Strangford, in the course of the preceding May, having by some means found its way into the publick journals, brought the first intimation to the Porte of the intention of Russia to take a leading part in the pacification of Greece. A plan more calculated to alarm the Sultan and his Ministers, and to prevent their satisfying the new claims of Russia, could hardly have been devised: while, at the

same time, it was sure to have the effect of encouraging the Greeks, and of inducing them to refuse any terms of accommodation which might be offered to them by the Porte. Before the indignation, which this note had excited in the Divan, had at all subsided, the Internuntio, in compliance with the orders of his Court, delivered in a representation to the Porte, pressing the demands of Russia on the subject of the Principalities. To this the Turks gave a flat refusal in a "written answer," which, although in terms and substance, unexceptionable, placed on record, and consequently made more difficult of retraction, their determination, not to withdraw their Troops from the Principalities until they had come to some settlement with their revolted subjects.

During the interchange of these notes, Lord Strangford brought to a successful termination, the Treaty between Sardinia and the Porte; and on the 14th of November the Sardinian Flag was, for the first time, seen floating in the Bosphorus.

The conclusion of this arrangement fulfilled the whole of the Commission with which the British Ambassador had been charged at Verona, and ought in strictness to have been followed by the restoration of the Russian Mission. That event, however, was still postponed; the withdrawal of the Turkish troops, and the release of Villaru,

being required as preliminaries to its accomplishment; and even then no positive promise was given by the Court of St. Petersburg, that, these further demands being complied with, no new requisition should be made, as the price of the Mission.

Mr. Canning was, however, most anxious that at any rate every thing like a fair pretence for the non-fulfilment by Russia of her implied engagements, should be done away; and therefore directed Lord Strangford, to avail himself of the occasion of M. de Minciaky's arrival as Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople, to come forward anew with the demand respecting the Troops, notwithstanding that his Lordship, in ignorance that their withdrawal was deemed an indispensable condition, allowed the Porte to believe, that the navigation of the Black Sea was the last point upon which Russia was determined to insist.

Meanwhile Mr. Canning took every opportunity of encouraging the peaceable dispositions of the Emperor Alexander, which, it has been before mentioned, His Imperial Majesty entertained: for this end, the despatches to Lord Strangford, respecting the question of the navigation of the Black Sea, were communicated, by Sir Charles Bagot, to Count Nesselrode, — a communication, which, being made, at the very

moment, when it was most wanted, produced the happiest effects.

The Emperor's impatience had been for some time past increasing on the whole subject of Turkey. Prince Metternich's attempts to fritter down, by everlasting despatches, the real grounds of complaint, which Russia conceived herself to have against Turkey, had been unremitting, and had nearly exhausted the patience of the Russian Government. The Emperor was upon the point of setting out to review his 500,000 men in arms, "perhaps to be intoxicated by the sight of them — perhaps to be urged on by their war cry." He was going to visit the very provinces which were suffering the most from the commercial regulations of the Porte.

The arguments of the Peace party were exhausted, and the War party were beginning to declare that forbearance had had its fair trial, and that the opposite course was the only one left. "At this moment arrived Mr. Canning's instructions to Lord Strangford. They came like oil upon the water. — The frown that was gathering upon the Imperial brow began to smooth, and the friends of peace to feel fresh confidence and energy."

The Emperor set forth on his journey in this state of mind, which the intelligence that reached him at Czernowitz of the concessions of the Porte, was well fitted to improve. The

War party were, however, sufficiently powerful to induce the Emperor to require the withdrawal of the Troops from the Principalities, before he would send back a Minister to Constantinople : and moreover from Czernowitz a proposal was made to the British Government to take part in a Conference to be held at St. Petersburg, on the question of the pacification of Greece ; which proposal contained an indirect intimation of an intention, that that pacification must take place before the restoration of their Mission.

This purpose was similar in effect to the one announced by the Turkish Ministers, in their answer to the Internuntio ; since *they* said the settlement of the affairs of Greece was to precede the withdrawal of the Turkish Troops from the Principalities, which withdrawal, Russia said, was, at any rate, to precede the restoration of the Mission. When this mutual determination on both sides to impede the one grand object of Lord Strangford's negotiations, became known to Mr. Canning, he at once pointed out to the Porte the impolicy of her resolution, as well on account of the dangers which would arise from a protracted discussion with Russia, while the Greek Insurrection was yet carried on with full vigour and with at least balanced success ; as on account of the hope, which the continued absence of a Russian Mission from Constantinople would give to the Insurgents, that Russia would

eventually be induced to aid them. Mr. Canning was about to address remonstrances upon this subject to the Russian Ministers, when the necessity of this was superseded by the judicious proceedings of Sir Charles Bagot, which, in the exercise of his discretion, that Ambassador had instituted with the Russian Court, immediately after the return of the Emperor to his Capital. The result which Sir Charles secured was a positive engagement, on the part of the Emperor, that so soon as the Principalities should be restored, in respect to the presence of the Turkish Troops, to the state, in which they were, previously to the breaking out of the troubles, a Russian Minister should be sent without delay to Constantinople.

Sir Charles Bagot immediately communicated to Lord Strangford, that he had obtained this stipulation, which was of the greatest use in the further prosecution of the negotiation; since one of the reasons on which the Divan had laid the most stress for non-compliance had been the uncertainty, whether, if this demand were yielded, it would be the *last* that would be brought forward. The promise of the Emperor conveyed through Sir Charles, of course effectually obviated this objection; and when Lord Strangford presented his note upon this last demand, and (as before) desired to receive a verbal answer, the Turkish Minister, in the Conference which was held on

the 27th of April, 1824, declared that the required evacuation should no longer depend (as stated in the answer to the Internuntio) upon the termination of the Greek Revolt: they even "recognized it as a measure, advantageous to the interests of the Turkish Empire, and consequently one which ought to be adopted."

They likewise promised that the orders for the evacuation should be sent, so soon as they were furnished with the information which the Porte had requested the Hospodars to furnish, touching the means of providing for the security and tranquillity of the Provinces when the Troops should be withdrawn: and, further, they undertook, when these things should be done, to notify the fact officially to the British Embassy. Before two months had elapsed, official notification was made * *verbally*, by the Turkish Ministers, in a Conference with Lord Strangford, and within yet another month the evacuation of Wallachia was completed. Owing to the intrigues of the Hospodar of Moldavia, the return of the Turkish Troops from that Principality was not so quickly accomplished as from Wallachia; and while they yet remained there, a circumstance occurred which undid much of the good which had hitherto been effected.

After the Emperor and his Ministers had returned to St. Petersburg from Czernowitz,

* July 1824.

Count Nesselrode occupied himself in devising a plan for the pacification of Greece. This plan, of which more will be said hereafter, was communicated by Count Nesselrode to the Allied Ministers at the Russian Court early in January 1824.

This document, in the following June, found its way into a Paris Newspaper ; and thus for the second time within twelve months, by the unaccountable disclosure of a Russian State Paper to the World, was the work of years exposed to the hazard of being rendered useless. Doubtless the Russian Government felt a deep indignation at such repeated violations of its confidence—violations which were so singularly timed, to throw an impediment in the way of the reconciliation, that it is impossible not to suppose that they were so designed, by the parties, who were guilty of them. The objects of those who published this paper were, however, only in some degree successful : for although the Turkish Ministers inveighed with bitterness against the conduct of Russia, and received with incredulity Lord Strangford's authorized assurances that Russia would, in fulfilment of her pledge, send the promised Mission, and although the evacuation of Moldavia was postponed, yet that postponement was excused, on other grounds, and fresh promises were given for its speedy execution.

Lord Strangford, however, who had received

leave of absence, when he had completed his task, was suffered by the Porte to depart, before those promises were fulfilled: nevertheless, before the year (1824) closed, the Turkish Troops had ceased to occupy Moldavia, and M. Minciacky had presented his credentials, as *Chargé d'Affaires*.

Previously, however, to His Excellency's departure * from Constantinople, he obtained the liberation of the Boyard Villaru, and was enabled, owing to Sir Charles Bagot's exertions at St. Petersburg, to announce to the Divan, that the Emperor of Russia had nominated M. de Ribeaupierre as His Imperial Majesty's Representative at the Porte. Lord Strangford † did not witness the consummation of his labours by the actual re-establishment of the Russian Mission: his proceedings diminished (so far as this Country was concerned,) the difficulty of dealing with Eastern affairs, inasmuch as the British Government was enabled to lay down the burthen of mediation which, during three years, Russia had continued to impose upon it, both by constantly bringing forward additional requisitions, and by eluding the pledge, which Sir Charles Bagot at last managed to extort,

* October 1824.

† Lord Strangford was at this time elevated to the British Peerage for his services, at Mr. Canning's especial recommendation.

for re-establishing her Mission at Constantinople, so soon as the remaining Turkish Troops should have been withdrawn from the Principalities. When the condition was fulfilled, the pledge ought to have been redeemed ; and, although the Emperor and his Ministers contented themselves with merely nominating a Minister, and sending a Chargé d'Affaires to Constantinople, yet these half measures were an acknowledgement that all pretence for hostilities, on purely Russian grounds, was fairly done away.

Lord Strangford's negotiations at Constantinople occupied a space of two years : during which time the war was raging in Greece, and the great Powers of Europe were employed in discussing the best means for effecting its termination.

A brief sketch must now, therefore, be given of the events of that War, and of the discussions to which its existence gave rise.

The campaign of 1823 was generally favourable to the Greeks ; but strange to say, pressed, as they were, on all sides by the Turks, the common danger did not unite them against the common foe. The Congress, which, in the preceding year (1822), had been installed at Epidaurus, again met in that Town ; and, after a short Session, was adjourned to Tripolizza.

There, on the occasion of the Election of a new President, the dissensions broke out into

actual combat; and Mavrocordato, the Greek who had been elected to that dignity by a great majority of suffrages, was either compelled to resign, or else was induced to do so, for the sake of preventing further conflict. Notwithstanding, Colocotroni, (the individual opposed to Mavrocordato, who was at the head of a party called Capitanos, who wished to substitute their own authority for that of the banished Pachas), carried off the executive Council to Napoli di Romania, where he exercised the functions of Government, while the Senate adjourned to Argos, there to protest against the violence and illegality of his proceedings. Early in May 1823, the Capitan Pacha set sail from the Dardanelles with a formidable fleet. Before his departure, Lord Strangford paid him a visit, for the purpose of impressing on his mind, the absolute necessity of conducting his operations against the Insurgents, with humanity; and of warning him that Europe would not tolerate a repetition of the atrocities which had been committed at Scio.

The Capitan Pacha assured the Ambassador that he would do every thing in his power to prevent such proceedings, and it must be confessed that he adhered to his promise. His movements were attended with little success; and he returned at the end of November to Constantinople, after having been defeated by the Greek Admiral, Miaulis.

The Turkish Pachas, who were entrusted with the military operations, did not meet with a more prosperous fate; since all of them were compelled to abandon the objects, which they had in view at the commencement of the Campaign.

In the beginning of the following year (1824) the dissensions amongst the Greek Leaders continued; but by the middle of May, the Senate triumphed over Colocotroni, and the executive Council. After which a Greek Provisional Government, of which the Hydriote, Conduriotti, was the President, was established at Napoli, without a rival being set up in any other place. The Greeks were again, throughout this year, almost invariably successful, in their encounters with the Turks, both by Sea and Land, although the latter had concluded a Peace with Persia, and were assisted by the Egyptian Fleet, under Ibrahim Pacha, the Son-in-law of Mahomed Ali, Pacha of Egypt; who, towards the end of 1824, sent, for the first time, succours to his Moslem brethren. Over this Fleet, the Greeks obtained a signal victory. But although they thus generally triumphed over their enemies, their successes were not of a sufficiently decided nature to present any reasonable prospect of the speedy discontinuance of a struggle, on which the eyes of all Europe were turned, as well, on account of the actual inconveniences which it produced, as on account of the consequences

which were too likely to grow out of it, if the Emperor of Russia should be forced by his people, to take part with the rebellious Greeks.

It therefore became an object of deep interest, with all the Powers of Europe, to gain time, for bringing about some amicable adjustment, and to prevent any hostile movement by Russia, until that adjustment should be effected.

In the outset of the contest, Great Britain had determined to preserve a strict neutrality, — a neutrality of which, however, both sides complained. The Greeks, because they looked for assistance from their fellow Christians: — the Turks, because they thought it unfair that the Greeks should be allowed a Belligerent character; since, as they argued, to subjects in rebellion, no national character could properly belong.

But this neutral system was not adopted by the British Government, for the sake of mere temporary convenience; it was determined upon in conformity with the soundest principles.

“The character of Belligerency,” said Mr. Canning, in defending neutrality, “is not so much a principle, as a fact — a certain degree of force and consistency, acquired by any mass of population engaged in War, entitles that population to be treated as a Belligerent, and even if their title were questionable, renders it the interest, well understood, of all civilized nations so to treat them: — For what is the

“ alternative? A Power or Community (which
 “ ever it may be called) which is at War with
 “ another, and which covers the Sea with its
 “ Cruizers, must either be acknowledged as a
 “ Belligerent, or dealt with as a Pirate.

“ The description of rebel, under which alone
 “ the Porte was willing to consider the Greeks,
 “ was not one, which could constitute a rule for
 “ the conduct of Foreign Nations, except, either
 “ on a presumption that Foreign Nations have a
 “ right to take cognizance of the internal dis-
 “ turbances of the Turkish dominions — (a right
 “ which, if admitted, some nations might exer-
 “ cise, in favour of the Greek side of the quarrel),
 “ or on the pretension that in a dispute between
 “ a Sovereign and a portion of his subjects, all
 “ Foreign Governments are bound by an over-
 “ ruling obligation to make common cause with
 “ the Sovereign.

“ If these two equally untenable propositions
 “ were rejected, as they necessarily must have
 “ been by the British Government, there re-
 “ mained but the single option between Belli-
 “ gerent, and Pirate.

“ But what monstrous consequences would
 “ follow from the treating as Pirates a popula-
 “ tion of Millions of Souls, to whom, by that
 “ very treatment, the right would be conveyed,
 “ and on whom (according to the natural law of
 “ self-defence) the obligation would be imposed,

-- of making terrible reprisals? Humanity, "therefore, required that a Contest, which was "marked in its outset, on both sides with the "most disgusting barbarities, should be brought "within the regulated limits of civilized war, "— thus restraining by those conventional observances and modifications, which disarm war "of half its miseries, passions, inflamed to so "furious a pitch, as to aim at nothing short of "mutual extermination."

Great Britain therefore set the example of admitting the Greek Nation to the Privileges of a Belligerent: but, at the same time, She required that if the Greeks were allowed the advantages of that character, they should in their turn conform to its rules.

When therefore the Greek Government put forth a proclamation that "all European Vessels "freighted to the Turkish Government, and "employed in conveying Troops, Stores, and "Provisions, for the Turks, should be attacked, "burnt, or sunk *together with their crews* by "the Ships of the Greek Fleet;" the British Government insisted, and obtained the reversal of that Proclamation, which was so gross a violation of the laws of civilized Warfare.

But although the British Government thus determined on principle, to be neutral, it could not look with indifference upon a contest, whereby British interests were immediately

affected. For it was a matter of no inconsiderable moment to this Country, to be obliged to maintain a large naval force in those Seas where the struggle was carried on, to protect our commerce and our flag from the lawless violence of the pirates of either Nation, whose existence owed both its origin, and duration, to the impunity afforded by the confusion necessarily attendant on the anarchy of Civil War.

This was a state of things of which we had a right to complain ; and was at any rate a sufficient reason for not abstaining from friendly interposition between the contending Parties, by pointing out to them the best means of settling their disputes. Moreover, the danger which existed that the Peace of the World would be disturbed by Russian interference, if the conflict should continue, fully justified the policy of interference by amicable counsel.

When, therefore, Count Nesselrode (whilst he was at Czernowitz) made a proposition to enter into discussion on the affairs of Greece, Mr. Canning, thinking that “ the magnitude of the “ evils resulting from the hostilities between the “ Turks and Greeks, would justify Russia in “ stretching to the utmost the construction of “ the Treaties by which she had a right to interfere for the protection of the Christian subjects of Turkey, did not hesitate to acknowledge “ the importance, and perhaps inevitable ne-

“cessity, of deliberating ere long, fully and
 “anxiously, upon the distractions and agitations
 “of Eastern Europe.”

But while Mr. Canning held out a hope that Great Britain would eventually have no objection to take part with her Allies in a Conference upon Greek affairs, he instructed Sir Charles Bagot distinctly to inform the Russian Court that the time for so doing, would never arrive, until the Russian Mission should be actually re-established at Constantinople. On this preliminary he insisted both as a matter of prudence and of principle.

The Mediation of Great Britain between Russia and the Porte had always been carried on under the express declaration, that the points which were intended to be made conditions of the renewal of diplomattick intercourse between the two Countries, were fairly brought forward. We could not, therefore, make ourselves party to a Conference, the entering into which, though not proposed by Russia as a new condition of the return of Her Mission, would nevertheless have been so understood by the Turks. Such an apprehension might have been perfectly unfounded, but it would not have been the less invincible; and however innocently designed and unjustifiably misinterpreted, the beginning of the proposed Conference might have been a signal with the Turks, “not only for an obsti-

“nate adherence to the point which yet remained to be conceded by them, but even for the retraction of concessions already made. That such conduct on their part would have been unreasonable, was no security, and in the event would have been little consolation.”

But the hypothesis acquired almost the force of demonstration, from the circumstance of the great alarm and anger excited in the Divan by the mischievous publication, in a Continental Newspaper, of Count Nesselrode's letter to Lord Strangford of the 7th of May 1823.

Moreover if Russia had the right by Treaty to interfere in favour of the Christian subjects of the Porte, She had only that right, in the character of a friendly Power; for the interference was, in terms, to be made through the Ministers of Russia, resident at Constantinople; although doubts might be raised, whether the right of interference extended to subjects of the Porte, who had thrown off their Allegiance.

But although Russia might be justified in acting “in the Spirit of those Treaties, if the case could not be brought within the letter of them, yet where it was a matter of choice to conform to the letter as well as to the Spirit of Treaties, unquestionably it was but reasonable to establish such conformity.”

Russia could not place the Greeks on the foot-

ing of peaceable subjects to the Porte ; but She could place herself on the footing of a friendly Power.

A short postponement of the proposed Conference would probably make this difference, and would enable Russia to speak, in common with her Allies, the language of amicable advice ; instead of that, which so long as She had no Mission at Constantinople, would have been considered by the Porte, as the language of menace, and dictation.

In short, a mediation between the Porte and Her Greek subjects, after the re-establishment of the Russian Mission, would be felt by the Porte to be a joint measure of all the European Powers, and was therefore likely to be received by that Government with the more seriousness, as possibly involving the risk of a rupture with them all ; whereas, a demand in favour of the Greeks, while the friendly relations of Russia were still suspended, would probably be considered by the Porte, as an additional Russian claim brought forward as a last pretext for long meditated Russian hostility.

On these considerations Mr. Canning deemed it not advisable to accede to Count Nesselrode's proposal for the immediate joint consultations of the Allies ; but, in declining it, he expressed his wish to receive from Russia the disclosure of her plans for the pacification of Greece, and to

communicate, without reserve, any observations that might occur to the British Government upon them. Equally ready would England be, when the time came, to confer with Russia, and her other Allies, for the purpose of making up a common opinion, and common course of action upon this momentous and interesting subject. He suggested, however, at the same time, whether, when the period for the Conference should arrive, the place of meeting might not be fixed more conveniently at Vienna, than at St. Petersburg.

While Mr. Canning was thus expressing on the part of His Government its readiness to receive and consider any ideas, which Russia might have for the settlement of Greece, Count Nesselrode was employed in preparing upon the subject a *Mémoire*, which he communicated, early in January 1824, to the Ministers of the Allied Powers at the Court of St. Petersburg.

The principle on which the *Mémoire* was wisely founded, was that of compromise, since it was well known that neither party would consent to the terms which the other required ; complete independence being demanded on the one side, and entire submission on the other. To reconcile these conflicting pretensions, the *Mémoire* suggested, —

1. The division of Continental Greece into three Principalities, similar to those of the Da-

nube ; the Islands of the Archipelago being left to a municipal form of Government, which would be no other than a renewal and regulation of the privileges originally enjoyed by them.

2. That the Porte should retain its Sovereignty, although precluded from the appointment of Pachas, or Governors, and should receive a fixed tribute.

3. That all publick employments should be filled by Natives.

4. That the Greeks should enjoy free liberty of Commerce, and the use of a national Flag.

5. That the Patriarch of Constantinople should be the Representative of the Greek Nation, and should enjoy the same privileges as the Agents of Wallachia, and Moldavia.

6. That the Porte should retain certain fortresses round which a line of demarcation was to be drawn, within the limits of which the Turkish Garrison were to provide themselves with subsistence.

7. That all other minor points should be reserved for future negotiations, at which the Greek Deputies were to assist, as was stipulated for Servia, in 1812.

8. That the arrangement should be guaranteed, by such of the Allies as might be so disposed.

The Mémoire then proposed that the Diplomatick Agents of the Allied Powers accredited to the Porte, should be instructed to act in accord-

ance with these suggestions, and should be permitted, in their measures, the exercise of a free discretion.

At the same time that this Mémoire was transmitted to Mr. Canning, the Russian Ambassador likewise communicated a Despatch from Count Nesselrode, in which, for the first time, Russia announced the intention of interfering, *very shortly*, in the contest, between the Porte and its Greek subjects, — a necessity, he said, imposed upon Her by the great inconvenience to which Her subjects were exposed, by the continuance of the struggle.

After an attentive consideration of these communications, Mr. Canning avowed to Prince Lieven that he approved of the tendency of the Russian Mémoire, and therefore, that England would consent to deliberate with Her Allies upon the subject to which it related.

Sir Charles Bagot was accordingly informed, that the British Government would no longer urge its objections to St. Petersburg being made the seat of the Conference; and His Excellency was told that permission would be given to him to assist at the Conferences, whenever the settlement of the Russian differences at the Porte, should have induced the Russian Government to re-establish its Mission at Constantinople.

About a month after Mr. Canning had thus

written to Sir Charles Bagot, intelligence arrived* from Lord Strangford, that the Divan had consented to yield to the demands of Russia, respecting the Principalities. Mr. Canning then stated to Prince Lieven, that if, on the receipt of this information at St. Petersburg, a Russian Minister were immediately sent to Constantinople, and all intention to employ force were abjured, Sir Charles Bagot would be authorized, forthwith to attend the Conferences at St. Petersburg.

These two preliminary conditions, if accepted, would at once have freed these Conferences from the objections which Mr. Canning entertained towards the meetings, which had taken place at Troppau, and Laybach, in 1821, and Verona, in 1822. Those Congresses had been convoked on the ground, that "the Alliance was an Union for "the Government of the World:" and from the attributes belonging to this self-assumed character was deduced the right of the Alliance, not only to exercise a jurisdictional superintendence over the internal affairs of independent States, but to make its decrees effective, if necessary, by force. Mr. Canning had denied this right of authoritative superintendence, and had protested against the assumption of the character. The abnegation of force would have been the abandonment of the right, and the restoration of the

* May 29. 1824.

Russian Mission would have taken away the objectionable character of the Tribunal: for Russia would have been placed in the position of a Friendly Power towards Turkey, in which capacity She was authorized by Treaty to interfere. The Conference, therefore, would not have acted in virtue of any right of jurisdiction supposed to be possessed corporately by the Alliance—but of the undoubted privilege which Russia enjoyed of consulting Her Allies, as to the best mode of exercising a right which She individually had acquired by stipulation. Not that Mr. Canning thought that a Conference of the Allied Powers was likely to be the most, or any thing like the most effective mode, in which they could co-operate for a common object; but he felt that if the grounds on which he had chiefly objected to former Congresses were removed, it would not be wise to reject this chance of settling amicably a question, which Russia might be induced to settle for Herself, by force, if this plan were rejected.

Mr. Canning having conditionally consented that some representative of Great Britain should bear a part in the meditated Conferences, the Court of St. Petersburg was extremely anxious that they should be opened without delay: and Sir Charles Bagot was prevailed upon, to assist at two, which were held on the 17th of June and 6th of July 1824, at St. Petersburg; although

the Russian Government had not despatched their Mission to the Porte. These Conferences had been deferred till the very last moment ; and Count Nesselrode was apprehensive, if they were longer deferred, that the Austrian, and probably the English, Ambassadors, who were about to leave Russia, would have taken their departure before they were opened. They were not however held, until after Sir Charles had, both received from Lord Strangford, the report of His Lordship's conference with the Turkish Ministers, in which they promised to yield to the demands of Russia respecting the Principalities ; and had also persuaded the Emperor, in consequence of that account, publicly to designate M. de Ribeaupierre, as the future Imperial Minister at the Porte.

These circumstances Sir Charles Bagot thought did away with two of the principal reasons for not joining in these Conferences : for, First, the public nomination of M. de Ribeaupierre was so decided a step towards the actual restoration of the Russian Mission, that that event seemed on the very eve of its accomplishment : Next, the Turkish Government, having actually consented to concede the demands of Russia, the danger of refusal in consequence of the Divan taking alarm, or umbrage, at the opening of the Conferences was almost entirely removed. Further, since the absence of the

British Ambassador from any meetings upon such a subject, would have been a more decided measure, than his being present at them, Sir Charles resolved to attend. The first of these Conferences passed in the Representatives of the Allied Courts respectively, giving their opinions on the Russian Mémoires. The British Ambassador simply stated, that, being without specifick instructions, from his Court, he could only say, that Great Britain approved generally of the contents of that document, although there were some points on which She held a different opinion. The other Plenipotentiaries expressed similar sentiments, and declared, in answer to a question from Count Nesselrode, that they were authorized to send directions to their Colleagues at Constantinople, in the event of any measure being decided upon at the Conferences. The British Ambassador said, that he could send no directions to Lord Strangford.

At the second meeting Count Nesselrode expressed the pleasure of His Imperial Master at the manner in which the Greek Mémoire had been received by His Allies. He then suggested, in a written paper, which he read, that the Ministers of the Allied Powers, at the Porte, should be instructed to consider this Mémoire as containing the general expression of the wishes of the Alliance with respect to Greece, and to act in conformity with the propositions which it

contained. For this purpose, even before the actual execution of the promises of the Porte would justify the presence of a Russian Minister at Constantinople, M. Minciaky would be instructed, as Russian Plenipotentiary for Greek Affairs, to co-operate with the Representatives of the Allies, who were to adopt, and present to the Porte, a collective declaration offering the mediation of their Governments, and proposing an Armistice, during which a Greek Deputation was to be permitted to come to Constantinople, to discuss, in Conference with the Ministers of the Allies, and the Porte, the terms of a final adjustment.

The paper in which these propositions were contained was taken by the Plenipotentiaries, without remark, to refer to their several Governments.

Sir Charles's proceedings at these Conferences were in every respect judicious: but it so happened, in consequence of the Publication of the Russian Mémoire, of which fact he was not informed, that he would have decided more fortunately had he altogether absented himself from those Meetings. His reasons for not doing so perhaps justified him in the measure; but since he was not acting under his instructions, his Government were of course at liberty to adopt, or to disavow his proceedings. In the present instance it became advisable to resort to

the latter alternative ; and as the British Ministers had given Sir Charles no authority to attend, the fact that they had not done so, was distinctly stated.

Before this occurrence it had been for some time settled that Sir Charles Bagot should leave St. Petersburg, to hold another Ambassadorial Station nearer home ; and the Greek question, as well as that respecting the North West Coast of America, still remaining unsettled, Mr. Stratford Canning was selected to proceed on a special Mission to St. Petersburg, for the purpose of discussing these two topics, with the Russian Government.

The Court of St. Petersburg expressed great satisfaction at this selection ; and were particularly pleased at the prospect of Mr. Stratford Canning's arrival, since it was intended to allow him to take part in the Conferences on Greek Affairs, if the Russian Government should by the time that he arrived at St. Petersburg, have fulfilled their reiterated promises of sending back their Minister to Constantinople.

But after Mr. Canning had made known His intention to Prince Lieven, circumstances occurred which induced him to suspend its execution. The publication already mentioned of the Russian Mémoire prematurely disclosed, to the two parties whom it concerned, the plan

proposed for their reconciliation. The consequence of this disclosure was, not only, as has been mentioned, a postponement of the evacuation of the Principalities, but a violent invective addressed by the Reis Effendi to Lord Strangford, against interference in any shape, but specifically against the particular species of interference suggested in the Russian *Mémoire*.

On the other hand, the Greek Provisional Government addressed a letter to Mr. Canning, in which they protested against the Russian plan, declared that death was preferable to its adoption, and called upon the British Government to aid their Countrymen in their struggles for independence.

When Mr. Canning found that this mode of pacification was thus indignantly repudiated by both Belligerents, he determined, that, even if the Russian Mission should be re-established at Constantinople, Great Britain should not then be a party to a Conference, the business of which was to have consisted—First, in settling a plan for the pacification of Greece founded on the Russian *Mémoire*: Secondly, to devise the means of carrying such a plan into execution. If neither Turks nor Greeks had been aware of the intention of the Allies to confer upon these subjects, it would not have been out of the question, “to have entered at once upon the discussion of the first of these two branches

“ of the subject ; deferring the question, how
 “ any given plan was to be executed, until, after
 “ due deliberation, some specifick plan should.
 “ have been arranged. But the Greeks being
 “ resolved to abide any extremity, rather than
 “ submit to an arrangement which should not
 “ secure their Independence, as a Nation ; and
 “ since no arrangement could be devised by the
 “ parties proposing to undertake the mediation,
 “ whereby any thing like that object could be
 “ accomplished, without exciting on the part of
 “ the Turks a determined and desperate resist-
 “ ance ; the question how far the Alliance would
 “ be prepared to go in pressing any compromise
 “ necessarily took precedence of the question,
 “ what the compromise should be.”

It was probable, that “ continued struggle
 “ and mutual exhaustion might in process of
 “ time bring, either or both of the contending
 “ parties to a more rational, and tractable state
 “ of mind.”

But until that should be the case, since the
 British Government, in the then existing stage of
 the question, had never contemplated the adop-
 tion of any settlement except through the “ un-
 “ forced ” acquiescence of both, it would be
 hopeless to persevere at that moment in an
 attempt to procure the adoption of “ any plan of
 “ compromise (however rational in its principle
 “ or impartial in its provisions) which either

“ Party had it in their power to defeat ; ” and which both had declared their fixed determination to reject.

The Greek Provisional Government were, therefore, informed by Mr. Canning, that Great Britain, would “ continue Her system of neutrality — that She would not be concerned in “ any attempt to force upon them a plan of “ pacification contrary to their wishes ; but that “ if at any time it should think fit to solicit the “ mediation of this Country, we should be ready “ to tender it to the Porte ; and, if accepted by “ the Porte, to do our best to carry it into effect ; “ conjointly with other Powers, whose co-operation would at once give facility to any arrangement, and afford the best security for its “ duration.”

At the same time, in answer to the application for assistance, Mr. Canning observed, that “ connected with the Porte by the established relations of Amity, and the antient obligations of “ Treaties, which the Porte had not violated, it “ surely could not be expected that England “ would engage in unprovoked hostilities in a “ quarrel not her own.”

On the other hand, in communicating to Prince Lieven the determination of the British Government not to take part in the Conference, Mr. Canning assured that Ambassador that he would use every exertion to conquer the repugnance

manifested by the two Belligerents to the mediation of the other Powers of Europe.

It cannot be denied that this refusal by the British Government to allow a British Plenipotentiary to take part in the proposed Conferences, was a somewhat hazardous measure; and there were not wanting solicitations from some of those, who were to have been parties to the Meetings, who, to gain time, were willing to encourage the Emperor of Russia's hopes that these Conferences would produce beneficial results, although they themselves did not participate in those hopes; that they might thus enable His Imperial Majesty in his turn to practise, whether consciously or unconsciously, a like salutary delusion upon his People.

But to this course of policy, even if it were not open to the fundamental objection, that, duplicity is sure to recoil, sooner or later, upon those who practise it, there was this decided "objection; that, in lending ourselves to an "undertaking, which we ourselves believed to "be utterly useless, we must either assign to the "Parliament and people of this Country reasons "for our conduct. by which, in fact, it was not "actuated, and must express hopes which, in "fact, we did not feel, — a course of proceeding "which was wholly out of the question; or else, "by declaring frankly our real motives for "engaging in so unpromising a Negotiation, we

“ should betray the secret, and therewith destroy
 “ the illusion, by which the Emperor of Russia
 “ was to be fortified against the warlike impul-
 “ sion of his people.”

The determination of the British Government not to take part in the Conferences, excited at St. Petersburg great dissatisfaction, which was manifested in a despatch from Count Nesselrode, wherein, after expressions of surprize at the change, he declared that all further deliberations between his Court and that of St. James's, as well with reference to the relations of the former with Turkey, as with respect to the affairs of Greece, were absolutely at an end.

Mr. Canning received this communication very coolly, contenting himself with “ observing, “ that the Emperor was Master, to do as he “ pleased ” — that the determination was “ an “ ebullition which would probably pass away, “ and that ere long the two Countries would “ probably find themselves again in the same “ road.”

Mr. Canning, indeed, was well convinced that no great length of time would elapse before the Emperor of Russia would discover the futility of the Conferences; and that whenever that time came, His Imperial Majesty would be more likely to take Counsel with the Power which had not concurred in the “ deception, than with “ those who had been foremost in promoting it.”

Before Mr. Canning learnt this determination of the Emperor, Mr. Stratford Canning had set out * for St. Petersburg, furnished with instructions to say, that although, while both the Turks and the Greeks repelled in no measured terms the intervention proposed by Russia, England would not take part in discussions, which, whatever might be the result agreed to by those who joined in them, could only, while the two parties continued in the same temper of mind, be made effective by force, which, in the then posture of affairs, England abjured, and, by consequence, would not mingle in Councils which might lead to it; still She would be willing to resume the joint consideration of the question, whenever either Belligerent should apply for her mediation, provided that the notion of resorting to force should be first openly disavowed, and especially the Russian Mission should be re-established at Constantinople.

On the actual fulfilment of this last condition the British Government had invariably insisted, not however “ from any obstinate adherence “ to a rule once laid down, nor any pedantick “ attachment to forms, still less any distrust “ of the repeated declarations of the Emperor “ of Russia; but from a sincere conviction, that “ nothing, short of the actual presence of the

“ Russian Minister at Constantinople, would
 “ persuade the World that the *chance* of War
 “ between Russia and the Porte, on separate
 “ Russian Interests, was altogether extinguished;
 “ that so long as any chance, however small, of
 “ that result was supposed to exist, fear on the
 “ part of the Porte, and hope on the part of the
 “ Greeks, would lead them to decline a media-
 “ tion in which Russia was to bear a part. The
 “ Porte would fear that Russia would only seek
 “ a more popular cause of War in associating
 “ the Greek cause with Her own — the Greeks
 “ would hope that if they steadily refused to
 “ accept Russia, as a Mediator, they might ere
 “ long have her co-operation as an Ally.

“ To these hopes and fears nothing but the
 “ arrival of M^r. de Ribeaupierre at Constanti-
 “ nople could put an end.”

But, however just and reasonable it might be
 for the British Government to recommend or
 claim the performance of this condition, it was
 one, with which the Russian Government seemed
 to be in no hurry to comply. On Mr. Stratford
 Canning's arrival at St. Petersburg, Count Nes-
 selrode asserted that he was prohibited from
 discussing the question of the pacification of
 Greece.

Mr. Stratford Canning was in consequence
 induced to postpone the execution of his in-
 structions respecting Greece until he should

have accomplished the other objects of his Mission; when, however, he had effected all that was to be done on other subjects, it became unnecessary for him to prolong his stay at St. Petersburg, if the Russian Government adhered inflexibly to its resolution. He accordingly informed Count Nesselrode that if His Excellency was not prepared to listen to what he had been instructed to communicate, on the part of his Government, upon the Greek Question, he could not delay any longer making application to the Emperor for his audience of leave. This notification made the Russian Government, who were unwilling to allow Mr. Stratford Canning to depart without knowing what he had to communicate, relax in its determination; and Count Nesselrode was accordingly empowered to depart from that reserve which he had hitherto maintained.

Mr. Stratford Canning then entered into a detailed explanation of the reasons why, at that moment, the British Government would not take part in the conferences; and, although the reasoning employed certainly had the effect of diminishing the discontent entertained by the Russian Minister at the decision, and satisfying him of the sincerity of those who made use of that reasoning, yet it had not the effect of convincing him of the inexpediency of holding Conferences at that particular period on the

affairs of Greece and Turkey. The evil was pressing, he argued, and required the immediate application of some species of remedy.

The Russian Government, however, being somewhat mollified by this communication, Mr. Stratford Canning proposed to go on with the discussion, by making known the circumstances under which his Government would be prepared to join the Allies in their deliberations, provided the Russian Minister would meet confidence with confidence, and explain in his turn the views of his Government.

On Count Nesselrode consenting to receive the communication on these terms, Mr. Stratford Canning stated that the English Ministry would be ready to entertain, in conjunction with the Allies, the question of mediation between Greece and Turkey, provided that, the Russian Mission being re-established at Constantinople, either Belligerent should apply to any one of the Allies; or any circumstances should occur to produce the belief that an offer of interference would not be unacceptable to either of the contending parties. In either of these cases the intervention was to be preceded by a joint disclaimer of the adoption of forcible measures against either Belligerent.

These circumstances were considered by Count Nesselrode as of far too vague and undetermined a character to enable him to place

any reliance upon the probability of their occurrence, so as to secure the eventual co-operation of Great Britain, while the Revolutionary character of the War in Greece required an immediate effort for its suppression ; and if the proposed intervention of the Allies did not produce the complete pacification of the Country, it would at least have the merit of enabling the Allied Powers to guard, by timely management, against the evils which they apprehended from the triumphant establishment of Greek Independence. Count Nesselrode further stated that, though earnestly desirous of maintaining Peace, His Government was nevertheless unwilling to renounce the employment of stronger measures in the event of their becoming necessary.

Mr. Stratford Canning then informed the Count, that the renunciation of the employment of force against either of the conflicting parties, was a *sine quâ non* condition of any intervention on the part of Great Britain. Count Nesselrode upon this absolutely refused to pledge his Government to abstain from coercive means ; whereupon Mr. Stratford Canning felt that the discussions had now reached that point, at which it was evident, that a further interchange of the opinions of the Russian and British Governments on the subject of Greece was, for the moment, at least, divested of every prospect

of practical advantage. In this view of the state of things, Count Nesselrode agreed, and it was settled, that Mr. Stratford Canning should no longer delay his application for an audience of leave.

Meanwhile the Conferences were carried on, by the Russian, Austrian, Prussian, and French Plenipotentiaries : the Austrian Government being as zealous to engage in them as was that to Russia, notwithstanding that the former differed with the latter as essentially, with regard to the principles which were to guide the proceedings of the Conference, as it did, with respect to the end, which was to be obtained by them. Russia hoped to effect some practical result, whereby a termination should be put to the Greek contest : Austria to gain time, and to amuse Russia, until the Porte, by the aid of the Egyptian forces, should herself have once more reduced the Greeks to her subjection.

Austria therefore desired that the Greek Insurrection should be put down at any rate. Russia desired to put an end to the Contest, and to compel the Turks to grant the Greeks, not independence, but security for their lives and property. These were undoubtedly the feelings of Alexander, with respect to the Greeks, — feelings encouraged by religious sentiments, amounting almost to superstition, which the calamity, with which his Capital had been

afflicted in December 1824, had contributed considerably to augment.

These differences of opinion between the two Imperial Courts might have been forgotten, if, as on former occasions, there had been a British Plenipotentiary present, who, diverging from Russia still more than Austria, might have made those two Powers forget their own differences, for the sake of a joint attack on the British Plenipotentiary: but, as it was, the Austrian and Russian Plenipotentiaries were placed in direct opposition to each other. Russia desired that the Porte should be menaced with the withdrawal of the Representatives of the Allies, if their intervention was refused; while Austria objected decidedly to any such proceeding. The French and Prussian Plenipotentiaries took part with Austria; and the Russian Government consequently was induced to acquiesce in the view of its Allies, which merely amounted to the tender of their good offices to the Porte to mediate with her insurgent subjects.

Before, however, this tender was made to Turkey, the Russian Government, fearing that it might not be accepted, urged upon its three conferring Allies, the necessity of resorting to coercion, in case the overture should be disregarded. They, however, unanimously answered, that they would never go beyond ad-

vice and remonstrance, in their language towards the Porte.

Meanwhile the proposal of Mediation, which had been determined upon at the Conferences, was made to the Divan, and rejected, almost with contempt. The refusal of the three Allies to accede to the proposal of Russia, and the abortive issue of the overture to the Porte, excited the anger of the Russian Government. The Conferences were closed in form at the latter end of August (1825) : and the Emperor complained, in terms of great bitterness, of the treatment which he had met with from his Allies ; at the same time that he threw out hints, that the Greek Question was not the only ground of difference between Russia and Turkey ; and that if Russian grievances had been for a time abandoned for European, the failure of the latter would be a reason for more peremptorily insisting upon satisfaction upon the other points of dispute.

This temper and language alarmed the Austrian Government, who had, for the sake of mollifying the anger of Alexander, proposed, to recognize the Independence of the Greek Nation, — a proposal, which, considering the language which had been held by Prince Metternich to Great Britain, on the subject of Her recognition of Spanish America, not eight months before, was of somewhat dubious consistency.

But be this as it may, the admission by one of the Members of the Holy Alliance of that which this proposal implies, that there "were interests" which would justify Nations in taking their "own measures with regard to Countries in a state of Civil War," was at once giving up one of the principles to which that Alliance had most pertinaciously adhered, and consequently was an acknowledgement, that their principles (England having set them at defiance) were no longer tenable in practice.

Russia, however, was by no means for taking so decided a step. The Emperor Alexander did not approve of rebellious subjects (whatever might have been their provocation to rebel) being established in a state of independence.

The most which he was desirous to obtain for the Greeks was safety; and he therefore declared that he would not listen to the proposal.

The consequence of these disagreements among the conferring Allies, was, that one and all began to look to England for assistance; and before the end of October of this same year, in which the Alliance had been offended by the recognition of Spanish America, and Russia had refused to discuss in any wise the subject of Greece with the British Government, the Russian, Austrian, and French Governments had separately expressed their wish to Mr. Canning, that he would take the question into his own hands, since

Great Britain was the only Power which could bring the state of affairs in Greece to a satisfactory settlement.

Although at the time, when these wishes were expressed, Mr. Canning was not prepared to attempt any thing, he nevertheless encouraged those, who disclosed them, to think, that he was by no means disinclined to interpose at a convenient season. "As yet," he observed, in writing to a diplomatick friend on the subject, "things are not ripe for our interference, for we must not (like our good Allies) interfere in vain. If we act, we must finish what is to be done."

Whilst the Great European Powers were thus employed in discussing among themselves, the best means of putting an end to the contest between the Porte and its insurgent subjects, the prospects of the latter were visibly on the decline, so far at least as depended upon their own exertions. In the Autumn of 1824 the Senate was dissolved, and re-elected; and the elections going for the most part against Colocotroni and his partisans, the same individuals were re-chosen by the Senate to fill the offices of the Executive Government. Colocotroni argued that the re-appointment of the same persons for a second and succeeding year was a violation of one of the Articles of the Constitution; and his Son, and himself, succeeded in raising a rebellion

against the Government, in which, not only several of the highest Officers in the Greek Army joined, but actually the Generals who were engaged in carrying on the siege of Patras, broke up the Camp before that place for the sake of taking part in these intestine feuds. The Rebellion was, however, soon put down by the vigour of the Government; and Colocotroni, having once more made his submission, was sent, with some of his partisans, a prisoner to a strong and lonely fortress in the Island of Hydra.

Internal peace being thus restored, the sieges of Patras, Coron, and Modon, were again undertaken by the Greeks: and at the close of the year 1824, a Loan was negotiated, in London, for the use of the Greek Government. Of this loan, however, which would have been of the very greatest assistance, the amount which fell into the hands of the unfortunate Greeks, was incredibly small.

While the Greeks were thus consuming their strength in disputes amongst themselves, the Porte were employed in making vigorous preparations for the ensuing Campaign, and had obtained an auxiliary, in the Pacha of Egypt, whose hostility promised to be far more formidable to the Greeks, than that of any of the Pachas, whom in previous campaigns the Sultan had employed against the Insurgents.

The Egyptian Forces were disciplined after

the European manner, and were under the Command of Ibrahim, who was an able leader.

On the 23d of February 1825, the first division of the Egyptian Army, which had been wintering in Candia, appeared off Modon, which place still remained in the hands of the Turks; there the whole Division, to the number of 6000, disembarked. The Ships, which had brought them, immediately returned to Candia, to transport another portion of the Troops; and before Forces to any amount had been collected by the Greeks, the reinforcement, which Ibrahim had received, placed him at the head of 15,000 effective Troops. Having received some further reinforcements, and being joined by his Fleet, he attacked the Island of Sphacteria in the Bay of Navarino, and gained possession of it. Shortly after, he made himself master of the City of Navarino. But the Greek Fleet managed to destroy several transports, and other ships belonging to the Egyptian Fleet in the harbour of Modon. The Turkish Pachas were not idle while these operations were going on in the South Western corner of the Morea. And the Seraskier, Redschid Pacha, advanced towards Missolonghi, at the head of a numerous Army. To oppose the Seraskier, all the Greek Forces, which belonged to Northern Greece, retired across the Isthmus. The Morea, deprived of these Troops, was almost in a defenceless condition; for the Moreote

Troops were discontented with the Provisional Government, for keeping Colocotroni in confinement, in whom alone they had any confidence. The Government had, therefore, no alternative but to replace that Chief at the head of the Armies; and accordingly, an Amnesty having been passed, he returned to collect the scattered forces of the Moreotes, and to oppose the progress of Ibrahim, who, shortly after the fall of Navarino, appeared with his army before Napoli di Romania. The Egyptian, however, failed in his attempt, to surprise that place; and after an unsuccessful attack, on some of the out-posts of the Town, he retreated, and endeavoured to make his way across the Peninsula to Patras.

He was, however, much harassed by the Greeks; and, in revenge, he destroyed all the cultivation with which the Country at that time abounded.

The Seraskier was in the mean while pressing the Siege of Missolonghi, but, notwithstanding the aid of the Ottoman Fleet, he failed in reducing that important place, which, at the end of the year, still remained in possession of the Greeks. The Capitan Pacha effected something in the course of the year, by throwing in supplies and reinforcements to the Fortresses on the Coast, which the Turks still retained; and although he more than once came in contact with

the Greek Fleet, no decisive advantage was gained by either side.

Before the end of the year, Ibrahim had made himself master of a considerable portion of the Morea, and reduced the inhabitants of that part of Greece to a state of very great distress. Under these circumstances, the Greeks determined to make application to Great Britain. And the Provisional Government passed an Act proposing to place the Greek Nation under the Protection of the King of England. Against this Act the Deputies at Napoli of the French and United States Philhellenick Committees, entered a formal protest; a proceeding which, if in character with their functions, was wholly unnecessary, since the British Government had no kind of intention of accepting the proposal. Shortly after this Act was published at Napoli, but before it had officially reached England, the Greek Deputies in London addressed a letter to Mr. Canning, purporting to ask the advice of the British Government, with respect to the selection of a Sovereign for Greece. In consequence of this communication Mr. Canning held a Conference with the Deputies, when they expressed the desire of their Nation to select some "supreme Chief who might put an end to dissensions and jealousies, and become a common centre of Government, and an Organ of the Greeks with Foreign Powers. That they

“ wished, therefore, to know upon whom England would recommend that their choice should fall.”

In answer to this suggestion, Mr. Canning entered into an explanation respecting what had been, and what then was, the policy of England towards Greece.

He said, “ That from the time at which disturbances in Greece assumed the character of a War between its inhabitants and the Ottoman Porte, England had declared and maintained a strict and impartial neutrality in the Contest.”

That She first admitted the Greeks to exercise the rights of a Belligerent, — a right which Austria still continued to deny them.

That “ were we to go one step further, and transgress the limits of impartiality in favour of the Greeks, it would be in fact to take part with them in the War, and to set other Powers free to take part against them.

“ That the wish expressed by the Greeks that Great Britain should take part with them in the Contest, was natural enough ;” — but Mr. Canning thought that he could show, “ that such a course would not be so advantageous to the Greeks themselves as they were disposed to imagine.

“ They reasoned, as if upon the assumption that the Contest between Turkey and Greece

“ was not only, the only contest then existing,
 “ but would continue to be the only contest in
 “ the world, after England had joined in it : and
 “ that it would be to be fought out by the Otto-
 “ man Porte on the one side, and Greece, with
 “ England, as her Protectress, and Ally, on the
 “ other. They forgot that there existed between
 “ England, and Turkey, Treaties of very antient
 “ date, and of uninterrupted obligation, which
 “ the Turks faithfully observed, and to the pro-
 “ tection of which, British interests of a vast
 “ amount, were confided within the dominions of
 “ the Sultan : and that all these interests must
 “ at once be put in jeopardy, and the obligation
 “ of the Treaties which protect them be at once
 “ advisedly broken, by the first blow, which
 “ Great Britain should strike, *as the Ally of*
 “ *Greece*, in hostility to Turkey.”

Mr. Canning then suggested the idea of com-
 promise with the Porte, but the Deputies de-
 clared that the Greeks must be either “ entirely
 “ independent or perish.”

Mr. Canning, then, having thus explained to
 the Deputies all that the Greeks had to expect
 from the British Government, endeavoured to
 impress upon their minds that the efforts to in-
 duce Great Britain to take part in their favour
 “ had not only no favourable result, but were
 “ always attended by consequences prejudicial
 “ to their cause.

“ Every step taken by the Greeks to identify
 “ Great Britain with their undertaking, obliged
 “ Her to put forth to the world some new decla-
 “ ration of her persevering in the system of neu-
 “ trality which she had established.

“ In a Country like England the real inten-
 “ tions and acts of its Government, though
 “ pretty well known, and in the result accurately
 “ judged of, were nevertheless liable to tempo-
 “ rary misapprehensions, and the case was still
 “ more serious when the conduct of England
 “ was considered abroad.”

The British Government therefore meditated some step to prevent this misapprehension ; and to apprise the Greek Deputies of its probability was one of the reasons for his consenting to the conference.

After some further conversation, the Deputies, having previously expressed their gratitude for Mr. Canning's frankness, admitted that it might be necessary for the British Government to take some step to prevent all suspicions of its good faith which might arise out of the offer of the Protectorate, and the preparations which were being made here by Lord Cochrane for their assistance.

The Conference then broke up. Mr. Canning subsequently addressed a letter to the individuals who had signed the Paper tendering the Protectorate, declining the offer, but at the same

time taking the opportunity to state, that the British Government was ready to contribute its good offices towards the termination of the contest.

Two or three days after the Conference, Proclamations were issued by the Government: one quoting the enactments of the Foreign Enlistment Bill, and enjoining all His Majesty's subjects to observe a strict neutrality in all the contests then carrying on, but especially in that one between the two belligerents, the Greeks and the Ottoman Porte — the other forbidding for six months the exportation of warlike stores from any of the Ports of the United Kingdom.

It was at this period of these transactions, and after the Russian Ambassador in London had adopted a more friendly tone in his communications with Mr. Canning, that the latter thought the time convenient for sending an Ambassador to St. Petersburg.

Lord Strangford was selected for this Embassy, and the selection was in no small degree influenced by the expressed sentiments of the Russian Emperor in favour of that Nobleman.

The only two subjects of deep interest between the two Governments at the time of his departure, were the Greek question, and the Russian Mission to Constantinople, which was not as yet re-established.

With regard to the first, it appeared that, with

the exception of a short period during Mr. Stratford Canning's Mission at St. Petersburg, the Emperor of Russia had, since the opening of the Conferences at St. Petersburg in the preceding winter, adhered to his declared determination to hold no further communication with the British Government—a determination, which, since the failure of the step which was decided upon at those Conferences, His Imperial Majesty had extended to his other Allies.

“It was not,” said Mr. Canning, “for the British Government to break in upon a resolution prescribed by His Imperial Majesty for his own conduct, whether founded upon resentment against us (which we should presume to think wholly unmerited), upon a sense of what was due to his own dignity (which we had no intention of offending), or upon considerations of prudence of which we could not estimate the weight.”

Lord Strangford, however, was authorized to say, that His Government were ready “to meet confidence with confidence: and again to discuss, with the most sincere desire of coming to a common and friendly understanding, a state of things which was in itself most afflicting to humanity, and which threatened more or less remotely the established tranquillity of Europe.”

In the event of the Russian Government,

manifesting any disposition to come to such an understanding, Lord Strangford was fairly to state the fact of the Greek Protectorate, having been offered to His Majesty, to point out the doubtful game which France was playing, to show the hardship inflicted upon the Greeks by Austria, in her refusing to acknowledge their Belligerent Character, and in her acts of undisguised partiality to the Ottoman Porte, and the consequent difference in opinion on this fundamental point between the British and Austrian Governments. These circumstances were all fairly to be stated, because "when taken together, they constituted that state of extreme difficulty in which the British Government was placed, as to the acceptance of any proposition, which had been, or might be made to it, for a joint interference on the part of the Allies in the then state of Turkish and Greek affairs," the grounds of which difficulty it was right that Russia should fully comprehend.

With respect to the second, notwithstanding the promise given by the Russian Court to Sir Charles Bagot, that, on the evacuation of the Principalities, a Russian Minister should be forthwith sent to the Porte, no Russian Minister had been sent, although one was designated for that Post. So long as Russia believed that England would take part in the Conferences, the assurances that M. de Ribeaupierre

was to repair to the Turkish Capital were renewed from time to time ; but when the British Government declined being a party to those discussions, the Russian Government excused itself for not fulfilling its pledge, that Lord Strangford's arrangement was incomplete, inasmuch as not only the *military status quo*, but also the *civil status quo* of the Principalities, was to be restored before the re-establishment of the Russian Mission at Constantinople.

“ Somewhat inconsistently with these pretensions, the Russian Government also contended that it had, in fact, re-established their Diplomatick relations, by giving to M. Miniciacki a Commission of Chargé d’Affaires.”

But independently of the inconsistency of this argument, the use of which betrayed a consciousness of the weakness of the other, there can be no doubt that the demand for the restoration of the *Civil status quo* was one which had not been before brought forward. For it is quite unaccountable, that “ if the *civil status quo* of the Provinces of Wallachia, and Moldavia, was intended by Russia to be stipulated by Lord Strangford, from the very beginning of his negotiation with the Porte, the Russian Government, which alone possessed a knowledge of the elements, whereof that *status quo* was heretofore composed, and which held some of those elements entirely within its own

“ hands, and at its own disposal, should never
 “ have given Lord Strangford the information
 “ respecting the internal state of those Pro-
 “ vinces, with which he was necessarily unpro-
 “ vided, and should never have declared its
 “ readiness to contribute towards the required
 “ settlement, the means of which were exclusively
 “ in its own power. The rule of the civil con-
 “ ditions of the Provinces was recorded in
 “ Turkish Instruments, of which Russia and
 “ the Porte only, and in Russian Instruments,
 “ of which Russia alone, had cognizance ; and
 “ the Agency by which that rule has been ac-
 “ customed to be maintained was a Russian
 “ Agency.

“ How was it possible, therefore, for Lord
 “ Strangford to have imagined that the task was
 “ imposed upon him of stipulating for a state
 “ of things of which he had not sufficient know-
 “ ledge to be able to define it ; which the Porte
 “ had not within itself the means of completing
 “ in all its parts ; and towards the establishment
 “ of which Russia, who alone, possessed both the
 “ knowledge and the means, did not offer to
 “ contribute either the one, or the other ?

“ But although the case was thus clear be-
 “ tween Russia on the one side, and the Bri-
 “ tish Government on the other, the latter had
 “ no wish to seek a triumph in argument, or to
 “ evade the fulfilment not only of any engage-

“ments which Lord Strangford could be supposed, however erroneously, to have contracted; but of any reasonable demand of Russia which should be made in the spirit, and “with a view to the maintenance, of peace.”

The British Government were therefore willing to bring forward this new demand, on the condition that Russia would give every facility in her power towards the re-establishment of this *civil status quo*, and that she would renew her pledge to despatch M. de Ribeaupierre forthwith to Constantinople so soon as the consent of the Porte to the *civil status quo* should have been obtained.

Mr. Stratford Canning, who, as Ambassador to the Porte, departed about the same time with Lord Strangford, was instructed to sound the disposition of the Turkish Ministers as to this one demand; but “he was not to take up the “burden which Lord Strangford had laid “down,” of advocating any other Russian interests or demands, at Constantinople.

On Lord Strangford's arrival at St. Petersburg, he found the minds of the Emperor of Russia and his Ministers in a state of great exasperation with His Imperial Majesty's Continental Allies, towards whom the Russian Ministers maintained the most determined reserve. They, however, manifested no unequivocal symptoms

of an inclination to come to a separate understanding with the British Government.

Count Nesselrode frankly avowed, that "it would be impossible to enter upon the great work of restoring peace in the Levant, unless a perfect understanding were established, between England and Russia. That the question lay entirely in their hands."

Notwithstanding, however, this language of the Emperor and his Ministers, Lord Strangford proposed to Count Nesselrode a plan for a joint intervention, at Constantinople, to which Austria, France, and Russia, were to be parties. At the time that this proposition was made, the Emperor had left St. Petersburg; and reached the Southern Provinces of his dominions. The proposal was referred to His Imperial Majesty's consideration; but before it came into his hands, he expired of a fever at Taganrog, a small Town, on the Sea of Azof.

The news of this fatal event arrived in England, but a very short time after the account of Lord Strangford's overture. As soon as the knowledge of the latter reached Mr. Canning, he at once publicly disavowed the measure; and when he was informed of the death of the Emperor, Lord Strangford was instructed to abstain from any further interference in Greek Affairs, except to declare to Count Nesselrode, the disposition of the British Government to

have a separate understanding with Russia upon the subject.

Mr. Stratford Canning left England for Constantinople towards the end of October. From the period of Lord Strangford's departure from the Turkish Capital, in the October of the preceding year, there had been only a British Chargé d'Affaires at the Porte. The absence of the British Ambassador at Constantinople had not, however, been either "accidental or unde-
"signed."

Lord Strangford had conducted to a successful termination the negotiations with the Porte, with which he had been charged by his Sovereign, on the part of the Russian Government. This termination was not, however, followed by the promised re-establishment of the Russian Mission. It would not have been possible for Lord Strangford "to have continued at the
"Porte, after the failure of the engagements of
"which he had been the organ. Neither would
"it have been fitting for his Lordship to have
"returned there, either to resume discussions,
"which had ended so much less satisfactorily than
"he had a right to expect, or to create distrust
"by declining to resume them."

To afford time for the settlement of the remaining point of dispute between Russia and Turkey, through M. Minciacky, was one of the motives for postponing the moment for Mr.*

Stratford Canning's repairing to Constantinople.

Another motive for this delay, " was the step
 " resolved upon by the Four Great Continental
 " Powers in the Conferences of the preceding
 " year at St. Petersburg, — a step in which
 " England did not concur, in which therefore
 " Her Ambassador did not participate, and
 " which it was on that account desirable to
 " leave to be executed in his absence.

" England declined participating in that mea-
 " sure, not from any unwillingness to do any
 " thing in her power, towards producing a settle-
 " ment of the troubles, which agitated Greece,
 " and towards establishing such an arrangement
 " between the Greeks and their late Masters as
 " would combine the fair interests of both parties,
 " and secure from interruption the general peace
 " of Europe. But the British Government en-
 " tertained no hope of such a result from pro-
 " positions, which had been discredited, even
 " before they were brought forward by a pre-
 " mature publication of the basis on which they
 " were to rest, and by the consequent expres-
 " sion, by both parties to whom they were to be
 " tendered, of their entire determination to re-
 " ject them.

" The British Government entertained no
 " hope of good from a co-operation of which (as
 " appeared to the British Government) those

“ who undertook it had neither defined the limits
 “ nor adjusted the principles, nor taken into
 “ consideration the consequences which were
 “ likely to result from its failure.

“ Had a British Ambassador been present at
 “ Constantinople when the joint propositions of
 “ Austria, Russia, Prussia, and France, for an
 “ intervention, between the Ottoman Porte and
 “ the Greeks, were brought forward, it cannot
 “ be doubted that the unfavourable reception of
 “ these propositions by the Porte, would have
 “ been ascribed, by some at least, if not by all
 “ these parties, to the advice or intrigues of the
 “ British Mission.

“ On the other hand, the Porte itself would
 “ hardly have believed that the British Amba-
 “ sador was there at his Post, in a state of absolute
 “ inactivity — a mere impartial observer — and
 “ it would either have suspected him of insti-
 “ gating others to measures of which, for some
 “ unavowed reason, he was not permitted openly
 “ to share the responsibility ; or, if he had been
 “ tempted to explain the reason of his abstinence,
 “ from participation in the proceedings of his
 “ Colleagues, the Porte would in all probability
 “ have conceived a false, or exaggerated notion,
 “ of the extent of the division between the
 “ Allies, and would have construed a difference
 “ of opinion as to the means of attaining a com-

“ mon object, into a diversity of views ‘as to the’
 “ desirableness of the object itself.

“ The British Government would have re-
 “ joiced, if the efforts employed by the Repre-
 “ sentatives of the Allies at Constantinople (un-
 “ assisted by those of Great Britain) had achieved
 “ the purpose to which they were directed ; but
 “ having no hope of such success, the British
 “ Government was naturally desirous to mark
 “ to the Porte and to the World, both that it
 “ was no party to the attempt, and that it was
 “ in no degree responsible for the failure.”

When these reasons no longer existed for the
 absence of a British Ambassador from Constan-
 tinople, Mr. Stratford Canning was instructed *
 to proceed thither, and to endeavour to regain
 that same influence and credit with the Divan,
 if it should so happen that they had been lost,
 which the British Ambassador once enjoyed ;
 and for this purpose he was frankly to explain
 the views and policy of his Government—to point
 out its sincere endeavour to enforce that system
 of Neutrality which it had proclaimed, notwith-
 standing it could not be denied that it had been
 contravened by some individual subjects of His
 Majesty.

With respect to the great question of the
 Contest between the Porte and the Greeks,

October 12, 1825.

the British Government earnestly and anxiously hoped that it was yet "susceptible of being brought to a conclusion on equitable terms by an amicable mediation."

The British Government would not, however, then "offer its mediation, because it knew that it would be refused, but if asked by either party it would be offered to the other—and if accepted, the British Ministry would not despair, difficult as the task might appear, of rendering essential service to both.

"There were not wanting reasons which should induce the Porte to reflect seriously upon its situation and prospect in this struggle. A War with Russia could not be matter of indifference to Turkey; and yet surely the Porte could not be ignorant, with what difficulty, with what compulsive and laborious perseverance the Russian Government and Nation (the Government through the influence and persuasion of its Allies, the Nation through the really pacifick disposition of its Sovereign) had been kept quiet, and prevented from crying out for war with their antient and natural enemy, and in behalf of a Nation professing the same religion with themselves."

War once commenced would probably have spread through Europe; but there "was not that Nation in Europe which would side with

“ the Porte against the Greeks, however little
 “ desirous might be any of them to assist the
 “ aggrandizement of Russia at the expence of
 “ Turkey, and however anxious all of them
 “ to restore Peace and to preserve the settlement
 “ of Europe undisturbed.

“ This was not the language of intimidation —
 “ it was that of truth. The influence of England,
 “ whatever that might be, would continue to be
 “ exerted with Russia, to encourage the forbear-
 “ ance of the Emperor, and to discountenance
 “ the warlike propensities of his subjects.

“ But every success of the Turkish Arms
 “ would render the Greeks more and more ob-
 “ jects of compassion, and every failure would
 “ contribute to place Turkey in the light of a
 “ more tempting and easy prey.”

The British Ambassador was to urge these arguments upon the Divan, to induce it to
 “ think of the pacification of Greece.”

Great Britain did not “ obtrude her Services —
 “ did not insist that they should be exclusive ; but
 “ she was at that time free from all engagements
 “ with other Powers, direct or constructive, with
 “ respect to the affairs of Turkey and Greece.

“ The opportunity was, therefore, one of
 “ which the Reis Effendi might, if he thought
 “ fit, take advantage, to open himself to the
 “ British Ambassador, without apprehension that
 “ that confidence would be communicated to any

“ but the British Government. How long the
 “ opportunity might last events only could de-
 “ termine.

“ It was for the Turkish Government to con-
 “ sider, whether they would profit by it in time,
 “ or risk the loss of it for ever.”

Furnished with these Instructions, Mr. Stratford Canning proceeded on his journey towards Constantinople. When he arrived at Corfu he found the affairs of the Greeks had considerably retrograded, since the request had been made to the English Government to assume the Protectorate of Greece. “ Continued struggle and exhaustion had,” as Mr. Canning had anticipated, “ brought the Greeks to a more rational and tractable state of mind ;” and Mr. Stratford Canning, as he was passing up the Archipelago, received a visit from the leading Member of the Greek Provisional Government, who informed him that the Greeks were anxious to end their disputes with the Porte, by a friendly settlement : furthermore, they stated that they were empowered, to request, for this purpose, the good offices of the British Government, whose aid, they would rather obtain than that of any other European Government. They still, however, demanded absolute Independence ; but on Mr. Stratford Canning informing them, that he could not suggest to the Porte any arrangement of which entire Independence was the foundation ;

the Deputation observed, that they might shortly be entrusted with a wider discretion by their Government, as to the conditions, to which the Greeks would consent to submit.

They hoped, therefore, that the Ambassador would not refuse to receive any further communications, which they might be authorized to make. With this request, Mr. Stratford Canning expressed his willingness to comply.

While these transactions were being carried on in the Archipelago, the news of the death of the Emperor Alexander excited dismay in every quarter of Europe, except in Greece. It was generally known, that it had been owing to the really pacifick disposition of that Monarch, that war had not been before declared against Turkey; and how long that event might now be postponed, with the Grand Duke Constantine at the head of the Russian Empire, no man could with certainty predict. To the surprise, however, of all Europe, that Prince, in adherence to an agreement into which he had entered during the lifetime of his brother, renounced his right to the throne.

Previously to the receipt at St. Petersburg of this renunciation, which was dated from Warsaw, Nicholas had taken the oaths of fidelity to his Brother. But when Constantine's determination became known, Nicholas, having read the docu-

ment to the Senate, consented to mount the Throne of his Fathers.

The Army were accordingly called upon to take the Oath of Allegiance to the new Emperor; when the plot which has already been mentioned, to establish a Constitutional form of Government, exploded, in the form of a mutiny, under the pretence of setting Constantine on the Throne. The rebellious Troops were however soon put down, but not until those Regiments who had taken the oath of fidelity to Nicholas, had engaged them, and killed upwards of two hundred of the Mutineers. These insurrectionary movements were not confined to the Capital; but the attempts, of a like nature, which were elsewhere made, met with a similar fate.

While the European Government were watching with intense interest these internal commotions in the Russian Empire, they were more than satisfied with the declared intentions of Nicholas, as to the course of external policy, which he meant to adopt.

“ Called to inherit the dominions of the Emperor Alexander, the Emperor Nicholas likewise inherited,” said Count Nesselrode in a Circular to the Diplomatick Body at St. Petersburg, “ the principles which directed the policy of his August predecessor, and professed the same respect, for all rights consecrated by existing Treaties, and the same attachment to the

“ maxims which ensure the general peace, and
 “ the bonds which subsist between the Powers.

“ But it was not long before a new and im-
 “ portant light was thrown upon these first pro-
 “ fessions of Nicholas, which gave to his declar-
 “ ation, that he was determined to follow in all
 “ things the policy of His late Imperial Brother,
 “ a much less cheering colour than that in which
 “ it originally appeared to other Powers.”

The Emperor Alexander had been led to ex-
 pect that “ an impression would be made on the
 “ Ottoman Ministry by the joint representation
 “ determined upon at the Greek Conferences, at
 “ St. Petersburg, whereby the Porte would be
 “ brought to reason, and the fate of Greece be
 “ placed in the hands of the Alliance.”

Those, however, who had encouraged the ex-
 pectation, probably never themselves entertained,
 a real hope of any such result. For, “ so little
 “ pains did Prince Metternich take,” during a
 visit which he made to Paris in the preceding
 Spring, “ to disguise this fact, that the facility,
 “ and almost dupery of the Emperor Alexander,
 “ became matter of common talk in that Metro-
 “ polis ; a talk which, being faithfully reported
 “ to His Imperial Majesty, by His Ambassador
 “ at Paris, contributed more perhaps than the
 “ subsequent, foreseen, and inevitable failure of
 “ the steps taken by the several Missions of
 “ the Allies at Constantinople to irritate the

“ feelings of the Emperor, to destroy his confidence in his Allies, and to throw him back upon Himself in that temper of gloomy abstraction in which,” it appeared by the declarations of the Russian Government after the accession of the New Emperor, “ He had resolved upon immediate War.”

The avowed determination therefore of Nicholas to follow, “ in all things,” the course of policy resolved upon by his Predecessor, was in fact no other than an avowal, that he would have recourse to “ immediate War.” For whether this resolution was really taken by the late Emperor, or not, it was quite clear that the line which Nicholas intended to pursue, was that which he, or his Minister, described as the line upon which Alexander had resolved. His Imperial Majesty’s own construction of his words was “ neither reluctant nor ambiguous. For he fairly confessed, that unless his Allies came effectually to his aid, He must look to the employment of his own resources. If, therefore, a crisis had arrived in this question, even before the death of the Emperor Alexander, it was a crisis, to which that fatal event by no means put an end. Deference to the alleged intentions of Alexander, afforded to his Successor, an excuse for war, while the untoward events of the new Reign” were only calculated

to aggravate the necessity, " of finding employment for the Russian Army.

" The situation of affairs in that Country might probably be felt to be, one, in which tranquillity at home would least surely be preserved by peace abroad, if the maintenance of that external peace was, in reality, as offensive as was supposed to the feelings of the Russian Nation."

Doubtful, however, as the chance seemed to be of preserving Peace between Russia and the Turks, Mr. Canning did not relax in his efforts " to induce the Emperor of Russia to forego, or " at least to suspend, his appeal to Arms."

He proposed, therefore, to the Duke of Wellington (whose Rank in Russia was of the highest grade) to convey to the Emperor Nicholas His Majesty's congratulations on His Imperial Majesty's accession to the Throne of Russia; and, at the same time, to take advantage of the opportunity which the Duke's access to the Emperor and His Ministers, would afford for ascertaining the real views of the New Emperor with respect to the affairs of Turkey and Greece; and for endeavouring to come to some confidential understanding, with the Court of St. Petersburg, on that subject.

To save Greece, through the agency of the Russian Name upon the fears of Turkey, *without War*, (which the Duke was the fittest man to

deprecate) was the object, at which Mr. Canning aimed.

The Holy Alliance, which for some months previously to the death of Alexander, had virtually ceased to exist, was *de facto* extinguished by the demise of one, and that one, the most powerful, of the Signing Parties. Alexander could never understand, why he was not to be trusted by his Allies, to settle Greece, as he had before trusted Austria to settle Naples, and France to settle Spain. In principle, indeed, His Imperial Majesty's Allies, except England, who had denied the principle on which the Alliance justified its interference, must have admitted that he had the right to interfere, and an undeniable claim to be trusted; and if His Imperial Majesty had his moments of enthusiasm, and paroxysms of ambition, the darling object of his mind, seemed to have been, till a short time before his decease, "not so much to liberate Greece, as to do that work as the instrument of the Alliance." But since the politicks of the New Emperor "were more likely to be Russian than Cosmopolitan;" and the language of the Russian Government and its Agents, teemed with "terms of bitterness and contempt for the delusive and worn-out policy of Austria, it was more than probable that Russia would be prepared to receive any overture from the Duke on the footing of perfect confidence."

The object of the Duke's overture was to be, if possible, to prevent Russia from going to war with Turkey. But, since it would have been "idle to imagine that the warlike disposition "natural enough in a young Monarch, who "found himself suddenly placed at the head of "800,000 men, and fostered by many concurrent "considerations, both of sentiment and policy, "could be diverted from its straight forward "course, by general recommendations to cultivate peace, and tranquillity," it became necessary, if those dispositions were to be restrained, to have recourse to other methods of persuasion more potent than advice.

It was obvious, therefore, that the only means to which recourse could be had, to prevent His Imperial Majesty's resorting to this last extremity, were to give him well founded hopes of accomplishing his purpose without it.

Fortunately the time had arrived when circumstances had enabled Mr. Canning to entertain earnest hopes of bringing this long pending, and much agitated question, to a final, and satisfactory settlement.

That one of the parties, who had before most vehemently protested against compromise, had now applied for British Mediation, and had indicated a disposition to be content with something short of unqualified Independence.

Here was that ground for hope which Mr.

Canning never would have pretended to have felt, if he had not conscientiously entertained it.

The Duke of Wellington was therefore * instructed "to offer the single intervention of "Great Britain, between His Imperial Majesty "and the Porte, on the one hand, and between "the Porte, and the Greeks on the other;" which intervention Mr. Stratford Canning had previously been instructed to propose to the Ottoman Porte.

The result of the execution of these instructions was not, at the time of the Duke's departure for Russia, known in England.

Lord Strangford's proceedings at St. Petersburg were certainly calculated to increase the chances of failure, if the report of them should have reached Constantinople before Mr. Stratford Canning, or before he was apprized of their disavowal by his Government; since they would have destroyed that singleness of position, upon which mainly, if not solely, rested the hope that our overture would be well received.

On the other hand, if Mr. Stratford Canning's arrival should have preceded that report, or if he should have been enabled to destroy its impression, by declaring that his Government had distinctly and publicly disavowed these proceedings, there was yet a hope that the Turkish

February 10th, 1826.

ministry might catch at the single mediation of Great Britain, as the last chance of avoiding hostilities with Russia.

For “the Turks were sufficiently well informed of all passing events in Europe, to be aware that the patience of the late Emperor of Russia had been at length wearied out; and that the commencement of the War had only been intercepted by that event, which had devolved his power and his projects into younger and more enterprising hands.”

It was necessary however to be prepared for either alternative, of acceptance or rejection of the proffered mediation.

“If the overture should have been favourably received, it was not too much to hope that the issue of it would be more or less patiently expected at St. Petersburg.”

If however it should have been rejected, the question then was, What could we interpose to prevent the Emperor of Russia declaring War?

In the case of the rejection it was suggested to propose to Russia the renewal of a similar offer at Constantinople, avowedly with the knowledge of the Russian Government. But if Russia should propose to join Herself with England at once in the offer of intervention between the Turks and the Greeks, Great Britain had no objection whatever to such a proposition if the Turks were willing to accede to it.

But the British Government was not to be committed to the acceptance of it, without the previous consent of the Turks; lest their refusal of it, should be “assumed by the Emperor of Russia, as a ground of offence, and as a cause of War.

“In either of the two cases of separate, or joint intervention, it was not to be admitted, or allowed to be taken for granted, that the failure of either would confer on Russia a right of War against Turkey.”

Such right was not given by the Treaties whereby Russia had authority to interfere. They only conferred on Her, as a Friendly Power, that privilege which she was to exercise through Her Minister at Constantinople in defence of Rayahs living in obedience to the Porte.

Other causes of purely Russian quarrel England never could allow to be a justification of Russian hostilities against Turkey: since most of these grievances had been redressed, and enough did not remain to warrant so fearful an extremity.

“A War therefore by Russia against the Porte, on any other account than that of the Greeks, would be a War of ambition and conquest; and it was not with respect to a War of that nature that England could take counsel with Russia; or could do otherwise than

“ dissuade, and deprecate it, and point out, in
 “ frank though friendly language, the wide and
 “ disastrous consequences to which it must in-
 “ evitably lead.

“ In this language, when addressed to Russia,
 “ there was nothing inconsistent with that
 “ which Mr. Stratford Canning had been di-
 “ rected to address to the Porte, to warn that
 “ Government of the impending hostilities of
 “ Russia. That warning was founded on facts,
 “ of which the existence was unquestionable ;
 “ but the disposition to make war, and the
 “ right to make it, are different things, and the
 “ prognostication of an Act of violence by one
 “ party, as likely to be consequent upon any
 “ particular line of conduct in another, does not
 “ imply any approbation of that Consequence
 “ when it may actually occur.

“ In either of the two cases of mediation in
 “ question, the Duke was not to revive the dis-
 “ cussion respecting the re-establishment of the
 “ Russian Mission at Constantinople.

“ In the first case—that of the offer of our
 “ separate intervention—it could not then be
 “ properly demanded ; since that separate in-
 “ tervention had in fact begun in the absence of
 “ a Russian Minister.

“ In the second case—that of the offer of a
 “ joint mediation by England and Russia pre-
 “ viously consented to by the Porte—there might

“ perhaps be in strictness a right to require as a
 “ preliminary the mission of M. de Ribeau-
 “ pierre, or of some one in his stead, to Constan-
 “ tinople.

“ But as it was highly desirable to avoid
 “ encouraging any proposal for the renewal of
 “ the conferences of the preceding year, and for
 “ England’s accession to them, it might be better
 “ not to bring forward a demand, which would at
 “ once disincline Russia from the acceptance of
 “ the plan which the British Government wished
 “ her to accept, and might suggest to others the
 “ revival of that of which it wished to avoid not
 “ only the adoption, but even the discussion.

“ It was to be hoped that the renewal of the
 “ conferences would not be proposed by any
 “ one. No Power except Prussia had recently
 “ adverted to it, as within the scope of reason-
 “ able expectation. But Prussia, having no
 “ contact with Turkey, and no intercourse
 “ with Greece, had no more interest than any of
 “ the remotest Powers of Europe, in the question
 “ at issue.

“ The object of the British Government was
 “ to avoid the fruitless and perplexing process of
 “ a conference; and for this end there was per-
 “ haps no more convenient mode than by mul-
 “ tiplying the conditions, which alone would
 “ induce the British Ministry to allow a British
 “ Plenipotentiary to attend.”

The Conditions, which Great Britain had already invariably required were,

“ 1st, The complete re-establishment of the
“ Russian Mission at Constantinople.

“ 2d, An abjuration, by all parties concerned,
“ of any employment of force, against either
“ Greeks or Turks.

“ To these were then to be added,

“ 3d, An abjuration by all and each of the
“ intervening Parties, of any views of aggran-
“ dizement, or peculiar advantage to be derived
“ to themselves either from the success, or the
“ failure, of the intervention.

“ But if Great Britain further insisted, as it
“ was but reasonable to do, that the King of
“ the Netherlands, the Maritime Power next
“ in importance in Europe to England and
“ France, should likewise be invited to take
“ part in any Conference, to be held on a ques-
“ tion so nearly touching maritime interests:
“ and further, if She required (as had been
“ already proposed by Prince Metternich),

“ 4th, That the seat of the Conference should
“ be London: the result would probably be
“ either that the proposal would be got rid of
“ altogether through the separate objections of
“ different Powers to the several Conditions
“ annexed to it; or that if, contrary to all ex-
“ pectation, all Parties should waive their ob-
“ jections, for the sake of obtaining British co-

“ operation, the British Government would at
 “ least afford that co-operation on their own
 “ terms.

“ England would then go into a Conference,
 “ wholly different in character from those against
 “ whose decisions she had twice had to protest,
 “ in the face of the World ; and the British Mi-
 “ nisters would have an account of the prin-
 “ ciples, and intentions of that Conference to
 “ render, which might be rendered without dis-
 “ guise not only to the Parties whose interests
 “ were discussed, but to the British Parliament,
 “ and Nation.

“ It could not be supposed, it was in truth
 “ utterly hopeless — that such a Conference
 “ would be able to settle the disputes of Tur-
 “ key and Greece. But it would have a better
 “ chance of doing so than a Conference con-
 “ sisting of five Powers, of whom one (Russia)
 “ would be in a state bordering on hostility to
 “ the Turks ; another (Austria) virtually and
 “ in conduct their Ally ; the third (France) in-
 “ volved in complicated intrigues, alike with
 “ Greece and with Egypt ; the fourth (Prussia)
 “ only either the instigator, or the abettor of
 “ violent Counsels in Russia ; and England
 “ paralyzed in her endeavours to do good by
 “ the conflicting interests and passions of her
 “ Allies.

“ Dismissing, therefore, the notion of a Con-

“ference,” Mr. Canning reverted to the consideration of a confidential concert between Great Britain and Russia.

In such concert there was little or no difficulty to be apprehended from the Greeks.

“They had already thrown themselves upon the aid of England so confidently, that She had only to name the terms of her interference. If, therefore, Mr. Stratford Canning’s attempt at separate intervention should have failed, it was unlikely that in their then, or in any thing like their then state, they would reject the only remaining hope of extrication from their dangers, by refusing to admit Russia into the Mediation.”

But if the offer of the joint intervention of England and Russia should be rejected by the Porte, the next point to be considered was, what course England would adopt herself, and what she would recommend to Russia to pursue?

“In solving this question,” said Mr. Canning, “it was necessary to ask, however England might deny the right of Russia to go to War, what probability there was of preventing it?”

Prevention could only be effected,

“1st, Either by a Combination with Austria and France, or,

“2d, By the single admonition of Great Bri-

“tain to Russia, that she would not see the
“ Turkish Power destroyed.”

As to the first mode, France had distinctly avowed that She could not tolerate a division of Turkey like that of Poland, by which Russia and Austria should alone be the sharers.

Austria too feared hostilities between Russia and Turkey.

But both France and Austria might be looking to become partakers in the Spoils, and their opposition might cease so soon as Russia was successful.

Thus the task of resistance to Russia would devolve on England alone; and if the Sultan's throne were laid prostrate, England might be involved in war, not only with Russia, but with the other Continental Powers.

As to the latter mode,

Would it be sound policy for Great Britain singly to undertake the defence of the Porte? and would Her Government have been supported by Parliament in such a war, Russia espousing (as in that event she would) the cause of the unhappy Greeks?

In 1791 the Parliament refused to interpose to arrest the progress of Russia towards Turkey, and that before the struggles of the Greeks for their Independence had excited the sympathies of the English Publick.

On the other hand, if Russia were to mingle

in the fray, would it be possible for England long to preserve that even-handed neutrality which she had hitherto maintained?

Could she stand by an indifferent spectatress of a conflict, which would probably end in the partition of the Turkish Empire, and in a general contest for the spoils?

“It was therefore,” Mr. Canning thought, “well worth while to consider, whether, in the hopelessness of avoiding altogether an ultimate participation in those consequences, the British Government might not, in perfect consistency with the principles which it had thus far professed, take some active measure, which by restraining the excesses of the existing War, between Turkey and the Greeks, might force upon the former that disposition to accommodation, which would afford the best, if not the only chance of producing a change in the warlike counsels of the Russian Emperor.”

Circumstances indeed both suggested and justified such a measure.

In the month of October preceding, when Prince Lieven made the first overture to renew on the part of his Government the Communications on the subject of Greece, which had been for a season wholly suspended, he at the same time informed Mr. Canning, that “before Ibrahim Pacha’s Army was put in motion, an agreement was entered into by the Porte with

“ the Pacha of Egypt, that whatever part of
 “ Greece, Ibrahim might conquer, should be at
 “ his disposal, and that the Pacha’s plan for
 “ disposing of his conquest was, (and was stated
 “ to the Porte to be, and had been approved by
 “ the Porte,) to remove the whole Greek popu-
 “ lation, carrying them off into Slavery in Egypt,
 “ or elsewhere, and to re-people the Country
 “ with Egyptians, and others of the Mahomedan
 “ Religion ! ” :

So monstrous and extravagant a plan, at first,
 appeared to Mr. Canning incredible. But when
 Mr. Stratford Canning’s first accounts from
 Corfu arrived, it appeared that the reports which
 had reached him of Ibrahim’s proceedings,
 tallied in a very remarkable degree with the
 reports which Prince Lieven had previously
 communicated.

“ The earliest operations of Ibrahim Pacha in
 “ the Morea had been carried on with some
 “ appearance of forbearance and consideration :
 “ but whatever might be the cause of the change,
 “ his conduct was no longer the same. If the
 “ statements which had reached Mr. S. Canning
 “ were true, Ibrahim then acted on a system little
 “ short of extermination. No acts of slaughter
 “ in cold blood were reported to have been
 “ committed by him ; but he seemed to spare
 “ no one where the slightest show of resistance
 “ was made ; and there was room to apprehend

“ that many of his prisoners had been sent into
 “ Egypt, as slaves : the children, it was asserted,
 “ being made to embrace the Mahomedan Faith.”

These observations proved beyond a doubt, that a general belief prevailed in the countries adjoining Greece, of the existence of some such plan, as that described by Prince Lieven ; and from various quarters the British Government had recently received repeated allusions to this project, as having been notoriously adopted by Ibrahim Pacha, and the Divan, and as being already in partial operation.

Still, however, considering the qualified terms of Mr. Stratford Canning's statement, the British Ministers “ were not in possession of such
 “ evidence, as would at once justify them in im-
 “ puting this design to the Porte, and acting as
 “ if they admitted its existence.”

Nevertheless, it was material that the opinion of Great Britain upon such a design, if adopted, and attempted to be carried into execution, should be distinctly declared.

Mr. Canning* therefore directed Mr. Stratford Canning, “ if his belief in what he had reported
 “ should not be shaken, to declare in the most
 “ distinct terms, to the Porte, that Great Britain
 “ would not permit the execution of a system of
 “ depopulation, which exceeded the permitted
 “ violences of war, and transgressed the conven-
 “ tional restraints of civilization.

“ The consequences of such a system of
 “ warfare, would be to change, as effectually,
 “ the face of Greece, as that of the Eastern
 “ Empire was heretofore changed by the first
 “ irruption of its Mussulman Conquerors:—
 “ it went to establish, in the very midst of
 “ Christendom, a new Barbary State.

“ The inconvenience which was felt by Euro-
 “ pean commerce, and the disgrace which at-
 “ tached to all Maritime Powers from the exist-
 “ ence of such States on the opposite coasts of
 “ the Mediterranean, were sufficiently known.

“ It had been the policy of England, out of
 “ consideration for the Ottoman Porte, to treat
 “ those Piratical States, rather as independent
 “ Powers, than as Provinces of the Ottoman
 “ Empire. Out of *consideration* for the Porte,
 “ because if England did not treat them as in-
 “ dependent, She must, in abundant instances,
 “ have demanded atonement, and reparation
 “ from the Porte, for their insolence and aggres-
 “ sions.

“ The British Fleet which exacted redress at
 “ Algiers, must, in that case, have been directed
 “ to the Dardanelles.” Mr. Stratford Canning
 was therefore not to let “ the Porte imagine,
 “ that, England could suffer a State of the like
 “ character to be erected anew, under Ottoman
 “ Protection, and to have its seat in Europe.

“ The Porte might take its choice, whether to

“ consider a determination on our part, to prevent the growth of such a State, as a determination with which the Porte had no more concern, and which it was no more interested, nor authorized to resist, than the British expedition against Algiers — or as a direct attack upon its own Sovereignty.

“ The British Government trusted that the Porte would consider it in the former light. But be that as it might, it was the fixed determination of Great Britain, that such new piratical State should not grow up in Christian Europe; — a determination which she could execute by herself, by interposing, if necessary, her maritime power, between the Morea and Egypt.

“ The British Government did not disguise from itself, nor did it intend that the Ambassador should disguise from the Divan, that, by such interposition, the operations of the War in Greece, would be incidentally, but nevertheless, materially affected.

“ That, however, was not the object of Great Britain : the steadiness and perseverance with which she had maintained her neutrality between the Porte and the Greeks, and the measures which she had taken, when necessary, for vindicating it impartially, with either belligerent, were sufficient proofs of the sincerity of this declaration. But the apprehension

“ that such would be the incidental consequence
 “ of a step, to be taken in the pursuit of an
 “ avowed and legitimate object, would not pre-
 “ vent that pursuit.

“ The only means, by which it could be pre-
 “ vented, would be by the Porte disavowing any
 “ compact or connivance with Ibrahim Pacha, to
 “ the effect imputed in the intelligence which had
 “ reached the British Government :” and “ at
 “ the same time a prompt transmission of Orders
 “ to that Pacha, should the plan imputed to him
 “ have been adopted, without the authority, or
 “ concurrence of the Porte, to desist from mea-
 “ sures, of which the Porte might be assured
 “ that Christian Europe would not tolerate the
 “ execution.”

At the same time that the British Ambassador
 at Constantinople was directed to hold this lan-
 guage to the Porte, orders were sent to “ His
 “ Majesty’s Naval Forces in the Mediterranean,
 “ to select an Officer, to proceed to the Port in
 “ the Morea, from which it might be most con-
 “ venient to have personal communication with
 “ Ibrahim, and to represent to him that His
 “ Majesty could not permit the execution of
 “ such a design ; and to give the Pacha distinctly
 “ to understand, that unless he should in a writ-
 “ ten document explicitly disavow, or formally
 “ renounce, if ever entertained, the intention
 “ of converting the Morea into a Barbary State,

“by transporting the population, particularly
 “ Women and Children, to Asia or Africa, and
 “ replacing them by the population of those
 “ Countries, effectual means would be taken to
 “ impede, by the intervention of His Majesty’s
 “ Naval Forces, the accomplishment of so un-
 “ warrantable a project.”

The Pacha was to be allowed one Week, to determine upon his answer ; and no reply was to be considered, as a refusal to comply with the King’s demand.

Of all the Pachas whom the Ottoman Porte had employed to quell the Greek Insurrection, Ibrahim Pacha was the only one whose efforts had been attended with success. Such a check, therefore, upon his proceedings, as the British Government thus intended to impose, was well calculated “to force upon the Porte a disposition
 “to accommodation :” a disposition which was all that was then wanting, to ensure a termination of the contest, — the consummation, which the sympathies of the Russian People and the Russian Monarch made them impatient to secure. Mr. Canning thought, that proving to the Russian Government the sincerity of our desires, to help towards the restoration of peace, would afford the best chance of at least, the suspension of any warlike enterprizes, on the part of that Power against Turkey.

The Duke of Wellington was accordingly em-

powered to make to the Government of Russia
 “ a full confidence of the intentions of his own.”

Furthermore, with respect to the conditions of a settlement between the Belligerents, Great Britain was ready to communicate without reserve with the Court of St. Petersburg, and to give consent for that settlement to be placed under the guarantee of Russia, jointly with France, Austria, and Prussia.

The British Government disclaimed the wish to obtain any accession of territory, or general influence in Greece. While it was its opinion that by the junction of Great Britain with Russia, and by both Belligerents being convinced that these Powers were united and not opposed to each other, the best prospect would be “ afforded of inducing the Greeks to accept such “ terms of accommodation, as it was to be hoped “ Great Britain might induce the Turkish Government to offer.”

When the Duke of Wellington arrived at St. Petersburg, he found the Emperor Nicholas in a very different state of mind from that which Mr. Canning had anticipated. The conspiracy, which had exploded at the time of His accession to the throne, and its extensive ramifications, which had subsequently been discovered, had apparently destroyed all His Imperial Majesty's sympathy for the Greeks, who, whatever might be their wrongs and their

sufferings, were still no other than rebellious subjects.

Accordingly, the Emperor seemed to object to any interference in their favour, as being at variance with his principles. At the same time he declared that he considered it a point of honour, to have no further communication with his Continental Allies.

But, although Nicholas disclaimed all thoughts of war with the Porte, on account of the Greek Contest, he manifested great asperity at the conduct of the Divan, with regard to differences purely Russian ; asserting that Turkey had for the last few years been trifling with Russia, and had pretended to make concessions and comply with demands, while in point of fact She did, neither one nor the other.

It must, indeed, be admitted, that the Turks, in many instances, did not fulfil their *verbal* promises to Lord Strangford ; and since these promises were not recorded in writing, there were no documents to prove that they had really been given — an inconvenience which more than counterbalanced the advantage of the facility with which, from being verbal, they were obtained.

The Emperor therefore felt that the dignity of his Crown required, that the remaining points in dispute should be finally set at rest, without delay ; and he announced his determination,

at oncè, to compel the Porte to concede what Russia had a right to ask, and in good earnest to fulfil the engagements into which she entered.

The Emperor's Ministers, and his people, however, had not changed those feelings of commiseration which they had so lately felt for their unhappy *Co-religionaires*; and it was clear that whatever might be the sentiments of the Emperor, for the moment, the time would come when he would either participate, or, if not, would be influenced by, the general dispositions of those around him.

The Duke of Wellington did not abstain*, therefore, from endeavouring to come to some understanding with the Russian Government, on the Greek question, which, if it were left unsettled, would be sure sooner or later, if the desire for war existed, to be made the pretext for its commencement.

The Emperor, thus pressed, was ready to co-operate with Great Britain, to prevent the execution of the designs to exterminate the Greeks, which were imputed to Ibrahim Pacha, in the event of their being entertained, and not renounced by that Commander, when their renunciation should be required of him.

The Greek question remained in this state for another Month; the Russian Government being

* March 4th, 1826.

occupied in settling the conditions of the New Ultimatum which was to be presented to the Porte, and in ascertaining from the Duke the degree of support which his Government would be disposed to give through its Ambassador at Constantinople, to the demands of Russia. His Grace promised generally the support of the British Ambassador.

On the arrival of Count Lieven, who had been summoned to St. Petersburg for the sake of personal communication with the new Emperor, the Russian Government seemed to return to its original view of the Greek question.

Counts Nesselrode and Lieven lamented that it had been left out in the discussions which had occurred, and in the last demands addressed by Russia to the Porte.

They described His Imperial Majesty, as not having been correctly understood: as feeling deeply for the unhappy fortunes of the Greeks, although his principles prevented him from taking up arms in defence of rebellious subjects.

The Duke of Wellington accordingly judged it prudent, to encourage the idea of the Greek question forming part of the agreement, which he was then arranging with the Count Nesselrode, respecting the assistance to be given by Great Britain in aid of the Russian requisitions to the Porte; at the same time that he bound the Russian Government, not under any cir-

cumstances to extend its support of the Greeks, beyond what the British Government might think expedient.

The result of these proceedings of His Grace was the Signature (April 4. 1826) of a Protocol by the Duke of Wellington on the one side, and Counts Nesselrode and Lieven on the other.

In the preamble of this document* it was stated on the part of Great Britain, that “ His Britannick Majesty *having been invited by the Greeks to interpose his good offices*, for the purpose of reconciling them with the Ottoman Porte; having consequently offered his mediation to that Power, and desiring to concert for this purpose with the Emperor of Russia: and on the part of Russia, that His Imperial Majesty was equally animated with a desire to put an end, by an arrangement conformable to the principles of religion, of justice, and of humanity, to the contest of which Greece and the Archipelago were the Theatre: —

“ The undersigned Plenipotentiaries agreed as follows: —

1. “ That in the event of the acceptance by the Porte of the proffered mediation, the arrangement to be proposed to the Porte should place the Greeks in the following relations to the Ottoman Empire: —

* The original is in French.

“ The Greeks *releveroient de cet Empire*, and
 “ should pay to it an annual tribute, of which
 “ the account should be settled once for all, by
 “ common agreement.”

“ They should have authorities whom they
 “ themselves should choose and nominate: but
 “ over the nomination of whom the Porte should
 “ have a limited controul: —

“ In this state of existence they should enjoy
 “ an entire liberty of conscience and commerce,
 “ and should carry on themselves exclusively
 “ their internal administration.

“ To effect an entire separation between the
 “ Individuals of the two Nations, and to prevent
 “ the Collisions which would be the necessary
 “ consequence of so long a struggle, the Greeks
 “ were to purchase the Property of the Turks
 “ which might happen to be situated on the
 “ Grecian Continent or Isles.

2. “ That if the principle of a mediation to
 “ interpose between Turkey and Greece should
 “ have been admitted, as the result of the steps
 “ already taken for this purpose by the British
 “ Ambassador at Constantinople, Russia should
 “ exert her influence under any circumstances to
 “ promote the success of the said mediation.

“ The manner in which She was to be asso-
 “ ciated in the future negotiations with the Otto-
 “ man Porte, which this mediation would entail,
 “ and the moment she should take part in them,

“ should be determined by common agreement
 “ between the Cabinets of London and St.
 “ Petersburg.

3. “ That in case the mediation offered by
 “ His Britannick Majesty to the Porte should
 “ not have been accepted by that Power, and
 “ whatever should be in other respects the state
 “ of relations of His Imperial Majesty with
 “ the Turkish Government, Great Britain and
 “ Russia should always consider the terms of
 “ the arrangement mentioned in the first Article
 “ of the present Protocol, as the basis of the
 “ reconciliation to be brought about by their
 “ interference, whether jointly or separately,
 “ between the Porte and the Greeks : and they
 “ will seize all favourable occasions to give
 “ weight to their influence with the two Parties,
 “ for the purpose of effecting the same recon-
 “ ciliation on the same base.

4. “ That Great Britain and Russia reserve the
 “ right of adopting in the end, the measures ne-
 “ cessary to settle the details of the arrangement
 “ in question, as well as the limits of the terri-
 “ tory, and the names of the Islands of the Archi-
 “ pelago to which it shall be applicable, and
 “ which it shall be proposed to the Porte to com-
 “ prehend under the denomination of Greece.

5. “ Moreover, that His Britannick Majesty
 “ and His Imperial Majesty would not seek,
 “ either one or the other, any augmentation of

“ territory, any exclusive influence, or any commercial advantages for their subjects, except those which every other nation should be equally able to obtain.

6. “ That His Britannick Majesty and His Imperial Majesty, desiring that their Allies might participate in the definitive arrangements of which the present Protocol contained the outlines, would confidentially communicate it to the Courts of Vienna, Paris, and Berlin, and would propose to them to guarantee in concert with Russia, the final arrangement which would reconcile Turkey with Greece, which arrangement His Britannick Majesty declined to guarantee.”

The agreements contained in this Protocol solved the Problems on the subject of Greece, which, at the time of the Duke of Wellington's departure for St. Petersburg, occupied the thoughts, and excited the anxiety, of the European Cabinets.

The first of which problems was, “ How to prevent the General Peace of Europe from being broken up by a war between Russia and Turkey on the affairs of Greece.”

The second, “ How to bring the Greek question into a train of settlement with the co-operation of Russia, but without affording to Russia opportunities of undue aggrandizement.”

So far, therefore, as the Greek question was concerned, the Mission of the Duke to St. Petersburg completely answered its end.

On the other hand, however, the danger of immediate War, between Russia and the Porte, on purely Russian matters, was more imminent than ever.

In the preceding October, M. Minciacky had presented, by order of Alexander, a protest to the Porte respecting the condition of the Principalities : and the Turkish Ministers had, as before, agreed to remove the cause of the complaints which it contained. But the measures which they took in consequence were not sufficient to satisfy the Russian Ministers, who, as has been before mentioned, prepared a New Ultimatum : this document was despatched to Constantinople, while the Duke of Wellington was at St. Petersburg. The Russian Government had (it must be confessed, somewhat unfairly) gravely discussed the contents of it with His Grace, as if capable of alteration, after the Messenger who bore it had been for two days on his road towards the Turkish Capital.

While these events were passing at St. Petersburg, Mr. Stratford Canning had arrived at Constantinople, and proceeded to execute his instructions with the Porte ; for notwithstanding the facility which the disposition of the Russian Government seemed to afford, for future joint

discussion, Mr. Canning's "preference for separate intervention was not one jot abated."

The news of the death of the Emperor Alexander had at first created the greatest dismay amongst the Turkish Ministers.

The warlike change which had taken place in the mind of Alexander was not then known beyond the immediate circle of his most confidential Counsellors, and his previously pacifick disposition, with which the Turkish Ministers must have been well acquainted, and in which they still trusted, notwithstanding the Protest of the Russian Government in the preceding October, had lulled them into a false security, and had chiefly served to encourage their obstinacy. His death, therefore, appeared to the Divan to destroy their only certainty of peace. But when the declaration of Nicholas, that he intended to adhere in all respects to the policy of his predecessor, and the more than indifference which he appeared to entertain for the Greeks, became known at Constantinople, the fears of the Turkish Ministers subsided, and they relapsed again into their original stubbornness. When therefore Mr. Stratford Canning came with his offer of mediation between Russia and the Porte, and the Porte and its Greek subjects, the offer was directly rejected ; the Reis Effendi asserting that all the matters in dispute with Russia were settled, and that the contest in Greece was a

matter of internal concern in which the interference of a Foreign Nation could not be admitted.

The arrival of the Russian Ultimatum soon however served to convince the Divan that the Emperor Nicholas by no means considered that all matters of dispute were settled between him and Turkey.

That Ultimatum, as given in by M. Minciacky, contained three demands ;

1. That the civil and military *status quo*, of 1821, of the Principalities of Wallachia, and Moldavia, should be restored.

2. That the Servian Deputies, who had been imprisoned by the Sultan should be immediately released.

3. That the Porte should send Plenipotentiaries to the Frontiers of Russia authorized to enter into negotiations with the Russian Plenipotentiaries, on all questions which had been discussed at Constantinople from the year 1816, to the year 1821, in virtue of the Treaty of Bucharest.

If the measures pointed out should not be put fairly into execution, after a delay of six weeks, M. Minciacky intimated his determination forthwith to quit Constantinople ; the immediate consequences of which event, he observed, it would not be difficult for the Sultan to foresee.

At the same time that this Ultimatum was de-

livered in at Constantinople, the Russian Troops on the Pruth were put in readiness to march.

Although the British Government did not admit the Right of Russia to go to War, in support of these demands, it was obvious, that unless Great Britain intended to support Turkey in a War, to submit was the only advice which the British Ambassador could give to the Divan.

Mr. Stratford Canning therefore strongly urged the Porte to concede to the demands of Russia. And his advice was now warmly seconded by the Representatives of France and Austria.

The effect of this Council was, that at the end of six weeks the Reis Effendi notified to M. Minciacky, the Sultan's consent to admit all the terms of the Ultimatum, and immediately to proceed to the execution of them. The Principalities were accordingly forthwith placed on the required footing, the Servian Deputies were liberated, and Hadi Effendi and Ibrahim Effendi were selected to be the Turkish Plenipotentiaries, in the Conferences on the Frontiers. All these concessions were made, notwithstanding that the news received from Greece, before the time allowed for answering the Ultimatum had arrived, was well calculated to inspire the Sultan with confidence.

Missolonghi had fallen, and Ibrahim was undisputed master of the Morea, with the exception of Napoli di Romania.

Missolonghi fell after a gallant defence. 'The garrison, finding their provisions exhausted, and all the means of obtaining supplies being cut off, determined to force their way, by night, through the besieging Army.

The only hope of escape by this means depended on the Turks being taken by surprise; but owing to the base treachery of some individual in the Town, notice was given to Ibrahim of the intentions of the Garrison, and when they sallied forth the Turks were prepared at all points to meet them.

The consequence of this treachery was, that more than half fell in the attempt; while the victorious Turks entered the Town, the wretched inhabitants of which, to escape pollution, and the barbarities of their enemies, had resolved, by blowing up the ground on which they stood, to perish in the ruins. In the confusion, this plan was only partially effected, and the result was, that all the male population above the age of twelve were massacred, and four thousand Women and Children were sent into Slavery in Egypt.

It was after these atrocities had been committed that the application was made, in conformity with the instructions sent from England, by a British Officer to Ibrahim, for a categorical denial of the plan of extermination which was imputed to him. The only answer that he would return was, that he was but a servant of the Porte, and

that to the Porte application must be made if Great Britain wished for information.

When Mr. Stratford Canning, in pursuance of his instructions, made the same enquiries of the Divan, the Reis Effendi refused to give any reply to the remonstrance, on the plea that England had no right to interfere, but, in conversation he distinctly denied the existence of any such barbarous project as had been imputed to his Government.

The acceptance by the Porte of the Russian Ultimatum had only the effect of preventing immediate hostilities. There was, as indeed the terms of the Ultimatum implied, yet another Ultimatum in reserve, the rejection of which by the Porte, if the Porte should resolve to reject it, was likewise to be followed by a declaration of war. M^r. de Ribeaupierre and Count Woronzow, were the Plenipotentiaries appointed to bring forward at Akerman this final Ultimatum. But before the two Effendis, who had been named as Turkish Plenipotentiaries, had left Constantinople, an event occurred, which, as it was calculated, at any rate for a time, to weaken the power of the Sultan, was consequently calculated to make the Russians more peremptory in their demands, and the Porte less able to resist them.

The Janissaries had long been the Masters of Turkey. Dethroning and setting up Her Monarchs at their will, they defied controul, prevented all

reforms likely to benefit the Empire, and, notwithstanding the fanatick valour, with which they were supposed to be endowed, were unable to cope with the more regular Armies of Europe.

The discipline, imperfect as it was, which existed amongst the Greeks, had made that people more than a match for the wholly undisciplined Armies, which, under the command of the different Pachas, the Porte had employed against them. It was not till the forces of Ibrahim, which to a certain degree had been instructed in European exercise, had come in contact with the Greeks, that any decided successes were obtained by a Mussulman Commander.

The Sultan had determined to remedy the evils of this want of discipline, by establishing Corps drilled and exercised in the European manner. In these Corps His Highness had caused great numbers of the Janissaries to be enrolled, and for some time the system went on without exciting any decided symptoms of discontent.

But at last the men broke out into open revolt, and when summoned to return to their duty, refused to do so unless the new regulations were abolished, and the heads of the obnoxious Ministers were delivered to them.

The Sultan had long foreseen, and was consequently not unprepared for this explosion; and, instead of complying with the demands of the

rebels, ordered his other troops to march to their destruction. The conflict was not of long duration ; the Janissaries dispersed in every direction, their barracks were set on fire, those who fled were pursued, and so soon as they were caught, strangled. The executions lasted for some days, and it is computed that scarcely fewer than twenty-five thousand Janissaries fell, either in the engagement, or by the hands of the Executioner.

The Janissaries being thus destroyed, the Sultan continued his efforts for the creation of a new Army ; but the annihilation of the antient though no longer formidable defenders of the Othman Throne, left His Highness for the time without an Army, and thus rendered it the more necessary for him to succumb, before it was too late, to the conditions, which Nicholas might think proper to exact. Perhaps, however, his weakness might not have made his haughty spirit bend, had not the earnest exhortations of the other Powers of Europe, not to expose his Empire to ruin, convinced him that it would be unsafe to reckon upon their assistance for its salvation.

It was under these circumstances that the Turkish Plenipotentiaries were dismissed by their Master, to meet the Russians at Akerman. On the other hand, the demands which the latter were instructed to bring forward, were not such as the Plenipotentiaries themselves expected

could be conceded, by Turkey. But, at the time of the departure of M. de Ribeaupierre and Count Woronzow from St. Petersburg, the affair of the Janissaries was not known.

The Conferences opened in July. The Russian Plenipotentiaries required,

1st. The confirmation of every clause in the Treaty of Bucharest.

2d. The Surrender of the great Islands of the Danube situated opposite to Ismail and Kili, as an unequivocal proof of the desire of the Ottoman Porte to cement the relations of friendship and good neighbourhood with Russia.

3d. The regulation of the internal Government of the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia in the way which Russia pointed out.

4th. That Russia and Turkey should severally retain the Fortresses on the Asiatick Frontiers, which they each, at that time, respectively possessed.

5th. That the Porte should restore the Servians to those privileges and advantages, stipulated for them, in the Treaty of Bucharest, and should arrange with the Servian Deputies the measures necessary for the purpose.

6th. That the Porte should indemnify the Russian Merchants, for their losses by the Barbary Pirates, since 1806.

7th. That the Porte should endeavour, to the utmost of its power, to prevent the Russian

commerce from being impeded by the corsairs of Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli ; but that if the Porte failed in doing so, then She should indemnify the Russian Merchants out of the Imperial Treasury for their losses.

8th. That all the Ships under Russian Colours should have free right to navigate the Black Sea, and to transship goods in the Port of Constantinople.

9th. That the Porte should accept the good offices of Russia for the admission into the Black Sea, of the Flags of Powers friendly to Turkey, who had not yet obtained this privilege.

These demands, notwithstanding their hard nature, were all, with the exception of the fourth and ninth, professed to be founded on concessions, to which the Porte had previously, at some period, agreed.

The effect of those relating to Wallachia, Moldavia, and Servia, was to give Russia more real influence in those Countries than the Porte, under whose nominal Sovereignty they were to remain.

The alteration in the Condition of the Islands in the Danube, was to place Constantinople in the condition of being reduced to a state, if not of famine, at least of great want, whenever it suited the caprice of Russia ; and the proposition respecting the Asiatick Fortresses was certainly any thing but just.

By the Treaty of Bucharest the Russians were bound to restore to Turkey those fortresses which they had "conquered" during the War. The Russian Government maintained that this agreement had been fulfilled, since all which had been taken by force had been restored; those which had been secured by bribery, the Russians held that they were not bound to surrender.

The Turks on the other hand asserted, that Russia was bound to give back all the Fortresses on that Frontier of which she had possessed herself, whether by force or treachery. Accordingly, when the propositions were disclosed at Akerman to the Turkish Plenipotentiaries, they expressed the greatest indignation at them; but having right on their side respecting the Fortresses, and moreover it being a precept of their religion, as has been before mentioned, not to alienate any of the "heritage of the Prophet" in Asia, without at least attempting to preserve it by Arms, they resolutely refused to concede this point.

The Russian Plenipotentiaries, probably thinking that it would not be creditable to their Government to break off the negotiations on a point on which they had not justice in their favour, gave it up, and promised to restore the Fortresses demanded by the Turks.

This being conceded by Russia, Her Pleni-

potentiaries were the more firm in insisting upon their other requisitions ; and the Turkish Plenipotentiaries, having, after the practice of their nation, protested to the very last moment that they would not yield—ended the negotiations by acceding, at once, and entirely, to all the Russian demands.

On the 6th of October the signature of the pacifick arrangements took place. The fear of a War between Russia and Turkey, on purely Russian grounds, being thus to all appearance permanently dissipated, the facilities for carrying into execution the stipulations of the Protocol which the Duke of Wellington had negotiated were consequently much increased. Before, however, this fortunate termination of the conferences at Akerman was known in England, or rather before it had occurred, Mr. Canning had not been inactive. He had learnt from the British Ambassador at the Porte,

1st, The fact before mentioned, that his official efforts to induce the Sultan to accept the mediation of England between Himself and his insurgent subjects had proved unavailing ; and, 2dly, that an unofficial paper of friendly advice, in which he demonstrated to the Divan, that it was in real truth for the interest of Turkey to come to some arrangement with the Greeks, met with no better fate.

The Greeks, on the other hand, turned their

eyes with greater anxiety than ever, towards England ; and their Deputies, who had been told by the British Ambassador when they applied for the good offices of England, and insisted upon unqualified Independence, that he could not suggest to the Porte any arrangement of which entire Independence was the basis, had according to their promise sought and obtained from their Government a wider discretion.

In the month of May following, Mr. Stratford Canning was authorized by the Greek Government to conclude a Treaty of Peace, which, while it provided for the honour and interests of the Greek Nation, and was commensurate with the great efforts which they had made to obtain their freedom, should at the same time satisfy the honour and interests of the Porte. To this end they were willing to make concessions, and to consent : —

1st. To recognize the *Suzerainté* of the Porte : — and

2d. To pay either a Sum of Money once for all, or an annual tribute.

For these concessions they required,

1st. That the Turks should retain neither property nor fortress in Greece.

2d. That the Porte should exercise no influence whatever in the internal administration of Greece.

3d. That all parts of Greece, whatever might

be their then situation, should participate in the Peace.

The Greek Government thought that an Armistice ought to be preliminary to negotiation ; and required the guarantee of Great Britain as a *sine quâ non* condition of their agreement to any terms with the Porte.

In the event of its being considered inexpedient to propose an Armistice, the Greek Government wished that the islands of Patmos and Milo should be declared neutral ; and that to these Islands, all the helpless population of Greece should be removed, and should be under the protection of the British Naval Forces, or under that of the Combined Forces of France and England.

It was after the receipt of this Communication that all further proceedings arising out of the Protocol took place. But the history of those proceedings must be reserved for a subsequent Chapter.

END OF THE SECOND VOLUME.

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